IMMANUEL KANT. What Is Enlightenment?

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1 IMMANUEL KANT (Immanuel Kant, , a professor at the University of Königsberg in the remote province of East Prussia, was the leading philosophical figure of the German enlightenment (Auf-klärung). The essay below, written in 1784, provides a good introduction to the main themes of the Enlightenment, with particular reference to the implications for the maturing of the human intellect in regard to religious thought and action. Later in this volume you will find a selection that provides a more formal introduction to the original contributions made by Kant to the study of morals.) What Is Enlightenment? Enlightenment is man s leaving his self-caused immaturity. Immaturity is the incapacity to use one s intelligence without the guidance of another. Such immaturity is self-caused if it is not caused by lack of intelligence, but by lack of determination and courage to use one s intelligence without being guided by another. Sapere Aude! Have the courage to use your own intelligence! is therefore the motto of the enlightenment. Through laziness and cowardice a large part of mankind, even after nature has freed them from alien guidance, gladly remain immature. It is because of laziness and cowardice that it is so easy for others to usurp the role of guardians. It is so comfortable to be a minor! If I have a book which provides meaning for me, a pastor who has conscience for me, a doctor who will judge my diet for me and so on, then I do not need to exert myself. I do not have any need to think; if I can pay, others will take over the tedious job for me. The guardians who have kindly undertaken the supervision will see to it that by far the largest part of mankind, including the entire beautiful sex, should consider the step into maturity, not only as difficult but as very dangerous. After having made their domestic animals dumb and having carefully prevented these quiet creatures from daring to take any step beyond the leadstrings to which they have fastened them, these guardians then show them the danger which threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. Now this danger is not really so very great; for they would presumably learn to walk after some stumbling. However an example of this kind intimidates and frightens people out of all further attempts. It is difficult for the isolated individual to work himself out of the immaturity which has become almost natural for him. He has even become fond of it and for the time being is incapable of employing his own intelligence, because he has never been allowed to make the attempt. Statutes and formulas, these mechanical tools of a serviceable use, or rather misuse, of his natural faculties, are the ankle-chains of a continuous immaturity. Whoever threw it off would make an uncertain jump over the smallest trench because he is not accustomed to such free movement. Therefore there are only a few have pursued a firm path and have succeeded in escaping from immaturity by their own cultivation of the mind.

2 But it is more nearly possible for a public to enlighten itself; this is even inescapable if only the public is given its freedom. For there will always be some people who think for themselves, even among the self-appointed guardians of the great mass who, after having thrown off the yoke of immaturity themselves, will spread about them the spirit of a reasonable estimate of their own value and of the need for every man to think for himself. It is strange that the very public, which had previously been put under this yoke by the guardians, forces the guardians thereafter to keep it there if it is stirred up by a few of its guardians who are themselves incapable of all enlightenment. It is thus very harmful to plant prejudices, because they come back to plague those very people who themselves (or whose predecessors) have been the originators of these prejudices. Therefore a public can only arrive at enlightenment slowly. Through revolution, the abandonment of personal despotism may be engendered and the end of profit-seeking and domineering oppression may occur, but never a true reform of the state of mind. Instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones, will serve as the guiding reins of the great, unthinking mass. All that is required for this enlightenment is freedom; and particularly the least harmful of all that may be called freedom, namely, the freedom for man to make public use of his reason in all matters. But I hear people clamor on all sides: Don't argue! The officer says: Don't argue, drill! The tax collector: Don't argue, pay! The pastor: Don't argue, believe! (Only a single lord in the world says: Argue, as much as you want to and about what you please, but obey!) Here we have restrictions on freedom everywhere. Which restriction is hampering enlightenment, and which does not, or even promotes it? I answer: The public use of a man s reason must be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment among men: while the private use of a man's reason may often be restricted rather narrowly without thereby unduly hampering the progress of enlightenment. I mean by the public use of one s reason, the use which a scholar makes of it before the entire reading public. Private use I call the use which he may make of this reason in a civic post or office. For some affairs which are in the interest of the commonwealth a certain mechanism is necessary through which some members of the commonwealth must remain purely passive in order that an artificial agreement with the government for the public good be maintained or so that at least the destruction of the good be prevented. In such a situation it is not permitted To argue; one must obey. But in so far as this unit of the machine considers himself as a member of the entire commonwealth, in fact even of world society; in other words, he considers himself in the quality of a scholar who is addressing the true public through his writing, he may indeed argue without the affairs suffering for which he is employed partly as a passive member. Thus it would be very harmful if an officer who, given an order by his superior, should start, while in the service, to argue concerning the utility or appropriateness of that command. He must obey, but he cannot equitably be prevented from making observations as a scholar concerning the mistakes in the military service nor from submitting these to the public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed upon him. Indeed a rash criticism of such taxes, if they are the

