Sophomore. Manual of Readings

Transcription

1 Sophomore Manual of Readings Fall 2016

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3 Sophomore Readings Table of Contents 1. The Pre-Socratic Philosophers 2. Commentary on Book III, Ch. 5 of Aristotle s De Anima; Saint Thomas Aquinas 3. Concerning the Teacher; Saint Augustine 4. The Teacher; Saint Thomas Aquinas 5. The Parson s Tale; Geoffrey Chaucer

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5 1. The Pre-Socratic Philosophers

6 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers The early philosophers whom Aristotle discusses in Book One of the Physics are usually called the pre-socratics. The original writings of these early philosophers have been lost. All we have are quotations and paraphrases from other authors; thus (for example) we speak of the fragments of Heraclitus, meaning the bits of his writing that have been preserved through quotations and paraphrases in other ancient authors. Thales of Miletus (c. 585 BC) 1. All things come from water. 2. The earth rests on water, riding like a ship. 3. The magnet is alive, for it moves iron. 4. All things are full of gods. 5. The moist nature, easily moulded into each different thing, is wont to be formed in various ways. For the part of it which steams away becomes air, and the thinnest part is kindled from air into each aether; while as it settles and changes into slime, water becomes earth. Therefore, Thales declared that among the four elements, water was most causal of all of them. Anaximander of Miletus (c. 575 BC) 1. Anaximander of Miletus, pupil and successor of Thales, said that the principle and element of all things was the infinite and he says that it is not water or any other of the so-called elements, but some other infinite nature, from which come all the heavens and the worlds in them. And the source from which things come to be is also that into which they are destroyed by necessity. For they paid the penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the order of time. [note: the word that infinite translates can also be rendered indefinite or indeterminate ] 2. When he sees the four elements (earth, air, fire, and water) changing into one another, he does not think it right to make any one of them the underlying (nature), but something else besides them. 3. He makes the infinite something besides the elements, rather than air or water, so that other things will not be destroyed by the infinite. For these elements are contrary to one another, inasmuch as air is cold, water is moist, and fire is hot; thus, if one of these were infinite, the others would already have been destroyed. But as it is (he says) the infinite is something other than these, from which they come. 4. The infinite nature is everlasting and does not grow old it is deathless and indestructible. 5. Also (he says) motion is everlasting, and as a result of it the heavens come to be. 6. And he does not think that things come into being by an alteration of the element, but by the separation of contraries which result from the everlasting motion These contraries (hot and cold, dry and moist, and the rest) exist in the infinite and are separated by the motion. 1

7 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers Anaximenes of Miletus (c. 550 BC) 1. Infinite air is the principle from which arise the things that are coming to be, and that are, and that will be, and gods and things divine, and the rest come from its offspring. 2. all things come to be from air, and in turn are dissolved into it. 3. And the differences among substances follow upon the rarity and the density of air. 4. And air is of this kind: when it is of a very even consistency, it is invisible to sight, but it becomes apparent as the result of cold or heat or moisture, or when it is moved. It is always in motion; for things would not change as they do unless it were in motion. It has a different appearance when it becomes denser or thinner; when it is expanded into a thinner state, it becomes fire, and again winds are condensed air, and air becomes cloud by compression, and water when it is compressed farther, and earth, and finally stones when it is even more compressed. 5. (Anaximenes says that) the hot and the cold are not in the substance of things, but are common passions of matter, following upon changes; for the compressed and condensed is cold, while the thin and loose is hot (for example) breath is chilled by being compressed and condensed with the lips, but when the mouth is loosened, the breath escapes and becomes warm through rarity. 6. Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air surround the whole world. Heraclitus (c. 500 BC) 1. It is wise, listening not to me but to reason, to agree that all things are one. 2. This universe, which is the same for all, no god or man has made, but is always and was and is and will be an ever living fire, kindled in measures and put out in measure. 3. All things are exchanged for fire, and fire for all things, just as goods for gold and gold for goods. 4. The changes of fire are, first, sea; half of sea is earth and half is storm cloud. 5. Earth is dispersed as sea water, and is measured in the same proportion as it was before it became earth. 6. The sun is new everyday. 7. It is not possible to step twice in the same river. 8. We step and we do not step in the same rivers; we are and we are not. 9. The cold becomes warm and warm becomes cold; the wet dries and the dry becomes wet. 10. Fire lives the death of air and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, earth, that of water. 11. The same in us are the living and the dead, the awake and the asleep, and the young and the old. For the former having changed are the latter, and again these having changed are the former. 12. Hesiod (the poet) is the teacher of most men. They believe he knew many things, but he did not even know day and night. For they are one. 13. The way up and the way down are one and the same. 2

8 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers 14. Fire is want and satiety. 15. Changing, it rests. 16. Men do not understand how that which is opposed agrees with itself the opposite is useful, and from opposites comes the most beautiful harmony, as in the bow or the lyre. [note: what is here translated as most beautiful may also be rendered backstretched.] 17. War is the father of all, the king of all; and some he has shown to be gods, and others, men. And some he has made slaves and others free. 18. War is common to all. And strife is justice; and all things both come to be and perish through strife. 19. Asses would rather have straw than gold; swine wash themselves in filth, chickens in dust. 20. Corpses should be cast out sooner than dung. 21. Good and evil are the same. Thus physicians, cutting and burning and torturing sick men in every way, yet complain that they do not get as much pay as they deserve from the sick; for what they do is good for diseases. 22. All things are fair and good and right to God; but men think of some as wrong and others as right. 23. Men would not have known the name of justice, had unjust actions not occurred. 24. It would not be better if men were to get all they wish for. Disease makes health pleasant and good; hunger, satiety; and weariness, rest. Parmenides (c. 475 BC) 1. and the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand in hers, and spoke to me these words: Welcome, O youth that comest to my abode on the car that bears thee, tended by immortal charioteers! It is no ill chance, but right and justice that have sent thee forth to travel on this way. Far indeed does it lie from the beaten track of men! Meet it is that thou shouldst learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, as the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true belief at all. Yet none the less shalt thou learn these things also how passing right through all things one should judge the things that seem to be The Way of Truth 2. Look steadily with thy mind upon things afar off as if they were near at hand. Thou canst not cut off being from its hold upon being, neither scattering everywhere in order, nor crowding together. 3. It is all one to me where I begin; for I shall come back there again in time. 4. Come now, and I will tell thee and do thou hearken and carry my word away the only ways of enquiry that can be thought of: the one way, that it is and cannot notbe, is the path of conviction, for it accompanies truth; the other that it is not and that it needs must not-be, that I tell thee is a path altogether unthinkable. For thou couldst not know non-being (that is impossible) nor utter it. 5. For the same thing can be thought as can be. 3

