Chapter 2 AN EXPOSITION AND EXAMINATION CONCERNING FREEDOM AND CAUSATION IN IMMANUEL KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

Transcription

1 Chapter 2 AN EXPOSITION AND EXAMINATION CONCERNING FREEDOM AND CAUSATION IN IMMANUEL KANT'S PHILOSOPHY 55

2 .:. "The 'thing in itself' is a kind of concept without which it is impossible to enter Kant's system, but with which it is impossible to get out of the system" (by F. Jacoby).:. Thesis-"Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that is also another causality, that of freedom" (by Immanuel Kant, CPR).:. Antithesis- "There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature" (by Immanuel Kant, CPR).:. "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity... The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude!" (by Immanuel Kant) 56

3 CHAPTER-2 An Exposition and Examination Concerning Freedom and Causation in Immanuel Kant's Philosophy I, in this chapter, shall expound Kant's doctrines of freedom and causation in context of his ontology, epistemology, morality and enlightenment rationality. With reference to Kant's ontology we shall deal with the distinction' between noumena and phenomena. In the context of noumena we will examine the issues like, 'noumenon as a limiting concept', 'noumenon as thing-in-itself, 'noumenon as an object of intellectual intuition' and 'noumena as distinct from phenomena'. For this I will examine the positions of, Fichte ( ) and Hegel who have attempted to reduce Kant's ontology to the level of idealism on the one hand and Engels ( ) and Lenin ( ) who have tried to justify the materialist claims of Kant's ontology on the other. With reference to Kant's epistemology we will develop the possibility, validity and limit of synthetic apriori knowledge and the distinction and relation between 'reason', 'understanding' and 'sensibility'. I will discuss Hume's criticism of causality and Kant's response to the criticism. Besides, I will develop the relation between Kant's theory of causality and that of Newton along with the common points as well as differences with Aristotle, Locke, and Einstein etc. I will examine the antinomies of pure reason. I will mainly focus on third antinomy (between freedom and causation) which posits a limit to our knowledge and opens the ground for faith or morality. In the context of morality, I will evaluate basically the three postulates of Kant's morality i.e. God, immortality of soul and freedom of will, simultaneously the concepts such as, autonomy, categorical imperatives, evil and autocracy etc. With reference to Kant's enlightenment rationality I will develop the concept of maturity, private and public domains of freedom, autonomy, sovereignty and tolerance. In order to organize the discussion I wish to divide the present chapter into four parts:- I. Ontological position i.e. distinction between phenomena and noumena. 57

4 II. Epistemological position i.e. possibility, validity, limits of synthetic aprlori knowledge and the antinomy between freedom and causation. III. Morality i.e. the postulates of morality (immortality of soul, existence of God and freedom of will) IV. Enlightenment rationality and human freedom. Kant advocates dualism between freedom and causation as for him the sphere of freedom is noumena and that of causality is phenomena. Besides, phenomena and noumena he also mentions about thing in itself which acts on our senses. Kant discusses causality in the table of hypothetical judgement under Relation which constitutes the epistemological position. He draws the dichotomy between freedom and causation which emerges in the third part i.e. Transcendental dialectics of first Critique as the third antinomy of pure reason. His moral position constitutes a law of causality through freedom or in other words the possibility of a supersensuous nature. Further, the enlightenment rationality results from the ontological, epistemological and moral positions. Thus, to understand the concept of freedom and causation it is essential to have a clear understanding 'of Kant's ontological, epistemological, dialectical, moral positions along with enlightenment rationality which I will be discussing in this chapter. PART-I Ontological position i.e. distinction between phenomena and noumena Kant in the written announcement of lectures given from 1765 to 1766 says that, "In ontology, I discuss the more general properties of things, the difference between spiritual and material beings".! So, the sphere of noumenon is what constitutes the spiritualist aspect of Kant's ontology wherein lies the basis of his moral laws. He advocated the possibility of moral laws by postulating immortality of Soul, freedom of will and existence of God. These are what Kant calls 'ideas of reason' and postulates of moral I Singh, R.P., (1990), Kant and Hegel: Methodology, Ontology, Epistemology, Dialectics and Ought, New Delhi, Galaxy Publication, p.2. 58