3 ones to be paid by him, may be punished as a scandal which might cause general resistance. But the same man does not act contrary to he duty of a citizen if, as a scholar, he utters publicly his thoughts against the undesirability or even the injustice of such taxes. Likewise a clergyman is obliged to teach his pupils and his congregation according to the doctrine of the church which he serves, for he has been accepted on that condition. But as a scholar, he has full freedom, in fact, even the obligation, to communicate to the public all this diligently examined and well-intentioned thoughts concerning erroneous points in that doctrine and concerning proposals regarding the better institution of religious and ecclesiastical matters. There is nothing in this for which the conscience could be blamed. For what he teaches according to his office as one authorized by the church, he presents as something in regard to which he has no latitude to teach according to his own preference.... He will say: Our church teaches this or that, these are the proofs which are employed for it. In this way he derives all possible practical benefit for his congregation from rules which he would not himself subscribe to with full conviction. But he may nevertheless undertake the presentation of these rules because it is not entirely inconceivable that truth may be contained in them. In any case, there is nothing directly contrary to inner religion to be found in such doctrines. For, should he believe that the latter was not the case, he could not administer his office in good conscience; he would have to resign it. Therefore the use which an employed teacher makes of his reason before his congregation is merely a private use since such a gathering is always only domestic, no matter how large. As a priest (a member of an organization) he is not free and ought not to be, since he is executing someone else's mandate. On the other hand, the scholar speaking through his writings to the true public which is the world, like the clergyman making public use of his reason, enjoys an unlimited freedom to employ his own reason and to speak in his own person. For to suggest that the guardians of the people in spiritual matters should always be immature minors is a nonsense which would mean perpetuating forever existing nonsense. But should a society of clergymen, for instance an ecclesiastical assembly, be entitled to commit itself by oath to a certain unalterable doctrine in order to perpetuate an endless guardianship over each of its members and through them over the people? I answer that this is quite inconceivable Such a contract which would be concluded in order to keep humanity forever from all further enlightenment is absolutely impossible, even should it be confirmed by the highest authority through parliaments and the most solemn peace treaties. An age cannot conclude a pact and take an oath upon it to commit the succeeding age to a situation in which it would be impossible for the latter to enlarge even its most important knowledge, to eliminate error and altogether to progress in enlightenment. Such a thing would be a crime against human nature, the original destiny of which consists in such progress. Succeeding generations are entirely justified in discarding such decisions as unauthorized and criminal. The touchstone of all this to be agreed upon as a law for people is to be found in the question whether a people could impose such a law upon itself. Now it might be possible to introduce a certain order for a definite short period as if in anticipation of a better order. This would be true if one permitted at the same time each citizen

4 and especially the clergyman to make his criticisms in his quality as a scholar.... In the mean time, the provisional order might continue until the insight into the particular matter in hand has publicly progressed to the point where through a combination of voices (although not, perhaps, of all) a proposal may be brought to the crown. Thus those congregations would be protected which had agreed to (a changed religious institution) according to their own ideas and better understanding, without hindering those who desired to allow the old institutions to continue.. A man may postpone for himself, but only for a short time, enlightening himself regarding what he ought to know. But to resign from such enlightenment altogether either for his own person or even more for his descendants means to violate and to trample underfoot the sacred rights of mankind. Whatever a people may not decide for themselves, a monarch may even less decide for the people, for his legislative reputation rests upon his uniting the entire people's will in his own. If the monarch will only see to it that every true or imagined reform (of religion) fits in with the civil order, he had best let his subjects do what they consider necessary for the sake of their salvation; that is not his affair. His only concern is to prevent one subject from hindering another by force, to work according to each subject's best ability to determine and to promote his salvation. In fact, it detracts from his majesty if he interferes in such matters and subjects to governmental supervision the writings by which his subjects seek to clarify their ideas (concerning religion). This is true whether he does it from his own highest insight, for in this case he exposes himself to the reproach: Caesar non est supra grammaticos; it is even more true when he debases his highest power to support the spiritual despotism of some tyrants in his state against the rest of his subjects. The question may now be put: Do we live at present in an enlightened age? The answer is: No, but in an age of enlightenment. Much still prevents men from being placed in a position or even being placed into position to use their own minds securely and well in matters of religion. But we do have very definite indications that this field of endeavor is being opened up for men to work freely and reduce gradually the hindrances preventing a general enlightenment and an escape from self-caused immaturity. In this sense, this age is the age of enlightenment and the age of Frederick (the Great). A prince should not consider it beneath him to declare that he believes it to be his duty not to prescribe anything to his subjects in matters of religion but to leave to them complete freedom in such things. In other words, a prince who refuses the conceited title of being "tolerant," is himself enlightened. He deserves to be praised by his grateful contemporaries and descendants as the man who first freed humankind of immaturity, at least as far as the government is concerned and who permitted everyone to use his own reason in all matters of conscience. Under his rule, venerable clergymen could, regardless of their official duty, set forth their opinions and views even though they differ from the accepted doctrine here and there; they could do so in the quality of scholars, freely and publicly. The same holds even more true of every other person who is not thus restricted by official duty. This spirit of freedom is spreading even outside (the country of Frederick the Great) to places where it has to struggle with the external hindrances imposed

