On Breaking the Spell of Irrationality (with treatment of Pascal s Wager) Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/27/17 version 2 RPI
|
|
- Dennis McKenzie
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 On Breaking the Spell of Irrationality (with treatment of Pascal s Wager) Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/27/17 version 2 RPI
2 Some Logistics
3 Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes on Steeples of Rationalistic Genius.
4 Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes on Steeples of Rationalistic Genius. Last mtg is Test #3. Must understand our Gödelian coverage! You can plan now to need to take a stand on R, or some aspect thereof, in one of your essays. And you will need to anticipate and rebut at least one powerful objection to your stand/argument.
5 Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes on Steeples of Rationalistic Genius. Last mtg is Test #3. Must understand our Gödelian coverage! You can plan now to need to take a stand on R, or some aspect thereof, in one of your essays. And you will need to anticipate and rebut at least one powerful objection to your stand/argument. Now some particulars for particular students
6 Well Kyle, thx! See:
7 For those writing on Newcomb s Problem: Pollock &
8 For those writing on Newcomb s Problem: Pollock &
9 On Religion & Rationality versus
10 The Book Found this on W3:
11 Once Broken, Religious People are Freed to be Truly Rational
12
13 Here s how it works:
14 Here s how it works: Theists and atheists share an affirmation of, and both in fact use, a common thing: thinking tools (= cultural software ) that cut(s) across all human beings.
15 Here s how it works: Theists and atheists share an affirmation of, and both in fact use, a common thing: thinking tools (= cultural software ) that cut(s) across all human beings. Human beings, blessed as they are with a capacity for meta-reasoning and meta-representations and metarepresentational capacity (recall recursion and hierarchical reasoning from PHP & our discussion of their BBS paper), can be brought to a realization that thinking tools, suitably deployed, entails the truth of atheism.
16 Here s how it works: Theists and atheists share an affirmation of, and both in fact use, a common thing: thinking tools (= cultural software ) that cut(s) across all human beings. Human beings, blessed as they are with a capacity for meta-reasoning and meta-representations and metarepresentational capacity (recall recursion and hierarchical reasoning from PHP & our discussion of their BBS paper), can be brought to a realization that thinking tools, suitably deployed, entails the truth of atheism. So, deploy these tools and join the enlightened community of atheists!
17 Key Text in BTS
18 Key Text in BTS
19 Key Text in BTS
20 Key Text in BTS
21 Key Text in BTS
22 A Key Part of Meta-Logic We All Share Contradictions imply falsity. Avoid contradictions!
23 And so
24 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one).
25 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.
26 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.
27 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational.
28 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational. My, that s ironic.
29 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational. My, that s ironic.
30 And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Dennett Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational. My, that s ironic.
31 After all, consider The many interpretations corresponding to the many main interpretations of quantum mechanics are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular interpretations (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.
32 After all, consider The many interpretations corresponding to the many main interpretations of quantum mechanics are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular interpretations (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.
33 After all, consider The many interpretations corresponding to the many main interpretations of quantum mechanics are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular interpretations (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.
34 More Sophisticated Direction?
35 More Sophisticated Direction? The mark of the vicinity of truth is a small number of contending frameworks among smart, learned people; and the mark of the vicinity of falsity is a large number of contending frameworks among people
36 More Sophisticated Direction? The mark of the vicinity of truth is a small number of contending frameworks among smart, learned people; and the mark of the vicinity of falsity is a large number of contending frameworks among people But how do you actually count the frameworks, in science and religion?
37 A Better Pascal s Wager
38 Pascal s Decision Matrix (= M) G not-g Bet on G 1 v1 Bet on not-g v2 v3 where background propositions include if G, then repentance secures infinite bliss etc..
39 The Optimality Principle (OP) (recall from coverage of Newcomb s Paradox) When choosing between alternative actions a1 and a2, rationality dictates choosing that action that maximizes expected value, computed by multiplying the value of each outcome that can result from each action by the probability that it will occur, adding the results together, and selecting the action associated with the higher utility.
