A Multitude of Selves: Contrasting the Cartesian and Nietzschean views of selfhood

Transcription

1 A Multitude of Selves: Contrasting the Cartesian and Nietzschean views of selfhood One s identity as a being distinct and independent from others is vital in order to interact with the world. A self identity allows one to make decisions, actions, and to make interpretations of experiences. A self is difficult to define, though. The current cultural definition of human nature as rational is limiting because it ignores other aspects and explanations for actions and feelings. Is a logical, internal self truly valuable? The Nietzschean conception of self rejects the Cartesian view of the internal thinker in order to provide a more holistic approach. The traditional view that humans are rational beings is supported by René Descartes s view of the self. Though early in his meditation he rejects the idea that he exists as a rational being, due only to lack of definition, his reliance on thought processes to uncover truth does require logic and rationality. In the Meditations, Descartes sets out to discover the truths and falsehoods of the world and of human experience. He asserts that the one most basic truth is that he does in fact exist, and that he exists as precisely nothing but a thinking thing, that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason. 1 Descartes turns away from reliance on sensations and bodily perception because of their aptness to deceive and trick the mind into believing or creating falsehoods. He holds the mind to higher standards than the body and asserts that only through thinking may one discover truths. External things are not perceived through their being touched or seen, but only through their being understood 2 by using the power of the mind. Though it seems that people see and understand with the eyes, those objects and ideas are grasped solely with the faculty of judgment, which is in [the] mind. 3 1 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy in Which the Existence of God and the Distinction Between the Soul and the Body are Demonstrated, pg 65 2 Ibid 69 3 Ibid 68

2 Everything exists in the mind and is therefore able to be understood through the mind and conscious thought. Descartes s meditation on the wax reveals that perception is through the mind alone 4 and that though it previously seemed based in sense perception, sensation is deceptive due to the constant external changes it reports to the mind. Objects may manifest in certain ways at one time and in other ways at a later time, as the wax did, 5 but the one constant is that the wax remains recognizable as a stable object to the perceiving mind. The perception of the wax is neither a seeing, nor a touching, nor an imagining rather it is an inspection on the part of the mind. 6 Descartes imagines the self as the powerful agent of thoughts, which one is conscious of and thus able to control. The self created out of this exclusivity is very limited. What is the value of defining a self in terms of itself? Descartes wonders who is this I whom I know? 7 and can only go as far as ascribing himself as author of his own thoughts. 8 His definition of self is circular and does nothing to shed light on the dilemma of selfhood. Friedrich Nietzsche rejects Descartes view that the completely internal thinker constitutes the definition of self. The idea that there is a dominant and controlling self or agent of thought is something added and invented and projected 9 by humans. There is no true self, but rather a constructed self that allows interpretation and understanding of the external world. Nietzsche rejects the notion that the I created by Descartes s thinking being is the given cause of thought, 10 and asserts that the sensation of thinking is a fictional phenomenon. What 4 Ibid 5 Ibid 67 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 65 8 Ibid 63 9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), pg Ibid 268

3 Descartes desired was that thought should have, not an apparent reality, but a reality in itself 11 which does not exist. All reality is relative and is interpreted by individuals in order to organize and understand their surroundings. All reality is based on the world of appearances, on the physical and sensible world. Friedrich Hegel also conceptualizes selves as social creatures, dependent on the presence of others. Selves recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another. 12 Selves may only become aware that they are individuals when one individual is confronted by another individual. 13 There only arises a need for selfhood in a social context, when one self must differentiate from another. In the social context, one self is given the tools to differentiate from another. This would account for how the Nietzschean ego, the internalized subject, is created. The construction of a doer allows an individual to understand what actions arise from themself, rather than from others. In the physical world, one needs to be aware of what actions are ones own and what are another s in order to avoid utter chaos. The need to understand concepts or to recognize objects arises when people wish to communicate to others. Having knowledge of the properties of wax is no good if one cannot communicate them to others, or use these ideas to enlighten world experience. The world of appearances may deceive, as Descartes states, but without sensation and deception, there would be no thinking thing. There would be no reason to think, no things to think about. Rather than being destructive, deceptions may allow a thinking thing, to gain a better understanding of itself and its place in the world, among other selves. Descartes s rejection 11 Ibid [italics in original] 12 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. AV Miller (Dehli: Shri Jainendra Press, 1998), section 184, [italics in original removed] 13 Ibid 186

