On Breaking the Spell of Irrationality (with treatment of Pascal s Wager) Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/27/17 version 2 RPI

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1 On Breaking the Spell of Irrationality (with treatment of Pascal s Wager) Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/27/17 version 2 RPI

2 Some Logistics

3 Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes on Steeples of Rationalistic Genius.

4 Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes on Steeples of Rationalistic Genius. Last mtg is Test #3. Must understand our Gödelian coverage! You can plan now to need to take a stand on R, or some aspect thereof, in one of your essays. And you will need to anticipate and rebut at least one powerful objection to your stand/argument.

5 Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes on Steeples of Rationalistic Genius. Last mtg is Test #3. Must understand our Gödelian coverage! You can plan now to need to take a stand on R, or some aspect thereof, in one of your essays. And you will need to anticipate and rebut at least one powerful objection to your stand/argument. Now some particulars for particular students

6 Well Kyle, thx! See:

7 For those writing on Newcomb s Problem: Pollock &

8 For those writing on Newcomb s Problem: Pollock &

9 On Religion & Rationality versus

10 The Book Found this on W3:

11 Once Broken, Religious People are Freed to be Truly Rational

12

13 Here s how it works:

14 Here s how it works: Theists and atheists share an affirmation of, and both in fact use, a common thing: thinking tools (= cultural software ) that cut(s) across all human beings.

15 Here s how it works: Theists and atheists share an affirmation of, and both in fact use, a common thing: thinking tools (= cultural software ) that cut(s) across all human beings. Human beings, blessed as they are with a capacity for meta-reasoning and meta-representations and metarepresentational capacity (recall recursion and hierarchical reasoning from PHP & our discussion of their BBS paper), can be brought to a realization that thinking tools, suitably deployed, entails the truth of atheism.

16 Here s how it works: Theists and atheists share an affirmation of, and both in fact use, a common thing: thinking tools (= cultural software ) that cut(s) across all human beings. Human beings, blessed as they are with a capacity for meta-reasoning and meta-representations and metarepresentational capacity (recall recursion and hierarchical reasoning from PHP & our discussion of their BBS paper), can be brought to a realization that thinking tools, suitably deployed, entails the truth of atheism. So, deploy these tools and join the enlightened community of atheists!

17 Key Text in BTS

18 Key Text in BTS

19 Key Text in BTS

20 Key Text in BTS

21 Key Text in BTS

22 A Key Part of Meta-Logic We All Share Contradictions imply falsity. Avoid contradictions!

23 And so

24 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one).

25 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

26 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

27 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational.

28 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational. My, that s ironic.

29 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational. My, that s ironic.

30 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Dennett Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational. My, that s ironic.

31 After all, consider The many interpretations corresponding to the many main interpretations of quantum mechanics are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular interpretations (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

32 After all, consider The many interpretations corresponding to the many main interpretations of quantum mechanics are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular interpretations (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

33 After all, consider The many interpretations corresponding to the many main interpretations of quantum mechanics are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular interpretations (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

34 More Sophisticated Direction?

35 More Sophisticated Direction? The mark of the vicinity of truth is a small number of contending frameworks among smart, learned people; and the mark of the vicinity of falsity is a large number of contending frameworks among people

36 More Sophisticated Direction? The mark of the vicinity of truth is a small number of contending frameworks among smart, learned people; and the mark of the vicinity of falsity is a large number of contending frameworks among people But how do you actually count the frameworks, in science and religion?

37 A Better Pascal s Wager

38 Pascal s Decision Matrix (= M) G not-g Bet on G 1 v1 Bet on not-g v2 v3 where background propositions include if G, then repentance secures infinite bliss etc..

39 The Optimality Principle (OP) (recall from coverage of Newcomb s Paradox) When choosing between alternative actions a1 and a2, rationality dictates choosing that action that maximizes expected value, computed by multiplying the value of each outcome that can result from each action by the probability that it will occur, adding the results together, and selecting the action associated with the higher utility.

40 The Optimality Principle (OP) (recall from coverage of Newcomb s Paradox) When choosing between alternative actions a1 and a2, rationality dictates choosing that action that maximizes expected value, computed by multiplying the value of each outcome that can result from each action by the probability that it will occur, adding the results together, and selecting the action associated with the higher utility. (This principle is taught to students in every introductory economics or decision-theory class, and is at least usually a key thing to follow in the pursuit of rational behavior.)

41 MV 13 CC 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

42 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

43 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

44 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

45 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Epistemically Negative Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

46 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Epistemically Negative Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

47 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Epistemically Negative (12) (11) (10) (9) (8) (7) (6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) (0) Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

48 The Optimality Principle (OP*) (based on 13-valued scheme used in solving Lottery Paradox) When choosing between alternative actions a1 and a2, rationality dictates choosing that action that maximizes expected value, computed by multiplying the value of each outcome that can result from each action by the likelihood (0 to 13) that it will occur, adding the results together, and selecting the action associated with the higher utility.

49 A rational person must bet that God exists. B. Pascal

50 A rational person must bet that God exists. B. Pascal Proof: We employ that any natural (or, for that matter, real) number n multiplied by/added to an infinite utility value yields an infinite utility value (unless n = 0). We observe that the likelihood God exists is at minimum evidently false (1). But then the expected utility value of betting on G is infinite, whereas the expected utility value of betting that God doesn t exists is finite. (Why, exactly?) Hence, by OP, a rational agent will bet on G (= bet that G exists). QED

51

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