5 laws. Different from noumena is the thing in itself which presents the materialist aspect of Kant's ontology because it is the ground and cause of the appearances, "appearances are only representations of things which are unknown as regards what they may be in themselves. As mere representations, they are subject to no law of connection save that which the connecting faculty prescribes. Now it is imagination that connects the manifold of sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the understanding, and for the manifoldness of its apprehension upon sensibility"? Thus, thing in itself affects our senses and thereby furnishes the material element in our cognition. Kant's phenomena can only be regarded as actual and the possible sphere of his ontology. Further, in the philosophical system of Kant there is lot of controversy regarding his position on ontology. Prof. R.P. Singh in the article, "Kant on Ontology,,3 writes that this controversy can be put forth in two ways: Whether there is an ontology in Kant's critical philosophy or not? This question is raised implicitly in two celebrated articles by Martin Heidegger 4 : (i) "Being and Time" (1927), and (ii) "What Is Metaphysics" (1937). The second question is still more controversial. It is based on the positive answer of the first question that if there is ontology in Kant, is it idealistic or materialistic? On this issue there are on the one hand, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel who attempt to reduce the materialist aspect of Kant's ontology to the level of idealism. This effort is persistent in the commentaries written by N.K. Smith, A.c. Ewing, H.W. Cassirer, S. Komer and so on. On the other hand, there are Engels and Lenin who try to justify the materialist claims of Kant's ontology. In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant in the context of noumena as different from phenomena writes, "Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of categories, are called phenomena. But if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding and which, nevertheless, can be given as such to an 2 Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N.K. Smith, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., B 164, p Singh, R.P., (1986), "Kant On Ontology", Review of Darshana, VoI.V, No.1, p For details regarding Heidegger's position on ontology please refer to, Singh, R.P., (1986), "Kant on Ontology", Review of Darshana, VoI.V, No.1, pp

6 intuition... such things would be entitled noumena (intelligibilia)".5 Kant defines noumena in two senses namely, negative and positive. In the negative sense, it means, "... a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it...".6 In the positive sense, it is, "... an object of a non sensible intuition,...,namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we posses and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility". 7 Therefore man can never comprehend the noumena because the intellectual intuition which comprehends noumena is of special kind which he can never posses. The concept of intellectual intuition is based on Kant's assumption that, "... we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of intuition". 8 Therefore, there must be an intellectual intuition in which noumena can be given. Here we can say that, although Kant denied the possibility of knowledge of noumena on the ground that such knowledge would require intellectual intuition but he did not reject the concept of noumena. On the contrary, he reinterprets it in such a way that it could be incorporated into his transcendental account and this is accomplished by giving it the function of a limiting concept. He no doubt thought. of such a faculty as belonging to God, but he denied any human knowledge of its very possibility. Kant regards noumena to be merely problematic and he sets out the distinguishing features of a problematic concept roughly in terms like that its affirmation or negation is taken as merely possible or optional; that its objective validity cannot be established in anyway; that it is free from contradiction, that its function is to limit the validity of certain other concepts. He writes, "The concept of noumena -that is, of a thing which is not to be thought as the object of the senses but as a thing-in-itself, solely through pure understanding--is not in any way contradictory. For, we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of intuition. Further, the concept of noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things-in-themselves, and thus to limit 5 Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N.K. Smith, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., A 249, pp Ibid., B 307, p Ibid. 8 Ibid., B 310, p

7 the objective validity of sensible knowledge. The remaining things, to which it does not apply, are entitled noumena, in order to show that this knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything which the understanding thinks".9 In the above passage, Kant says that, noumena as a thing in itself can be thought only through pure understanding and never be regarded as an object of senses. This conception of noumena is based on Kant's thesis that sensible intuition cannot be regarded as the only possible kind of intuition. Kant, therefore conceives a kind of intellectual intuition and asserts that noumena as a thing-in-itself can be given in the intellectual intuition. Further, for Kant, an object is, "... given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions;... ". IO The intuitions which are yielded by sensibility are regarded by Kant as sensible intuitions. The manifolds of sensible intuitions, in so far as they are not determined by the categories 'of understanding are the 'appearances'. But when they are determined in accordance with the unity of categories, they become phenomena. On this basis he states that there must be something which can never be given in a manifold of sensible intuition but which can be regarded as an object of understanding. Such thing he designates as noumena. He writes in this context, "The concept of noumenon-that is, of a thing which is not to be thought as object of the senses but as a thing in itself, solely through a pure understanding... ".11 Things-in-themselves exist as the ground of appearances, they are something which affect our senses 'and are the cause of appearance. The acceptance of things-inthemselves as the ground of appearances is based on his assumption that, "... behind the appearances we must admit and assume something else which is not an appearancenamely, things-in-themselves although, since we can never be acquainted with these, but only with the way in which they affect us, we must resign ourselves to the fact that we, 12 can never get any nearer to them and can never know what they are in themselves". 9 Ibid., A 2551B10, pp Ibid., A 19, p.65. II Ibid., B 310, p.27l. 12 Paton, H.J., (1969), The Moral Law; Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, Hutchinson University Library, London, P

