The Classificatory Conception of Propositions. Peter Hanks University of Minnesota
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1 The Classificatory Conception of Propositions Peter Hanks University of Minnesota 1
2 The Fregean conception Frege, King, Merricks The Russellian conception Russell 1903, Speaks, Richard, Caplan & Nutting & Tillman The classificatory conception me, Soames, Schiffer 2
3 The Fregean conception Frege, King, Merricks Role for propositions: primary bearers of representation and truth-conditions. Beliefs are secondary/derivative bearers of representational features & truth-conditions. Beliefs derive their representational features and truthconditions from propositions. 3
4 The Fregean Conception <a = b> <Hesperus is a planet> <Phosphorus is a planet> <Kepler died in misery> <Dr. Lauben was wounded> <Frege was a logician> transmission of representational features and truth-conditions entertainment belief Frege was a logician. Subject Problem: the Fregean conception makes us consumers of representations, not producers. 4
5 The Fregean Conception Problem: can we explain how propositions are representational and have truth-conditions? Merricks: No. It s primitive. Philosophically disappointing. Frege: Yes. Saturation. Also philosophically disappointing. King: Yes. Ascription. Undermines explanatory role for propositions. Explanation fails on its own terms. 5
6 King ascribes swimming to Dara spontaneously and unreflectively <a = b> <Dara swims> <Hesperus is a planet> <Phosphorus is a planet> <Kepler died in misery> <Dr. Lauben was wounded> Subject Dara <Frege was a logician> swims Frege was a logician. Subject 6
7 King ascribes swimming to Dara spontaneously and unreflectively Subject Dara represents Dara as a swimmer is true iff Dara swims swims ascribes running to Sarah Subject The flashlight doesn t represent Sarah as a runner, and it s not true iff Sarah runs. 7
8 The Fregean Conception Two problems: Makes us consumers of representations, not producers. Pressing demand for an explanation of how propositions represent the world and have truth-conditions. 8
9 The Russellian conception Russell 1903, Speaks, Richard, Caplan & Nutting & Tillman Role for propositions: what we represent with our beliefs. Propositions are true or false but not representational. Beliefs and other attitudes are primary bearers of representational features & truth-conditions. Beliefs represent propositions. Richard: What is representational and what is true or false in the first instance are mental states and sentence tokens that represent propositions, (2013, p.702, my italics) 9
10 The Russellian conception belief Barack loves Michelle. represents Subject represents <Barack loves Michelle> 10
11 Russell 1903 Barack loves Michelle. Barack loves Justin Bieber. represents represents Subject Subject represents represents true existent false non-existent 11
12 Speaks, Richard, Caplan & Nutting & Tillman Replace Russellian facts with something else. Speaks: property of being such that Barack loves JB. False (instantiated by nothing) Richard: property of being a situation in which Barack loves JB. False (not instantiated by the maximal situation) C&N&T: hylomorphic composite containing Barack, JB, loving, and the proposition building relation False 12
13 The Russellian conception belief Barack loves Michelle. represents Subject Russell 1903 represents property of being such that Barack Speaks/Richard loves Michelle / a situation in which Barack loves Michelle hylomorphic composite of Barack, Michelle, loving, & Prop C&N&T 13
14 Two kinds of representation Object-object representation represents Representation-as Represents Obama as riding a giant duck 14
15 The Russellian conception Barack loves Michelle. Subject Russell 1903: S / S s belief represents as true/existing. Speaks/Richard: S / S s belief represents a certain property as being true/instantiated. C&N&T: S / S s belief represents a certain hylomorphic composite as being true. These are non-representational concepts of truth. 15
16 The Russellian conception Barack loves Michelle. Subject Intuitively, S / S s belief represents Barack as loving Michelle. The Russellian conception of propositions makes this representational fact indirect: S / S s belief represents Barack as loving Michelle by representing a proposition as true. This indirectness should be avoided, if possible. Tends to motivate attempts to do away with propositions altogether, since propositions come between us and the objects we represent (see Davidson). 16
17 The Russellian conception Two problems (Non-representational concepts of truth.) Indirectness: inserts propositional intermediaries between us and the objects that we represent with our beliefs. 17
18 The classificatory conception Me, Soames, Schiffer Role for propositions: devices we use to individuate and classify our mental states and utterances. Beliefs are primary bearers of representational properties and truth-conditions. Beliefs do not represent propositions - they represent objects as being various ways. 18
19 The classificatory conception <Barack loves Michelle> Barack loves Michelle subject Barack aime Michelle subject <Barack loves JB> Barack loves JB subject 19
20 The classificatory conception Analogy with measurement sentences Joe weighs 200 pounds Classifies Joe according to weight by relating Joe to a node on a weight scale. Joe s weighing 200 lbs is not constituted by his bearing a relation to a node on a weight scale. Joe s relation to this node won t figure in an explanation of what it is for him to weigh 200 lbs. The point of relating Joe to a node on a weight scale is purely classificatory. It s to provide information about the underlying facts that constitute his weight. 20
21 The classificatory conception Analogy with measurement sentences Joe believes that Barack loves Michelle Classifies Joe s mental state by relating Joe to a proposition. Joe s believing that Barack loves Michelle is not constituted by his bearing a relation to a proposition. Joe s relation to this proposition won t figure in an explanation of what it is for him to believe that Barack loves Michelle. - beliefs don t derive their representational features from propositions, nor do they represent propositions The point of relating Joe to a proposition is purely classificatory. It s to provide information about Joe s mental state. 21
22 The classificatory conception Explaining the representational features and truth-conditions of propositions. Propositional classification provides information about the representational features and truth-conditions of a belief. So it s important for propositions to be representational and to have truthconditions. Explaining these representational features and truth-conditions is not as pressing a problem as it is for the Fregean conception. Nothing explanatorily wrong with treating it as primitive that propositions represent and have truth-conditions (although it would be preferable not to.) 22
23 The classificatory conception me, Soames, Schiffer Me: types of acts of predicating, asking, or ordering. Soames: types of acts of predication. Schiffer: non-composite, finely grained, sui generis objects that have truth-conditions essentially and absolutely. 23
24 The classificatory conception = predication? = asking! = ordering <Russell, philosopher>? <Russell, philosopher>! <Russell, philosopher> Russell is a philosopher Is Russell a philosopher? Russell, be a philosopher! assertion question order S said that Russell is a philosopher. S asked whether Russell is a philosopher. S told Russell to be a philosopher. 24
25 The classificatory conception We classify according to satisfaction conditions. reports satisfaction conditions direction of fit assertions beliefs S asserted/believes that a is F. truth-conditions word-to-world mind-to-world questions wonderings S asked/wonders whether a is F. answer hood conditions word-to-word representation-torepresentation orders promises desires intentions S ordered/wants a to be F. a promised/intends to be F. fulfillment conditions world-to-word world-to-mind 25
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