9 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers 6. That which can be spoken and thought is necessarily being, for it is possible for it, but not for nothing, to be; that is what I bid thee ponder. This is the first way of enquiry from which I hold thee back. But I also hold thee back from another way, on which mortals wander, knowing nothing, two-headed; for helplessness rules the wandering thought in their breasts; they are carried along, deaf and blind at once, altogether dazed. Crowds without judgment, who think that to be and not to be are the same, and yet not the same, and for whom the path of all things is backwardturning. 7. For never shall this be proved, that non-beings are; but hold back thy thought from this way of enquiry, nor let custom, born of much experience force thee to cast upon this way a wandering eye or sounding ear or tongue. Rather judge by reason the strife-encompassed proof I have spoken. 8. One way only is left to be spoken of, that it is. And on this way are full many signs that being is ungenerated and imperishable. For it is complete, immovable, and without end. It never was, nor will it be, since it is now, all at once, one, continuous. For what birth wilt thou seek for it, and how and from what did it grow? I shall not allow thee to say or to think from non-being, for it is not to be said or thought that it is not. And if it came from nothing, what need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? Thus it must either be altogether, or not at all. Nor will strength of true belief allow anything ever to arise from non-being, in addition to it being. Wherefore, justice does not loosen the chains and allow it to come into being or perish, but holds it fast. And our judgment on these matters remains here: either it is or it is not; and it has surely been judged, as it must be, to abandon the one way as unthinkable and nameless (for it is no way true), and that the other way is real and true. And how could being at sometime perish? Or how could it come to be? For if it could come to be, it is not. So coming-to-be vanishes and perishing is inconceivable. Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike; nor is there more here and less there, which would prevent it from holding together, but it is all full of being. Thus it is all continuous, for being is right next to being. Moreover, it is immovable within the limits of mighty bonds, without beginning or end, since coming-to-be and perishing have been driven afar, banished by true belief. Remaining the same and in the same place, it rests by itself, and so it remains firmly where it is, for mighty necessity has it in the bonds of the limit that holds it tight on every side. Wherefore, it is not the law that being should be infinite, for it is not in need of anything if it were, it would need all. What can be thought is only the thought that it is. For you will not find thinking without the being about which it is uttered, for there is not, nor will there be, anything else besides being, since fate has chained it so as to be whole and immovable. Wherefore all these are mere names which mortals have given, believing them to be true: coming-to-be and perishing, change of place and alteration of bright color. But since there is a furthest limit, it is bounded on every side, like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere, from the center equally balanced in every direction. For it cannot be somewhat more here or somewhat less there. And neither is there nonbeing, which might keep it from reaching out uniformly, nor can being be more here or less there than being, since it is all unharmed. For being equal on all sides, it reaches out uniformly within its limits. 4

10 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers The Way of Opinion Here shall I close my trustworthy speech and thought about the truth; henceforth learn the beliefs of mortals, listening to the deceitful ordering of my words. For they made up their minds to name two forms, one of which they should not name that is where they have gone astray. They distinguish them as bodily contraries, and assign them marks which they do not share with one another. To the one they give heavenly fire, gentle and very light, and everywhere the same as itself, but not as the other; the other is just the contrary, dark night, a dense and heavy body. The whole ordering of these, as it seems to be, I shall tell thee, so that no mind of mortals will ever surpass thee. 9. And when all things have been named light and night, and the names which belong to the power of each have been assigned to these and to those, everything is full at once of light and dark night, since neither partakes in nothingness. 10. And thou shalt know the substance of the sky, and all the signs in the sky, and the resplendent works of the glowing sun s pure torch, and whence they arose. And thou shall learn likewise of the wanderings of the round-faced moon, and of her substance. Thou shalt know too the heavens that surround us, whence they arose, and how necessity took them and bound them to keep the limits of the stars 11. Thus, according to men s opinions, did things come into being and thus they are now. In time they will grown up and pass away. To each of these things men have given a name to stand for it. Melissus 1. Anything that ever was must always have been and always will be. For if it had come into being, then before its coming-to-be it must have been nothing. But if ever there was nothing it would have been impossible out of nothing for anything else to arise. 2. Well then, since what is real could not have come into being, it not only now is but always was and always will be; and since it has neither beginning nor end it is [temporally] unlimited. If it had come-to-be, then indeed it would have both a beginning and an end a beginning, because its coming-to-be must have occurred at one moment of time rather than another; an end, because what has come-to-be will eventually terminate. Such is not the case, however. It never began and it never will terminate, but always was and always will be, without beginning or end; for it is impossible for anything really to be unless with utter completeness. 3. Not only must it always be [and hence be unlimited in time], it must likewise always be unlimited in magnitude. 4. Nothing that has a beginning and end is either eternal or unlimited. 5. If it were not one, it would be bounded by something else. 6. If it is real it would have to be one; for if it were two, it would be bounded by something else. 7. (A) Accordingly it is eternal and unlimited everywhere alike. As it cannot perish, so it cannot become larger, nor undergo change, nor suffer pain or grief. For if it 5

