Braithwaite'sAnalysis of Religious Belief; AnInstrumentalist Approach to Religion

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1 International Research Journal of Applied and Basic Sciences 2013 Available online at ISSN X / Vol, 4 (10): Science Explorer Publications Braithwaite'sAnalysis of Religious Belief; AnInstrumentalist Approach to Religion Mohammad HosseinMahdavinejad Assistant Prof. and Faculty Member, Department of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Payame Noor University (PNU), I.R. Iran. Corresponding Author h_mahdavinejad@yahoo.com ABSTRACT:The contemporary philosopher and physician, Richard Bevan Braithwaite ( ), is among the proponents of instrumentalist attitude.he wrote an essay in 1955 under the heading An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief which drew much attention. He has tried from the position of a religious and empirical physician to hold religious beliefs along with his philosophical and positivistic thought. Braithwaite holds that the function of religious utterances is essentially the same of the moral statements. Religion involves stories that provide a picture of moral life and encourage to that moral life. According to him, the moral and religious statements reflect prescription for and commitment to a special way of behavior and conduct. Consequently, truth and falsity about religious statements are meaningless and essentially religious stories and statements appearing in narrative form, invite their addressees to a proper pattern of life, without being factual. Braithwaite who views the role of religion as moral and expects the religion to offer prescriptions for a proper form of life, has arrived at such a view following a fully positivistic attitude. Keywords:Religious belief, Language of religion, Positivism, Instrumentalism, Morality, Braithwaite. INTRODUCTION According to instrumentalism in religion, the set of religious teachings has been offered for human beings to satisfy a proper purpose and indeed these teachings are means for meeting that purpose. The notification of these teachings is not aimed at demonstrating an affair, but satisfying it. Thus, one should consider the religious statements from instrumental aspect and should consider them as nothing but instrument for meeting the purpose of the holy religions. The divine religions have descended to communicate the earthly creature (human) with the heavenly being (God) and all the teachings of religions follow this holy purpose. Thus, the doctrines of religions concerning heaven, earth, human, angels, and the other phenomena of universe all are accounts to satisfy thatpurpose and it is not necessary for all of these accounts to correspond exactly with what is stated by them. Instrumentalism in religion removes the conflict between religion and science ignoring the feature of realism in scriptures and developing them into useful stories. In this view, the problem of resurrection, punishment and reward are useful fiction and stories that are necessary for creating and supporting the morality in society and we should consider the individual and social functions of this kind of stories and should not take into account their truth and falsity. Instrumentalism in religion emphasizes more the usefulness of religious utterances than their truthfulness and more theethical, psychological, individual and social functions of religious beliefs than their logical aspects. (Austin, 1976: pp ) Instrumentalism in religion has been interpreted in different ways and we consider it sufficient to mention Braithwaite's approach. Braithwaite and Logical Positivism According to logical positivists, the meaningfulness criterion of a statement is the verification possibility of truth and falsity of it. (Lycan, 2000: p. 116) Following Ludwig Wittgenstein ( ) in his first book "TractatusLogico-Philosophicus", the principal doctrine of positivism is: The sense of a proposition is the method of its verification. (Waismann, 1979:p. 79) Similarly, Friedrich Waismann ( ) records this remark from conversations between Wittgenstein and him and MoritzSchlick ( ): In order to determine the sense of a proposition, I should have to know a very specific procedure for when to count the proposition as verified. (Waismann, 1979:p. 47) Thus, if one cannot show the verification and confirmation of a speech, it will be nonsensical. A speech about external world is meaningful if there is a way for its truth and falsity. According to meaningfulness theory, meaningful sentences are exclusively of three types: (Braithwaite, 1971: p. 73)

