CONCLUSION TO PART I

Transcription

1 T CONCLUSION TO PART I he implication of our discussion in Part I concerning the nature of divine etemity is that the question of whether a tensed or a tenseless theory of time is correct is truly a watershed issue for the doctrine of divine etemity. Specifically whether tense and temporal becoming are objective features of reality will be determinative for whether it is possible for God to be unqualifiedly timeless. For example, some ofthe arguments for divine timelessness which we examined hinged upon one's presupposition of a tensed or tenseless theory oftime. The fourth argument-that if God is temporal in virtue of His knowledge of tensed facts, He is also spatial-amounted to an argument against a tensed theory of time. I indicated that partisans of tensed time who hold to divine atemporality must in response show either how God can know tensed facts without being drawn into time (and space) or why His ignorance of tensed facts does not impugn His omniscience. But in the last chapter we saw that this seems to be an impossible task. On the other hand, if the advocate of tensed time holds to divine temporality, he must explain why the existence of temporally tensed facts does not imply the existence of spatially ''tensed'' facts as weil or how a spaceless deity could know such facts. l Or again, the fifth argument-that only a timeless God could create two discrete time seriesended inconclusively, pending a discussion of creation on tensed and tenseless theories of time respectively. If our subsequent argument in chapter 3 was sound, we have now seen that a timeless deity could not in fact create two discrete time series if a tensed theory of time is correct, since such a deity could not even create one time series and remain timeless. The fifth argument therefore depends for its cogency upon the presupposition of a tenseless theory of time, on which the timeless creation of multiple time series becomes unproblematic. Or again, the thirteenth argument-that only a timeless God could be a perfect knower-seemed to backfrre on the atemporalist, for it left him with the task of explaining how a timeless God could know tensed facts about events in addition to the tenseless dates and temporal relations of events. We saw in the last chapter that this task seems hopeless, given a tensed theory of time. In our discussion of arguments for divine temporality, we found that the two most powerful arguments-the one based on God's creative action in the world and the other on God's omniscience-are sound only on the presupposition of a tensed theory of time. The proponent of tenseless time, who denies tensed facts and temporal becoming, eludes these arguments because God and the universe co-exist tenselessly and there just are no tensed facts to be known. -an issue I take up in my The Tensed Theory 0/ Time: a Critical Examination, Synthese Library (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), chap

2 PART I: CONCLUSION 135 The doctrine of divine timelessness is thus, so far as we have seen, unobjectionable given a tenseless theory of time. In the absence of such objections, the argument from the imperfection arising from the transiency of temporal experience might well justify a doctrine of divine timelessness. How might such a theory look? Certainly not like the unintelligible Stump-Kretzmann model or the pseudo-scientific Leftow model; rather it would postulate the tenseless, or extrinsically timeless, existence of the four-dimensional world. Though extrinsically timeless, this tenselessly existing block universe is ordered along one of its dimensions by tenseless relations of earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than, akin to the tenseless relations less than, equal to, and greater than, so that it is intrinsically temporal. Temporal becoming is a subjective illusion of consciousness; all things/events simply exist tenselessly at their temporal locations. There is no objective distinction between past, present, and future, these predicates being subjective ways of relating things/events/moments to oneself. Similarly, tensed discourse and temporal indexicals are subjective forms of referring and relating to things/events/moments. Einstein's relativistic ether, while no reference frame, may nonetheless be conceived as God's "frame of reference" for the physical world. He and it may be imagined to co-exist in a fictitious higher dimensional space in which the four-dimensional block universe is embedded. All points in space, time, and space-time are equally real and accessible to Hirn; indeed, creation just is the tenseless, ontological dependence of this four-dimensional block and all its constituents on God. Though it never comes into nor passes out of being, it is nevertheless radically contingent in its existence. God knows all the temporal facts about the universe, what is happening (tenselessly) at every moment and every place. Since there really is no past, present, or future, God's knowledge oftenseless facts is exhaustive of all the facts there are, and His knowledge of the world may be conceived in terms oftenseless propositions describing the world. Given a tenseless theory of time we have no need of devices like ET -simultaneity or the Zero Thesis; God's timelessness in relation to the world becomes perspicuous. On the other hand, given a tensed theory of time, divine timelessness seems to be metaphysically impossible. A pure tensed theory enjoins an ontology of presentism, according to which only the present "slice" of space-time exists. Things come into and pass out of existence; events happen as they do; time elapses. The distinction between past, present, and future is real; the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist, even tenselessly. Therefore, God cannot co-exist with any time but the present, for that is the only time there iso The universe does not merely depend upon God for its (present) existence; it was literally brought into being by God and subsequently sustained by Hirn. Tense is an objective feature of reality which is mirrored in our language. Therefore, there are tensed facts ab out what has happened, is happening, and will happen in the universe, which any omniscient being must know. Given a tensed theory of time, therefore, God's timeless existence is, as we have argued, metaphysically impossible. On a tensed theory oftime God's temporal existence is, however, unproblematic. God exists simultaneously with every time; that is to say, He existed in the past, exists in the present, and will exist in the future, so long as time shall last. He

