Annotated Reading. Socrates claims this isn't true; that whatever the "many" do is "the result of chance." (30)

Transcription

1 Page 1 of 32 From bartleby.com "Crito" is one of the dialogues contained in Plato's The Apology that features the Greek philosopher Socrates. "Crito" chronicles a conversation between Socrates and his friend and student, Crito, just before Socrates is to be executed. Crito tries to convince Socrates to let his friends help him escape. In response, Socrates justifies why he doesn't want to be rescued. "Crito" is written like a play. It is entirely dialogue, and the speakers are indicated at the beginning of each line, just as they would be in a script. The setting is inside Socrates' prison cell in the middle of the night. Summary, Paragraphs 1 33 Crito arrives to visit Socrates at night. Instead of waking Socrates up, Crito let s him sleep peacefully until he wakes up on his own. He remarks on how "easy" and "cheerful" Socrates is in light of his upcoming execution. Socrates (who is 70 years old) replies that at his age, he shouldn't dread death. Crito has come to tell Socrates that his execution will probably happen the next day. It is scheduled for the end of a religious festival marked by the return of a ship, which has been spotted on the horizon. Socrates replies that while dreaming, he had a vision that he would be killed in three days' time. Crito urges Socrates to take him and his friends up on their offer to help Socrates escape. If Socrates is killed, not only will they lose a friend, but they will also look bad. "People who do not know you and me," Crito says, "will believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this that I should be thought to value money more than the life of a friend?" Socrates counters Crito's statement by saying, "But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they happened." Crito claims that you must listen to the opinions of the masses "because they can do the very greatest evil to anyone who has lost their good opinion." (27) Socrates claims this isn't true; that whatever the "many" do is "the result of chance." (30) Crito wonders if Socrates is refusing to escape so as not to get his friends in trouble for helping him. Crito assures Socrates that they are willing to run the risks involved. Socrates agrees that he does worry about the fate of his friends, but it's not his only worry. Using logos and pathos, Crito launches into a long statement about how the group will handle the risks, and why Socrates should escape: They'll pay off the informers, and they have the money for it. Even if Socrates can't stay in Athens, people outside of Athens will love him.

2 Page 2 of 32 He can stay with Crito's friends in Thessaly. Submitting to execution will be "playing into the hands of your enemies and destroyers." (33) He'll betray his children, who will have no father if he is executed. "No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to preserve to the end their nurture and education." (30) He's choosing the easier route. He's going to make Crito and his other friends look like cowards. Now is the last chance for escape! Persons of the Dialogue Socrates Crito Scene: The Prison of Socrates 1 Socrates. WHY have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite early. Crito. Yes, certainly. 2 Soc. What is the exact time? 3 Cr. The dawn is breaking. 4 5 Soc. I wonder the keeper of the prison would let you in. 1 Cr. He knows me because I often come, Socrates; moreover, I have done him a kindness. 2 Soc. And are you only just come? How did you get in? (Socrates is in prison after all, and Crito is sitting in his cell in the middle of the night.) 2. Sounds as if the prison guard either owed Crito a favor or Crito has bribed him. 8

3 Page 3 of 32 Cr. No, I came some time ago. 9 Soc. Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of awakening me at once? Cr. Why, indeed, Socrates, I myself would rather not have all this sleeplessness and sorrow. But I have been wondering at your peaceful slumbers, and that was the reason why I did not awaken you, because I wanted you to be out of pain. I have always thought you happy in the calmness of your temperament; but never did I see the like of the easy, cheerful way in which you bear this 10 calamity Disaster 11 Soc. Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought not to be repining 4 at the prospect of death. Cr. And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining Regret or dread (Men who are my age, 70, shouldn't be freaked out about death.) 5. Sure, but some old men who are in situations like yours do stress out about it. 13 Soc. That may be. But you have not told me why you come at this early hour. Cr. I come to bring you a message which is sad and 14

4 Page 4 of 32 painful; not, as I believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest of all to me. Soc. What! I suppose that the ship has come from Delos, on the arrival of which I am to die? 6 Cr. No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium 7 tell me that they have left her there; and Socrates' execution is scheduled for the end of a religious festival marked by the return of a ship, which has been spotted on the horizon. 7. A lookout near Athens at the tip of a peninsula therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the last day of your life. Soc. Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day. 17 Cr. Why do you say this? 18 Soc. I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of the ship? 19 Cr. Yes; that is what the authorities say. 20 Soc. But I do not think that the ship will be here until tomorrow; this I gather from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep. 21