2 1. Personal sentences (observation-statements)about particular matters of empirical fact; 2. Scientific universal propositions that are verifiable or falsifiable outside; 3. Mathematical and logical tautologies and their contradictories. Moral statements that there were no way for showing their truth and falsity were viewed as meaningless. Thus, some of logical positivists considered moral concepts and sentences as nonsensical and for the other the function of moral and religious statements were to express personal emotions. Alfred Jules Ayer ( ) emphasized an emotive approach to ethics. He suggested that ethical statements express the feelings of the speaker. For example, When I say, Stealing money is bad. this is just another way of saying Stealing money!! with a particularly strong show of feeling. Since no factual statement is being made, you can disagree with my moral feelings but you cannot contradict me. (Stiver, 1996: p. 45) ButBraithwaite believed that in addition to the expression of emotion there is a kind of motivation in these statements. According to him, the function of religion is not merely emotive; because religion states the intention of performing the action in a certain way. Braithwaite emphasizes moral intentions and encouragement to moral behavior in his analysis and states: A religious assertion, for me, is the assertion of an intention to carry out a certain behavior policy, subsumable under a sufficiently general principle to be a moral one, together with the implicit or explicit statement, but not the assertion, of certain stories. (Braithwaite, 1971: p. 89) Thus, the criterion in the preference of one religion over another religion is not the distinction between the truth in the stories of one religion and the falsity in the stories of the another, but the criterion of being or not being preferable is a way of behavior or life that religion encourages in it. If the way of life in question is the same in two religions, then the criterion will be the degree of success in encouraging of humans in commitment to that way of life. For some positivists, ethics were not nothing but personal emotions and feelings. For example, Stealing is wrong. means I hates stealing., not as a universal rule but as a personal feeling. However, for Braithwaite, Stealing is wrong. Means I am determined never to steal. This decision is not a proper intention for a certain case, but it is an intention for following a universal rule. Thus, moral assertions are the external forms of asserter's intention for acting in a way asserted to it in assertion content. According to Braithwaite, if this were so, it would follow that it would be logically impossible to intend to act wrongly. He views action and faith as one thing and says: action is a sign of faith sincerity. Thus, it is unacceptable that one professes faith, but he is not a believer in practice. Although many positivists try to give a cognitive aspect to moral statements to express the emotions and feelings of individuals, Braithwaite finds out in an exact view that moral statements are not essentially statements with the cognitive aspect and they don't speak about something to be a way empirically for their verification or falsification. In the positivistic course, he understood that moral statements are neither verifiable nor falsifiable. According to Braithwaite, moral statements are not factual; because otherwise, since there is not a way for their verification and falsification, they become meaningless. Denying cognitive content, Braithwaite holds the meaningfulness of moral statements. He lambastes the criterion of positivism meaningfulness and rules out the implication between the non-cognitivism of moral statements and their meaninglessness and holds that positivists have considered denying the cognitive content as denying the content absolutely, falling into the morass of fallacy. According to the verifiability principle,positivists should have said that moral statements lack cognitive meaning and concept, but not they lack any meaning and concept. Braithwaite and positivists are of the same opinion that if a statement had the cognitive content, it would be factual and should have a way of verification and falsification, that is, he accepts their criterion in cognitive meaning exclusively, but he holds that meaning doesn't depend upon verification and falsification absolutely. The Meaningfulness oflanguage of Religion Instead of the empirical verifiability criterion, Braithwaite directs his attention to the usability and serviceability. Making use of Wittgenstein's use theory, he concentrates on the meaningfulness of moral statements. One of the linguistic foundations of Braithwaite's view is Wittgenstein's use theory concerning meaningfulness on the basis of that if a discourse has usability and serviceability, it will be meaningful and if a speech has not any use, it will be meaningless; just as if a coin has no use, it will be worthless and valueless. (Stiver, 1996: p. 72; Alizamani, 1996: p. 160)In this theory, worthiness is not intrinsic for the moral and religious statements, but they become worthy or valuable through use and usage. Therefore, moral statements become meaningful. In summary, first, language of religion is a meaningful language because this language has a proper use and usage. Second, language of religion is like language of ethics. Third, in language of religion, one should focus more on the functions of this language rather than the verification of its content. Fourth, the principal function of language of religion is to createa kind of commitment sense to a moral universal behavior or conduct in life and prescription of others for it. (Peterson, 1991: p. 146) God is love. Means I intend always to have a

