Curriculum Vitae. Jenny HUNG

Transcription

1 Curriculum Vitae Jenny HUNG, Lingnan University, Hong Kong (+852) Education Visiting Scholar, (Spring 2018) Ph.D., Philosophy, Lingnan University, Hong Kong (2014 now, Thesis Defended) Visiting Scholar, (Aug 2016 May 2017) Ph.D., Nano Science & Technology, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST 2013) M.Phil., Physics, HKUST (2008) B.Sc., Pure Physics with Minor in Humanities, 1 st Class Honors, HKUST (2006) Honors Reaching Out Award, The Hong Kong Government (2018) Full Postgraduate Studentship (2017 now) HKPhD Fellowship, Hong Kong Research Grants Council ( ) Conference Sponsorships (five times), Lingnan University ( ) The Hong Kong Association of University Women Scholarship (2010) Full Postgraduate Studentship, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology ( ) Dharma Ambassador Scholarship, Hong Kong Buddhist Organization (2006) Research Area AoS AoC Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Science, Chinese Philosophy, Buddhism Current Projects PhD Thesis The Ontology of Subjects of Experience This thesis is on our essential nature and the metaphysics of subjects of experience. I compare animalism and constitutionalism of persons and argue that both have drawbacks. I further argue that we are essentially subjects of experience whose essential property is to be conscious. I go on to defend that there is a non-reducible, non-qualitative further fact responsible for the uniqueness and persistence of a subject. I propose that this proposal provides a solution to the problems raised in the current literature, such as split-brain experiments and The Problem of Too Many Thinkers. Jenny (CV) P. 1 of 7

2 Papers (please see my website for full abstracts) The Theory of the Self in the Zhuangzi: A Strawsonian Interpretation Philosophy East and West (forthcoming) I argue that the Zhuangzian conception of the self can be understood via Galen Strawson s theories of thin subjects of experience and process metaphysics. I adopt Strawson s two uses of I to understand wu 吾 and wo 我 in the context of I (wu 吾 ) have lost myself (wo 我 ). On the Same-order Representational Theory of Consciousness Status: Revise-and-Resubmit. Philosophical Psychology I point out that the relation between an experience and its reflexive awareness remains obscure in the same-order representational view. I propose an overlap model to situate reflexive awareness. The Zhuangzian Theory of Desires - A Constructive Interpretation Status: Revise-and-Resubmit. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy I discuss how the spiritual theory in the Zhuangzi sheds light on a new direction to a contemporary theory of will and desires. I argue that a Daoist sage is not a wanton but an observer of her mental states. Paper Under Review The Early Yogācāra Theory of No-self I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the cognitive schema (CS) of the self. Projects in Progress Objective Particulars and the Sense of the Self I propose that the Master-sound is not sufficient for the idea of places where they might exist unobserved. Instead, one should have the two classes of change proposed by Henri Poincaré (1898). On the Extensional Model of Phenomenal Continuity I argue that the Extensional View of Phenomenal Continuity is incomplete in the sense that the question of what unifies these smaller temporal parts to one specious present remains unexplained. Perceptual Constancy and Phenomenal Objectivity I raise objections to theories of perceptual constancy. I argue that they fail to explain the lack of phenomenal objectivity in cases of visual perceptions. A Gricean Interpretation on Nāgārjuna s positive Catuskoti I propose that one can use Gricean pragmatics to understand the term fei 非 in Nāgārjuna s writings. Nāgārjuna aims not to destroy language systems but to abolish the reified schema by revealing emptiness. A Three-Fold Interpretation of Zhiyi s Ji Jenny (CV) P. 2 of 7