5 Page 5 of Cr. And what was the nature of the vision? 23 Soc. There came to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely, 8 clothed in white raiment, 9 who called to me and 8. Attractively; 9. Clothes said: O Socrates "The third day hence, to Phthia 10 shalt thou go." Cr. What a singular 11 dream, Socrates! Another area of Greece. Socrates interprets this to mean he's going to die. 11. Strange Soc. There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think Cr. Yes: the meaning is only too clear. But, O! my beloved Socrates, let me entreat 12 you once more to take my advice and escape. For if you die I shall not only lose a 12. Beg friend who can never be replaced, but there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this that I should be thought to value money more than the life of a friend? 13 For the many will not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that 13. Crito is concerned about his friend, Socrates, dying and his reputation. you refused. 27

6 Page 6 of 32 Soc. But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they happened Socrates starts laying the foundation for a deductive argument (general to specific) using logos. He'll come back to this point later. Cr. But do you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be regarded, as is evident in your own case, because they can do the very greatest evil to anyone who has lost their good opinion? Soc. I only wish, Crito, that they could; for then they could also do the greatest good, and that would be well. But the truth is, that they can do neither good nor evil: they cannot make a man wise or make him foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance. 29 Cr. Well, I will not dispute about that; but please to tell me, Socrates, whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: are you not afraid that if you 30 escape hence 15 we may get into trouble with the 15. Then informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or a great part of our property; or that even a worse evil may happen to us? Now, if this is your fear, be at ease; for in order to save you, we ought surely to run this or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I 16. You're not refusing to escape because you are worried about what might happen to your friends who would help, are you? If so, don't worry; we are willing to run the risk involved. Come on. Let's go!

7 Page 7 of 32 say Soc. Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means the only one. 17 Cr. 18 Fear not. There are persons who at no great cost are willing to save you and bring you out of prison; and as for the informers, you may observe that they are far from being exorbitant 19 in their demands; a little money will satisfy them. My means, which, as I am sure, are ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple 20 about You're right, I do worry about my friends, but that is not my only worry. 18. Using logos and pathos, Crito tries to convince Socrates to escape. He addresses money, life in exile, Socrates' kids, courage, and dignity. 19. Excessive (We can afford the bribe money!) 20. Worry spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a sum of money for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are willing to spend their money too. 21 I say, therefore, do not on that account hesitate about making your escape, and do not say, as you did in the court, that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do 21. I'm willing to spend all of my money saving you, and if you are worried about cleaning me out, there are plenty of other people who are willing to put up some cash. with yourself if you escape. For men will love you in other places to which you may go, and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give you any trouble. 22 Nor can I think that you are justified, Socrates, in betraying your own life when you might be 22. Don't worry about the money, and don't worry about not having a home (Socrates will have to go into exile if he escapes). People will love you everywhere, even outside of Athens. You can stay with my friends in Thessaly, and they'll watch your back.

8 Page 8 of 32 saved; this is playing into the hands of your enemies and destroyers; and moreover I should say that you were betraying your children; for you might bring them up and educate them; instead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanks to you. No man should bring c hildren into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in their nurture and education. 23 But you are choosing the easier part, as I think, not the better and manlier, which would rather have become one who professes virtue in all his 23. If you chose death instead of escape, you are betraying your own life, and you are betraying your kids. You're not going to be there for your kids to raise them, educate them, and provide for them. You shouldn't have kids if you're not willing to take responsibility for caring for them. actions, like yourself. And, indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your friends, when I reflect that this entire business of yours will be attributed to our want of courage. 24 The trial need never have come on, or might have been brought to another issue; and the end of all, 24. People are going to think your friends are cowards who wouldn't come and save you. which is the crowning absurdity, will seem to have been permitted by us, through cowardice and baseness, 25 who 25. Inferiority might have saved you, as you might have saved yourself, if we had been good for anything (for there was no difficulty in escaping); and we did not see how disgraceful, Socrates, and also miserable all this will be to us as well as to you. Make your mind up then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time of deliberation is over, and