11 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers suffered any such modifications it would no longer be One. If it were altered in any respect, then necessarily it would not always be like itself; which would mean that something which once was had passed away and that something which once was not had come-to-be. If in ten thousand years it were to change by even so much as a hair s breadth, it would all perish for all time. (B) Even any reordering of it is not possible; for the order which it once had cannot perish, nor can any new order come-to-be. Since there cannot be any increase, nor any perishing, nor any alteration, how could there be any reordering of What Is? If anything at all were to be altered it would involve alteration of the entire cosmos. (C) It does not suffer pain. For a thing in pain lacks full being, and does not have the same power as a healthy thing does of continuing to be. Moreover, if it were in pain it would not always be alike, for to feel pain involves the addition or removal of something, and that would destroy its homogeneity. What is healthy cannot feel pain, for pain is a destroyer of health, and hence a destroyer of being and a producer of not-being. This same reasoning applies not only to pain but to grief as well. (D) There cannot be any emptiness; for what is empty is nothing, and what is nothing cannot be. Accordingly What Is does not move; there is nowhere to which it can go because everything is full. If there were some emptiness a thing could move into it, but since the empty does not exist there is nowhere for a thing to go. This means that neither can the dense and the rare exist; for to be rare is to be less full than to be dense, and is therefore to be comparatively empty. The difference between what is full and what is not full is simply this. If a thing has room to receive anything else into itself, it is not full; but if it has no room to do so it is full. What Is must necessarily be full, since the empty does not exist; and since it is full everywhere it cannot move. 8. If there existed a many, the many existing things would have to be of the same kind as the One is. For suppose there existed, just as we see and hear them, such things as earth and water, air and fire, iron and gold, living and dead, black and white, and all the other different whatnesses which we speak of as existing: then each one of these perceived phenomena would be as it first appeared to us, perpetually just as it was at the first moment, without any alteration whatever. Now in our everyday life we assume that we see and hear and understand more or less rightly; nevertheless we believe that what is warm becomes cool and what is cool becomes warm, that soft things become hard and hard things become soft, that what is living dies and that each new living thing is born out of non-living materials in short, that all things are changed, and that there can be a vast difference between what they formerly were and what they are now. We suppose that evensomething as hard as iron gets worn away a little when rubbed, and we suppose the same of gold, stone, and other things that we regard as relatively durable. We suppose, too, that earth and stone come-to-be out of water. In such ways we show our ignorance of things as they are. Our beliefs are not even consistent with one another. Having accepted many things as eternal and as possessing forms and durabilities of their own, we still imagine that all things undergo alteration, and that they become different from what we see on any given occasion. It follows, then, that we did not see correctly after all, and that we get no true apprehension of the things we believe to be many. For if [the appearances] 6

12 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers were real, they would not change, but each of them would have to [continue to] be exactly such as it first appeared. For nothing is stranger than what is real. In short, if there were any change, then what was has passed away and what wasnot has come-to-be. Consequently even if many things existed they would have to be of the same nature as the One. 9. If anything is, it would have to be one. Thus if something really is, it cannot have body; for if it had body it would consist of parts and hence would no longer be one. 10. If Being were divided it would be in motion, and if it were in motion it would not Be. Empedocles of Acragas (c. 450 BC) 1. Fools! For they have no far-reaching minds who think that what did not exist before comes to be, or that anything dies or is utterly destroyed. 2. For wise men would not conjecture such things as that as long as they live what they call life, so long do they exist, and experience miseries and joys, but that before mortals were fastened together and after they are unfastened, they are then nothing. 3. For it is impossible that anything would come to be from what in no way is, or that being should perish completely this does not come about nor is it heard of. For it will always be there, just where one puts it. 4. There is no birth of any mortal thing, nor end in destructive death, but there is only a mixing and exchange of what has been mixed. Birth, however, is a name given to these by men. [Alternate translation: read nature for birth from the Greek physis.] 5. but they (men), when these have been mixed in any way suited to men, or to the race of wild beasts or bushes or birds of prey, say then that this has been born (has come to be); and when these have been separated, they call it miserable death. They do not name the things rightly, but I also follow the custom. 6. Come now, I will tell you from what came to view all the things we see now: the earth, and the sea swelling up with many waves, and the moist lower air and the titan upper air which binds all things tightly around in a circle. 7. Hear first the four roots of all things: bright Zeus (fire), life-giving Hera (air), Aidoneus (earth), and Nestis (water), who moistens with tears the springs of mortals. 8. Look at the sun, everywhere warm and shining, and at the immortals, steeped in heat and bright light; and at the rain, everywhere dark and cold, and at the earth, from which arise things solid and based on the soil. In hatred, they take on form and are separated; in love, they come together and are desired by one another. From these come forth all the things that were and are and will be, trees, and men and women, beasts, and birds of prey, and fishes nursed and living in water, and the long-lived gods, highest in honor. These alone exist, and as they run through one another, become now this and now that so much are they changed by mixing. 9. As when painters men whom wisdom has given art having taken many-colored dyes with their hands, mix some more and some less in harmony, and from these make forms resembling all things So, do not let your mind be fooled into thinking 7

