Notes on Modern Philosophy

Transcription

1 Notes on Modern Philosophy Version John Coleman October 2007 Notes on Modern Philosophy

2 Notes on Modern Philosophy Contents 1 About these notes About me René Descartes [2] Meditation I Of the things which we may doubt [3,4] Meditation II Of the nature of the human mind; and that it is more easily known than the body [6,7] Meditation III Of God: that He exists[10,11] in which René goes off the rails and finds God Meditations IV-VI Truth and Error; Material Things; Mind and Body [17,18] Criticism of The Meditations The mind-body problem [9] Hobbes and Locke, British empiricists Hobbes Locke 21 Book I. Of Innate Notions...21 Book II. Of Ideas 23 Book III. Of Words 25 Book IV. Of Knowledge and Opinion Political Philosophy The Social Contract Personhood Freedom 34 7 Mathematics, pseudo-science, and semantics Leibniz's law When is a person not a person? The law of transitivity God, Free Will and Determinism Paradoxical problems relating to Free Will To be continued? References...39

3 1 About these notes My purpose in beginning to write these notes is to help me understand better some thoughts I have about philosophy. What it means? (as Kamil Ettinger use to say in a Polish accent). I hope that I may clarify these thoughts as I set out my present understanding, and that constructive criticism of them by others could lead me to better understanding. Throughout these notes numerals in square brackets [1] refer to references in the end-notes list in the References chapter, readers of the Microsoft Word version of this document may hyperlink to them by Ctrl left-click and return via the Back button in the Web toolbar. Many references include further hyperlinks to resources openly available via the Internet and the World Wide Web. This document remains a 'work in progress' until this disclaimer is removed. 2 About me I declare an interest in the scientific method; reason; evidence-based conclusions; and that I call myself an atheist (based on my definition of God, of which more later maybe?). I studied Physics (and Medical Physics) at university and have worked in teaching (very briefly) and as a computer software engineer on various scientific/engineering applications. Currently I am 57¾ years old and sitting comfortably in the study with a cup of tea. Over the years I have been involved in several brief amateur 'philosophical' discussions with friends and family. I have recently begun a DACE 1 course at Glasgow University on Modern Philosophy and it is the week-end. Being in a relatively calm state of mind, with a little time to spare and no major passions at present it seems there will be no better time to start these notes than now. 3 René Descartes [2] In the notes which follow I have used italicised text for Descartes' own words cut-and-paste or copied verbatim from sources I have referenced, which are of course translations derived somehow from original Latin edition of I have paraphrased very slightly sometimes, and altered the order a little when it seemed to help my précis flow more smoothly, but in general I have been very careful not to alter the sense of what I have read. A few purple patches are shaded purple. I make no apology for using more of Descartes' words than my own. He wrote well and tried hard to explain difficult concepts clearly, which is more than can be said for some distinguished modern commentators I have struggled to understand. Occasionally I have use key words which I have picked up from somewhere else and I have used bold type for these (a bit like the Guardian). So, if it's not italic and it's not bold, it's my own words what I wrote. 1 Department of Adult and Continued Education Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 1

4 3.1 Meditation IOf the things which we may doubt [3,4] Descartes had realised that many of his beliefs from early youth were based on principles which were not well established. He wanted to establish a firm and permanent structure in the sciences and felt that first he needed a new foundation of beliefs which were beyond doubt, from which to progress by reason alone. That seems to me to be a fantastic (meaning laudable) aspiration, albeit over ambitious. I am fond of a reasoned approach but not convinced (yet) that everything could be determined from first principles by reason alone. In considering which of his beliefs were beyond doubt Descartes quickly ran into deep water. He realised that every belief which was based in the smallest way on any previous belief which was doubtful could not be admitted to his new foundation of building blocks validated as beyond doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labour; but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. Further, he came to the terrible realisation that all his learning had been acquired via his senses and that if the senses were not reliable, then nothing was beyond doubt. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. Why distrust the senses? the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation things are not always as they appear to be (eg a straight stick apparently bent by refraction) Descartes is astonished to realise that it could be difficult to clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep could all our experience be part of a dream?... Even dreamed things, Descartes reasoned, are counterparts of something real and true. Therefore general objects, at all events, namely, eyes, a head, hands, and an entire body, are not simply imaginary, but really existent. Descartes compared dreamed experiences with the work of fantastical painters, who cannot bestow upon them natures absolutely new, but can only make a certain medley of the members of different animals; or if they chance to imagine something so novel that nothing at all similar has ever been seen before, and such as is, therefore, purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is at least certain that the colours of which this is composed are real. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 2