3 I investigate the meaning of ji 即 in the phrase Ignorance equal dharma-nature ( 無明即法性 ), and further propose that the meanings of ji 即 are three-fold. Publications (Physics) Optical activities of large-area SU8 micro-spirals fabricated by multi-beam holographic lithography X. Wang, W. Gao, J. Hung, and W. Y. Tam, Appl. Opt. 53, (2014). Optical activities of micro-spiral photonic crystals fabricated by multi-beam holographic lithography J. Hung, W. Gao, and W. Y. Tam, J. Opt. 13, (2011). Doubly slanted layer structures in holographic gelatin emulsions: solar concentrators J. Hung, P. S. Chan, C. Sun, C. W. Ho and W. Y. Tam, J. Opt (2010). Complete photonic bandgaps in the visible range from spherical layer structures in dichromate gelatin emulsions J. Hung, M. Kok, W. Y. Tam, App. Phys. Lett. 94, (2009). Conference Presentations The Metaphysics of Reflexive Awareness Copenhagen Summer School in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Denmark, On the Haecceity of Subjects Self: Between Consciousness and Non-being, Japan, Zhuangzi and Galen Strawson s Theory of the Self Central APA, Kansas City, U.S., The Cognitive Schema of the Self A Yogācāra Model Eastern APA, Baltimore, U.S., On McMahan s Embodied Mind Account of Egoistic Concern Summer school with Jeff McMahan, Germany, Zhuangzi s Theory of Desires and Freedom Singapore-Hong Kong-Macau Symposium on Chinese Philosophy, Hong Kong, On Barry Dainton s Extensional Theory of Experience Symposium on Philosophy of Mental Time IV: Time, Experience, and Consciousness, Japan, On the Continuity of Consciousness LU-SYSU Philosophical Forum, Hong Kong, A Psychological Explanation of Selves Self and its Realization, Japan, Jenny (CV) P. 3 of 7

4 Invited Talks The Personal Identity Theories of Robert Nozick and Bernard Williams The Hong Kong Society of Humanities (HKSH), Hong Kong, On Montague s Theory of Awareness of Awareness Graduate Colloquium Series,, Texas, U.S., On the Unity of Consciousness Dao and life lecture series, HKSH, On L. R. Baker s Constitutionalism of Persons and the Materialist Ontology Nihon University, Japan, Gender and Philosophy Lingnan University, Hong Kong, On Miri Albahari and Mark Siderits Concept of Nirvana Dao and life lecture series, HKSH, Is Zhuangzi a wanton? On Zhuangzi s theory of freedom Dao and life lecture series, HKSH, An Interpretation of the Early Buddhist Theory of no-self Dao and life lecture series, HKSH, The Soul, the Mind, and the Self Round table discussion, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, The Yogācāra System of Personal Identity Dao and life lecture series, HKSH, Jenny (CV) P. 4 of 7

5 Work Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Physics, HKUST (Fall 2013 Spring 2014) Responsible for conducting research (computer simulations and experiments) on nano-materials Research Assistant (PT), Division of Humanities, HKUST (Fall 2013) Responsible for translating Chinese philosophical essays into English Teaching Experience As Sole Instructor: Personal Identity, Lingnan University (Spring 2016) Metaphysics and Epistemology, Chilin Evening College (Spring 2014) Philosophy of Mind, Chilin Evening College (Spring 2013) Introductory Buddhism (8 lectures per year), Buddhist Miu Fa Organization ( ) As Teaching Assistant: Personal Identity, Lingnan University (Fall 2014) Philosophy of Religion, Lingnan University (Spring 2015) Critical and Creative Thinking, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Summer 2009) Professional Service Treasurer and Website Manager Hong Kong Association of University Women Chief Organizer Conference Philosophy of Religion, A New Perspective, HKUST Poster Designer Hospital Care Service, Queen Elizabeth Hospital Editor A Meditation Guide, Venerable Xuyun. Publisher: Po Lam Zen Monastery Chief Organizer Summer Camp for university students in Hong Kong and mainland China, The Hong Kong Buddhist Association Jenny (CV) P. 5 of 7