40 The Optimality Principle (OP) (recall from coverage of Newcomb s Paradox) When choosing between alternative actions a1 and a2, rationality dictates choosing that action that maximizes expected value, computed by multiplying the value of each outcome that can result from each action by the probability that it will occur, adding the results together, and selecting the action associated with the higher utility. (This principle is taught to students in every introductory economics or decision-theory class, and is at least usually a key thing to follow in the pursuit of rational behavior.)
41 MV 13 CC 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False
42 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False
43 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False
44 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False
45 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Epistemically Negative Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False
46 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Epistemically Negative Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False
47 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Epistemically Negative (12) (11) (10) (9) (8) (7) (6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) (0) Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False
48 The Optimality Principle (OP*) (based on 13-valued scheme used in solving Lottery Paradox) When choosing between alternative actions a1 and a2, rationality dictates choosing that action that maximizes expected value, computed by multiplying the value of each outcome that can result from each action by the likelihood (0 to 13) that it will occur, adding the results together, and selecting the action associated with the higher utility.
49 A rational person must bet that God exists. B. Pascal
50 A rational person must bet that God exists. B. Pascal Proof: We employ that any natural (or, for that matter, real) number n multiplied by/added to an infinite utility value yields an infinite utility value (unless n = 0). We observe that the likelihood God exists is at minimum evidently false (1). But then the expected utility value of betting on G is infinite, whereas the expected utility value of betting that God doesn t exists is finite. (Why, exactly?) Hence, by OP, a rational agent will bet on G (= bet that G exists). QED
51
52 slutten
Who Has the Burden of Proof? Must the Christian Provide Adequate Reasons for Christian Beliefs?
Who Has the Burden of Proof? Must the Christian Provide Adequate Reasons for Christian Beliefs? Issue: Who has the burden of proof the Christian believer or the atheist? Whose position requires supporting
More informationContra Darwin, Humans are Rational Animals, But Mere Animals are Not; and Darwin is Irrational in Thinking Otherwise
Contra Darwin, Humans are Rational Animals, But Mere Animals are Not; and Darwin is Irrational in Thinking Otherwise Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/6/17 RPI Logistics Logistics Logistics Again:
More informationIs it rational to have faith? Looking for new evidence, Good s Theorem, and Risk Aversion. Lara Buchak UC Berkeley
Is it rational to have faith? Looking for new evidence, Good s Theorem, and Risk Aversion. Lara Buchak UC Berkeley buchak@berkeley.edu *Special thanks to Branden Fitelson, who unfortunately couldn t be
More informationThe significance of faith proven by decision theory Pascal s wager game is correct and refutes atheism completely
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive The significance of faith proven by decision theory Pascal s wager game is correct and refutes atheism completely Michael Weinem 12 April 2018 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87458/
More informationConstruing faith as action won t save Pascal s wager
Construing faith as action won t save Pascal s wager Stephen Petersen Niagara University steve@stevepetersen.net March 15, 2007 Abstract Arthur Falk has proposed a new construal of faith according to which
More informationAquinas Cosmological argument in everyday language
Aquinas Cosmological argument in everyday language P1. If there is no first cause, there cannot be any effects. P2. But we have observed that there are effects, like observing change in the world. C: So
More informationThere are various different versions of Newcomb s problem; but an intuitive presentation of the problem is very easy to give.
Newcomb s problem Today we begin our discussion of paradoxes of rationality. Often, we are interested in figuring out what it is rational to do, or to believe, in a certain sort of situation. Philosophers
More informationChoosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly *
Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly * Ralph Wedgwood 1 Two views of practical reason Suppose that you are faced with several different options (that is, several ways in which you might act in a
More informationLogic and Theism: Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God, by John Howard Sobel.