5 Descartes considered that, dreaming or not, there is a class of objects still more simple and universal, which are real and true from which all these images of things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or false and fantastic are formed. This class includes space-occupying objects with a corporeal nature (bodily? concrete?); their quantity or magnitude, and their number, as also the place in, and the time during, which they exist, and other things of the same sort. I think these are things which are deemed to be necessary truths (A single belief which could not be false is said to express a necessary truth[5]). They include statements proved true mathematically, like two and three make five and things which are true by definition, like a square has but four sides; a bachelor is unmarried. He considered that Arithmetic, Geometry, and the other sciences of the same class, which were based only on necessary truths and reason, contain some measure of certainty and an element of the indubitable which is not available with Physics, Astronomy, Medicine and all other sciences which consider composite things (ie not elementary, Necessary Truth things) and are very dubious and uncertain (not least I suppose because such sciences involve acquiring experience via the senses). Even as he has just proposed a class of objects which are real and true Descartes considered the possibility that in fact there is no earth, no heaven, no extended thing, no magnitude, no place, but that nevertheless he was somehow deceived in to perceiving such things as if they did exist. At first Descartes was inclined to trust that an all-powerful God existed who is supremely good and that surely then He would not permit Descartes to be deceived about existence in such a way. Descartes declared that I have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-powerful God existed by whom I have been created and this rings alarm bells with me, surely he was not already reasoning on long-held beliefs which he had not re-evaluated as beyond doubt? But Descartes avoided that by granting for the present that all that is here said of God is a fable. He pointed out that there were people who would prefer to deny the existence of a God so powerful as to be capable of deceiving our perception of existence, than to admit the loss of certainty which necessarily follows. Descartes seemed disinclined to join the God sceptics but had to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true of which is beyond doubt. He determined that in the spirit of his new endeavour he should suspend his long-held belief in God (until he could reason that it was beyond doubt) just as surely as he should not admit proposals which were manifestly false. Instead, he entertained the possibility of a God who is an evil genius not less powerful than deceitful who has employed His whole energies in deceiving me: I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all external things are nought but illusions and dreams. If that were the case, he reasoned, it might be beyond his own power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth but he could at least hold firm to his purpose and refuse to give credence to anything which could be doubtful (ie everything as it could all be implanted by the evil genius God). Here endeth the first Meditation and our hero seems completely at sea. He has proposed a methodology for reasoning forwards from a new foundation of Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 3

6 beliefs which are beyond doubt and set out to enumerate them. But they are very hard to find, although a class of elementary objects which are real and true provides some hope of progress. Nevertheless almost all his former beliefs seem open to doubt. He cannot even rule out that his every thought and perception of external things and necessary truths could be the work of an evil genius. 3.2 Meditation II Of the nature of the human mind; and that it is more easily known than the body [6,7] The Meditation of yesterday has filled my mind with so many doubts, that it is no longer in my power to forget them. Nor do I see, meanwhile, any principle on which they can be resolved; and, just as if I had fallen all of a sudden into very deep water, I am so greatly disconcerted as to be unable either to plant my feet firmly on the bottom or sustain myself by swimming on the surface. I will, nevertheless, make an effort, and try anew the same path on which I had entered yesterday, that is, proceed by casting aside all that admits of the slightest doubt, not less than if I had discovered it to be absolutely false; and I will continue always in this track until I shall find something that is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing more, until I shall know with certainty that there is nothing certain. Archimedes, that he might transport the entire globe from the place it occupied to another, demanded only a point that was firm and immovable; so, also, I shall be entitled to entertain the highest expectations, if I am fortunate enough to discover only one thing that is certain and indubitable. Right on René, go for it. He considered that maybe all the things which I see are false What is there, then, that can be esteemed true? Perhaps this only, that there is absolutely nothing certain. That seemed bleak but he persisted : But how do I know that there is not something different altogether from the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is impossible to entertain the slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some being, by whatever name I may designate him, who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind? But why suppose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them? Am I, then, at least not something? But I before denied that I possessed senses or a body; I hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 4

7 definite conclusion that this proposition 'I am, I exist', is necessarily true each time I pronounce it, or mentally conceive it. Hurray, a result Descartes exists, his first belief which is beyond doubt! But he was not so carried away by his success that he forgot his purpose. He had reasoned that 'I am' but not yet solved 'What am I?' What then did I formerly think I was? Undoubtedly I judged that I was a man. But what is a man?... In the first place, then, I thought that I possessed a countenance, hands, arms, and all the fabric of members that appears in a corpse, and which I called by the name of body. It further occurred to me that I was nourished, that I walked, perceived, and thought, and all those actions I referred to as the soul; But what am I? now that I suppose there exists an extremely powerful, and, if I may say so, malignant being, whose whole endeavours are directed toward deceiving me? Can I affirm that I possess any one of all those attributes of which I have lately spoken as belonging to the nature of body? After attentively considering them in my own mind, I find none of them that can properly be said to belong to myself. To recount them would be idle and tedious. Let us pass, then, to the attributes of the soul. The first mentioned were the powers of nutrition and walking; but, if it be true that I have no body, it is true likewise that I am capable neither of walking nor of being nourished. Perception is another attribute of the soul; but perception too is impossible without the body; besides, I have frequently, during sleep, believed that I perceived objects which I afterward observed I did not in reality perceive. Thinking is another attribute of the soul; and here I discover what properly belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I am--i exist: this is certain; but how often? As often as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should wholly cease to think, that I should at the same time altogether cease to be. I now admit nothing that is not necessarily true. I am therefore, precisely speaking, not more than a thing which thinks, that is to say a mind or a soul, or an understanding or a reason, terms whose significance was formerly unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing, and really exist; but what thing? I have answered: a thing which thinks. Hurray, it's a wrap, Cogito ergo sum [8]. Q.E.D. (quod erat demonstrandum, "which was to be demonstrated"). But Descartes' second meditation did not end there, he went on to consider what else he might be, beyond a thing which thinks. I think this is the tip of the mind-body problem[9] iceberg and I have not got my head round it yet. I hope that all will be revealed (by reason alone?) by the time we reach Meditation VI, Of the existence of material things, and of the real distinction between the mind and body of man. I will complete my précis of Meditation II but I admit just now that I might be losing the plot a bit. The question now arises, am I aught besides? I will stimulate my imagination with a view to discover whether I am not still something more than a thinking Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 5