8 Since categories of understanding cannot be applied to them therefore they remam unknown and unknowable. In the similar context as cited in the above passage, Kant in Prolegomena writes, "And we indeed, rightly considering objects of senses as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself but only know its appearances, namely the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding, therefore, by assuming appearance, grants the existence of things in themselves also; and to this extent we may say that the representation of such things are as the basis of appearances, consequently of mere beings of the understanding, is not only admissible but unavoidable". 13 Further, Kant regards noumena as a limiting concept. It is the negative employment that Kant ascribes the indispensable limiting function. Kant states, "The concept of noumena is thus a merely a limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the presentations of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention, and it is bound up with the limitations of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility". 14 Thus, noumena, in its negative employment act as a limiting concept and it is then that is indistinguishable from the notion of the unknown things in themselves. The concept of noumenon as a limiting concept prevents sensible intuitions from being extended to things in itself. It does not limit the understanding as we can still think about the noumenal objects otherwise we would land up in absurd conclusions, "... though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears".15 Here Kant has emphasized on the words know and think. By know he means that one must be able to prove its possibility through its actuality by experience or a priori by means of reason. And by think he means that one can think whatever one pleases to provided one 13 Kant, Immanuel, (1977), Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. by Paul Carus, Revised by Paul Ellington Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, pp Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, etc., A 255/B 311, p Ibid., B xxvii, p

9 do not contradict oneself i.e. the thought should be a 'possible thought', as physical existence is not necessary in such cases. Hence, Kant in this sense says that we cannot know these objects as things in themselves but we can yet think of them as things in themselves. He has shown the possibility of ideas of pure reason or postulates in the form of freedom, the immortality of soul and the existence of God. Further, Kant says understanding limits the sensibility by applying the term noumena to it. And, since none of the categories can be applied to it so, it is wise to think them under the title of unknown something. He writes, "... Understanding is not limited through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by applying the term noumena to things-in-themselves (things not regarded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something". J 6 Hence the concept of noumena as a limiting concept prevents sensible intuitions from being extended to thing in itself and limits the sphere of human cognition in order to leave room for faith. Thus, the thing in itself is never a limiting concept in Kantian philosophy and when he regards things in itself as unknown and unknowable he does so by applying the term noumena to thing in itself. The concept of noumena is a problematic concept in Kantian philosophy that whether it is identical with thing in itself or it is distinct from it. Controversies and criticism have been focused on this. In A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, N.K. Smith says, "...it is the concept of noumena in the negative sense, as equivalent therefore simply to the thing-in-itself...". 17 Also, noumena if taken in positive sense (as given in Critique) are distinct from thing in itself because there we have to postulate an intuition other than sensible. In the general ontological framework of Kant's philosophy, noumena represent the idealist aspect of it and different from noumena is the thing in itself which presents the materialist aspect of Kant's ontology. Taking the advantage of this definition of noumena, the idealist interpreters of Kant like H.W. Cassirer, S. Komer and so forth 16 Ibid., A 2561B 312, p Smith, N.K., (1979), A CommentalY to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., p.4l3. 63

10 make an attempt towards identifying things in itself with noumenon. Cassirer Says, "Kant's theory of things-in-themselves can be rendered acceptable only by being connected as closely as possible with his view on intellectual intuition".18 In order to. equate thing-in-itselfwith noumena, Cassirer tries to conceive thing-in-itself also through the intellectual intuition. S. Komer also tries to identify thing in itself with noumena giving the argument that, "... they are entities of the understanding to which no objects of experience can ever correspond and contrast them with phenomena which can be objects of experience". 19 On the other hand there is a specific and significant distinction between noumenon and thing-in-itself, as Kant regards noumenon as a limiting concept. Regarding thing in itself as distinct from noumenon, Theodore 1. Oizerman points out, "In his theory, a thing in itself is not an idea of pure reason' that is the key premise of transcendental aesthetics that is the theory of sensation. Things-in-themselves affect our senses. As for the noumenon, they have nothing in common with sense-perception or with the cognitive process in general".20 Through this passage he wants to say that, thingin-itself is not an idea of pure reason instead it is theory of sensation and affects our senses whereas noumena have nothing to do with sense perception. The Kantian concept of 'thing in itself stands opposed to the concept of noumenon, despite the fact that the thing in itself is treated as existing outside of space and time. Moreover, the thing in itself strictly speaking, is not a thing in the usual sense of the word, since the latter, being spatially determined and sensually perceived, represents an appearance. The relation between these mutually exclusive concepts of Kant's philosophy reveals that contradiction between materialism and idealism which the philosopher attempted to overcome Cassirer, H.W., (1968), Kant's First Critique, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., p Komer,S., (1960), Kant, Penguin Book, p Oizennan, T., (1982), Dialectical Materialism and the History of Pilosophy, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p Oizennan, T.I., (1981), "Kant's Doctrine of the "Things in Themselves" and Noumena", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 41, No.3, March, pp