3 lovely life and prescribe you to choose such form of life. Braithwaite takes advantage of some points about religious knowledge to affirm his theory. Religious Knowledge and Functional Approach Every religion includes a range of thoughts, values, acts, liturgical rites (rituals) and teachings about the form of life and tendencies and moral characteristics. A religious person is a person to whom some qualities are attributed and does some acts. Given belief in God and non-material objects, what is their role in encouraging in act.according to Braithwaite, religious statements explain moral truths attractively narrating stories that include a certain form of life. Religions narrate these stories for their audience appealingly and capture their spirit and imagination and lead them to a form of moral conduct by causal-psychological effectiveness. Stories are the group of doctrines which can be experienced, but it is not necessary to believe in their truth because their role is to arouse practical commitment in person. Braithwaite states: Next to the Bible and the Prayer Book the most influential work in English Christian religious life has been a book whose stories are frankly recognized as fictitious- Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress; and some of the most influential works in setting the moral tone of my generation were the novels of Dostoevsky. It is completely untrue, as a matter of psychological fact, to think that the only intellectual considerations which affect action are beliefs: it is all the thoughts of a man that determine his behavior; and these include his phantasies, propositions, ideas of what he would wish to be and do, as well as the propositions which he believes to be true. (Braithwaite, 1971: p ) Starting point of Braithwaite's instrumentalism is in his position that says: on my view, a person is not a true Christian unless he intends to live in accordance with Christian moral principles and links his intention to thought about Christian stories as well. However, it is not necessary for him to hold that experimental statements presented by stories correspond with experimental fact and are true. He claims that we should take psychological effectiveness into consideration instead of constantly trying to find logical causes. Such effectiveness provokes humans and leads them to action and in this respect, the role of religion is like art and literature role and changes the life of humans efficiently and influentially. Therefore, apostasy and the conversion of religion mean the alteration of decision and will for following a form of life rather than the change in philosophical and rational arguments. (Austin, 1976: p. 45) Those who appeal to religion usually choose a proper form of life and reject another form of life. When a prophet invites, more than all, the life of followers are changed. According to Braithwaite, a believer without act is unjustifiable and unacceptable and the principal message of religion is that it teaches a new form of life to humans, that is, the very moral teachings. All stories in scriptures are instruments for reinforcement, stabilization and prescription for a kind of moral conduct and a proper form of life. For example, stories that narrate the toleration of Jesus' suffering and hardships and his Crucifixion teach self-sacrifice lesson and stories that narrate Jesus' sympathy for people teach love of the public. Religious beliefs and thoughts are evolving, that is, their meaning and concept change. The followers' thought of religions concerning creation, devil, human and God, angels, paradise and hell, resurrection and etc. evolve continually. The truth of these matters is not necessary but it is sufficient for them to have a role in arousing practical commitment. It is enough for thestory of the city destruction of Lut's folk to make some people avoid from sodomy. The aim of the prophets is the provoking of moral decisions. God, paradise, hell, and etc. are aimed at giving more influence and insistence to ethical commands so as to lead the people to action and all religious narrations are instructive and advice-oriented and invite to purity. According to Braithwaite, one cannot explain the changeability of religion regarding the religious concepts and teachings as true. However, instrumentalism in religion not only recognizes this changeability but also deems it as necessary. For Braithwaite, non-empirical religious statements are not problematic because scientific theories have unobservable concepts too, like atomic theory. The existence of such theories in itself is not a sign of being unscientific and meaninglessness. God, paradise, hell, angels, and etc. are declared as non-empirical when one cannot derive other empirical theories from them, or the assumption of their existence or nonexistence is the same outside. As atom and intelligence and etc. are not observable and the theories requiring the existence of atom and intelligence, have empirical effects and results, religion has empirical results too, that is, it creates commitment to a proper way in the person's life. According to Braithwaite, conversion to another religion is not appealing to a philosophical or scientific school or set of beliefs, but is appealing to another way of life. It indicates that the nature of religion is the very orientation in life rather than beliefs and doctrines. An apostate leaves a form of life and chooses the another form. Thus, the whole of religion and its principal message is to inculcate a proper way of moral behavior in humans in life. Therefore, the religion is interpreted selectively. The clergies of religions offer a part of religious teachings to people every time that serve for their life.in this direction, some times some secondary problems become so principal and fundamental that person's fidelity and faith depend on it. Braithwaite states: this fact is explained with instrumentalism in religion. One can say that in every times we select a story among religious stories to be appropriate and useful for the life of people. If today the light in the story of the companions of the