8 being. Now it is plain I am not the assemblage of members called the human body; to imagine is nothing more than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing; but I already know that I exist, and that it is possible at the same time that all those images, and in general all that relates to the nature of body, are merely dreams [or chimeras]. But what, then, am I? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses; that imagines also, and perceives. Certainly it is no small matter, if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belong to it? Am I not that very being who now doubts of almost everything; who, for all that, understands and conceives certain things; who affirms one alone as true, and denies the others; who desires to know more of them, and does not wish to be deceived; who imagines many things, sometimes even despite his will; and is likewise percipient of many, as if through the medium of the senses. Is there nothing of all this as true as that I am, even although I should be always dreaming, and although he who gave me being employed all his ingenuity to deceive me? Is there also any one of these attributes that can be properly distinguished from my thought, or that can be said to be separate from myself? I am as certainly the same being who imagines; for although it may be (as I before supposed) that nothing I imagine is true, still the power of imagination does not cease really to exist in me and to form part of my thought. Finally, I am the same being who perceives, that is, who apprehends certain objects as by the organs of sense, since, in truth, I see light, hear a noise, and feel heat. But it will be said that these presentations are false, and that I am dreaming. Let it be so. At all events it is certain that I seem to see light, hear a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be false, and this is what in me is properly called feeling, which is nothing else than thinking. Descartes seems to me to be suggesting that although his perceptions, or feelings, of the material world could have been implanted by the evil genius the feelings themselves nevertheless exist, even if their material counterpart does not. In other words, the figments of his imagination exist even if that is just what they are. He realised that it seemed strange to conclude that his imagination was a first-class 'beyond doubt' thing, before things as perceived via the senses. in truth, it may seem strange to say that I know and comprehend with greater distinctness things whose existence appears to me doubtful, that are unknown, and do not belong to me, than others of whose reality I am persuaded, that are known to me, and appertain to my proper nature; in a word, than myself. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 6

9 Descartes began to consider again how his perceptions via the senses could reveal the essential nature of external objects. He started with a piece of wax and noted how its shape, colour, smell, dimensions could change as he approached the fire and it melted (why didn't he start with a brick?). This led on to considering the relationship between an object's identity and its appearance. We say, for example, that we see the same wax when it is before us, and not that we judge it to be the same from its retaining the same colour and figure: whence I should forthwith be disposed to conclude that the wax is known by the act of sight, and not by the intuition of the mind alone, This seems to be pedantry of the 'brown on the side that I can see' variety (as the scientist replied to 'what colour is that cow?'). Descartes noted further how he could be misled by his mind's misjudgement when drawing false conclusions from appearances alone. I remember the instance of men passing on in the street below, as observed from a window. I really do not see them but infer that what I see is men, just as I say that I see the wax; and yet what do I see from the window beyond hats and cloaks that might cover automatic machines, whose motions might be determined by springs? But I judge these to be men. And similarly solely by the faculty of judgement which rests in my mind, I comprehend that which I believed I saw with my eyes. Descartes seems to have drawn a blank in answer to 'what else might he be, beyond a thing which thinks?' Certainly he has not turned up anything new which is beyond doubt. But finally, what shall I say of the mind itself, that is, of myself? for as yet I do not admit that I am anything but mind. What, then, I who seem to perceive this piece of wax so distinctly, do I not know myself, both with greater truth and certainty, and also much more distinctly and clearly? And there are besides so many other things in the mind itself that contribute to the illustration of its nature, that those dependent on the body, to which I have here referred, scarcely merit to be taken into account. But, in conclusion, I find I have insensibly reverted to the point I desired; for, since it is now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone; and since they are not known from the fact that they are seen and touched, but only because they are understood. I see clearly that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than my own mind. But because it is difficult to rid one's self so promptly of an opinion to which one has been long accustomed, it will be well that I should halt a little at this stage, so that that, by long continued meditation, I may more deeply impress upon my memory this new knowledge. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 7

10 3.3 Meditation III Of God: that He exists[10,11] in which René goes off the rails and finds God. Before I attempt to summarise Meditation III I will reflect a little on the story so far. Descartes adopted a methodology to establish some secure and lasting result in science. He would start afresh, reasoning forward from a platform of truths that were beyond doubt. But he soon found that almost everything seemed to be doubtful and finally concluded at last that the first certain thing was himself, a thinking thing. This was very subjective, he reasoned that he himself existed and his thoughts, but was not convinced of the existence of the external world. Mind and conscious things were more knowable than body and material things. Scruton [12] comments: So far, it will be noted, Descartes' conclusions concerned only himself and the contents if his own consciousness. And his very method of doubt has forced him into the confines of what I shall call 'the first-person case', beyond which he has so far found no argument that will open the passage. That seems a fair summary to me, now read on In his third meditation Descartes began to consider more carefully whether there may be other things in me which I have not discovered. He introduced a rule: whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true. Then he rehearsed his previous arguments and reconsidered the possibility of a Divine deceiver, which he found not proven - nor have I yet sufficient certainty that there is any God I must examine whether there is a God, and if so, whether He can be a deceiver; without knowing this, I seem unable to be quite certain of anything else. He started by classifying his experiences in order to find in which of them truth and falsehood properly inhere: ideas: pictures of objects when I think of a man, a chimera, the sky an angel, or God. volitions and emotions: more than the likeness of the thing in question have additional properties when I will; am afraid; assert; or deny. ie an idea and a conscious reaction to the idea. judgements: eg taking ideas within myself to have similarity or conformity to some external object. The first two classifications were not a problem for Descartes, ideas; and volitions and emotions cannot strictly be false I may desire what is evil, or what does not exist anywhere, but it is none the less true that I desire it. But judgements could be problematic the chief problem is about the ideas that I regard as taken from external objects Of these some seem to be innate, some acquired and some devised by myself. He reconsiders what is my motive for thinking them [his ideas] similar to those [external] objects? After reprising the the 'flawed senses' argument he moves on: At this point however, there occurs to me a way of investigating whether any of the objects of which there are ideas within me also exist outside me. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 8