11 Kant's successors, particularly Fichte and Hegel attempt to abolish Kant's thingin-itself altogether because it cannot be accepted within the framework of their idealism. Fichte criticizes the thing-in-itself because it contradicts his concept of dualism between phenomena and things-in-themselves. 22 Further, Hegel rejects the thing in itself of Kant as it lies outside the ambit of cognate consciousness. He overcomes the gulf between phenomenon and the thing in itself by rejecting Kant's contention that categories of understanding are incapable to penetrate into the thing-in-itself. In other words, the contribution of thought for Kant is something purely mental and subjective. Our categories and concepts act as a barrier between us and the reality as it is in itself. In their way, there is a dualism between phenomenon and thing in itself, and like the dualism in Locke's philosophy, it portrays the subject as separated and cut off from the objective world by an absolute divide. Against it Hegel says - "Thought, according to Kant, although universal and necessary categories, are only our thoughts separated by an impossible gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our knowledge. But the true objectivity of thinking means that thoughts, far from being ours, must at the same time be real essence of the things and of whatever is an object for US".23 According to Hegel, an object gets its objectivity from the subject because the real which consciousness actually holds in the endless flux of sensations and perceptions is a universal which cannot be reduced to objects free from the subject. The object, in other words, must be comprehended as a subject, in its relation to its otherness. On this basis, Hegel rejects Kant's unknown and unknowable things in itself and maintains that all being is realized by reason and all becoming is a development of reason, and if all that is real is a manifestation of reason and each thing is a stage or modification of reason; then reason and the real are identical. In Hegel, "reason or the idea is not merely a demand, a longed for ideal but a world-power which accomplishes its own realization... The rational is real and the real is rational".24 Hegel, thus, rejects the unknown and 22 Singh, R.P., (1987), A Critical Examination Of Immanuel Kant's Philosophy, New Delhi, Intellectual Publishing House, p Hegel, G.W.F., (1985), Science of Logic, Quotation from Sean Sayers: Reality and Reason-Dialectic and Theory of Knowledge; New York, Basil Blackwell, p Falkenberg, Richard, (1977), History of Modern Philosophy, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, p

12 unknowable Kantian thing in itself by regarding that to be and to be known is one and the same thing. So, on this basis, he demonstrates that our knowledge of a thing is not only as it appears to us, but also as it is in-itself. He overcomes the unknown and unknowability of Kant's thing in itself by formulating his view that all reality at least potentially and in principle is accessible to consciousness. He overcomes the Kantian thing in itself through the expression of 'force'. I will develop this concept at length in chapter-3. For Engels everything unknowable is things in itself as Lenin writes, "Engels apparently, having learned that according to Kant the 'thing-in-itself is unknowable, turned this theorem into its converse and concluded that everything unknown is a thingin-itself'.25 Engels does not refute Kant's thing in itself but only the Kantian ungraspable thing in itself. He writes, "In the first place, it is not that Engels is producing a refutation of the thing-in-itself. Engels said explicitly and clearly that he was refuting the Kantian ungraspab/e (or unknowable) thing-in-itself,.26 This means that Lenin accept Kant's thing in itself which exist independent of our knowledge of it being unknown and unknowable. Having independent existence means it is materialist in nature but to say that it is unknowable/ungraspable is something Engels cannot accept. Further, Lenin admits that there is no difference between phenomena and thing in itself and any philosophical investigation in this context is useless. He writes, "There is definitely no difference in Principle between the phenomena and thing-in-itself, and there cannot be any such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical investigations of specific boundaries between the one and the other inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is beyond phenomena...is the sheerest nonsense". 27 According to Lenin there is nothing unknowable in principle and Kant has misunderstood the problems of epistemology by regarding the constitution of human mind as incapable of knowing thing in itself. The human cognition is based on practice and if in his practical activity man is able to realize the correctness of his conception of things by making things serve his own purposes, and then the things cannot be regarded 25 Lenin, (1977), Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Moscow, Progress publishers, p Ibid. 27 Ibid., pp