1 Logic and Theism: Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God, by John Howard Sobel. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 672 pages. $95. ROBERT C. KOONS, University of Texas This is a terrific book. I'm often
More informationA DEFINITION OF BELIEVING. R. G. Cronin
A DEFINITION OF BELIEVING R. G. Cronin It is the aim of this paper to present a formally correct and materially adequate analysis of what it is to believe paradigmatically that p. The object of the analysis
More informationRationality & The Meaning of Life
Rationality & The Meaning of Life Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 10/2/17: Selmer.Bringsjord@gmail.com Part I done (Test 1 back Thurs), so now, to debates & discussion Sources/Targets SEP entry:
More informationBased on the translation by E. M. Edghill, with minor emendations by Daniel Kolak.
On Interpretation By Aristotle Based on the translation by E. M. Edghill, with minor emendations by Daniel Kolak. First we must define the terms 'noun' and 'verb', then the terms 'denial' and 'affirmation',
More informationWhy Christians should not use the Kalaam argument. David Snoke University of Pittsburgh
Why Christians should not use the Kalaam argument David Snoke University of Pittsburgh I ve heard all kinds of well-meaning and well-educated Christian apologists use variations of the Kalaam argument
More informationOn Interpretation. Section 1. Aristotle Translated by E. M. Edghill. Part 1
On Interpretation Aristotle Translated by E. M. Edghill Section 1 Part 1 First we must define the terms noun and verb, then the terms denial and affirmation, then proposition and sentence. Spoken words
More informationSimplicity and Why the Universe Exists
Simplicity and Why the Universe Exists QUENTIN SMITH I If big bang cosmology is true, then the universe began to exist about 15 billion years ago with a 'big bang', an explosion of matter, energy and space
More informationClass #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism
Philosophy 405: Knowledge, Truth and Mathematics Fall 2010 Hamilton College Russell Marcus Class #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism I. The Continuum Hypothesis and Its Independence The continuum problem
More informationArtificial Intelligence Prof. P. Dasgupta Department of Computer Science & Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur
Artificial Intelligence Prof. P. Dasgupta Department of Computer Science & Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur Lecture- 9 First Order Logic In the last class, we had seen we have studied
More informationRamsey s belief > action > truth theory.
Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory. Monika Gruber University of Vienna 11.06.2016 Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory. 11.06.2016 1 / 30 1 Truth and Probability
More informationToday we begin our discussion of the existence of God.
Aquinas Five Ways Today we begin our discussion of the existence of God. The main philosophical problem about the existence of God can be put like this: is it possible to provide good arguments either
More informationKierkegaard is pondering, what it is to be a Christian and to guide one s life by Christian faith.
1 PHILOSOPHY 1 SPRING 2007 Blackboard Notes---Lecture on Kierkegaard and R. Adams Kierkegaard is pondering, what it is to be a Christian and to guide one s life by Christian faith. He says each of us has
More informationOn A New Cosmological Argument
On A New Cosmological Argument Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss A New Cosmological Argument, Religious Studies 35, 1999, pp.461 76 present a cosmological argument which they claim is an improvement over
More informationIs Faith Worth Believing?
Is Faith Worth Believing? 1 Is Faith Worth Believing? By Mark McGee Atheist philosopher Peter Boghossian believes that faith is pretending to know things you don t know (May 6, 2012 public lecture richarddawkins.net/).
More informationEvidential arguments from evil
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48: 1 10, 2000. 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 1 Evidential arguments from evil RICHARD OTTE University of California at Santa
More informationNICHOLAS J.J. SMITH. Let s begin with the storage hypothesis, which is introduced as follows: 1
DOUBTS ABOUT UNCERTAINTY WITHOUT ALL THE DOUBT NICHOLAS J.J. SMITH Norby s paper is divided into three main sections in which he introduces the storage hypothesis, gives reasons for rejecting it and then
More informationCHAPTER III. Of Opposition.
