Anna-Sara Malmgren CURRICULUM VITAE July 2018

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1 Anna-Sara Malmgren CURRICULUM VITAE July Department of Philosophy Phone: (+1) Bld. 90, 450 Serra Mall Office: 92L Stanford University Web: Stanford, CA Academic Employment Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, 2011 present. Professor II at CSMN, University of Oslo, (15% research appointment.) Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, Education PhD in Philosophy, New York University, Committee: Paul Boghossian (supervisor), Stephen Schiffer, Crispin Wright. Dissertation Title: Essays in the Theory of Justification. BPhil in Philosophy, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, (1 st with Distinction.) BA in Philosophy, King s College, University of London, (1 st with Distinction.) Research Areas Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind (AOS). Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics (AOC). Academic Publications (Articles) Varieties of Inference?, Philosophical Issues: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by C. Juhl and J. Schechter, 2018 (forthcoming). A Priori Testimony Revisited, The A Priori In Philosophy, edited by A. Casullo and J. Thurow, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements, Mind, vol. 120: 478, , Is There A Priori Knowledge by Testimony?, Philosophical Review, vol. 115:2, , (Reviews) Review of Philosophy Without Intuitions by H. Cappellen, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ( Review of Relying on Others by S. Goldberg, Mind, vol. 120: 480, ,

2 Work in Progress (Books) Understanding Inference (working title), under contract with Oxford University Press. (Articles) Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, under review. TBA, for Philosophical Issues: Epistemology, edited by L. Miracchi and E. Sosa (2019). Awards and Fellowships William H. and Frances Green Faculty Fellowship, Stanford University, APA Article Prize (for Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements ), Visiting Fellowship at Arché, University of St Andrews, Blossom Flowers Ford Burns Excellence Endowment, University of Texas at Austin, Dean s Fellowship, University of Texas at Austin, Dean s Dissertation Award, New York University, Frankel Fellowship, New York University, McCracken Fellowship, New York University, Scatcherd Scholarship, University of Oxford, Adrian Grey Turner Prize, King s College London, Sambrooke Exhibition, King s College London, Invited Talks and Commentaries Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, CPA Annual Congress, June Reply to Rationality Requires Rationally Representing Representations as Rational by R. Neta, Conference on Inference and Reasoning, UNC, April Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure, University of Lund, June Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure, University of Miami, April Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Arizona State University, April The Normativity of the Sub-Personal, Högre Seminariet, University of Göteborg, April Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Oberlin College, March Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, 48th Chapel Hill Colloquium, October Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Simon Fraser University, October Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Reasoning Conference, University of Konstanz, July

3 Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Workshop: Perspectives on Inference, CSMN, University of Oslo, June (Co-organized with Olav Gjelsvik) Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, UC Irvine, May Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, UCLA, May Inference and the Problem of Relevantly Complete Representation, University of Notre Dame, April On Getting Started, Symposium on Philosophical Method, Tufts University, February A Puzzle about Inference, University of Copenhagen, June A Puzzle about Inference, 5th Formal Epistemology Festival, University of Toronto, June Inference: Explanation and Justification, CSLI Workshop, Stanford University, June Inference: Explanation and Justification, University of Arkansas, April Reply to Intuitive Knowledge and the Benacerraf Problem by J. Bengson, Pacific APA, March Philosophy Without What?, Symposium on Philosophy Without Intuitions by H. Cappellen, The Institute of Philosophy (University of London) and CSMN (Oslo University), February Inference: Explanation and Justification, LEMMing Graduate Conference (keynote), University of Cologne, November Inference: Explanation and Justification, University of Victoria, November Particularistically Unreasonable, Workshop on Intentions, University of Leeds, June A Priori Testimony Revisited, Harvard University, November Varieties of Inference, Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference (keynote), University of St Andrews, October A Priori Testimony Revisited, North Carolina Metaphysics Workshop, June Reply to Iconic Representation and the Interface Problem by C. Montemayor, UT-UNAM Conference on Perception and Consciousness, University of Texas at Austin, October Reply to Easy Knowledge, Reliabilism, and the Transparency of Justification by R. Neta, Pacific APA, April Varieties of Inference, Workshop on the Philosophy of Richard Feldman, University of Texas at San Antonio, February Quine s Two Dogmas, University of Oslo, December Varieties of Inference, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November Varieties of Inference, King's College London, July Varieties of Inference, Stanford University, January