9 Page 9 of 32 there is only one thing to be done, which must be done, if at all, this very night, and which any delay will render all but impossible; 26 I beseech you therefore, Socrates, to be persuaded by me, and to do as I say. 26. If you're going to escape, we've got to go now, tonight. This is the last chance., Paragraphs Socrates responds to Crito's speech about why he should escape. Rather than saying a simple "no," Socrates begins a long argument to prove that it is more just, or right, for him to stay and submit to his death sentence than it is to escape. Notice how he sets up his argument in this section. If one of his lines of thought doesn't seem to have a conclusion, don't worry. Just keep reading; he'll tie it all together in the end. Summary Socrates says he is guided by reason (ethos alert!) and has to stick to his principles now as he has always done before. He says that he will not agree with Crito even if "the power of the multitude could inflict [cause] many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths... " (34) "But," he continues, "what will be the fairest way of considering the question?" (34) He returns to the earlier point about only listening to the opinions of some people and not others. Using logos, Socrates lays out an argument within an argument. He uses the example of an athlete listening to a sports coach rather than the masses and a sick person listening to a doctor and not to the uneducated within his argument about listening only to the opinions of some people and not to others. He poses his points as questions to Crito, but since Crito always agrees with him, the questions can be treated like statements when you break out the arguments. Here's the rough outline: Point 1: Only the opinions of some men are worth listening to, not others. Point 2: We should listen to the "good" opinions and not to the "bad" ones. Point 3: The opinions of people who are wise are good opinions, and the opinions of people who are unwise are bad. First Supporting Argument (A E) 33 o o o o o Point A: An athlete is supposed to listen his or her coach, not to everyone. Point B: If the athlete doesn't listen to the coach and listens to the crowd instead, something bad will happen to him. Point C: If the athlete doesn't listen to his coach, he will get injured. Point D: Just like the athlete, on subjects such as justice, fairness, and good and evil, we should listen to the man who has the most understanding and not to "the many" (50). Point E: If we listen to the crowd instead of this man with understanding, we will injure ourselves.

10 Page 10 of 32 Second Supporting Argument (a c) o o o Point a: If we listen to people who don't know anything about medicine when we are sick, we'll destroy "that which is improvable by health," and we'll get sick (52). Point b: Life is not worth living if we're really sick. Point c: That part of us which is injured by injustice is just as valuable or more valuable than the physical body. Conclusion to Supporting Arguments A E and a c o Conclusion: Life is not worth having if that part of us that is damaged by injustice and improved by justice is damaged. Conclusion for the larger argument (Points 1 3): We should listen to "the one man who has understanding of just and unjust" (the wise) and not "the many" (the unwise) (60). So, Socrates concludes that Crito's statement about listening to the opinions of "the many" is in error. He moves on to begin yet another argument. He makes the point that, "not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued" (62) and that, "a good life is equivalent t o a just and honorable one" (64). Soc. Dear Crito, your zeal 1 is invaluable, 2 if a right one; but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the evil; 3 and therefore we ought to consider whether these things shall 1. Enthusiasm; 2. Priceless 3. If it's right. But if it is wrong, the more enthusiastic you are, the worse it is. be done or not. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best; and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot put away the reasons which I have before given 4 : the principles which I have hitherto 5 honored and revered 4. I'm a rational guy, so let's look at the facts. 5. Up until now I still honor, and unless we can find other and better principles on the instant, I am certain not to agree with you; 6 no, not even if the power of the multitude could 6. Thanks but no thanks: Unless we can come up with a better argument for me to escape, I'm not going to agree to do it.

11 Page 11 of 32 inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. But what will be the fairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument about the opinions of men, some of which are to be regarded, and others, as we were saying, are not to be regarded? 7 Now were we right in maintaining this before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking; 8 in fact an amusement only, and altogether vanity? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito: whether, under my present circumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. 9 That argument, which, as I believe, is maintained by many who assume to be authorities, was to 7. O.K., let's hash this out. What's the best way to approach it? We could go back to what you were saying about the importance of the opinions of other people Before I was sentenced to death, I had a good argument for listening to the opinions of some people over others. Is that argument still true now that I'm about to die? 9. Here's the resolution Socrates wants to debate. In the next section, Socrates uses logos to address this issue. the effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are a disinterested person who are not going to die to-morrow at least, there is no human probability of this, and you are therefore not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed. 10 Tell me, then, whether I am right in 10. Do you think this is true? Is Crito really disinterested? He seems pretty interested in saving Socrates' life. saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and other opinions, and