13 as unknown and unknowable. He writes, "In the theory of knowledge, as in every other sphere of science we must think dialectically that is we must not regard our knowledge as readymade and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact".28 Thus, one will find millions of examples of such development of knowledge not only in history of the progress of science and technology, but also in everyday activity of ones life, "... the transformation of "things-in-themselves" into "things-for-us"".29 Lenin does not equate things in themselves with things for us but holds that the known or the things for us is a part of the greater unknown- or the things in itself, but the latter is never unknowable because it can be known through the practical and cognitive activity of human beings. Thus, the three concepts namely noumenon, thing in itself and phenomenon constitute the totality of Kant's ontology. The concept of noumena constitutes the idealist aspect of Kant's ontology whereas the concept of thing in itself presents its materialist aspect. The concept of phenomena constitutes the sphere of actual and possible scientific knowledge. In Kant's analysis human cognition is confined to the extent a thing can be given in sensible intuition and is determined by the categories. But human cognition can never penetrate into the noumenon and the thing in itself because they cannot be cognized by sensible intuitions. Kant thus prepares a border of cognition between what is cognizable in principle and what is non cognizable. On the basis of what is cognizable in principle and what is non-cognizable the epistemological problems in Kant arise. He expresses those problems in terms of possibility, validity and limits of human cognition. So, I in the Part-II will bring out the discussion on a possibility, validity and limits of synthetic a-priori knowledge. 28 Ibid., p Ibid. 67

14 PART-II Epistemological position i.e. possibility, validity, limits of synthetic apriori knowledge and the antinomy between freedom and causation In Kant's epistemology, sensibility and understanding are two factors which constitute knowledge. The two cannot exchange their functions nor can anyone alone claim for knowledge to be possible, "without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thought without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the objects to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise". 30 So, in order to make clarity I will examine Kant's position on sensibility and understanding. Kant holds that knowledge springs from two fundamental sources, i.e. sensibility and understanding. Perhaps the following remark by Kant about two of his philosophical precursors can provide us sufficient explanation. He summarized the famous dispute between Leibniz and Locke in the following way, "In a word, Leibniz intellectualized appearances, just as Locke... sensualised all concepts of the understanding, i.e. interpreted them as nothing more than empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection. Instead of seeking in understanding and sensibility two sources of representations which, while quite different can supply objectively valid judgment of thing only in conjunction with each other, each of these great men holds to one only of the two, viewing it as in immediate relation to things in themselves. The other faculty is then regarded as serving only to confuse or to order the representations which this selected faculty yields".31 Kant therefore, takes up the view that only the claim about knowledge based on two sources would take us beyond the rationalist and empiricist errors. Sensibility is the faculty of intuition and understanding is the faculty of concepts. And both intuitions and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge as already 30 Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, etc., A 511B 75, p.93. 3IIbid., A 2711B 327, p

15 discussed. Kant writes, "Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production of] of concepts). Through the first an object is given to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). Intuitions and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts can yield knowledge". 32 Through intuitions object are given to us and through concepts they are thought. Sensibility furnishes the manifold materials which are absolutely chaotic and unintelligible, while understanding gives them a unifying form and renders them intelligible. So, the two faculties constitute knowledge but that is no reason for confounding the contribution of either with that of the other. Rather, it is a strong reason for carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the other. Now, I will examine Kant's position on sensibility. Sensibility: Space & Time In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant examines the apriori forms of sensibility, "The science of all principles of apriori sensibility I call transcendental aesthetic. There must be such a science, forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in distinction from that part which deals with the principles of pure thought, and which is called transcendental logic".33 Further, there are two a priori forms of sensible intuition i.e. space and time. According to Kant, space and time are the forms of sensibility because empirical intuitions become ordered into experience of spatio-temporal objects. They are the apriori forms of sensibility because they are presupposed by our awareness of spatio-temporal objects rather than being derived from that awareness by abstraction. I will take up this discussion little latter. Further, Kant argues that, sensibility is the understanding's means of accessing objects. In Critique of Pure Reason Kant defines sensibility as, "The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by 32 Ibid., A 501B 74, p Ibid., A 21/B 36, pp