13 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers that there is any other source of mortal things which appear in such great numbers. Be sure about this for you have heard it from a goddess! 10. the pleasing earth in its broad mold received two of the eight parts of the glittering Nestis and four of Hephaistos. And these became white bone, begotten divinely by the gluing of harmony. 11. The earth, anchored in the ports of Cypris (love), came together with these in about equal measure, with Hephaistos, water, and all-shining upper air, a little more or less than their greater share. And from these came blood and the forms of other flesh. 12. at one time there grew to be only one out of the many; at another time, the many grew apart from the one fire and water and earth, and the immense height of air; and destructive strife apart from these, equal in weight everywhere; and love amongst them, equal in length and width It is she whom we recognize to be inborn in our mortal limbs, she who causes us to think friendly thoughts and reach agreement, as we call her Joy or Aphrodite All these are equal and of the same generation. Each one takes care of its own position by the character belonging to it. And they prevail in turn as time turns. And apart from these, nothing comes to be or ceases to be. For if they kept on perishing; they would no longer be. And what could make the whole bigger? And where would it come from? And where would it perish, since no place is deprived of these things? Rather, these things alone exist, and as they run through one another, become now this and now that, and yet always keep as they are. 13. I shall tell a double tale: at one time it grew from the many to be only one; at another time, it grew apart from the one to be many. There is a double birth of mortals and a double death. The coming together of all things gives birth to and destroys one while, as things are separated, the other grows up and is (then) scattered. And nowhere do these things stop taking place forever: at one time, all things come together by love; at another time, everything is carried away by hatred (strife). Thus, insofar as the one is wont to grow from the many, and again the many spring from the one as it breaks up, so do they come to be and there is no lasting life for them. But insofar as they never stop taking turns, so are they unchangeable within the cycle. 14. Yet when a god was more mixed with god, these things fell in with one another in whatever way they chanced to meet; and many other things besides them continually came to be. 15. There sprang up many faces without necks, arms wandered without shoulder, unattached, and eyes strayed alone, in need of foreheads. Many things were born with two faces and two breasts, offspring of cattle with faces of men, others the reverse, born of men with the heads of oxen, mixed partly from men and partly from women by nature, and adorned with dark limbs. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 450 BC) 1. All things were together, infinite in number and smallness; for the small also was infinite. And, all things being together, nothing was clear because of smallness. Air and aether (upper air), both being infinite, encompassed all things, for these are the greatest in number and size of all things. 8

14 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers 2. (for) there is no smallest of the small, but there is always a smaller (for being cannot cease to be by being cut). But also there is always something greater than the great. And it is equal to the small in number, and each thing in relation to itself is both great and small. 3. These things being so, it is necessary to think that there are many things of all kinds in all compounds, and the seeds of all things, having all kinds of shapes and colors and flavors Before these things were separated, all things were together, and no color was clear. For the mixture of all things prevented (this) of the moist and the dry, the hot and the cold, and the bright and the dark, and of much earth in it, and of seeds infinite in multitude, and nothing like each other. For none of the others are similar, one to the other. These things being so, it is necessary to think that all things exist together in a whole. 4. How could hair come from what is not hair, and flesh from what is not flesh? 5. And since the parts of the large and the small are equal in number, so would all things be in everything, nor can they exist apart, but everything has a share of everything. Since there cannot be a smallest, it cannot be separated, nor come to be by itself; but just as in the beginning, so now all things are together. Many things are in all things, and the things separated into the greater and the smaller are equal in number. 6. The things that are in one world are not divided from one another, not cut off with an ax, neither the hot from the cold nor the cold from the hot. 7. When things have thus been separated, we must know that all things are neither more nor less (for it is impossible that there be more than all things), but all things are forever equal. 8. The Greeks do not rightly accept coming-into-being and perishing. No thing comes to be or perishes, but is mixed and separated from existing things. And thus they would be right to call coming-into-being mixing, and perishing separation. 9. Because of the weakness of our senses, we cannot discern the truth. 10. In everything there is a portion of everything, except of mind; and there are also things in which there is mind. 11. And when the mind began to move things, it was separated from everything; and as much as the mind is moved, all this was separated. As things were being moved and separated, the revolution made them separate even more. 12. things thus revolve and are separated by force and speed. And the speed makes the force. The speed of these things is not like the speed in any of the things which are now among men, but altogether many times as fast. 13. The thick and the moist and the cold and the dark came together where now the earth is, and the thin and the warm and the dry went outwards to the further part the aether. 14. From these things as they separated off, the earth was solidified; from the clouds, water was separated, and from the water, earth. And from the earth, stones were solidified by the cold, and these things rush outward more than water. 15. Other things have a part of everything, but mind is unlimited and self-ruling and is mixed with nothing, but is alone by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with something else, it would have a share of all things (if it were mixed with any); for there is a part of everything in everything, as I said in what went before. 9