CHAPTER III. Of Opposition. Section 449. Opposition is an immediate inference grounded on the relation between propositions which have the same terms, but differ in quantity or in quality or in both. Section
More informationChance, Chaos and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Chance, Chaos and the Principle of Sufficient Reason Alexander R. Pruss Department of Philosophy Baylor University October 8, 2015 Contents The Principle of Sufficient Reason Against the PSR Chance Fundamental
More informationWhat God Could Have Made
1 What God Could Have Made By Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky I. Introduction Atheists have argued that if there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, then God would have made
More informationCognitive Deductive R
Cognitive Deductive Shots @ R Are Humans Rational RPI Selmer Bringsjord 9.18.17 Floridi s Continuum, and Claims ( Consciousness, Agents, and the Knowledge Game Minds & Machines) False Belief Task Wise
More information15 Does God have a Nature?
15 Does God have a Nature? 15.1 Plantinga s Question So far I have argued for a theory of creation and the use of mathematical ways of thinking that help us to locate God. The question becomes how can
More information= (value of LEAVE if rain x chance of rain) + (value of LEAVE if dry x chance of dry) = -20 x x.5 = -9
3. PASCAL S WAGER Suppose you are facing a decision under conditions of uncertainty : say, whether to take an umbrella or not, on a day when the chance of rain is one half. e value of taking as opposed
More informationIntroductory Matters
1 Introductory Matters The readings in this section take up some topics that set the stage for discussion to follow. The first addresses the value of philosophy, the second the nature of truth, and the
More informationBounded Rationality. Gerhard Riener. Department of Economics University of Mannheim. WiSe2014
Bounded Rationality Gerhard Riener Department of Economics University of Mannheim WiSe2014 Gerhard Riener (University of Mannheim) Bounded Rationality WiSe2014 1 / 18 Bounded Rationality We have seen in
More informationJeffrey, Richard, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 140 pp, $21.99 (pbk), ISBN
Jeffrey, Richard, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 140 pp, $21.99 (pbk), ISBN 0521536685. Reviewed by: Branden Fitelson University of California Berkeley Richard
More informationLeibniz, Principles, and Truth 1
Leibniz, Principles, and Truth 1 Leibniz was a man of principles. 2 Throughout his writings, one finds repeated assertions that his view is developed according to certain fundamental principles. Attempting
More informationRational dilemmas. Graham Priest
Rational dilemmas Graham Priest 1. Dilemmas A dilemma for a person is a situation in which they are required to do incompatible things. That, at least, is one natural meaning of the word. Dilemmas (in
More information1 Introduction. Cambridge University Press Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice Andrés Perea Excerpt More information
1 Introduction One thing I learned from Pop was to try to think as people around you think. And on that basis, anything s possible. Al Pacino alias Michael Corleone in The Godfather Part II What is this
More informationBayesian Probability
Bayesian Probability Patrick Maher September 4, 2008 ABSTRACT. Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be
More informationFirst Principles. Principles of Reality. Undeniability.
First Principles. First principles are the foundation of knowledge. Without them nothing could be known (see FOUNDATIONALISM). Even coherentism uses the first principle of noncontradiction to test the
More informationPredicate logic. Miguel Palomino Dpto. Sistemas Informáticos y Computación (UCM) Madrid Spain
Predicate logic Miguel Palomino Dpto. Sistemas Informáticos y Computación (UCM) 28040 Madrid Spain Synonyms. First-order logic. Question 1. Describe this discipline/sub-discipline, and some of its more