4 Sub-Personal Reasons, Workshop on Theoretical and Practical Reason, University of Leeds, June The Content Problem and Varieties of Inference, Arché Methodology Seminar, University of St Andrews, June Reply to McKinsey One More Time by C. Wright, Conference on Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency, CSMN, University of Oslo, June Warrant-Preservation and Testimony, Forry and Micken Lecture Series on the Philosophy of Testimony, Amherst College, March Testimony, Self-Knowledge and The A Priori, Basic Knowledge Workshop VI, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, March Reply to Delusion, Assertion and Mad Belief by D. Murray, Central APA, February The Justification of Intuitive Judgments, Workshop on Thought Experiments and The A Priori, University of Fortaleza, August Inferential Integration and Epistemic Relevance, Filosofidagarna, Lund University, June Intuitions by Inference, University College London, March Intuitions by Inference, Cornell University, February Intuitions by Inference, University of Rochester, February Intuitions by Inference, University of Massachusetts Amherst, February Intuitions by Inference, University of Western Ontario, February Intuitions by Inference, University of California Berkeley, February Intuitions by Inference, University of Pittsburgh, February Intuitions by Inference, University of Texas at Austin, January Intuitions by Inference, University of California Davis, January Reply to Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis? and We re Right, They re Wrong by P. van Inwaagen, Workshop on Science and Religion, New York Institute of Philosophy, March What Do We Know When We Know That Smith Doesn t Know And How Do We Know It?, University of Texas at Austin, December Intuitions and The A Priori, Arché Epistemology Seminar, University of St Andrews, July Reply to Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals by T. Williamson, Anders Wedberg Lectures, Stockholm University, April A Priori Knowledge by Testimony, Logic and Language Seminar, Stockholm University, June Is There a Coherent Form of Environmentalism?, Cumberland Lodge Weekend, University of London, October

5 Professional Service (Departmental) Member, Stanford Philosophy Diversity Committee (2018 present). Member, Stanford Philosophy Graduate Admissions Committee (2013, 2015, 2017, 2018). Member, Peter Hawke s Dissertation Committee ( ). Member, Samuel Asarnow s Dissertation Committee ( ). Member, Stanford Philosophy Search Committee ( ). Chair, Stanford Philosophy Colloquium Committee ( ). Member, UT Austin Philosophy Colloquium Committee ( ). Member, UT Austin Philosophy Outreach Committee ( ). Member, Jenn Nielson s Dissertation Committee (2010). (Other) Reader for: Analysis, American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Bellingham Summer Conference, Dialectica, Disputatio, Episteme, Erkenntnis, Inquiry, Journal of Philosophical Research, Mind, NWO (Dutch Research Council), Noûs, Oxford University Press, Philosophers Imprint, Philosophical Studies, Philosophia, Philosophical Review, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Routledge, Synthese, Thought, Teorema. Invited Discussant/Commentator-at-Large at: Penn Reasons and Foundations of Epistemology Conference, University of Pennsylvania, November 2017, November 2016; Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference, University of British Columbia, July 2017; Workshop on the Normativity of Logic, University of Bergen, June 2017; Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop, University of South Alabama, May 2016; Epistemology and Cognition, College of William and Mary, September International cooperation partner, Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases: Theoretical Foundations, Responses, and Alternatives (EXTRA), Emmy Noether, German Research Foundation ( ). International network member, Knowledge Beyond Natural Science, John Templeton Foundation, University of Stirling, the Thought trust ( ). Member, sakkyndig komité, IFIKK, University of Oslo (2015). Sub-Editor in Philosophy of Language, Thought (2013). Member, American Philosophical Association (2008 present). Affiliate, Stanford University Symbolic Systems Program (2011 present). Courses Taught (Stanford University) Advanced Dissertation Seminar, Fall, Winter, Spring , , (G) Self Knowledge and Consciousness, Spring (UG) 5

6 Philosophy of Mind, Spring 2013, 2014, 2016, Winter 2015, (UG/G) Metaphysics, Spring 2012, Winter (UG/G) Rule-Following, Fall (G) Explanation and Justification, Winter 2013, (UG) Bounded Rationality, Fall (UG) Dissertation Development Pro-Seminar, Fall, Winter, Spring (G.) Theory of Knowledge, Spring (G/UG) What s an Inference? Winter 2012, Fall (G) (University of Texas at Austin) Thought Experiments, Spring (G) Theory of Knowledge, Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall (UG) Knowledge and Reality, Fall 2009, (UG) (New York University) Minds and Machines, Spring (UG) Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Fall 2007, Summer (UG) 6