11 Descartes begins to develop a kind of cosmological argument[12], based on a premise which is already clear by the light of nature that the complete efficient cause must contain as much as the effect of that cause. but further I cannot have the idea of heat, or of a stone, without its being put into me by a cause in which there is in fact as much reality as I conceive to exist in the heat or the stone. He argued that his ideas of things which exist must be caused by external things which actually exist. But maybe these ideas were caused by other ideas, not by external things? He considered this and concluded And though one idea may originate from another an infinite regress here is impossible; we must at last get back to some primary idea whose cause is as it were an archetype, containing actually any reality whatever that occurs in the idea representatively. I have considered the cosmological argument before (who hasn't?), usually in its 'What came before the Big Bang?' form, and concluded that we may as well accept some kind of causa sui or 'First Cause', or remain stuck in Descartes' infinite regress. We might term that thing God for want of a name but I can never manage the leap of faith that leads people to believe God is somehow omniscient; omnipotent; loving human-kind etc where is the evidence for that?[16]. To me God, used in the causa sui sense, is just an abstract concept we can assign for now to the philosophical parking-lot, while we move on to areas which seem more usefully productive. Descartes continued: So it is clear to me by the light of nature that the ideas in me are like pictures; they may fall short of the perfection of the things from which they are taken, but cannot contain anything greater or more perfect. He then segued into his version of the ontological argument[13] which concludes that the existence of God is an a priori necessity because God's existence cannot be denied without contradiction. I prefer to think of this as that God must exist by definition, because He is defined as the most perfect being imaginable, and that implies She must exist, as the notion of God's greatness or perfection includes Its existence. Propositional Logic [14] probably has some bearing on the ontological argument but I don t quite understand it. However, apparently (quoting logic@philosophy.ox.ac.uk, not Descartes) if it would be impossible for the conclusion to be false then the argument must be valid, whatever the premises may be. And [15] according to the definitions of propositional logic anything one likes follows from an inconsistent set of sentences or beliefs. And a necessary truth follows from anything one likes. Thus if God exists is deemed to be a necessary truth then any argument leading to that conclusion is valid! To cut a long story short Descartes finally reached - On all counts the conclusion must be: from the mere fact that I exist, and have in me some idea of the most perfect being, that is, God, it is clearly demonstrated that God exists. [aye, right not] I think Descartes had reasoned that his ideas certainly existed and that he had an idea of God. Further, the light of nature showed him that ideas of things which exist must be caused by external things which actually exist. Also, he Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 9

12 argued that any idea could only be at best an inadequate representation of the actual thing and that his idea was of a perfect thing so that God must be just as perfect and exist. Having convinced himself that God exists he wondered It only remains for me to examine how I got this idea from God and decided that the idea of God can only be innate in me, just as the idea of myself is. He likened this to an artist signing his work and believed he was created by God in His image and that he (Descartes) could perceive his own likeness to God, and similarly perceive himself. I find Meditation III profoundly disappointing after the first two, in which he seemed to propose an objective methodology and to follow it doggedly despite the shortage of conclusions which were beyond doubt. By Meditation III he seems determined to 'prove' that God exists and introduces (for the first time) the light of nature and the rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true to help him. It seems to me that the method of doubt has been abandoned and that reason is being subordinated to deception by smoke and mirrors. In break time at the DACE class we speculated that Descartes may have been coerced somehow into proving God's existence. Certainly his first Meditations would have seemed utterly heretical to the established Church. How could anyone conclude that the first, maybe the only, thing which exists beyond doubt is I, myself, a thing which thinks? We wondered if it was somehow made very clear to Descartes he should find very rapidly that the second certain thing was that God exists. Maybe he concluded that selfinterest might indicate a more pragmatic course than the method of doubt and that discretion was the better part of valour? It seems to me that this proposition could be quite plausible because the Meditations change direction and style so suddenly. No doubt very many learned people have debated this and much has been written about it, but so far I have not encountered it or made enough time to seek it out. 3.4 Meditations IV-VI Truth and Error; Material Things; Mind and Body [17,18] I will deal only briefly with the last three Meditations, partly because I can no longer follow Descartes line of 'reasoning' and partly because the DACE class moved on after Meditation III from discussing Descartes per-se, to considering his impact on later developments. Despite Of God: that He exists there seems to be a general feeling that Descartes has removed God from the equation and replaced the Aristotelian notion of the soul [19] with his new rational idea of the mind. His ontological argument is deemed to be 'weak' and maybe that is why his conclusion that God exists seems to be almost ignored. In the DACE class we had a straw poll on who would assign Descartes to Orwell's Room 101, as in Paul Merton's TV show. My opinion is that Descartes showed promise, but after Meditation II he seemed to do exactly what he set out not to do, he began to base new arguments on premises which were doubtful (to say the least). But I wouldn't consign him to the worst thing Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 10