More informationDISCUSSIONS WITH K. V. LAURIKAINEN (KVL)
The Finnish Society for Natural Philosophy 25 years 11. 12.11.2013 DISCUSSIONS WITH K. V. LAURIKAINEN (KVL) Science has its limits K. Kurki- Suonio (KKS), prof. emer. University of Helsinki. Department
More informationThe St. Petersburg paradox & the two envelope paradox
The St. Petersburg paradox & the two envelope paradox Consider the following bet: The St. Petersburg I am going to flip a fair coin until it comes up heads. If the first time it comes up heads is on the
More informationWILL THEY TURN THE OTHER CHEEK? CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING AND VICTIM S RELIGIOUS SELF-IDENTIFICATION
UNC CHARLOTTE ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES WILL THEY TURN THE OTHER CHEEK? CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING AND VICTIM S RELIGIOUS SELF-IDENTIFICATION Craig A. Depken, II Dennis P. Wilson Working Paper No. 2016-015
More informationThink by Simon Blackburn. Chapter 5d God
Think by Simon Blackburn Chapter 5d God No clickers today. 2 quizzes Wednesday. Don t be late or you will miss the first one! Turn in your Nammour summaries today. No credit for late ones. According to
More informationThe Principle of Sufficient Reason and Free Will
Stance Volume 3 April 2010 The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Free Will ABSTRACT: I examine Leibniz s version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason with respect to free will, paying particular attention
More information175 Chapter CHAPTER 23: Probability
75 Chapter 23 75 CHAPTER 23: Probability According to the doctrine of chance, you ought to put yourself to the trouble of searching for the truth; for if you die without worshipping the True Cause, you
More informationKeywords precise, imprecise, sharp, mushy, credence, subjective, probability, reflection, Bayesian, epistemology
Coin flips, credences, and the Reflection Principle * BRETT TOPEY Abstract One recent topic of debate in Bayesian epistemology has been the question of whether imprecise credences can be rational. I argue
More informationIs the Existence of the Best Possible World Logically Impossible?
Is the Existence of the Best Possible World Logically Impossible? Anders Kraal ABSTRACT: Since the 1960s an increasing number of philosophers have endorsed the thesis that there can be no such thing as
More informationPrécis of Empiricism and Experience. Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh
Précis of Empiricism and Experience Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh My principal aim in the book is to understand the logical relationship of experience to knowledge. Say that I look out of my window
More informationPollock s Theory of Defeasible Reasoning
s Theory of Defeasible Reasoning Jonathan University of Toronto Northern Institute of Philosophy June 18, 2010 Outline 1 2 Inference 3 s 4 Success Stories: The of Acceptance 5 6 Topics 1 Problematic Bayesian
More information2014 THE BIBLIOGRAPHIA ISSN: Online First: 21 October 2014
PROBABILITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. Edited by Jake Chandler & Victoria S. Harrison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 272. Hard Cover 42, ISBN: 978-0-19-960476-0. IN ADDITION TO AN INTRODUCTORY
More informationSemantic Entailment and Natural Deduction
Semantic Entailment and Natural Deduction Alice Gao Lecture 6, September 26, 2017 Entailment 1/55 Learning goals Semantic entailment Define semantic entailment. Explain subtleties of semantic entailment.
More informationBetting on God: Pascal, Probability Theory and Theology. nevertheless made surprising contributions to the field of religious philosophy.
Silsbee 1 Betting on God: Pascal, Probability Theory and Theology Blaise Pascal, born in 17 th century France, was a mathematician and physicist who nevertheless made surprising contributions to the field
More informationIs Innate Foreknowledge Possible to a Temporal God?