15 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers And what were mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would rule over nothing, as it does being alone with itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything, and the greatest power. And mind rules all things which have life, both the greater and the lesser. And mind ruled over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And first it began to revolve from something small, but now it revolves over a greater (distance), and it will revolve over even more. And mind knows all the things mixed together, and those separated off, and those divided. And mind put in order all the things that were to be, and all things that were but now are not, and whatever is now and whatever will be, and this revolution in which the stars and the sun and the moon and the air and the aether go around, after being separated off. This revolution has caused them to be separated. The thick is separated from the thin, and the warm from the cold, and the dark from the bright, and the dry from the moist. There are many parts of many things. Nothing is separated off or divided entirely, the one from the other, except mind. Every mind is similar, both the greater and the lesser. Nothing else is like anything else, but each thing is and was most clearly those things of which it has the most. Democritus of Abdera (c. 425 BC) 1. Nothing can come into being from that which is not, or pass away into that which is not. 2. The first principles of the universe are atoms (indivisible bodies) and space the full and the empty; everything else is merely thought to exist. 3. The atoms are solid, existent, and eternal; the place (or space) in which they exist is empty a nothingness. 4. It is impossible that one thing come from two, or two things from one. 5. If there were no empty space, movement would be impossible, and one thing would not be separate from another. Things are divisible because of the emptiness in them. 6. All differences result from differences among the atoms. And these are of three kinds: differences of shape, of arrangement, and of position. To illustrate: A differs from N in shape, AN differs from NA in arrangement, and Z differs from N in position. 7. The number of shapes (of atoms) is infinite: for there is no reason why an atom would be of one shape rather than another. 8. The atoms move in the infinite void, and, overtaking one another, they collide, and some are scattered, while others, intertwined where their shapes fit together, stay together and thus give rise to the compound bodies which we see. And they cling together until some stronger necessity comes from the outside and breaks them apart. 9. The atoms have always been moving, and always will move; and they move by bumping and knocking one another. 10. By convention, color exists, by convention, bitter, by convention, sweet; but in reality, only the atoms and the void. Men think that there is such a thing as white, black, sweet, bitter, but in truth the universe is composed of thing and nothing. The atoms have no qualities, nor can they in any respect undergo those changes of quality which men believe to happen because they trust their senses. They cannot grow 10

16 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers warm or cold, nor can they become moist or dry, and it is even more impossible that they become white or black; to speak generally, they cannot assume any other quality by any change whatever. 11. The appearances of the various qualities are produced by various combinations of the basic difference mentioned above i.e. by differences of shape, arrangement and position among the atoms. For example, bitter taste is caused by small, smooth, rounded atoms, whose surfaces are actually sinuous; therefore, it is both sticky and viscous; salt taste is caused by large unrounded atoms, but in some cases jagged ones 12. One atom will be heavier than another only when it is bigger. In compound bodies the lighter is that which contains more empty space, the heavier, that which contains less. 11

17 2. Commentary by Saint Thomas Aquinas on Book III, Chp. 5 of Aristotle's De Anima

18 St. Thomas Aquinas Commentary On Aristotle s De anima, Book III, chapter 5 (lectio 10) 728. Postquam philosophus determinavit de intellectu possibili, nunc determinat de intellectu agente. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit esse intellectum agentem, praeter possibilem, et ratione, et exemplo. Secundo ostendit huius intellectus naturam, ibi, et hic intellectus. Ponit ergo circa primum talem rationem. In omni natura quae est quandoque in potentia et quandoque in actu, oportet ponere aliquid, quod est sicut materia in unoquoque genere, quod scilicet est in potentia ad omnia quae sunt illius generis. Et aliud, quod est sicut causa agens, et factivum; quod ita se habet in faciendo omnia, sicut ars ad materiam. Sed anima secundum partem intellectivam quandoque est in potentia, et quandoque in actu. Necesse est igitur in anima intellectiva esse has differentias: ut scilicet unus sit intellectus, in quo possint omnia intelligibilia fieri, et hic est intellectus possibilis, de quo supra dictum est: et alius intellectus sit ad hoc quod possit omnia intelligibilia facere in actu; qui vocatur intellectus agens, et est sicut habitus quidam Huius autem verbi occasione, quidam posuerunt intellectum agentem idem esse cum intellectu qui est habitus principiorum. Quod esse non potest: quia intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum, praesupponit aliqua iam intellecta in actu: scilicet terminos principiorum, per quorum intelligentiam cognoscimus principia: et sic sequeretur, quod intellectus agens non faceret omnia intelligibilia in actu, ut hic philosophus dicit. Dicendum est ergo, quod habitus, sic accipitur secundum quod philosophus frequenter consuevit nominare omnem formam et naturam habitum, prout habitus distinguitur contra privationem et potentiam, ut sic per hoc quod nominat eum habitum distinguat eum ab intellectu possibili, qui est potentia After the Philosopher determined about the possible intellect, now he determines about the agent intellect. And about this he does two things. First he shows by argument and by example that there is an agent intellect beyond the possible [intellect]. Second he shows the nature of this intellect where [he says] "And this intellect." About the first, he posits such an argument: In every nature which is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, it is necessary to posit in every genus something that is just as matter, which, namely, is in potency to all the things which are of that genus. And [it is necessary to posit] another that is just as an agent and productive cause, which in making all things stands just as art to matter. But the soul, according to the intellective part, sometimes is in potency and sometimes in act. It is necessary, therefore, that there be these differences in the intellective soul, so that, namely, 1) there is one intellect in which all the intelligibles are able to come to be, and this is the possible intellect, about which he has spoken above; and 2) there is another intellect for this [reason] that is able to make all the intelligibles in act, which is called the agent intellect, and it is just as a certain habit On the occasion, however, of these words, certain men have posited the agent intellect to be the same as the understanding [intellectus] which is the habit of the principles, which can not be. Since the understanding which is the habit of the principles presupposes other things already understood in act, namely the terms of the principles, through whose understanding [intelligentiam] we know the principles. And thus it would follow that the agent intellect would not make all the intelligibles in act, as the Philosopher here says. It must be said, therefore, that "habit" is here taken in the manner in which the Philosopher is frequently accustomed to name every form and nature "habit", where habit is distinguished from privation and potency, so that by naming it "habit" he distinguishes it from the possible intellect, which is a potency. 1