13 in the world; I admire him for his early aspirations and his willingness to challenge dogma. It seems to me that during the first two Meditations had boxed himself into a corner by his refusal to trust the senses. He had managed to reason that he and his mind must exist, but he needed something more to argue conclusively that external things truly existed beyond his own mind. Unable to accept any new premises via his senses he managed to find God by pure reason, albeit rather weakly as we have seen. I rather wish he had meditated longer on the admittance of sensed evidence and how rationalism and empiricism might complement each other. But that would be another story, perhaps being played out in a parallel universe far, far away... Be that as it may, Descartes endorsed God as the second certain thing, and removed the possibility of an evil genius hell-bent on deception. In Meditation IV, Of Truth and Falsehood he made rapid progress, with God on his side. First, I can see the impossibility of God's ever deceiving me. Any fraud or deception involves imperfection; and although it may seem that the ability to deceive is a mark of skill or power, the will to deceive is a sign of malice or weakness, and so cannot occur in God. Next, I am aware of having the faculty of judging. This like everything else that is in me, I have received from God; and since God would not deceive me which I doubtless received from God, he cannot have given me a faculty whose right employment could ever lead me astray. So Descartes considered that he might be infallible due to his God-given perfect understanding. He concluded though that actually he was prone to errors because sometimes he acted beyond his understanding, wilfully making judgements about matters understood by God but not himself. I think he was saying that if God granted him understanding in a matter it was necessarily perfect, but that there were some matters where understanding was reserved unto God. But he wasn't complaining: I have no reason, either for complaining that God did not give me a greater power of understanding Again, I have no reason for complaining that God gave me a will extending more widely than my understanding Finally, I must not complain that God co-operates with me when I perform those acts of will, or those judgements in which I go wrong. Descartes argued that in some way the perfection of the universe is greater, because some parts of it are not exempt from going wrong and he did not complain if God chose him for a part that contributed to universal perfection by going wrong (big time). Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 11

14 The final conclusion of Meditation IV was that although Descartes could not avoid being unable to perceive everything clearly and distinctly he could certainly avoid making a decision whenever the truth of the matter is not clear. In Meditation V, The Nature of Material Things: God's Existence again considered, Descartes began by returning to the problem of external things, maybe more tractable with God to help? the most urgent task seems to be to get out of these difficulties I fell into on previous days, and see if any certainty is to be had as regards material objects. First he considered his ideas of external things and which properties of them were perceived most clearly and distinctly. These included spatial extension (length, breadth, depth); size; shape; position; local motion; and durations in time. He argued that the truth of these is obvious, leading to the notion of innate truths, like the geometrical proofs that the internal angles of a triangle sum to 180 etc. He seemed to get sidetracked from the pursuit of material objects and digressed into a second go at his ontological argument, maybe he wasn't convinced by his first shot either. He argued that many of his ideas, about geometry and mathematical concepts for example, were far more than just figments of his imagination. He perceived these types of things very clearly and distinctly, previously he had noted that on first discovering these ideas it was not as learning of something new, but as the recollection of what I already knew. So these ideas did not originate from Descartes, they were somehow innate and ranked as certainties along with his existence and his mind. He realised that by pure reason he could construct mathematical proofs which were undoubtedly true, including geometrical constructs so complex as to be way beyond anything perceived via the senses from external objects. So constructing a valid argument that led to a true conclusion in his mind did not necessarily make that thing exist externally. Descartes 'reasoned' that when he perceived clearly and distinctly that the internal angles of a triangle sum to 180 it must be true (by his previous meditations) and wondered could not this give rise to an argument by which the existence of God might be proved? Descartes' ideas about the internal angles of a triangle did not depend on its existence, whether it existed or not did not undermine his geometrical proof, and the proof did not require it to exist. But if Descartes' clear and distinct idea of God essentially included His existence, that was surely a different matter? His idea of God was as clear as his idea of the triangle so both ideas were undoubtedly true, but the God idea was inseparable from God's existence, so He must indeed exist. I think Descartes put his ontological argument slightly better this time but it still seems very 'weak' to me. He tried to head off criticism that by this reasoning he could argue anything into existence, by asserting that the idea of God is different from all others, God is the only substance for which existence is an essential property: For what is intrinsically more obvious than that the Supreme Being is; that God, to whose essence alone existence belongs, exists? Having reassured himself that God still exists Descartes repeated the deduction that But now I have discerned that God exists and that he is not deceitful I have gathered that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 12

15 necessarily true and returned towards the most urgent task concerning material objects, concluding: Thus I see plainly that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends entirely on my awareness of the true God; before knowing Him I could have no perfect knowledge of anything. And now it becomes possible for countless things to be clearly known and certain to me; both about God Himself and other intellectual beings, and about the whole field of corporeal nature that is the subject-matter of pure mathematics. Is this saying that having disposed of the evil genius Descartes is free at last to entertain ideas of external things perceived via the senses, taking care to understand them as well as he might? Or that he should confine his ideas to those based on necessary truths, like God's existence and mathematics? It doesn't seem to be a clear statement about the existence of material objects. But read on, for Meditation VI, Of the existence of material things, and of the real distinction between the mind and body of man begins: It remains for me to examine whether material things exist. He examined the difference between imagination and pure understanding with reference to ideas of simple, and extremely complex geometrical figures (triangles and chiliagons). He felt that he could understand either type of figure quite well (a triangle has 3 sides, a chiliagon has 1000 etc) but that visualising the chiliagon in his imagination was much more difficult; this new mental effort plainly shows the difference between imagination and pure understanding. But did his ability to imagine material things imply that they really exist? in spite of careful investigation of all points, I can as yet see no way of arguing conclusively from the fact that there is in my imagination a distinct idea of a corporeal nature to the existence of any body. He distinguished between ideas arising from pure mathematics and many other things that I habitually imagine colours, sounds, flavours, pain; but none of these are so distinctly imagined I must see if I can get any certain argument for the existence of material objects from things perceived in the mode of consciousness that I call sensation. He remembered that he had the use of his senses before the use of reason and thus readily convinced myself that I had nothing in my intellect that I had not previously had in sensation. In the first place, then: I had sensations of having a head, hands, feet, and the other members that make up the body; and I regarded the body as part of myself, or even as my whole self. But he also recalled his recent distrust of sensation: Since then, however I have had many experiences that have gradually sapped the faith I had in the senses. He enumerated some again, including the amputee's pain, apparently in the missing limb; and dreams. Having endorsed the existence of God Descartes' need to doubt ideas based on sensation was reduced: But now that I am beginning to be better acquainted with myself and the Author of my being, my view is that I must not rationally accept all the apparent data of sensation; nor on the other hand, call them all into question. Some progress at last. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 13