12 Page 12 of 32 the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. 11 I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this? 11. Point 1: Only the opinions of some men are worth listening to, not others. 34 Cr. Certainly. Soc. The good are to be regarded, and not the bad? Point 2: We should listen to the "good" opinions and not to the "bad" ones. Cr. Yes. Soc. And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the unwise are evil? 13 Cr. Certainly. Soc. And what was said about another matter? Was the disciple in gymnastics supposed to attend to the Point 3: The opinions of people who are wise are good opinions, and the opinions of people who are unwise are evil. (What about people whose opinions are neutral, neither good nor bad? Does Socrates factor these people in?) praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only his physician or trainer, whoever that was? 14 Cr. Of one man only. Soc. And he ought to fear the censure 15 and welcome the praise of that one only, and not of the many? 16 Cr. That is clear Here's an argument within an argument. To support his point, Socrates uses illustrations and an inductive argument (specific to general). Point A: Is an athlete supposed to listen to everyone, or just to his or her coach? 15. Criticism 16. So he (the athlete) should fear the feedback and welcome the praise of the coach, but not the crowd?

13 Page 13 of Soc. And he ought to live and train, and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together? Socrates further illustrates his point about the athlete listening to his or her coach. Cr. True. 45 Soc. And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil? 18 Cr. Certainly he will Point B: If the athlete doesn't listen to the coach and listens to the crowd instead, something bad will happen to him or her. Soc. And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting, in the disobedient person? 47 Cr. Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil. 19 Soc. Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate? 20, 21 In the matter of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, 22 ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear Point C: If the athlete doesn't listen to his coach, he or she will get injured. 20. List; 21. Isn't the same thing true for other things? 22. What we're currently talking about

14 Page 14 of 32 them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding, and whom we ought to fear and reverence more than all the rest of the world: 23 and whom deserting we shall destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice; 24 is there not such a principle? Point D: On subjects such as justice, fairness, and good and evil, we should listen to the man who has the most understanding and not to "the many." 24. Point E: If we listen to the crowd instead of this man with understanding, we will injure ourselves. Cr. Certainly there is, Socrates. Soc. Take a parallel instance; 25 if, acting under the advice of men who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improvable by health and deteriorated by disease 26 when that has been destroyed, I say, would life be worth having? 27 And that is the body? Here, Socrates' uses another example to build evidence for his case. 26. Point a: If we listen to people who don't know anything about medicine when we are sick, we'll destroy "that which is improvable by health," and we'll get sick. 27. Point b: Life is not worth living if we're really sick. Cr. Yes. 53 Soc. Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body? 54 Cr. Certainly not. 55 Soc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be depraved, which is improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice? 28 Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do with justice 28. Point c: That part of us which is injured by injustice is just as valuable or more valuable than the physical body.

15 Page 15 of 32 and injustice, to be inferior to the body? 29 Cr. Certainly not. Soc. More honored, then? Conclusion tying together arguments A C and a c: Life is not worth having if that part of us that is damaged by injustice and improved by justice is damaged. Cr. Far more honored. 58 Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say 30 and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you suggest that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. Well, someone will say, "But the many can kill us." Conclusion for the larger argument (Points 1 3): We should listen to "the one man who has understanding of just and unjust" and not "the many." Cr. Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer. 60 Soc. That is true; but still I find with surprise that the old 61 argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the same of another proposition that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued? 31 Cr. Yes, that also remains Here's another resolution. Point x: A good life is to be valued more than an average life.

16 Page 16 of Soc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one that holds also? Point y: A good life is a just and honorable life. Cr. Yes, that holds. 65, Paragraphs Using the premises he has just set up in the last section, upon which he and Crito agree, Socrates proceeds to take a closer look at whether or not he should escape. Summary "If I am clearly right in escaping," he says, "then I will make the att empt; but if not (clearly right in escaping), I will abstain (not escape)" (66). He discounts Crito's points about "money, and loss of character, and the duty of educating children" as merely the "doctrines of the multitude" (or, the ideas of the masses) t hat are meaningless since the masses don't know what they are doing although he will return to these points later (66). Socrates suggests that he and Crito should "consider the matter together" (68) and encourages Crito convince him if he's wrong or else stop talking about escaping. First, Socrates presents two short arguments, or syllogisms, on right and wrong to build his case: Point A: Doing wrong is "evil and dishonorable" (70). Point B: Injustice is always an "evil and dishonor" for those who act unjustly (70). Conclusion: We must do no wrong. Point a: We must not injure others, even if we are injured. Point b: Doing evil is the same as injuring someone. Conclusion: We must not do evil in return for evil. Socrates points out that this last statement is one upon which people passionately disagree. He reaffirms his conclusion by stating it another way; he asks if man should "do right" (84). Finally, he comes back to the practical. He asks if he will be wronging the Athenians or not wronging his friends if he escapes. 64 Soc. 1 From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try to escape without the consent of the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in 1. Now Socrates examines whether it will be just and honorable for him to escape and continue living. He'll return to his argument from the previous section later on.