Is Innate Foreknowledge Possible to a Temporal God? by Kel Good A very interesting attempt to avoid the conclusion that God's foreknowledge is inconsistent with creaturely freedom is an essay entitled
More informationThe Cosmological Argument
The Cosmological Argument Stage I 1. Causal Premise: Everything of type T has a cause. [note: cause purpose]. 2. Something of type T exists. 3. There is a reason X for thinking that there is a First Cause
More information(Some More) Vagueness
(Some More) Vagueness Otávio Bueno Department of Philosophy University of Miami Coral Gables, FL 33124 E-mail: otaviobueno@mac.com Three features of vague predicates: (a) borderline cases It is common
More informationReligious Belief and Atheism are not Mutually Exclusive. Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford and Todd K. Shackelford. Oakland University
Johnson commentary p. 1 [in press, Religion, Brain, & Behavior, February 2012] Religious Belief and Atheism are not Mutually Exclusive Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford and Todd K. Shackelford Oakland University
More informationLogic I or Moving in on the Monkey & Bananas Problem
Logic I or Moving in on the Monkey & Bananas Problem We said that an agent receives percepts from its environment, and performs actions on that environment; and that the action sequence can be based on
More informationDALLAS BAPTIST UNIVERSITY THE ILLOGIC OF FAITH: FEAR AND TREMBLING IN LIGHT OF MODERNISM SUBMITTED TO THE GENTLE READER FOR SPRING CONFERENCE
DALLAS BAPTIST UNIVERSITY THE ILLOGIC OF FAITH: FEAR AND TREMBLING IN LIGHT OF MODERNISM SUBMITTED TO THE GENTLE READER FOR SPRING CONFERENCE BY MARK BOONE DALLAS, TEXAS APRIL 3, 2004 I. Introduction Soren
More informationModule 1-4: Spirituality and Rationality
Module M3: Can rational men and women be spiritual? Module 1-4: Spirituality and Rationality The New Atheists win again? Atheists like Richard Dawkins, along with other new atheists, have achieved high
More informationAccuracy and epistemic conservatism
Accuracy and epistemic conservatism Florian Steinberger Birkbeck College, University of London December 15, 2018 Abstract: Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is
More informationINTERMEDIATE LOGIC Glossary of key terms
1 GLOSSARY INTERMEDIATE LOGIC BY JAMES B. NANCE INTERMEDIATE LOGIC Glossary of key terms This glossary includes terms that are defined in the text in the lesson and on the page noted. It does not include
More informationPrisoners' Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem
DAVID LEWIS Prisoners' Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem Several authors have observed that Prisoners' Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem are related-for instance, in that both involve controversial appeals to dominance.,
More informationPLANTINGA ON THE FREE WILL DEFENSE. Hugh LAFoLLETTE East Tennessee State University
PLANTINGA ON THE FREE WILL DEFENSE Hugh LAFoLLETTE East Tennessee State University I In his recent book God, Freedom, and Evil, Alvin Plantinga formulates an updated version of the Free Will Defense which,
More informationSTEWART COHEN AND THE CONTEXTUALIST THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION
FILOZOFIA Roč. 66, 2011, č. 4 STEWART COHEN AND THE CONTEXTUALIST THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION AHMAD REZA HEMMATI MOGHADDAM, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), School of Analytic Philosophy,
More informationThe Backward Induction Solution to the Centipede Game*
The Backward Induction Solution to the Centipede Game* Graciela Rodríguez Mariné University of California, Los Angeles Department of Economics November, 1995 Abstract In extensive form games of perfect
More informationHow Gödelian Ontological Arguments Fail
How Gödelian Ontological Arguments Fail Matthew W. Parker Abstract. Ontological arguments like those of Gödel (1995) and Pruss (2009; 2012) rely on premises that initially seem plausible, but on closer
More informationPHIL 251 Varner 2018c Final exam Page 1 Filename = 2018c-Exam3-KEY.wpd
PHIL 251 Varner 2018c Final exam Page 1 Your first name: Your last name: K_E_Y Part one (multiple choice, worth 20% of course grade): Indicate the best answer to each question on your Scantron by filling
More information2nd International Workshop on Argument for Agreement and Assurance (AAA 2015), Kanagawa Japan, November 2015
2nd International Workshop on Argument for Agreement and Assurance (AAA 2015), Kanagawa Japan, November 2015 On the Interpretation Of Assurance Case Arguments John Rushby Computer Science Laboratory SRI
More informationMcCLOSKEY ON RATIONAL ENDS: The Dilemma of Intuitionism
48 McCLOSKEY ON RATIONAL ENDS: The Dilemma of Intuitionism T om R egan In his book, Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics,* Professor H. J. McCloskey sets forth an argument which he thinks shows that we know,
More informationAbstract. Coping with Difficult, Unanswered, and Unanswerable Questions
Abstract Coping with Difficult, Unanswered, and Unanswerable Questions Difficult, Unanswered, and Unanswerable Questions are often catalysts for paradigm shifts in technology, medicine, and in personal
More informationDoes the Skeptic Win? A Defense of Moore. I. Moorean Methodology. In A Proof of the External World, Moore argues as follows:
Does the Skeptic Win? A Defense of Moore I argue that Moore s famous response to the skeptic should be accepted even by the skeptic. My paper has three main stages. First, I will briefly outline G. E.