16 Then he began to distinguish between his mind and body: I have on one hand, a clear and distinct idea of myself taken simply as a conscious, not extended, being; and on the other hand a distinct idea of the body, taken simply as an extended, not a conscious, being; so it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and could exist without it. So Descartes has separately identified his mind and body and associates the notion of 'myself', essentially, with the mind. He goes on: Nature likewise teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and as it were intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity. For if this were not the case, I should not feel pain when my body is hurt, seeing I am merely a thinking thing, but should perceive the wound by the understanding alone, just as a pilot perceives by sight when any part of his vessel is damaged; and when my body has need of food or drink, I should have a clear knowledge of this, and not be made aware of it by the confused sensations of hunger and thirst: for, in truth, all these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are nothing more than certain confused modes of thinking, arising from the union and apparent fusion of mind and body. Body, from its nature, is always divisible; the mind is entirely indivisible. For in truth, when I consider the mind, that is, when I consider myself in so far only as I am a thinking thing, I can distinguish in myself no parts, but I very clearly discern that I am somewhat absolutely one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from my mind. Nor can the faculties of willing, feeling, understanding, etc., properly be called its parts, for it is the same mind that wills, feels, and understands. But quite the opposite holds in corporeal or extended things; for I cannot imagine any one of them which I cannot easily sunder in thought, and which, therefore, I do not conceive of as divisible. This would be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already been apprised of it on other grounds. Descartes seems to be making real progress here, the body may exist after all, and why not other external things? there can be no doubt that my body, or rather my entire self, in as far as I am composed of body and mind, may be variously affected, both beneficially and hurtfully, by surrounding bodies. Finally, he reaches: This consideration is of great service, not only in enabling me to recognise the errors to which my nature is liable, but likewise in rendering it more easy to avoid or correct them. I know that all my sensations are much more often true Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 14

17 than false I can almost always use several senses to examine the same object; above all I have my memory, which connects the present to the past, and my understanding, which has now reviewed all the causes of error. So I ought not to be afraid any longer that all that the senses show me daily may be an illusion; the exaggerated doubts of the last few days are to be dismissed as ridiculous. [skipping a bit about how to recognise wakefulness from dreaming] And I need not doubt the reality of things at all, if after summoning all my senses, my memory, and my understanding to examine them, these sources yield no conflicting information. I am quite content with this conclusion, although I have omitted his final reminder, In such things I am nowise deceived because God is no deceiver, and his caveat, But since practical needs do not always leave time for such a careful examination, we must admit that in human life errors as regards particular things are always liable to happen; and we must recognise the infirmity of our nature. Clearly (and distinctly?) his caveat is prudent, but for me the God reference is unnecessary, summoning all my senses, my memory, and my understanding to examine each idea should be sufficient. So by the end of Meditation VI, I am quite pleased with the conclusion but do not follow each step of Descartes' arguments to reach it. Many times our intuition may persuade us to favour (or not) the conclusion of an argument without quite understanding the reasoning, and that seems unsatisfactory. Apparently Plato proposed that knowledge should be a 'true belief with a logos (a rational account)' which led to the tripartite theory of knowledge[20] : A person S knows proposition P if and only if: 1. P is true 2. S believes P 3. S is justified in believing P. In these terms, if I am S and the conclusion of Meditation VI is P, conditions 1 and 2 might be met but condition 3 is more difficult. My intuition persuades me that P is true and I am prepared to believe it, but if I have to accept Descartes train of argument to get there then I might not be justified in believing it. Of course I have attempted to reach the conclusion of Meditation VI from that of Meditation II (cogito ergo sum) without introducing the notion of God to help me, but that, like these notes, remains a 'work in progress'. 3.5 Criticism of The Meditations Not surprisingly the publication of the Meditations stirred up some controversy in 1641 (and since) and led to many criticisms which have been published. This is part of 'the philosophical method', to paraphrase the scientific one which I have signed up to. Principal among the criticisms are objections raised by the British empiricists, Hobbes[21], Locke and Berkeley [22]. I have not spent a great deal of time reading these criticisms but I do note that very few of them take serious issue with the existence of God. This serves as a reminder that 17th and 18th century philosophers seemed almost obliged to Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 15