5 by a government which misunderstands its own position. For an example is illuminating them which shows that such freedom (public discussion) need not cause the slightest worry regarding public security and the unity of the commonwealth. Men raise themselves by and by out of backwardness if one does not purposely invent artifices to keep them down. I have emphasized the main point of enlightenment, that is of man's release from his self-caused immaturity, primarily in matters of religion. I have done this because our rulers have no interest in playing the guardian of their subjects in matters of arts and sciences. Furthermore immaturity in matters of religion is not only most noxious but also most dishonorable. But the point of view of a head of state who favors freedom in the arts and sciences goes even farther; for he understands that there is no danger in legislation permitting his subjects to make public use of their own reason and to submit publicly their thoughts regarding a better framing of such laws together with a frank criticism of existing legislation. We have a shining example of this; no prince excels him whom we admire. Only he who is himself enlightened does not fear specters when he at the same time has a well-disciplined army at his disposal as a guarantee of public peace. Only he can say what (the ruler of a) free state dare not say: Argue as much as you want and about whatever you want but obey! Thus we see here as elsewhere an unexpected turn in human affairs just as we observe that almost every-thing therein is paradoxical. A great degree of civic freedom seems to be advantageous for the freedom of the spirit of the people and yet it establishes impassable limits. A lesser degree of such civic freedom provides additional space in which the spirit of a people can develop to its full capacity. Therefore nature has cherished, within its hard shell, the germ of the inclination and need for free thought. This free thought gradually acts upon the mind of the people and they gradually become more capable of acting in freedom. Eventually, the government is also influenced by this free thought and thereby it treats man, who is now more than a machine, according to his dignity. Koenigsberg, September 30, 1784 (From: The Philosophy of Kant, translated and edited by Carl J. Friedrich. Copyright 1949, by Random House, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

6 IMMANUEL KANT Metaphysical Foundation of Morals The Good Will and the Categorical Imperative Section 1 Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a GOOD WILL. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects. But these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of these gifts, and which therefore constitutes what is called character is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health, and the general wellbeing and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness. all inspire pride and often presumption if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this to rectify also the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition for being even worthy of happiness... A good will is good not because of what it Performs or effects, nor by its aptness for attaining some Proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition: that is, it is good in itself and when considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that it can bring about in pursuing any inclination. nay even in pursuing the sum total of all inclinations. It might happen that, owing to special misfortune, or to the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose. If with its greatest efforts this will should yet achieve nothing and there should remain only good will (to be sure, not a mere wish but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, good will would still shine by its own light as a thing having its whole value in itself. We assume, as a fundamental principle. that no organ [designed] for any purpose will be found in the Physical constitution of an organized being. except one which is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now if the proper object of nature for a being with reason and a will was its preservation its welfare in a word its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement when it selected the reason of the creature to carry out this function. For all the actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct would be far more surely prescribed by [its own] instinct, and that end [happiness] would have been attained by instinct far more certainly than it ever can be by reason.... Nevertheless, reason is imparted to us