More informationEvidential Support and Instrumental Rationality
Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder, and Franz Huber Formal Epistemology Research Group Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy University of Konstanz
More informationMoral Relativism and Conceptual Analysis. David J. Chalmers
Moral Relativism and Conceptual Analysis David J. Chalmers An Inconsistent Triad (1) All truths are a priori entailed by fundamental truths (2) No moral truths are a priori entailed by fundamental truths
More informationRobert Nozick s seminal 1969 essay ( Newcomb s Problem and Two Principles
5 WITH SARAH WRIGHT What Nozick Did for Decision Theory Robert Nozick s seminal 1969 essay ( Newcomb s Problem and Two Principles of Choice ) introduced to philosophers the puzzle known as Newcomb s problem.
More informationVAGUENESS. Francis Jeffry Pelletier and István Berkeley Department of Philosophy University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
VAGUENESS Francis Jeffry Pelletier and István Berkeley Department of Philosophy University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta, Canada Vagueness: an expression is vague if and only if it is possible that it give
More informationChalmers, "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature"
http://www.protevi.com/john/philmind Classroom use only. Chalmers, "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" 1. Intro 2. The easy problem and the hard problem 3. The typology a. Reductive Materialism i.
More informationA solution to the problem of hijacked experience
A solution to the problem of hijacked experience Jill is not sure what Jack s current mood is, but she fears that he is angry with her. Then Jack steps into the room. Jill gets a good look at his face.
More informationArtificial Intelligence: Valid Arguments and Proof Systems. Prof. Deepak Khemani. Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Artificial Intelligence: Valid Arguments and Proof Systems Prof. Deepak Khemani Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Module 02 Lecture - 03 So in the last
More information1/7. The Postulates of Empirical Thought
1/7 The Postulates of Empirical Thought This week we are focusing on the final section of the Analytic of Principles in which Kant schematizes the last set of categories. This set of categories are what
More informationRATIONALITY AND SELF-CONFIDENCE Frank Arntzenius, Rutgers University
RATIONALITY AND SELF-CONFIDENCE Frank Arntzenius, Rutgers University 1. Why be self-confident? Hair-Brane theory is the latest craze in elementary particle physics. I think it unlikely that Hair- Brane
More informationToday s Lecture. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil J.L Mackie
Today s Lecture Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil J.L Mackie Preliminary comments: A problem with evil The Problem of Evil traditionally understood must presume some or all of the following:
More informationProspects for Successful Proofs of Theism or Atheism. 1. Gods and God
Prospects for Successful Proofs of Theism or Atheism There are many contemporary philosophers of religion who defend putative proofs or arguments for the existence or non-existence of God. In particular,
More informationWhy Have Consistent and Closed Beliefs, or, for that Matter, Probabilistically Coherent Credences? *
Why Have Consistent and Closed Beliefs, or, for that Matter, Probabilistically Coherent Credences? * What should we believe? At very least, we may think, what is logically consistent with what else we
More informationAnthony P. Andres. The Place of Conversion in Aristotelian Logic. Anthony P. Andres
[ Loyola Book Comp., run.tex: 0 AQR Vol. W rev. 0, 17 Jun 2009 ] [The Aquinas Review Vol. W rev. 0: 1 The Place of Conversion in Aristotelian Logic From at least the time of John of St. Thomas, scholastic
More informationRationalism. A. He, like others at the time, was obsessed with questions of truth and doubt
Rationalism I. Descartes (1596-1650) A. He, like others at the time, was obsessed with questions of truth and doubt 1. How could one be certain in the absence of religious guidance and trustworthy senses
More informationWHY SHOULD ANYONE BELIEVE ANYTHING AT ALL?