18 include God. Even Rationalists like Descartes managed to reason for God's existence, for him the 'Leap of Faith'[23] was not necessary. More interesting here perhaps are comments arising from informal discussions in the DACE class: maybe Descartes was somehow coerced into finding for God? maybe Descartes did not actually believe in God? maybe Descartes intended to take body and soul out of the equation? Descartes identified thought as an action of the soul so maybe he associated the mind with the soul? mind-altering drugs can alter the mind so the mind is part of the body? were the Meditations (published 1641) somehow affected by the death of his father and daughter (in1640)? maybe cogito ergo sum wasn't such great result? as Socrates (b. 470 B.C) is reported by Bob Somerby [24] "Every time that he d utter that silly bromide, I d just say to him, René--you call that thinking?" 4 The mind-body problem [9] This short chapter is currently just a parking-lot for my thoughts on the mindbody problem, which intrigues me. I will use it as a place holder for ideas which I might return to, lest I forget. This time, italicised text, just indicates verbatim text extracted from the referenced source, probably not Descartes. I am persuaded that I exist, and my mind; also my body and other external things (including other people with minds). But what is the mind? and what are thoughts? Descartes proposed that mind and body were quite distinct, although intimately related. He felt that the mind was an immaterial thing and was somehow more essential to his 'self' than his body. This is the origin of Cartesian Dualism[25]. Dualism involves a belief in the existence of a non-physical substance: the mental. A dualist typically believes that body and mind are distinct substances which interact with each other but remain separate. Mental processes, such as thinking, are note the same as physical ones, such as brain cells firing; mental processes occur in the mind, not in the body. The mind is not the living brain. Mind-body dualism is a view held by many people, particularly by those who believe it is possible to survive our bodily death, either by living in some kind of spirit world or by being reincarnated in a new body. The contrasting view is termed physicalism: Physicalism is the view that mental events can be completely explained in terms of physical ones, usually events in the brain. In contrast to mind-body dualism, which states there are two basic sorts of substance, physicalism is a form of monism: it is the view that there is just one sort of substance, the physical. Physicalists do not deny Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 16

19 that there are mental events, but maintain that they can be explained in physical terms by neuroscience etc. Dualism and physicalism are two approaches to explaining the true relationship between mind and body; to solving the mind-body problem. A third approach is known as Logical behaviourism, as proposed by Gilbert Ryle ( )[26] in his book, The Concept of Mind(1949). Ryle famously attacked Cartesian dualism: I shall often speak of it with deliberate abusiveness as "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine". He believed Descartes had made a serious 'category mistake', inventing the mind as a separate entity when in fact it simply represents the net effect of a person's behaviour (I think a category mistake is like failing to see the wood for the trees; or taking the class, the wood, to be something distinct from the members of the class, the trees). Ryle denied the existence of the mind altogether, he argued that referring to mental events was simply a shorthand way of describing sets of behaviour. Thus, saying someone is in love is much more concise than explaining that they exhibit all the typical behaviour associated with that 'mental state' (skipping down the street; buying flowers; proposing marriage etc). Several significant objections were raised against behaviourism including, for example, that it fails to distinguish between someone who is in pain (say) and someone who feigns pain, simply mimicking the appropriate behaviour. I can't see how every possible state of mind actually represents a distinct category of behaviours: lying in bed at night I might be in pain or merely pondering the mind-body problem, my outward behaviour could look pretty similar. Apparently behaviourism was largely superseded by functionalism, which is a theory of the mind that is currently quite widely accepted. But that will have to wait for another day. I have declared for the scientific method and I have worked for most of my life in the field of science and technology, so maybe I should be a natural physicalist; but somehow that does not appeal to me. I certainly accept that my brain is a very important organ and that neuroscience has a lot to offer, but I can't quite accept that my mind and my thoughts are simply the net result of (random?) neural activity. So I have some kind of tendency to dualism. I have worked for a while in medical physics, even programming brain scanners, but that kind of technology doesn't help to visualise the mind. Maybe psychology and psychiatry is the only way to approach it, but hitherto I have stayed very well away from those subjects (and philosophy). Many dualists believe that the mind can somehow 'live on' after bodily death, in a spirit world or reincarnated in a new body, but that doesn't seem important to me. Whatever the truth of the mind-body relationship, they must be pretty closely intertwined, my assumption is that my mind and body have been working together since I became a viable foetus and will cease together when I die. The only way people should expect to 'live on' is in the memory of a few others, and (potentially) in the thoughts of many others via their legacy of writings, or music, or whatever. Mostly I avoid the soul word, I am not sure if it is useful. Some people seem to use it synonymously with the word mind, and some seem to reserve it for Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 17