4 of the world of appearances severely limits the value of his idea of self. He rejects those things that are unknown to him some subtle air a wind a fire a vapor a breath 14 as nothings. Though it is difficult to challenge his assertion that all concepts are already present in the mind and within the self, one wonders what the value of these ideas and objects are without context. An internal self has no true value. Raising the logical self up is problematic because it dismisses all other aspects of the self and its experience in the world. At one point in the Meditations, Descartes seems to entertain the notion that each thought may come from a different self, a different I, though he quickly reasserts that it is the same I who imagines, senses and thinks. 15 Nietzsche grasps this concept and turns it around. The postulate I think therefore I am and there is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks 16 are both severely flawed. Rather than accepting the single thinking core labeled as I, Nietzsche instead assume[s] a multiplicity of subjects 17 one for each thought. Thus, the only claim Descartes can make is simply: there is thinking, therefore there are thoughts. 18 One cannot so easily assign a thinker without proof, especially if one is being radically sceptical about the rest of the appearances of the world as Descartes is. Nietzsche s theory of multiplicity and created unity more fully accounts for human experience. The subject is a multiplicity of mental processes, actions, feelings, and desires. all intertwined. 19 Though traditional views hold that the subject is a thing-in-itself, a single thinker, 14 Descartes Ibid Nietzsche Ibid Ibid T Le, "Overview of Nietzsche's Philosophy", The Le Foundation, 2002, pg 10,

5 Nietzsche asserts that our selves are the sum of all those perceptions 20 we gain from interacting with the physical world. Nietzsche likens the traditional, Cartesian understanding of selves to a ranked aristocracy. It is believed that there is a ruler the thinker and subjects the thoughts and other aspects of character but this is a constructed falsehood. The ruler and his subjects are of the same kind, all feeling, willing, thinking 21 in equal measure. The ruler is created in order to organize thoughts, actions, and feelings and to give a sense of control. It is merely created out of utility rather than truth. The traditional self relies too heavily on this view and restricts and represses the experience of self as a sensing, changing being. Sometimes this hierarchy is necessary for understanding, but the value relations must take into consideration usefulness and harmfulness. 22 The repression of impulses and lack of recognition that selves are complex beings may limit one s experience of the world or cause psychological traumas. Logic cannot solve all problems and cannot adequately perceive all phenomena of the world Nietzsche asks: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality or are they a means and measure for us to create reality, the concept reality, for ourselves? 23 It is most definitely the latter. Though Descartes holds logic to be the key to truth and understanding, there is no great truth to reach. Reality is relative and is created by each individual. Every experience and each contact with other individuals effects perception and understanding of the world. Logical analysis is only one aspect of the perceiving self; it is not the core or dependent agent. Nietzsche consequently proposes that selves are in constant flux, a constant state of becoming. The traditional view that selves are beings comes about because we have to be stable in our beliefs if we are to prosper, we have made the real world not of change and becoming, but one of 20 Nietzsche Ibid Ibid Ibid 279

6 being. 24 The need to be comes from the Cartesian self of a core thinker that can control its actions and thoughts and must therefore be a constant and stable agent, though this is not the true experience of the world. Individuals are able to recognize a change in their selves over time, yet are hesitant to extend this definition of self to others. Every experience and impulse, every instant results in a slightly different self. One may believe that they keep track of these changes internally and so gain a sense of control, but this sensation cannot be extended to others. However, these changes are minute and only noticeable over time. One can argue that there are certain aspects of the personality that are relatively stable. Dominant aspects of the self 25 called character traits allow recognition by others even amid internal change. There is a need for consistency and control, which creates the delusion that selves are constant and stable. Though the stability of self created by the Cartesian view has merit, the internal thinker is extremely limiting as the only measure of self. In order to account for the full human experience, one must recognize that there are many more aspects that constitute the self. Nietzsche s assertion that selves are created out of necessity and from a social context is more sensible. Selves are a product of change, of experiences, feelings, logic, and many more impulses. Though this seems problematic and chaotic, there are character traits, and external bodily form, which allows others to identify an individual. Selves are very complex ideas, which might even be false completely. In order to make sense of the world, though, a sense of self identity is necessary in some form or another. word count: Ibid Le 4