WHY SHOULD ANYONE BELIEVE ANYTHING AT ALL? Beliefs don t trump facts in the real world. People almost invariably arrive at their beliefs not on the basis of proof but on the basis of what they find attractive.
More informationpart one MACROSTRUCTURE Cambridge University Press X - A Theory of Argument Mark Vorobej Excerpt More information
part one MACROSTRUCTURE 1 Arguments 1.1 Authors and Audiences An argument is a social activity, the goal of which is interpersonal rational persuasion. More precisely, we ll say that an argument occurs
More informationUNR Joint Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper No To Believe or Not Believe or Not Decide: A Decision-Theoretic Model of Agnosticism
UNR Joint Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 10-005 To Believe or Not Believe or Not Decide: A Decision-Theoretic Model of Agnosticism Tigran Melkonyan and Mark Pingle Department of Economics
More informationPascal s wager: tracking an intended reader in the structure of the argument 1
Vol. 6 (2/2016) pp. 391 411 e ISSN 2084 1043 p ISSN 2083 6635 Pascal s wager: tracking an intended reader in the structure of the argument 1 Iva SVAČINOVÁ* ABSTRACT Pascal s wager is the name of an argument
More informationA CRITIQUE OF THE FREE WILL DEFENSE. A Paper. Presented to. Dr. Douglas Blount. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. In Partial Fulfillment
A CRITIQUE OF THE FREE WILL DEFENSE A Paper Presented to Dr. Douglas Blount Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for PHREL 4313 by Billy Marsh October 20,
More informationReview Tutorial (A Whirlwind Tour of Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion)
Review Tutorial (A Whirlwind Tour of Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion) Arguably, the main task of philosophy is to seek the truth. We seek genuine knowledge. This is why epistemology
More information(Refer Slide Time 03:00)
Artificial Intelligence Prof. Anupam Basu Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur Lecture - 15 Resolution in FOPL In the last lecture we had discussed about
More informationSearle vs. Chalmers Debate, 8/2005 with Death Monkey (Kevin Dolan)
Searle vs. Chalmers Debate, 8/2005 with Death Monkey (Kevin Dolan) : Searle says of Chalmers book, The Conscious Mind, "it is one thing to bite the occasional bullet here and there, but this book consumes
More informationHere s a very dumbed down way to understand why Gödel is no threat at all to A.I..
Comments on Godel by Faustus from the Philosophy Forum Here s a very dumbed down way to understand why Gödel is no threat at all to A.I.. All Gödel shows is that try as you might, you can t create any
More informationThe Unbearable Lightness of Theory of Knowledge:
The Unbearable Lightness of Theory of Knowledge: Desert Mountain High School s Summer Reading in five easy steps! STEP ONE: Read these five pages important background about basic TOK concepts: Knowing
More informationFourth Meditation: Truth and falsity
Fourth Meditation: Truth and falsity In these past few days I have become used to keeping my mind away from the senses; and I have become strongly aware that very little is truly known about bodies, whereas
More informationThe Moral Problem of Other Minds
The Moral Problem of Other Minds Jeff Sebo Abstract In this paper I ask how we should treat other beings in cases of uncertainty about sentience. I evaluate three options: (1) an incautionary principle
More informationThe Problem of the External World
The Problem of the External World External World Skepticism Consider this painting by Rene Magritte: Is there a tree outside? External World Skepticism Many people have thought that humans are like this
More informationWhen is Faith Rational? 1. What is Faith?
1 When is Faith Rational? Lara Buchak Forthcoming in Norton Introduction to Philosophy 2nd edition (eds. Alex Byrne, Josh Cohen, Liz Harman, Gideon Rosen). Can it be rational to have faith? In order to
More information2.1 Review. 2.2 Inference and justifications
Applied Logic Lecture 2: Evidence Semantics for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic Formal logic and evidence CS 4860 Fall 2012 Tuesday, August 28, 2012 2.1 Review The purpose of logic is to make reasoning
More information