19 730. Unde dicit quod est habitus, ut lumen, quod quodammodo facit colores existentes in potentia, esse actu colores. Et dicit quodammodo, quia supra ostensum est, quod color secundum seipsum est visibilis. Hoc autem solummodo facit lumen, ipsum esse actu colorem, inquantum facit diaphanum esse in actu, ut moveri possit a colore, ut sic color videatur. Intellectus autem agens facit ipsa intelligibilia esse in actu, quae prius erant in potentia, per hoc quod abstrahit ea a materia; sic enim sunt intelligibilia in actu, ut dictum est Inducitur autem Aristoteles ad ponendum intellectum agentem, ad excludendum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit quidditates rerum sensibilium esse a materia separatas, et intelligibiles actu; unde non erat ei necessarium ponere intellectum agentem. Sed quia Aristoteles ponit, quod quidditates rerum sensibilium sunt in materia, et non intelligibiles actu, oportuit quod poneret aliquem intellectum qui abstraheret a materia, et sic faceret eas intelligibiles actu Deinde cum dicit et hic ponit quatuor conditiones intellectus agentis: quarum prima est, quod sit separabilis: secunda, quod sit impassibilis: tertia quod sit immixtus, idest non compositus ex naturis corporalibus, neque adiunctus organo corporali; sed in his tribus convenit cum intellectu possibili: quarta autem conditio est, quod sit in actu secundum suam substantiam; in quo differt ab intellectu possibili, qui est in potentia secundum suam substantiam, sed est in actu solum secundum speciem susceptam Et ad has quatuor conditiones probandas, inducit unam rationem, quae talis est. Agens est honorabilius patiente, et principium activum, materia: sed intellectus agens comparatur ad possibilem sicut agens ad materiam, sicut iam dictum est: ergo intellectus agens est nobilior possibili. Sed intellectus possibilis est separatus, impassibilis et immixtus, ut supra ostensum est: 730. Whence he says that it is a habit, like light which in some manner makes colors existing in potency to be actual colors. And he says "in some manner" because he has shown above that color in itself is visible. Light, however, makes it to be an actual color only in so far as it makes the transparent to be in act so that it can be moved by color so that in this way the color may be seen. The agent intellect, moreover, makes the intelligibles themselves to be in act, which previously were in potency, by abstracting them from matter. For in this way they are intelligibles in act, as was said Aristotle, moreover, is led to positing an agent intellect in order to exclude the opinion of Plato, who posited that the whatnesses of sensible things exist separated from matter and are actually intelligible, whence there was no necessity for him to posit an agent intellect. But because Aristotle posits that the whatnesses of sensible things exist in matter and are not actually intelligible, it was necessary that he posit some intellect that would abstract from matter and in this manner make them actually intelligible Then when he says "and this...", he posits four conditions of the agent intellect, the first of which is that it is separable; the second, that it is impassible; the third, that it is unmixed, that is not composed out of natural bodies nor adjoined to a bodily organ. But in these three it is like the possible intellect. The fourth condition, however, is that it is in act according to its own substance, in which it differs from the possible intellect, which is in potency according to its own substance, but is in act only according to a received form And in order to prove these four conditions, he introduces a single argument, which is such: An agent is more noble than a patient, and the active principle than the matter. But the agent intellect is compared to the possible just as an agent to matter, as already has been said. Therefore the agent intellect is more noble than the possible. But the possible intellect 2

20 ergo multo magis intellectus agens. Ex hoc etiam patet, quod sit secundum substantiam suam in actu; quia agens est nobilius patiente, non nisi secundum quod est in actu Occasione autem horum quae hic dicuntur, quidam posuerunt intellectum agentem, substantiam separatam, et quod differt secundum substantiam ab intellectu possibili. Illud autem non videtur esse verum. Non enim homo esset a natura sufficienter institutus, si non haberet in seipso principia, quibus posset operationem complere, quae est intelligere: quae quidem compleri non potest, nisi per intellectum possibilem, et per intellectum agentem. Unde perfectio humanae naturae requirit, quod utrumque eorum sit aliquid in homine. Videmus etiam, quod sicut operatio intellectus possibilis, quae est recipere intelligibilia, attribuitur homini, ita et operatio intellectus agentis, quae est abstrahere intelligibilia. Hoc autem non posset, nisi principium formale huius actionis esset ei secundum esse coniunctum Nec sufficit ad hoc, quod actio attribuatur homini per hoc quod species intelligibiles factae per intellectum agentem, habent quodammodo pro subiecto phantasmata, quae sunt in nobis; quia ut supra diximus, cum de intellectu possibili ageretur, species non sunt intelligibiles in actu, nisi quia sunt abstractae a phantasmatibus: et sic eis mediantibus actio intellectus agentis non posset nobis attribui. Et praeterea intellectus agens comparatur ad species intellectus in actu, sicut ars ad species artificiatorum, per quas manifestum est, quod artificia non habent actionem artis: unde etiam dato, quod species factae intelligibiles actu, essent in nobis, non sequeretur, quod nos possemus habere actionem intellectus agentis. is separated, impassible, and unmixed, as was shown above. Therefore all the more is the agent intellect. From this also it is clear that according to its own substance it is in act, since as agent is more noble than a patient only according as it is in act On the occasion of the things which are said here, some posited the agent intellect to be a separated substance and that it differs according to substance from the possible intellect. This, however, does not seem to be true. For man would not be sufficiently constituted by nature, if he were not to have in himself the principles by which he could complete his operation, which is to understand, which [operation] indeed is not able to be completed except through the possible intellect and through the agent intellect. Whence the perfection of human nature requires that each of these be something in man. Also we see that just as the operation of the possible intellect, which is to receive the intelligibles, is attributed to man, so also is the operation of the agent intellect, which is to abstract the intelligibles. This, however, would not be possible unless the formal principle of this action were conjoined to him according to being Nor is it sufficient for this that the action be attributed to man through the fact that the forms [species] made intelligible through the agent intellect have in some manner for [their] subject the phantasms, which are present in us, since, as we said above when treating of the possible intellect, the forms [species] are not intelligible in act except because they have been abstracted from the phantasms. Even with them mediating in this way, the action of the agent intellect could not be attributed to us. And, furthermore, the agent intellect is compared to the forms understood [species intellectus] in act, just as art to the forms [species] of artifacts, through which it is manifest that artifacts do not have the action of art. Whence, even granting that the forms [species] made actually intelligible are in us, it would not follow that we could have the action of the agent intellect. 3