17 Page 17 of 32 escaping, then I will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. 2 The other considerations which you mention, of 2. Hold back money and loss of character, and the duty of educating children, are as I hear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to call people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death and with as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed, 3 the only question which remains to be 3. Won considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks, or whether we shall not do rightly; and if the latter, 4 then death or any other calamity which may ensue 5 on my remaining here must 4. Second of two 5. Result not be allowed to enter into the calculation. Cr. I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed? 66 Soc. Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians: for I am 67 extremely desirous to be persuaded by you, 6 but not against my own better judgment. And now please to 6. Do you think Socrates really wants to be persuaded by Crito?

18 Page 18 of 32 consider my first position, and do your best to answer me. Cr. I will do my best. 68 Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was just 69 now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? 7 Are all our former admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at our 7. Point A: Doing wrong is "evil and dishonorable," so we shouldn't do it intentionally. age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover that we are no better than children? Or are we to rest assured, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, of the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him who acts unjustly? 8 Shall we affirm that? Cr. Yes Point B: Injustice is always an "evil and dishonor" for those who act unjustly. (You're hurting yourself if you act unjustly.) Soc. Then we must do no wrong? 9 Cr. Certainly not Conclusion: We must do no wrong. (What do you think of this argument? Is Socrates proving something here or not? Can you fill in any of the gaps in his thinking with other statements he has made along the way?)

19 Page 19 of 32 Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we must injure no one at all? Point a: We must not injure others, even if we are injured. 74 Cr. Clearly not. 75 Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil? 76 Cr. Surely not, Socrates. 77 Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many is that just or not? 78 Cr. Not just. 79 Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him? Point b: Doing evil is the same as injuring someone. 80 Cr. Very true. Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for 81 evil to anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. 12 But I would have you consider, Crito, whether 12. Conclusion: We must not do evil in return for evil. you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have

20 Page 20 of 32 no common ground, and can only despise 13 one another, when they see how widely they differ. 14 Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by 13. Hate 14. Socrates notes that this is a point on which people strongly disagree. He asks if Crito is sure he agrees to this point. Crito agrees. evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still my opinion; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I will proceed to the next step. 82 Cr. You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind. 83 Soc. Then I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the form of a question: Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the right? People should do what they consider to be "right." 84 Cr. He ought to do what he thinks right. 85 Soc. But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just? What do you say? If I escape, do I wrong the Athenians or not wrong my friends?

21 Page 21 of 32 Cr. I cannot tell, Socrates, for I do not know. 87, Paragraphs Taking on the imaginary voice of the state to continue his argument, Socrates examines if escaping will be "doing right" to the people and the government of Athens. He uses logos, but he also uses pathos, describing an imaginary situation and using more colorful language. Summary Socrates takes on the voice of the state (the government) to describe what the state might say about his escape. He suggests that escaping is not only about his own punishment but is an act of rebellion "to over turn us the laws and the whole State" (88). If Socrates were to argue that his sentence was unjust, the state would respond that: He entered into an implied contract to abide by the laws of Athens and the decisions of its government in return for citizenship. Escaping would break that agreement. Socrates supports the claim that he has an agreement with the state by saying: Point A: The state brought him into existence because it allowed his parents to get married. Point B: The state educated him. Conclusion: Therefore he's a "child and slave" of the state. He continues to argue against escape on behalf of the state and compares the relationship between the citizen and the state to a child and a father. As a citizen, he has the right to convince the state that the laws are unjust and to leave Athens if he doesn't agree with the government, but to rebel now by escaping would be wrong when he had those other opportunities to address complaints. If Socrates disobeys the state, he'll be wrong for three reasons: 1. He'll also be disobeying his parents. 2. The state provided him with an education. 3. He has an agreement with the state to follow its rules. Not only did he not object to the laws that have placed him in prison when he had the chance, but there is also plenty of evidence that he was satisfied and happy with the government of Athens: He never leaves the city. He had his children in Athens.