3 136 PART I: CONCLUSION sustains every thing in existence at the moment of its being present and knows every present-tense truth at that same time. His activity and knowledge are thus constantly changing, but there is no reason to think that He is not therefore immutable in His perfection. Being omniscient, He will have complete knowledge of the past and of the future, in virtue of His knowledge of all tensed facts. Many interesting philosophical questions will remain to be answered concerning God's creation of time, the relation of God's time to physical time, and so forth, but the notion that God is temporal seems perspicuous on a tensed theory oftime. That leads us to wonder whether the tenseless theory is compatible with divine temporality. The tenseless theory accords so naturally with a doctrine of divine timelessness that it seems at first blush bizarre to suggest that God exists as a sort of one-dimensional string or world line. Though few have espoused such a view, a notable exception is D. H. Mellor, the most important contemporary defender of a tenseless view of time. In a remarkable article in the Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, Mellor tries to persuade theologians to adopt a tenseless theory of time. He declares, "Clearing our vision of time in this way is a good example of the service that true, i.e. analytic, philosophy can render to theology.,,2 According to Mellor the right way to think of a tenseless creation is not to think that God created a temporally extended world "all at once," for this would mean "at one time"; rather it is to think that God successively creates every thing at the time of its existence. "So God does create the world's contents successively, but not because anything is ever future and therefore does not then exist. Everything always exists, but because it is always spread out in time, so is its Creator.,,3 On this view God exists co-temporally with the products of creation in a B-series of moments. Such a view might seem to make God a part of the world, so that the question arises: what sustains the four-dimensional block consisting of God and the universe in existence? But Mellor insists that such a question is illicit. So long as God is other than and independent of His creation, God may be said to be "outside" the world and even "outside" time. Not that God exists in some sort of eternity, which Mellor characterizes as "problematic." Oddly, however, the problems Mellor mentions with respect to timeless eternity are the difflculties the doctrine faces if a tensed theory of time is true. He specifically notes the incoherence that arises from trying to reconcile God's timelessness with the traditional notion oftime's flow. He thinks that the doctrine of divine timelessness is motivated by adesire to exempt God from changes in His knowledge wrought by the flux of tensed facts and champions bis alternative because "on the tenseless view, there are no such changing facts: God can be in time without His knowledge ever needing to change.,,4 Mellor's view is that God knows only the tenseless facts which serve to D. H. Mellor, "History without the Flow oftime," Neue Zeitschriftfür systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 28 (1986): 75. J Ibid., p. 73. Ibid., p. 74.