21 736. Est etiam praedicta positio contra Aristotelis intentionem: qui expresse dixit, has differentias duas, scilicet intellectum agentem et intellectum possibilem, esse in anima: ex quo expresse dat intelligere, quod sint partes animae, vel potentiae, et non aliquae substantiae separatae Sed contra hoc videtur esse praecipue, quod intellectus possibilis comparatur ad intelligibilia, ut in potentia existens ad illa; intellectus autem agens comparatur ad ea, ut ens in actu: non videtur autem possibile, idem respectu eiusdem posse esse in potentia et in actu: unde non videtur possibile, quod intellectus agens et possibilis conveniant in una substantia animae Sed hoc de facili solvitur, si quis recte consideret, quomodo intellectus possibilis sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, et quomodo intelligibilia sunt in potentia respectu intellectus agentis. Est enim intellectus possibilis in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut indeterminatum ad determinatum. Nam intellectus possibilis non habet determinate naturam alicuius rerum sensibilium. Unumquodque autem intelligibile, est aliqua determinata natura alicuius speciei. Unde supra dixit, quod intellectus possibilis comparatur ad intelligibilia, sicut tabula ad determinatas picturas. Quantum autem ad hoc, intellectus agens non est in actu Si enim intellectus agens haberet in se determinationem omnium intelligibilium, non indigeret intellectus possibilis phantasmatibus, sed per solum intellectum agentem reduceretur in actum omnium intelligibilium, et sic non compararetur ad intelligibilia ut faciens ad factum, ut philosophus hic dicit, sed ut existens ipsa intelligibilia. Comparatur igitur ut actus respectu intelligibilium, inquantum est quaedam virtus immaterialis activa, potens alia similia sibi facere, scilicet immaterialia. Et per hunc modum, ea quae sunt intelligibilia in potentia, facit intelligibilia in actu. Sic enim et lumen facit colores in actu, non quod ipsum habeat in se 736. The aforesaid position is also contrary to the intention of Aristotle, who expressly said that these two differences, namely the agent intellect and the possible intellect, are in the soul, from which he expressly gives us to understand that they are parts, or powers of the soul and not of some separate substance But against this position seems chiefly to be this: the possible intellect is compared to the intelligibles as existing in potency to them. The agent intellect, however, is compared to them as a being in act. It does not seem possible, however, that the same thing, in the same respect, can be in potency and in act. Whence it does not seem possible that the agent intellect and the possible can come together in the one substance of the soul But this is resolved easily, if one rightly considers how the possible intellect is in potency to the intelligibles, and how the intelligibles are in potency with respect to the agent intellect. For the possible intellect is in potency to the intelligibles just as the indeterminate to the determinate. For the possible intellect does not have determinately the nature of any sensible thing. Each and every intelligible, however, is some determinate nature of some species. Whence he said above that the possible intellect is compared to the intelligibles just as a slate to determinate pictures. To this extent, however, the agent intellect is not in act For if the agent intellect were to have in itself the determination of all the intelligibles, the possible intellect would not need phantasms, but it would be reduced into the act of all the intelligibles through the agent intellect alone and in this way it would not be compared to the intelligibles as the maker to the made, as the Philosopher says here, but as the existing intelligibles themselves [to the intelligibles]. Therefore it is compared as act with respect to the intelligibles in so far as it is a certain immaterial active power, being able to make other things to be similar to itself, namely to be immaterial. And through this manner, it makes 4

22 determinationem omnium colorum. Huiusmodi autem virtus activa est quaedam participatio luminis intellectualis a substantiis separatis. Et ideo philosophus dicit, quod est sicut habitus, vel lumen; quod non competeret dici de eo, si esset substantia separata Deinde cum dicit idem autem determinat de intellectu secundum actum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit conditiones intellectus in actu. Secundo ostendit conditiones totius partis intellectivae, secundum quod differt ab aliis partibus animae, ibi, separatus autem. Circa primum tres ponit conditiones intellectus in actu: quarum prima est, quod scientia in actu, est idem rei scitae. Quod non est verum de intellectu in potentia. Secunda conditio eius est, quod scientia in potentia in uno et eodem, tempore est prior quam scientia in actu; sed universaliter non est prior, non solum natura, sed neque etiam tempore: et hoc est, quod philosophus dicit in nono metaphysicae, quod actus est prior potentia natura, tempore vero in uno et eodem potentia prior est actu, quia unum et idem prius est in potentia, et postea fit actu. Sed universaliter loquendo, etiam tempore actus est prior. Nam quod in potentia est, non reducitur in actum nisi per aliquod quod est actu. Et sic etiam de potentia sciente, non fit aliquis sciens actu, inveniendo, neque discendo, nisi per aliquam scientiam praeexistentem in actu; quia omnis doctrina et disciplina intellectiva fit ex praeexistenti cognitione, ut dicitur in primo posteriorum Tertia conditio intellectus in actu, per quam differt ab intellectu possibili, et intellectu in habitu, est quia uterque quandoque intelligit, et quandoque non intelligit. Sed hoc non potest dici de intellectu in actu, qui consistit in ipso intelligere. those which are intelligible in potency intelligible in act. For in this way also light makes colors in act, not that it has in itself the determination of every color. An active power of this sort, however, is a certain participation of the intellectual light from separate substances. And therefore the Philosopher says that it is just as a habit, or a light, which would not be suitably said of it, if it were a separate substance Then when he says "The same, moreover" he determines about the intellect according to act. And about this he does two things: First he posits the conditions of the intellect in act. Second he shows the conditions of the whole intellective part according as it differs from the other parts of the soul, where he says "Separated, moreover". About the first he posits three conditions of the intellect in act, the first of which is that knowledge in act is the same as the thing known, which is not true about the intellect in potency. Its second condition is that knowledge in potency in one and the same thing is prior in time to knowledge in act. But universally it is not prior: neither by nature nor even in time. And this is what the Philosopher says in the ninth book of the Metaphysics that act is prior by nature to potency; in time, in fact, in one and the same thing potency is prior to act since one and the same thing is first in potency and later becomes actual. But universally speaking, even in time act is prior. For what is in potency is not reduced to act except through something which is actual. And in this way also an actual knower does not come to be from a potential knower either by discovery or by learning except through some knowledge preexisting in act, since every intellective teaching and discipline comes to be from preexisting knowledge, as is said in the first book of the Posterior Analytics The third condition of the intellect in act, through which it differs from the possible intellect and the intellect in habit, is because each sometimes understands and sometimes does not understand. But this can not be said of the intellect in act, which consists in understanding 5