22 Page 22 of 32 He didn't argue for exile during his trial. Finally, Socrates, still speaking as the State, points out that he's had 70 years to leave the city if he didn't like it, but he didn't leave. Therefore, he concludes, escape would be breaking the agreement he has with the state. Soc. Then consider the matter in this way: Imagine that I am about to play truant 1 (you may call the proceeding by 1. Go missing any name which you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: "Tell us, Socrates," they say; "what are you about? are you going by an act of yours to overturn us the laws and the whole State, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a State can subsist 2 and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of 2. Exist law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?" What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? Anyone, and especially a clever rhetorician, will have a good deal to urge about the evil of setting aside the law which requires a sentence to be carried out; and we might reply, "Yes; but the State has injured us and given an unjust sentence." Suppose I say that? Cr. Very good, Socrates Soc. 3 "And was that our agreement with you?" the law would say; "or were you to abide by the sentence of the State?" And if I were to express astonishment at their 3. Socrates proposes that by being a citizen of Athens, he has entered into an agreement. Escaping and not abiding by the jury's decision (even if he considers it unjust) would be breaking that agreement. His

23 Page 23 of 32 saying this, the law would probably add: "Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in t he habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us what argument is based on the assumption that not following the sentence would be a rebellious threat to the State. complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the State? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage?" 4 None, I should reply. "Or against those of us who regulate the 4. Point A: We (the state) brought you into existence because we let your parents get married. system of nurture and education of children in which you were trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge of this, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?" 5 Right, I should reply. "Well, then, since you were brought into the 5. Point B: We raised you in our education system. world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? 6 And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think 6. Conclusion: Therefore, you are a "child and slave" of the State. that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. 7 Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master, if you had 7. You can't do to us what we are doing to you because we are not on equal footing. one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands? you would not

24 Page 24 of 32 say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? 8 And will you, O professor of true virtue, say that you are justified in this? 8. If we decide to destroy you, you have no right to destroy us (by escaping and not abiding by the laws). Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed? 9 And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured 10 in silence; and if she leads us to wounds or 9. Socrates, in the voice of the State, compares the relationship between the citizen and the State to a child and a father. What do you think of this view on government? 10. Suffered through death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country." 11 What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not? 11. You can convince us (the State) that we're wrong and change our idea of what is just and right, or you can bear your punishment and duty in silence. However, don't rebel. 90 Cr. I think that they do. 91

25 Page 25 of 32 Soc. Then the laws will say: "Consider, Socrates, if this is true, that in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For, after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good that we had to give, we further proclaim and give the right to every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him; and none of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods with him. 12 But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the State, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. 13 And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice 14 wrong: first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands; 15 and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us; 12. We've brought you up and educated you, and we've also given you the right to leave the city when you grow up if you don't like how we do things here. 13. If you stay here, you are entering into an implied contract with us to do as we tell you. 14. Three times 15. If you disobey us, it is wrong for three reasons: 1. because by disobeying us, you are also disobeying your parents, 2. because we provided you with an education; and 3. because you have an agreement with us to follow our rules.

26 Page 26 of 32 that is what we offer, and he does neither. 16 These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all other Athenians." Suppose I ask, why is this? they will justly retort 17 upon me that I above 16. You have the option of convincing us that our laws are unjust, but you didn't object to them when you had the opportunity. 17. Reply all other men have acknowledged the agreement. "There is clear proof," they will say, "Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military service; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other States or their laws: 18 your affections did not go beyond us and our State; we were your especial favorites, and you acquiesced in 19 our government of you; and this is the State in which you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. 20 Moreover, you might, if you 18. In fact, not only did you not complain when you had the chance, there is proof that you liked living here in Athens: A. You never leave you don't even go to away games or on vacation. 19. Did not oppose 20. B. You had your children here. had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the trial the State which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile, and that you were not grieved at death. 21 And now you have forgotten these fine 21. C. You didn't argue for exile instead of death at your trial, even though it would have worked.