6 Graduate Courses Taken (* denotes audited course) HKUST Taoism Theories of Language Song and Ming Confucianism Topics in Comparative Philosophy Fundamentals of Chinese Philosophy Confucianism: Contemporary Period 1 Confucianism: Contemporary Period 2 Fundamentals of Comparative Philosophy An Analytic Perspective on Chinese Philosophy International Graduate Summer Schools (3-week intensive courses) John Locke Pragmatism German Idealism Philosophy of Action* Philosophy of Biology Philosophy and Psychology Early Modern Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science and Technology Core Logic* Virtue Ethics* Objective Reference* Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics* Consciousness and Intentionality* Advanced UG Courses at Lingnan Ontology* Modal Logic* Personal Identity* Philosophy of Science* Experimental Philosophy* Referees Andrea SAUCHELLI (Supervisor at Lingnan) Lingnan University, Hong Kong andreasauchelli@ln.hk Galen STRAWSON (Supervisor at UT) gstrawson@austin.utexas.edu Philip J. IVANHOE (Mentor in Chinese Philosophy) Center for East Asian and Comparative Philosophy City University of Hong Kong pivanhoe@cityu.edu.hk Richard M. SAINSBURY (Mentor in Analytic Philosophy) marksainsbury@austin.utexas.edu Kim Chong CHONG (Mentor in Chinese Philosophy) Division of Humanities The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology hmckc@ust.hk Michael TYE (Mentor in Analytic Philosophy) marksainsbury@austin.utexas.edu Jenny (CV) P. 6 of 7

7 What are we? The Ontology of Subjects of Experience Dissertation Abstract Supervisors: Andrea Sauchelli, Darrell Rowbottom, Galen Strawson This thesis is on our essential nature and the metaphysics of subjects of experience. I propose that we are essentially subjects of experience. Furthermore, subjects are not reducible to their physical substrates or their psychological properties. I argue for a modified simple view of personal identity, according to which personal identity is an unanalyzable, primitive fact. I first investigate different types of Animalism the view that we are numerically identical to the human animals. I propose in chapter one that there are two conceptions of human animal. If one adopts a hybrid conception, one may end up having a dualistic view of our nature. If one adopts a physical conception, premise one of the famous Thinking Animal Argument that there is a thinking animal would be dubious. The Animalists are thus not successful in arguing that we are numerically identical to physical organisms. I go on to illustrate that an embedded subject view can avoid most of the problems generated by Animalism. In chapter two, I object to the Constitutional View of persons, the claim that we are essentially persons with first-person perspectives and are constituted by human animals. In contemporary discussions, we find two stages of the first-person perspective. The rudimentary one is the ability to perceive the external world from a spatiotemporal perspective, and the robust one is the ability to think of oneself as oneself and to effectively use first-person pronouns in a language. I propose that it is possible that I exist even if I permanently lose the ability to have a robust first-person perspective. Second, it is possible that I have more than one spatiotemporal perspective from which I perceive the external world. Third, one can have a robust first-person perspective without having a rudimentary one. I thus conclude that (1) they are not different stages of the same property but are totally different properties, and (2) neither of them is necessary for my existence. I go on to show in chapter three that the Embedded Part Views in the current literature have drawbacks. An Embedded Part View is the view that we are essentially physical parts of the human animals that directly (or non-derivatively) think. I argue that if we read non-derivativeness in a de re sense, the brain thinks only derivatively. On the other hand, if we understand non-derivativeness in a de dicto sense, this modified definition would involve circularity. I also discuss the Embedded Mind View, according to which we are essentially minds, the persistence of which is determined by psychological continuity with a certain sort of causal chain. I argue that this view violates our intuition that we persist as the post-person with only simple experience of pain or joy during the final stage of Alzheimer s disease. Furthermore, if we are essentially conscious beings, then psychological continuity is not necessary for our persistence given that there is already the same conscious being supported by sufficient amount of the same brain over time. I further argue in chapter four that we are essentially subjects of experience whose essential property is to be conscious. Many of us think that the same individual wakes up every time after gradual replacement of the brain, but we are not sure whether the individual who wakes up after an operation is still the original one in a case in which the whole cerebrum is replaced all of a sudden. If we suppose that there is already psychological continuity in both cases, it is not psychological continuity that determines our persistence over time. I propose that our intuition stems from the view that we are subjects of experience, and the sameness of subject is preserved if there is a gradual replacement of brain cells. I go on to defend that there is a non-reducible, non-qualitative further fact responsible for the uniqueness and persistence of a subject. If we regard personal identity over time as the sameness of subject over time, then personal identity should be an unverifiable primitive fact. My theory thus supports a simple view of personal identity. Jenny (CV) P. 7 of 7