4 PART I: CONCLUSION 137 make our tensed beliefs true, so that there is no change in God's knowledge, although He is temporal. Thus, Mellor denies to God those very tensed beliefs which MacBeath, the only other theorist of tenseless time I know of who inclines toward divine temporality, found so important to God's experience of our world that he for that very reason seemed disposed to place God in time.s Mellor's view faces the severe difficulty of explaining how God, lacking tensed beliefs, can act in a timely fashion, since He never knows at what moment He exists: He lacks all beliefs de praesenti. Since He is not timeless, but exists moment by moment successively, He must act at each moment to bring about the effects at that moment. But MeHor's God never knows at what moment He is located. If Mellor holds that by a single, continuing action at every time God brings about at each time all the effects in the entire B-series (which also seems necessary to preserve God's immutability), then he must posit action at a distance on God's part, which Mellor specifically rejects in arguing that God creates successively, moment by moment. It seems to me, therefore, that if God is temporal on a tenseless theory of time, we have to adopt MacBeath's, rather than Mellor's, viewpoint and accede to God tensed beliefs as weh as a succession of actions. But then God's possessing such a non-veridical experience of the way the world really is becomes difficult to reconcile with His cognitive perfection. Moreover, if God exists in time on a tenseless theory of time, the question of whether He is composed of temporal parts or stages cannot be avoided. If the tenseless theory implies that entities are temporally extended objects and the doctrine of temporal parts proves to be unacceptable, then God cannot be rightly conceived to exist in tenseless time. 6 In any case, what is clear is that the doctrine of divine timelessness stands or falls with the tenseless theory of time. The tenseless theory of time is the metaphysical presupposition of divine timelessness. Not that the defender of divine atemporality must prove this theory to be correct; he may simply presuppose it in the absence of good reasons to prefer the tensed theory of time. Thus, the doctrine of divine timelessness is tenable so long as the tensed theory has not been shown to be a superior account of temporal reality. As the tenseless theory of time fares, so also fares the doctrine of divine timelessness. An adjudication of the doctrine of divine timelessness is therefore made feasible by-and probably necessitates-an adjudication of the tensed vs. tenseless theory of time. Few philosophers of religion have been wiuing to undertake seriously this task. But apart from such an assessment, as we have seen, the most importarit arguments for and against divine timelessness remain inconclusive. The adjudication of this debate within the philosophy of space and time is therefore of critical importance and cannot be avoided. See Murray MacBeath, "Omniscience and Etemity I," Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1989): See discussion in my The Tenseless Theory 0/ Time: a Critical Examination Synthese Library (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), chap. 9.

5 138 PART I: CONCLUSION I have undertaken this task in extenso in two companion volwnes 7 and shall in the practical interests of space rest content with swnmarizing my findings there. The superiority of the tensed theory of time over the tenseless theory of time may be shown by means of the following considerations. I. Argwnents for the Tensed Theory oftime A. Tensed sentences, which can neither be translated into synonymous tenseless sentences nor be given tenseless, tokenreflexive truth conditions, correspond, if true, to tensed facts. B. The experience of temporal becoming, like our experience of the external world, is properly regarded as veridical. 11. Refutation of Argwnents against the Tensed Theory oftime A. McTaggart's celebrated paradox is based upon the misguided marriage of a tenseless ontology of events or things with objective temporal becoming, as weil as the unjustified asswnption that there should exist a unique, complete description of reality. B. The passage oftime is not a myth, but a metaphor for objective temporal becoming, a notion which can be consistently explicated on apresentist metaphysic. III. Refutation of Argwnents for the Tenseless Theory oftime A. Temporal becoming is compatible with Relativity Theory ifwe reject space-time realism in favor of a neo-lorentzian interpretation ofthe formalism ofthe theory. B. Time as it plays a role in physics is a pale abstraction of a rieher metaphysical reality, omitting indexical elements such as the "here" and the ''now'' in the interest of universalizing the formulations of naturallaws. IV. Argwnents against the Tenseless Theory of Time A. In the absence of objective distinctions between past, present, and future, the relations ordering events on the tenseless theory are only gratuitously regarded as genuinely temporal relations of earlierllater than. B. The claim that temporal becoming is mind-dependent is selfdefeating, since the subjective illusion of becoming involves itself an objective becoming in the contents of consciousness. See my Tensed Theory oftime and Tenseless Theory oftime.

6 PART I: CONCLUSION 139 C. The tenseless theory entails perdurantism, the doctrine that objects have spatio-temporal parts, a view which is metaphysically counter-intuitive, incompatible with moral accountability, and entails the bizarre counterpart doctrine of transworld identity. D. The tenseless theory is theologically objectionable, since its claim that God and the universe co-exist tenselessly is incompatible with a robust doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. For ab these reasons I am convinced that time is tensed and that therefore God exists in time. What remains, then, is to explicate a coherent doctrine of divine eternity in light ofwhat contemporary philosophy and physics tell us about the nature oftime.