16 objects is entitled sensibility',.34 According to Kant, although both sensibility and understanding constitute knowledge but objects are given to us only through intuitions i.e. sensibility. Then they are thought through the understanding and as a result concepts arise. Also, these thoughts directly or indirectly should relate to intuitions because in no other way can objects be given to us. Further, Kant makes clarity between sensation, empirical and appearance. I think the proper knowledge of these concepts is essential to understand Kant's first critique. He writes, "The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it, is sensation.that intuition which is in relation to the object through sensation, is entitled empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled appearance". 35 Now, I will take up the discussion of space and time. In the first part of Critique of Pure Reason entitled as Transcendental aesthetic, Kant discusses space and time as forms of intuitions under two heads-metaphysical and Transcendental. In the former exposition, he tries to show that space and time are given a priori and that they cannot be derived from sensibility. In the latter, he states that though space and time cannot be derived from sensibility yet every manifold of sensibility has to be received in the form of space and time. Space is not an empirical concept derived from experience by abstraction. We could not derive our idea of space by abstracting it from our experience of adjacent objects because in order to represent objects as adjacent in the first place, we require an idea of space. Also, we can imagine space as being empty of objects, but not the absence of space itself. Hence, space is in us a priori underlying and presupposed by our awareness of outer objects. Space is logically prior to the objects that exist in it. Kant regards space and time as unitary one. He says, "Space is essentially one",36 and "Different times are but parts of one and the same time".37 He states very emphatically that we can represent one space and one time in which various spatial and temporal manifestations are received. But he however, denies the concept of absolute space and absolute time independent of the perceiving mind as held by Newton. Kant 34 Ibid., A 19, p Ibid. 36Ibid., A 25, p Ibid., B 47, p

17 believes that space and time are in no sense independent of the perceiver and, "...if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay, space and time themselves would vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in US".38 For Kant space and time are always mind dependent and whatever remains beyond this receptivity of our sensibility is completely unknown to us. Space and time are transcendentally ideal and empirically real but, "... the ideality of space and time leaves, however, the certainty of empirical knowledge unaffected".39 Kant's views on time are parallel to his views on space except for two differences. First, he says that, whereas space is apriori form of outer intuition, time is the form of inner intuition. In so far our awareness is directed inwardly to our own experience, we are aware of a temporal series. But when our awareness is directed to outer things, to objects other than our self, it must be a spatial awareness. In other words, experience itself must be temporal, but external objects must be both spatial and temporal. The second difference between Kant's exposition of space and time is this: geometry is the apriori science of space, but it is not clear in the Aesthetic that there is a parallel a priori science, of time. Although Kant does claim that there are synthetic apriori truths about time such I that it is one dimensional, there seems to be no parallel to geo~etry for time. However,, there is some textual evidence, later in the Critique, for arguing that Kant regarded, arithemetic as a body of synthetic apriori based on time. 4o Kant regards proposition like, '7+5=12' as synthetic apriori. In the introduction to the Critique, he argues that such propositions are not analytic. He says that it is more obvious with large numbers that such propositions are not analytic. What then is the relation between arithemetic and time? A rather crude interpretation of Kant is that he regards numbers as generated by the process of counting and that counting takes time. However, this view makes the connection between numbers and time empirical, and Kant's view is that the connection is transcendental. In other words, the connection 38Ibid., A 42, p Ibid., A 39/B 56, p Thomson, G., (1993), An Introduction to Modern Philosophy, California, Wadsworth Publishing Company, p

18 , involves an apriori element; arithemetic is about the magnitude of series, and this finds concrete expression in temporal sequences of successive units. Numbers involve the addition of units, and if arithemetic is to have application to the world then these units must be tempora1. 41 Further, Kant in first Critique writes, "Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which bodies of apriori synthetic knowledge can be derived. Time and space, taken together, are the pure forms of all sensible intuition, and so are what make apriori synthetic propositions possible. But these apriori sources of knowledge, being merely conditions of our sensibility, just by this very fact determine their own limits, namely,. that they apply to objects only in so far as objects are viewed as appearances, and do not present things as they are in themselves. This is the sole field of their validity; should we pass beyond it, no objective use can be made ofthem".42 Kant has prepared an unbridgeable gulf between things as they appear or as they affect us and things as they are in themselves. All the objects of knowledge are only appearances and this can be seen by Kant's referring to the pre-conceptualized intuitions as 'representations' which suggest phenomenal status for them. Although they can exist independently of the categories of understanding, they remain phenomenal and cannot exist apart from the way in which they are related to human sensibility. But the thing in itself is independent even of human sensibility. This distinction is very significant to understand Kant's exact epistemological situation, because it differentiates Kant from any form of subjective idealism. 43 Further, the appearance which are posited and ordered in space and time, are called by Kant as 'brute facts', 'blind' and 'chaotic'. The blindness of appearances means their meaninglessness. In order to give meaning to them, what is required to be done is to determine them under one or more of the categories of understanding. Against the empiricists, Kant tries to show that universality and necessity are more than the products of sensible intuitions. In other words, universality and necessity are applicable to sensible 41 Ibid., p.22i. 42 Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, etc., A 39/B 56, p Singh, R.P., (1990), Kant and Hegel: Methodology, Ontology, Epistemology, Dialectics And Ought, etc., p