7 as a practical faculty; that is. as one which is to have influence on the will. Therefore, if we admit that nature generally in the distribution of natural propensities has adapted the means to the end, nature's true intention must be to produce a will, which is not merely good as a means to something else but good in itself. Reason is absolutely necessary for this sort of will... [The analysis of the notion of a will that is good in itself reveals the notion of duty. or moral obligation, which all rational being possess. And we clearly distinguish `actions performed in accordance with duty (though from a prudential or utilitarian motive) from actions performed out of respect for duty: that is. actions performed not only as. but because. duty requires. Kant's first main proposition, then. is that only actions performed specifically for the sake of duty possess "true moral worth.. ] The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined. Therefore the action does not depend on the realization of its objective, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire. The third proposition, which is a consequence of the preceding two, I would express thus: Duty is the necessity of an action, resulting from respect for the law. But what sort of law can it be the conception of which must determine the will, even without our paying any attention to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have stripped the will of every impulse which could arise for it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the general conformity of the will's actions to law in general. Only this conformity to law is to serve the will as a principle; that is, I am never to act in any way other than so I could `want my maxim. also to become a general law. It is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a clinical notion.... It is a wholly different thing to be truthful from a sense of duty, than to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In the first case, the very conceiving of the action already implies a law for me; in the second case, I -must first look about elsewhere to see what results may be associated with it which would affect me. For it is beyond all doubt wicked to deviate from the principle of duty; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me, although it is certainly wiser to abide by it. However, the shortest way, and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question of whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, "Would I be content if this maxim of extricating myself from difficulty by a false promise held good as a general law for others as well as for myself?" Would I care to say to myself, "Everyone -may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot extricate himself otherwise"? Then I would presently become aware that while I can decide in favor of the lie, I can by no means decide that lying should be a general law. For under such a law there would be no promises at all, since 1 would state my intentions in vain in regard to my future actions to those who

8 would not believe my allegation, or, if they did so too hastily. they would pay me back in my own coin. Hence, as soon as such a -maxim was made a universal law, it would necessarily destroy itself. Section 2 The concept of an objective principle. in so far as it is compulsory for a will, is called a command of reason and the formulation of such a command is called an IMPERATIVE. All imperatives are expressed by the word ought (or shall) and they indicate thereby the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which, because of its subjective constitution, is not necessarily deter-mined by this [compulsion]. All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. Since every practical law represents a possible action as good. and on this account as necessary for a subject who can determine practically by reason, imperatives are formulations determining an action which is necessary recording to thc principle of a will in some respects good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical. If the action is conceived as good in itself and consequently as necessarily being the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason then it is categorical. Therefore we shall have to investigate a priori the possibility of a categorical imperative, since, in this case, we do not have the advantage that the imperative's reality is given in experience, so that the elucidation of its possibility would be needed only for explaining it, not for establishing it. It can be discerned that the categorical imperative has the purport of a practical law. All the rest may certainly be principles of the will but not laws, since whatever is merely necessary for attaining some casual purpose -may be considered contingent in itself, and at any time we can be free from the precept if we give up the purpose. However, the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite, and consequently only the will carries with it that necessity we require in a law... When I conceive of a hypothetical imperative at all, I do not know previously what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. In addition to the law, the imperative contains only the necessity that the maxim conform to this law. As the maxim contains no condition restricting the maxim, nothing remains but the general statement of the law to which the maxim of the action should conform. and it is only this conformity that the imperative properly represents as necessary. Therefore there is only one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on a maxim by which you can will that it, at the same time, should become a general law. Now, if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as easily as from their principle, then we shall be able at least to show what we understand by it and what this concept means, although it would remain undecided whether what is called duty is not just a vain notion. Since the universality of the law constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense [as to form]; that is, the existence of things as far as

9 determined by general laws, the general imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a general law of nature. We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of duties to ourselves and to others, and of perfect and imperfect duties. 1. A man, while reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes and feeling wearied of life, is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a general law of nature. His maxim is: Out of self-love I consider it a principle to shorten my life when continuing it is likely to bring more misfortune than satisfaction. The question then simply is whether this principle of self-love could become a general law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature, whose law would be to destroy life by the very feeling designed to compel the maintenance of life, would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly be a general law of nature and consequently it would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty. Another man finds himself faced by dire need to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but he also sees that nothing will be lent him unless he promises firmly to repay it within a definite time. He would like to make this promise but he still has enough conscience to ask himself: Is it not unlawful and contrary to my duty to get out of a difficulty in this way? However suppose that he does decide to do so, the maxim of his action would then be expressed thus: When I consider myself in want of money, I shall borrow money and promise to repay it although I know that I never can. Now this principle of selflove or of one s own advantage may perhaps be agreeable to my whole future well being; but the question is now: Is it right? Here I change the suggestion of selflove into a general law and state the question thus: How would it be if my maxim were a general law? I then realize at once that it could never hold as a general law of nature but would necessarily contradict itself. For if it were a general law that anyone considering himself to be in difficulties would be able to promise whatever he pleases intending not to keep his promise, the promise itself and its object would become impossible since no one would believe that anything was promised him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses... Now, if a supreme practical principle ought to exist, or a categorical imperative with respect to the human will, it must be one which turns the concept of what is necessarily an end for everybody because it is an end in itself into an objective principle of the will which can serve as a general practical law. The basis of this principle is that rational mixture exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being this rational nature, to the extent that it is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly for the same rational reason that holds true for me, so at the same time it is an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, all laws of the will must needs be deductible. Accordingly, the practical imperative will be as follows: Act so as to treat man, in your own person as well