4 Cave is twinkling and it is about to die out, tomorrow it is possible that its burner will be pulled up and its light and heat will be used for utility and expediency. The Assessment and Criticism of Braithwaite's Theory Critique1 The first critique ofbraithwaite's theory is that his analysis from religious statements as useful fictions is very different from what is common in religious society and believers' convention because the faithful believe in real entity and objective existence of God, paradise and etc. and even accept objectivity in religious stories. Braithwaite in this claim that religious beliefs cause to change the way of people's life and the ontological orientation of humans is right, but he has failed to explain and analyze this change. The reason that religious beliefs cause to change the form of people's life is not purely on the basis of their imaginative and psychological effectiveness, but it is for the belief of their truth. For the faithful, religious beliefs originate from the reality. Otherwise, if one deems them as mere fiction, how religious beliefs will be the agent of ontological orientation and the change in the form of people's life, whereas even they sometimesare willing to devote their life for these beliefs. Our purpose is not to deny the effectiveness of imaginative and artistic attractions in audience, but what is the case is that if religious beliefs and stories are not real, how can they have so profound and comprehensive effectiveness over the centuries and long periods? The cause of the effectiveness of the prophets' teachings in changing the ontological orientation of humans is primarily the truthfulness of these teachings and in the second their literary and artistic attractions. Critique2 Scientific advances can wipe out the moral effectiveness of religious stories indirectly. Theory of evolution and its theological implications are a clear evidence for this claim. When the falsity of religious stories is revealed by the development of science, it will be difficult to obligate people to act. On the other hand, given if we look at religious stories that belief in their truth is not a required condition for their effectiveness instructively, then first, besides religious stories, there are other false stories to be all ears for them. Second, we can find other true stories that may be more effective and efficient. Critique3 Indeed, Braithwaite has laid the theory of non-cognitivism of religious language on the basis of positivists' foundations. Accepting their foundations about theological statements, he says: if we don't regard theological statements as moral statements, they won't have any concept and meaning. Unless religious principles are moral principles, it makes no sense to speak of putting them into practice. (Austin, 1976: p. 42)Braithwaite's reason is that if theological statements are meaningful, they should be verifiable and empirical. This is the very primal core of positivists' discourse. On the other hand, the only way of meaningfulness of religious knowledge is not to connect it to moral thoughts. The linguistic foundation of Braithwaite's view is Wittgenstein's use theory about meaningfulness, whereas the usage are secondary to the understanding of discourse meaning. One of the assumptions of such theories is that the criterion of meaningfulness should merely be one criterion, whereas we can mention various criteria for meaningfulness. Thus, the confinement of meaningfulness criterion to a proper criterion is groundless and misleading. Critique4 Braithwaite has reduced religion to morality incorrectly. Religion is broader than morality and moral statements consist of only a part of religion. Another part concludes statements that have cognitive aspect as compared with existence and finally the third part as jurisprudence states our relations. Braithwaite's analysis about the metaphysical attributes of God is incomplete and imperfect and does not cover all of them. Although we can accept that the statement of God is love. is denoting asserter's intention for following a kind of form of life together with love and means Live lovingly., the statement of God is eternal. don t include the commitment and prescription for audience because the pre-eternity and post-eternity are not possible for audience to be prescribed for them. Thus, Braithwaite's analysis about many of the religious statements is not true. Furthermore, his definition of the language of religion only is applied toa small part of religious statements and is not applied to the great part of religious statements. According to John H. Hick: The Christian stories to which Braithwaite refers in the course of his lecture are of very diverse logical types. They include straightforward historical statements about the life of Jesus, mythological expressions of belief in creation and a final judgment, and belief in the existence of God. Of these, only the first category appears to fit Braithwaite's own definition of a story. (Hick, 1991: p. 94) Critique5 Religious statements don't only state moral purposes and intentions. Language of religion and even religious language is a phenomenon with hidden meanings and can simultaneously bear several contents. It is