19 intuitions without ansmg from them. And, Kant tries to establish this point in the transcendental deduction of the categories of understanding, which I will be examining now. Transcendental Deduction of Categories and the Analogies of Experience Kant's discovery of categories and their transcendental deduction presents the very center of his epistemological quest. The categories are not inductive generalizations but deduced from the concepts of 'logical employment of understanding'. Kant attempts to furnish systematic formulation and deduction of categories. He does so by distinguishing the rules of sensibility which presents the object of knowledge from the rules of understanding that is logic. He writes, "We therefore distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, that is, aesthetic, from the science of rules of the understanding in general, that is, logic". 44 "Logic", he says, "... can be treated in twofold manner, either as logic of the general or as logic of the special employment of the understanding".45 General logic contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought and may also be called, "logic of elements", 46 while the other one is the instrument of sciences and, "is commonly taught in the schools as a propaedeutic to the sciences".47 General logic does not deal with the origin of knowledge but only with that from which the understanding is able to impart it to the representation (either apriori or empirically). There is another logic which deals with, the origin, the scope and the objective validity of knowledge and is called 'Transcendental logic'. Kant writes, "Such a science, which should determine the origin, the scope, and the Objective validity of such knowledge, would have to be called transcendental logic, because, unlike general logic, which has to deal with both empirical and pure knowledge of reason, it concerns itself with the laws of understanding and of reason solely in so far as they relate apriori to 44 Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, etc., A 521B 76, p Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 73

20 objects".48 Here the tenn, Transcendental means that the branch of logic is concerned with the conditions and possibility of a priori knowledge of objects. Transcendental logic is divided into two parts: the Analytic and the Dialectic. Kant discusses transcendental deduction of categories in the analytic part of the Critique. J The analytic part has three main subsections: the Metaphysical deduction, the Transcendental deduction, and the Analytic of principles. In the Metaphysical, Kant tries to provide a principle to identify the most fundamental concepts of thought, the categories of understanding, and then to show that our knowledge of any object always involves these categories. Garrett Thomson says, "... the metaphysical deduction of 'the clue to discovery of all pure concepts of understanding', is an obscure passage of the critique. Kant's aim is to isolate the categories and find some way of listing them. His intention is not to argue that the categories are necessary for experience; he does that latter in the transcendental deduction".49 In the Analytic of principles, Kant concentrates on particular categories, and the way they find application in experience. Kant's main object in the transcendental deduction is to justify SCIence philosophically, i.e. prove the apriori principles on which he thinks it depend. He writes, "The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction".5o To deduce the categories is to offer a justification for them, to show that we are entitled to use them. Since the categories are apriori, we cannot deduce them empirically by showing how they are acquired from experience so a transcendental deduction is required. Before analyzing Kant's position on categories, I would examine the view of Aristotle ( Be), who was the first to use the tenn in philosophy. Aristotle maintains that categories are the fundamental concepts of thought and at the same time they are the basic features of objective reality. Hence it is impossible to think of anything as real and existent except as subsumed under one or more of the categories. He enumerates ten such categories which are as follows, "substance, quality, 48 Ibid., A 57/B 82, pp Thomson, G., (1993), An Introduction to Modern Philosophy, etc., p Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, etc., A 85/B 117, p.12l. 74

21 quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity".51 Aristotle regards these ten categories as the fundamental concepts which constitute the basic features of material things. However, he maintains that the category of substance is the most important one and the other categories have their importance only in so far as they can be predicated to it, because, "... things are called good in as many senses as they are said to exist; for they are so called in the category of substance...".52 By the category of substance, Aristotle means, "The simple bodies (earth, fire, water and all such things), and bodies generally and the things composed of them-living creatures as well as stars and their parts. All these are called 'substance' because they are not predicated of a subject while everything else is predicated ofthem".53 Aristotle's formulation of categories serves two main purposes--on the one hand it overcomes Plato's strict division between 'form' and 'matter'. For Aristotle, "... matter and form are really correlative, though logically distinct; informed matter and in mattered form are two different ways of looking at the same thing". 54 The category of substance is the subject and rest of the nine categories are the predicates of the subject but subject cannot exist without the nine predicate, nine categories nor can those categories exist without the subject. On the other hand, Aristotle's categories explain the transition from potential being to actual being. Matter is potentially everything but actually nothing. It becomes something only when certain forms are impressed on it, "... each contrary quality or state is potentially the other, and the substrate is potentially both, because it can become either, given the requisite conditions. Infact, the antithesis of potentiality and actuality is that of matter and form viewed dynamically. Bricks are not actually, but are potentially, a house; a lump of bronze is potentially a statue. So too in the organic sphere: the seed is potentially a tree". 55 In this way, Aristotle categories are related to his epistemological and ontological doctrines. 51 Aristotle, (1981), Ethics, trans. by J.A.K. Thomson, Penguin Books, p Ibid. 53 Aristotle, (1956), Metaphysics, trans. by John Warrington, London, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., p.l8. 54 Aristotle, (1981), Ethics, trans. by J.A.K. Thomson, etc., p Ibid., p