10 as in that of anyone else, always as an end, never merely as a means. We shall now inquire whether this principle can be realized. To use the previous examples: First: In regard to the concept of necessary duty to oneself, whoever contemplates suicide will ask himself whether his action is consistent with the idea of man as an end in itself. If he destroys himself to escape onerous conditions, he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition until life ends. But man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but in all his actions must always be considered as an end in itself. Therefore I cannot dispose in any way of man in my own person so as to mutilate, damage or kill him. (It is a matter of morals proper to define this principle more precisely to avoid all misunderstanding. Therefore I bypass such questions as that of the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve one's life, and of exposing one's life to danger with a view to preserving it, etc.) Second: As regards necessary or obligatory duties toward others, whoever is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a means, without the latter being the end in itself at the same time. The person whom I propose to use by such a promise for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my way of acting toward him.... This conflict with the principle of duty toward others becomes more obvious if we consider examples of attacks on the liberty and property of others. Here it is clear that whoever transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as means without considering that as rational beings they shall always be regarded as ends also; that is, as beings who could possibly be the end of the very same action... Third Section Transition From The Metaphysic Of Ethics To The Critique Of Pure Practical Reason The Concept of Freedom Is the Key to the Explanation of the Autonomy of the Will The will is a kind of causality of living beings in so far as they are rational. Freedom then would be that property of such causality by which it can become operative without being dependent on foreign causes determining it; whereas physical necessity is the property of the causality of all non-rational beings to be determined to activity by the influence of foreign causes. The above definition of freedom is negative and therefore not fruitful for an understanding of its essence. But out of it grows its positive conception which is all the richer in content and the more fruitful. Since the concept of causality is accompanied by that of laws in accordance with which, because of something that we call cause, something else, namely the result, must be posited, therefore freedom, even though it is not a property of the will by the physical laws, is not therefore without its positive laws.

11 It must, on the contrary, be a causality following immutable laws, but be of a very special kind. Otherwise a free will would be a monstrous thing. Physical necessity, we have seen, is a heteronomy of the operating causes, because every effect is possible only in accordance with the law that something determines the operating cause to produce the causality. What then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is to say, the property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: In all its actions the will is a law to itself, merely expresses the principle to act only on that maxim which is able also to have as an object itself as a universal law. But this is the formula of the categorical imperative and the principle of morality. Consequently a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same. Then if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows from it by the mere analysis of its concept. However, this principle is nevertheless a synthetical proposition: An absolutely good will is one the maxim of which contains within itself itself as a universal law; for this quality of the maxim cannot be discovered by the analysis of the concept of an absolutely good will. Such synthetical propositions are, however, made possible only if the two cognitions are brought together by their connection with a third in which they are both present. The positive concept of freedom supplies this third idea, which cannot, as in the case of physical causes, be of the nature of the world of the senses (in the concept of which the concepts of cause and effect come together in the relation of something as cause to something else as effect). We cannot without some further preparation show here at once what this third idea is to which freedom directs us and of which we have an idea a priori, nor can we without more preparation sufficiently explain the deduction of the concept of freedom from pure practical reason and with it also the possibility of a categorical imperative. Freedom Must Be Presupposed as a Property of the Will of All Rational Beings It is not enough to ascribe freedom to our will for whatever cause unless we have sufficient cause to ascribe the same freedom to all rational beings as well. For since morality serves as a law for us only because we are rational beings. it must be valid also for all rational beings. Since it must be deduced solely from the property of freedom, it must also be proved that freedom is the property of the will of all rational beings. It is also not enough to demonstrate it from certain alleged experiences of human nature (though this is besides absolutely impossible and freedom can be verified only a priori), but it must be proved as belonging generally to the activity of beings who are rational and are endowed with a will. Now I say: Everything that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom is therefore in practical respects really free, that is to say, for him all the laws count which are inseparably connected with freedom, as if his will were of itself declared to be free and indeed by a proof acceptable in theoretical philosophy. Now I maintain that to each being who has a will we must necessarily also attribute the idea of freedom by which alone he acts. For in such a being we