23 itself Deinde cum dicit separatus autem ponit conditiones totius intellectivae partis. Et primo ponit veritatem. Secundo excludit obiectionem, ibi, non reminiscitur. Dicit ergo primo, quod solus intellectus separatus est hoc, quod vere est. Quod quidem non potest intelligi neque de intellectu agente neque de intellectu possibili tantum, sed de utroque, quia de utroque supra dixit quod est separatus. Et patet quod hic loquitur de tota parte intellectiva: quae quidem dicitur separata, ex hoc quod habet operationem suam sine organo corporali Et quia in principio huius libri dixit quod si aliqua operatio animae sit propria, contingit animam separari; concludit, quod haec sola pars animae, scilicet intellectiva, est incorruptibilis et perpetua. Et hoc est quod supra posuit in secundo, quod hoc genus animae separatur ab aliis, sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. Dicitur autem perpetua, non quod semper fuerit, sed quod semper erit. Unde philosophus dicit in duodecimo metaphysicorum, quod forma numquam est ante materiam, sed posterius remanet anima, non omnis, sed intellectus Deinde cum dicit reminiscitur excludit quamdam obiectionem. Posset enim aliquis credere, quod quia pars intellectiva animae est incorruptibilis, remanet post mortem in anima intellectiva scientia rerum eodem modo quo nunc eam habet: cuius contrarium supra dixit in primo, quod intelligere corrumpitur, quodam interius corrupto; et quod corrupto corpore non reminiscitur anima, neque amat Et ideo hic dicit, quod non reminiscitur, scilicet post mortem eorum, quae in vita scivimus, quia hoc quidem impassibile est, id est ista pars animae intellectivae impassibilis est, 742. Then when he says "separated, moreover" he posits the conditions of the whole intellective part. And first he posits the truth. Second he excludes an objection where he says "It does not remember". He first says, therefore, that only the separated intellect is that which truly is. Which [fact] indeed can be understood neither about the agent intellect nor the possible intellect alone, but about each, since above he said about each that it is separated. And it is clear that here he is speaking about the whole intellective part, which indeed is called separated from the fact that it has its operation without a bodily organ And because in the beginning of this book he said that if any operation of the soul be proper, it happens that the soul is separated. He concludes that this part alone of the soul, namely the intellective, is incorruptible and perpetual. And this is what above he posited in the second book, that this genus of soul is separated from the others, just as the perpetual [is separated] from the corruptible. It is called perpetual, moreover, not because it has always existed, but because it will always exist. Whence the Philosopher says in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics that a form never exists before its matter, but afterwards the soul remains, not every [soul], but the intellect Then when he says "it remembers" he excludes a certain objection. For someone could believe that since the intellective part of the soul is incorruptible, the knowledge of things remains in the intellective soul after death in the same manner in which it now has it, contrary to which he said above in the first book that understanding is corrupted, with a certain interior thing having corrupted, and that with the body having corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves And thus he says here that it does not remember, namely after death, those things which in life we knew because "this indeed is impassible", i. e., that part of the intellective soul 6

24 unde ipsa non est subiectum passionum animae, sicut sunt amor et odium, reminiscentia et huiusmodi, quae ex aliqua passione corporali contingunt. Passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis est, idest pars animae, quae non est sine praedictis passionibus, est corruptibilis; pertinent enim ad partem sensitivam. Tamen haec pars animae dicitur intellectus, sicut et dicitur rationalis, inquantum aliqualiter participat rationem, obediendo rationi, et sequendo motum eius, ut dicitur in primo Ethicorum. Sine hac autem parte animae corporalis, intellectus nihil intelligit. Non enim intelligit aliquid sine phantasmate, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo destructo corpore non remanet in anima separata scientia rerum secundum eundem modum, quo modo intelligit. Sed quomodo tunc intelligat, non est praesentis intentionis discutere. is impassible, whence it is not subject of the passions of the soul, such as love and hate, memories, and things of this sort, which occur from some bodily passion. The passive intellect, in truth, is corruptible, i. e., the part of the soul which is not without the aforesaid passions is corruptible. For they pertain to the sensitive part. Nevertheless this part of the soul is called intellect, just as also it is called rational, in as much as it somehow participates in reason by obeying reason and by following its motion, as is said in the first book of the Ethics. Without this part of the corporal soul, the intellect understands nothing. For it does not understand something without phantasms, as will be said below. And therefore, with the body destroyed, knowledge of things does not remain in the separated soul according to the same mode by which it understands now. But it is not his present intention to discuss how it understands then. 7

25 3. Concerning the Teacher St. Augustine

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