27 Page 27 of 32 sentiments, 22 and pay no respect to us, the laws, of 22. Thoughts or feelings whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true or not?" How shall we answer that, Crito? Must we not agree? Cr. There is no help, Socrates Soc. Then will they not say: "You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants 23 and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any haste 24 or under any 23. Contract, agreement 24. Hurry compulsion or deception, but having had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. 25 You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedæmon or Crete, which you often praise for their good government, 25. If you escape, you will be breaking the agreement you have with the state. You've had 70 years to leave the city if you had a problem with the government! or to some other Hellenic or foreign State. Whereas you, above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the State, or, in other words, of us her laws (for who would

28 Page 28 of 32 like a State that has no laws?), that you never stirred out of her: the halt, the blind, the maimed, were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake 26 your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you 26. Leave, abandon will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city., Paragraphs In this section, Socrates concludes his arguments, ties everything together, and confirms his decision. Summary Still speaking as if he were the voice of the state, Soc rates continues to describe why escaping would be a bad idea. He uses pathos and logos and points out that: His friends may face exile and loss of their property if they help him. He could go to a respectable city with a good government, but the people there would see him as a criminal and dislike him. He could go to a less-respectable city with a bad government, such as Thessaly, where everyone will be thrilled to hear about his escape from prison, but those citizens might turn on him. He wouldn't be able to philosophize about virtue and justice because it would offend them. If he chooses to escape for the sake of his kids, he either won't be around anyway or he'll have to take them to Thessaly, where they won't have the advantages of Athenian citizenship. Socrates, speaking as the State, says that he should consider justice before children anyway. Drawing together his earlier points, Socrates concludes that: If he submits to his punishment and dies, he'll die innocently, the victim of unjust people. If he escapes, he'll be returning evil for evil and injury for injury (doing something unjust and against the law in return for being treated unjustly); he'll be breaking his agreement with the state; and he'll be causing harm to himself, his friends, his country, and the government. The government will be angry with him and so will the gods. Socrates decides not to escape. 94

29 Page 29 of 32 "For just consider, if you transgress 1 and err 2 in this sort of way, what good will you do, either to yourself or to your 1. Break a law, agreement or boundary; 2. Make a mistake friends? That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain; 3 and you yourself, if you fly to one of the 3. If you escape, your friends might be exiled, or they might lose their property. neighboring cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as an enemy, 4 Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter 5 of the laws, and you will 4. If you flee to a respectable city with a good government, the people and the government will see you as a criminal, and they will be against you. 5. Someone who undermines or destroys the laws confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be corrupter of the young and foolish portion of mankind. 6 Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on 6. They're going to be even more likely to think you are a corrupter of youth (the crime Socrates was charged with that landed him in jail) because you really will be a criminal if you are a fugitive. these terms? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that be decent of you? Surely not. 7 But if you go away from wellgoverned States to Crito s friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and license, they will be charmed to have the tale of your escape from prison, 8 set off with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in 7. What will you do then? Will you go to the lessrespectable cities that are poorly governed? Is life worth living in that case? Or, will you go and start preaching to them about virtue and justice and laws? That's a not a very nice thing to do in a new town. 8. Thessaly, where Crito's friends live, is a perfect example. They'd love to have you and would be thrilled to hear all the details of your prison-escape story.

30 Page 30 of 32 a goatskin or some other disguise, 9 and metamorphosed as the fashion of runaways is that is very likely; but will there be no one to remind you that in 9. Wow, it really was easy to escape from prison in Athens if you could just dress up like a goat! your old age you violated the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you will live, but how? as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and doing what? eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments about justice and virtue then? 10 Say that you wish to live for the sake of 10. Maybe no one will bother you in Thessaly about having no integrity, but chances are, if they are in a bad mood, they are going to say a lot of crummy things to you. To live there, you are going to have to be "the flatterer of all men" and a servant. You'll be able to eat, but you won't be able to do what you love philosophizing about justice and virtue. your children, that you may bring them up and educate them will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is that the benefit which you would confer 11 upon them? Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them; 12 for that your friends will take care of them? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world they will not take care of them? 13 Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are truly friends, they surely will Give, bestow 12. If your justification for living is to bring up your children, what are you going to do take them to Thessaly with you where they won't be able to be Athenian citizens? Or do you think they will be better educated and cared for if you are still alive but are not around? 13. Do you really think your friends will take care of your kids if you are in Thessaly but not if you are dead?