12 conceive a reason that is practical, that has causality in reference to its objects. It is impossible to conceive a reason that in full consciousness would be directed in respect to its judgments by some outside source, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of his judgment not to reason, but to some impulsion. Reason must look upon itself as the originator of its principles, independent of foreign influences. Consequently it must, as practical reason or will of a rational being, conceive itself as free, that is to say, its will can be a will of its own only under the idea of freedom, and this idea must therefore in every practical respect be attributed to all rational beings. How is a Categorical Imperative Possible? As intelligence the rational being reckons himself as of the world of reasoning, and he calls his causality a will inertly as being an efficient cause pertaining to the world of reasoning. From the other side he is conscious of himself also as part of the world of the senses and in this his actions are found to be mere appearances of the above causality, though he cannot comprehend the possibility of his actions from this causality since it is unknown to us; but instead he must understand these actions as determined by other appearances belonging to the world of the senses, namely the desires and inclinations. Accordingly, if 1 consider myself only a member of the world of reasoning, all my actions would be in perfect accord with the principle of the autonomy of the pure will; if I considered myself only as Part of the world of the senses, they would have to be taken as wholly in accord with the natural law of the desires and inclinations, that is to say with the heteronomy of nature. (The former would rest on the supreme principle of morality, the latter on the principle of happiness.) But because the world of reasoning contains the basis of the world of the senses and consequently also its laws, and since it therefore legislates directly for my will (which belongs altogether to the world of reasoning) and must be conceived as doing so; therefore, though I must consider myself as belonging also to the world of the senses, as intelligence I must acknowledge that I am subject to the law of the world of reasoning, which means to reason which in the idea of freedom contains this law, and consequently subject also to the autonomy of the will. In consequence I must consider the laws of the world of reasoning as imperatives for me, and the actions which accord with this principle as duties. Thus categorical imperatives are possible in that the idea of freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world. If I were solely this then all my actions would at all times accord with the autonomy of the will; but since I simultaneously conceive myself a member of the world of the senses, they ought to be in such accord. This categorical "ought" represents a synthetic a priori proposition inasmuch as above and beyond my will affected by sensuous desires there is added further the idea of this will, but as belonging to the world of reasoning. This idea is pure and practical of itself, and supplies to the former will the supreme condition according to reason, in very much the same way as to the inner perceptions of the world of the senses there are added the concepts of reason? which, though in themselves they signify nothing but lawful form in

13 general, make the synthetic a priori propositions possible upon which all knowledge of physical nature rests. The practical use of ordinary human reason confirms this deduction. There is no one, not even the most hardened criminal, provided only that he is otherwise accustomed to employ reason, who, when confronted with evidences of honesty of intention, of steadfastness in the pursuit of good maxims, of sympathy and general good will (even when connected with great sacrifice of advantages and comfort), would not wish that he might be similarly disposed. But he does not succeed only because of his inclinations and impulses although he at the same time considers them burdensome and would gladly be free from them. Thus he proves that with his will which is free from the impulses of the senses he is transporting himself into an entirely different order of things that of his sensuous desires, because from this wish to be free from them he can expect no enjoyment of his desires and consequently no condition that will satisfy any of his real or imagined inclinations (for this would deprive of its preference the very idea which inspired his wish); but he can expect only a greater intrinsic worth of his person. He thinks he is this better person when he transports himself onto the standpoint of a member of the world of reasoning, to which the idea of freedom, that is, the independence from the determining causes of the world of the senses urges him against his wish, and in which he is conscious of a good will which according to his own admissions supplies for his evil will as belonging to the world of the senses, the law of which he recognizes the authority as he transgresses it. The moral "ought" then i one's own necessary "I will" as member of an intelligible world, and is construed as an "ought" only because the person considers himself as also a member of the world of the senses. (From: Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundation of Morals[or Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals] 1785, from The Philosophy of Kant, trans. and ed. Carl J. Friedrich [New York: Random House, 1949], pp passim.)

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