5 impossible that a religious statement indicates both reality and our moral intentions. For example, among the theological statements of the language of religion, the statement of There is no god but Allah. is a case in point. This sentence bears two contents; cognitive and informative content that indicates the fact and functional content that includes the moral purposes. Religious statements have both doctrinal and cognitive aspect and moral aspect in religious society and believers' practice. Indeed, Braithwaite has fallen into the morass of false disjunction fallacy because he has thought that religious sentences have either cognitive or moral aspect as an exclusive proposition. (Mahdavinejad, 2011: p. 206) Critique6 We should ask Braithwaite: is your analysis about religious statements a description of reality or it is nothing but a proposal? In the first case, we will say that this description is false. The faithful regard theological statements as comprising informative content. According to them, religious beliefs are true and religious stories are free of falsity. In the second case, there is no reason to accept your proposal and essentially the task of philosophy of religion is description, notproposal. Critique7 According to Braithwaite's analysis of moral statements denoting person's decision for acting, the statement of Lying is wrong. means I intend never to lie. Logical criterion for the recognition of two equivalent propositions is that from the falsity of one results the falsity ofanother because the negation of one and the affirmation of the anotherwill be a contradiction. If Lying is wrong. is equivalent to I intend never to lie. then the expression of Lying is wrong, but I intend to tell a lie is contradictory. (Hick, 1991: p. 94) Whereas such expressions don't include a contradiction with attention to common sense and everyday life of people. It can be said as a reply to this criticism: Contradiction is proper to cognitive language and there is not any contradiction in non-cognitive language. At most, it is possible for it to include contrast or contrariety. Second that the condition of contradiction realization is ten unities. The two sentences Lying is wrong. and Lying is not wrong. are contradictory, but for Braithwaite the sentence of Lying is wrong, but I intend to tell a lie. is not self-contradictory. As if in the first part we have declared our commitment to moralities universally and in the second part we have particularized it. Thus, there is no contradiction between a universal matter like I intend never to lie. and its particularization I intend to tell a lie (now and in these circumstances). Although we reprimand those who intend on purpose to act wrongly, we don't regard their speech as self-contradictory. CONCLUSION Braithwaite doesn't accept the meaningfulness criterion of logical positivists in the realm of ethics and religion and doesn't regard the positivists' justification as being correct concerning ethics as the expression of personal feeling. Instead of empirical verifiability criterion, he puts forward the criterion of use and justifies the meaningfulness of religious and moral statements on the basis of it. According to his view, religious statements are not informative, but they are regarded as moral statements that have two kinds of function disjunctively negation. First, they indicate asserter's intention for and commitment to following a general moral rule and a conduct according to a universal policy. Religious statements indicate asserter's intention and commitment to following a universal policy and prescribe to the audience. Thus, the meaning of God is love. is that I intend to have a lovely life and prescribe you to choose a kind of form of life and live lovingly. Religious statements narrate moral truths with the use of stories more attractively and appealingly and deal more and more with internal behaviors and inmost feelings. The effectiveness of the stories of religions on human souls is a psychological effectiveness and the belief in their correspondence to the facts is not necessary and the condition of their effectiveness on the audience doesn't pertain to their cognitive enjoyment from the facts. The meaning of apostasy and conversion is the change of decision and intention for following by a form of life rather than the change of philosophical and rational arguments. The diversity of religions of the same substance pertains to both the stories that these religions narrate and their effectiveness degree on the souls. REFERENCES Alizamani, Amir A The Language of Religion. Qom: The Center of Publication of the office of Islamic Propagation. Austin,WilliamH The Relevance of Natural Science to Theology.The Macmillan Press Ltd. Braithwaite, R.B An Empiricists View of the Nature of ReligiousBelief in ThePhilosophy of Religion. ed. Basil Mitchell,Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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