22 Kant appreciates Aristotle's enumeration of categories and their significant role in human cognition. He writes, "It was an enterprise worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle to make search for these fundamental concepts. But as he did so on no principle, he merely picked them up as they came in his way and at first procured ten of them, which he called categories (predicament)".56 Prof. R.P. Singh says, "... the difference between the two regarding the categories arises out of their fundamental philosophical positions. Whereas for Aristotle, an object is the amalgaiil:ation of form and content, and is independent of the human mind but they can exist independent of the synthetic aspects, i.e. the forms, cannot exist independent of the human mind but they can exist independent of the synthetic aspects which constitute the content. On this basis, Kant draws a distinction between form and content and this leads to his differences with Aristotle's categories".57 Kant also differs regarding the origin of categories because for him they are, "original pure concepts. of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself apriori".58 Kant also differs from Aristotle's view on space (place) and time which the latter regards as categories, whereas for Kant they are forms of sensible intuition. And the development from Aristotle to Kant is that whereas Aristotle expounds ten categories, Kant expounds twelve. At the same time, Kant agrees with Aristotle that the knowledge of an object is possible only through categories. He also retains some of the categories already enumerated by Aristotle such as substance, quality, quantity, relation, position and state. But whereas in Aristotle, categories provide both the form and the content, in Kant they provide only the form and the content is given by sensible intuitions. I have already discussed the role of sensibility in cognition, so now I will dwell upon the role of understanding through which he furnishes the means of knowledge i.e. the categories. Kant regards understanding as a 'faculty of judgement'. He writes, "Judgement is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. In every judgement there is a concept which holds of many representation that is immediately related to an object... Now we can reduce all acts of the 56 Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, etc., A 811B 107, p.1l4. 57 Singh, R.P., (1987), A Critical Examination of Immanuel Kant's Philosophy, etc., pa Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, etc., A 80/B 106, p

23 understanding to judgements and the understanding may therefore be represented as a faculty of judgement". 59 In this way he regards judgements as prior to the concepts, though necessarily connected with them. He divides all kinds of judgement into four main heads i.e. quantity, quality, relation and modality. He deals with them separately and does not show any interrelation. Each head contain three subdivisions which are interrelated. Kant believes that there is a parallel between the forms of judgement and the categories. The main function of the categories is to organize the manifold intuition into experience by the process of synthesis. By synthesis Kant says, "I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge".60 Further, he says, "Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or apriori) is what first gives rise to knowledge. This knowledge may, indeed, at first, be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis. Still the synthesis is that which gathers the elements of knowledge, and unites them to [form] certain content. It is to synthesis, therefore that we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge".61 Thus, this organization of synthesis is akin to judgement, and therefore the logical form of judgement provides a guide to the categories. Quantity, quality, relation and modality, each contain three subdivisions. And from each judgement a concept is derived. Thus, in 'quantity', the judgements are universal, particular and singular; and the concepts derived are unity, plurality and totality respectively. In 'quality', the judgements are affirmative, negative and infinite; and the concepts derived are reality, negation and limitation respectively. In 'relation', the judgements are categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive; and the concepts derived are inherence and subsistence, causation 62 and dependence, and community respectively. Finally, in 'modality', the judgements are problematic, assetoric or apodeictic; and the 59 Kant, Immanuel, (1973), Critique of Pure Reason, etc., A 691B 93-4, pp Ibid., B 103, p.lll. 61 Ibid., A 781B 103, pp.lll The category of causation is very important for Kant. He develops this further in Analogies of experience where the general topics of three analogies i.e., Substance, Causality and Reciprocity corresponds to Newtonian concept of Matter, Force and Reaction. 77