20 life after death (as in John Brown's body lies a mouldering in the grave but his soul goes marching on). I think of the mind as a very personal thing, the essence of one's self, but I also like the idea of some kind of human spirit, common to all people and hopefully comprising traits of human kindness and consideration that will allow us to develop and survive collectively. OK, it's late, I should re-visit this in the clear light of day. Given that mind and body are very self-centred and personal things then grand unifying ideas like the human spirit have to come from elsewhere. I will mention God just for completeness. I have considered the classic theistic belief in a God who is omnipotent and omniscient and supremely benevolent; and I don't buy it for quite a few good reasons which are not for discussion just now. Maybe if such a thing as the human spirit exists it has evolved along with the human body and is somehow expressed in all our genes, that seems feasible, even if it relies on a sort of physicalism. Another idea I quite like is that the human spirit is a dynamic kind of thing, at any time the net result of all the thoughts and feelings of everyone alive. But it spans generations and develops over history as ideas are passed on from older people to younger people, new doctrines are developed and science progresses (religion and faith too I suppose). No doubt Ryle would dismiss all this as a colossal category mistake, just as minds do not exist, nor does any generalisation of minds, like the human spirit. Actually, I don't have much difficult accepting that what I have referred to as the human spirit could be 'merely' the net aggregation of the minds of all currently living people. More difficult is Ryle's assertion that an individual's mental properties (like pain, love and thoughts) are simply the sum of his/her external and public behaviour. 5 Hobbes and Locke, British empiricists I have been looking forward to learning more about empiricism, in the philosophical sense of the word, because to my mind empirical evidence is an essential part of the scientific method. As is reason, so the notion that rationalism and empiricism could seem somehow to be mutually exclusive in philosophy has always surprised me. Recently I have learned that Descartes, a seminal rationalist, set out to establish a firm and permanent structure in the sciences via pure reason, initially eschewing evidence of the external world acquired via the senses. But his best argument for finally admitting the existence of external things, and considering his sensations of them, involved proposing that God exists which he found to be true. His ontological argument for God seems very weak, maybe it is not possible to establish a firm and permanent structure in the sciences via pure reason alone. Could empiricism help out here, without recourse to God? As the DACE course opened out to consider the work of other modern philosophers after Descartes I found it increasingly difficult to keep up with my background reading. So books like Stephen Priest's [27] have been most useful. This chapter is mainly based on my reading of his book, The British Empiricists : Hobbes to Ayer, italicised extracts are quotations of Priest from that work or of the philosophers themselves from their referenced work. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 18

21 In the rest of this chapter I will concentrate on Hobbes and Locke, both of whom had a lot to say in the political sphere as well as the intellectual. At present I have limited my reading to the intellectual aspects, for comparison with what I have recently learned about Descartes. The more I know, the more I know I don't know, as usual; and I have a feeling that political philosophy might be most useful. Maybe I will spend more time on that later (in chapter 6, Political Philosophy). 5.1 Hobbes Hobbes is both an empiricist and a materialist: that is, he not only maintains that all knowledge is acquired through sense-experience, but he also believes that everything that exists is physical composed of matter. Hobbes was a political theorist as well as a scientific materialist and Hobbes thought of his political theory as continuous with his materialism. Hobbes is most renowned for Leviathan[28], which was published in We know that he had studied Descartes by his objections [21] and implicit references to Descartes' ideas are noticeable in Leviathan. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider: First the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man. Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights and just Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that Preserveth and Dissolveth it. Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-Wealth. Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness. Right from the outset of Leviathan Hobbes shows he has no doubt where ideas come from, Chapter 1 Of Sense begins: Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly, and afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another. Singly, they are every one a Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an Object. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of Apparences. The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that originall. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 19

22 Hobbes argued that physical objects cause sensations and that sensations cause thoughts, that there is a causal relationship between objects and thoughts. Similarly there is a representational relationship between thoughts and objects. Although all thoughts are originally based on sensations caused by physical objects, thoughts may persist after the object is removed: For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, that Latines call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies Apparence, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but Decaying Sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, as well sleeping, as waking. So Hobbes preferred the term fancy to imagination because we can fancy more than images, but he seems to go with the flow and referred subsequently to imagination, referring to all the other senses, as well sight. He realised that Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names. Both memory and imagination led to thoughts in the absence of the original physical object. Hobbes distinguished simple imagination, as in recollection of an entire scene, as perceived (a man on a horse) from compound imagination, as in the thought of a centaur (a man's torso with a horse's body). Thoughts due to compound imagination, as distinct from memory, do not necessarily represent objects in mind-independent reality, they are fictions of the mind. He introduced the notion of a train of thoughts, or mental discourse: By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse. Hobbes proposed, logically, that just as thoughts could be caused by external physical objects, subsequent thoughts could be caused by the first, in a train of thoughts. He perceived two kinds of trains of thought, unguided and regulated. Unguided trains of thought are simply the result of association, as in thought A suggests thought B and so on Wherein there is no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow. Regulated trains of thought are more imperative though, driven by some kind of desire or fear: For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return. Priest commented: Indeed, desire or fear, trains of thought and actions form a mutually dependent triad in Hobbes's philosophy of the person. We fear or desire, we think how to act to obviate the fear or fulfil the desire and we act according to our thoughts. None of the three makes sense in abstraction from the other two. Hobbes concluded his chapter, Of The Consequence Or Trayne Of Imaginations, by: besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; In other words the mind is nothing more than sensations and thoughts, and thoughts are caused by external objects, 'matter in motion'. This materialist view leaves no room for the Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 20

23 Existence of an Incorporeall Soule, Separated from the Body. Indeed Hobbes maintained that God and the soul are physical objects, albeit composed of matter so refined as to be invisible physical objects. His theory that God was a powerful physical object brought him a reputation as an atheist, and the Great Fire and Great Flood of London were blamed on him. So our second Modern Philosopher has not altogether ruled out the existence of God either, although Hobbes has come closer to it than Descartes. Not many theists could accept that God was just a powerful physical object. Once again I wonder if lip-service (at least) to God was part of the terms and conditions of all philosophers operating in the 17th century. Leviathan is an enormous work with four parts and 47 chapters. I have barely scratched the surface of the 16 chapters in Part 1. But I will move on just now to Locke, and may return to parts of Hobbes via cross-references under other headings. 5.2 Locke In philosophy, Locke developed the anti-metaphysical empiricism of Hobbes, but (with dubious consistency) rejected materialism for the mind-body dualism of the kind endorsed by Descartes. In politics he is arguably the inventor of liberalism; his writings had an enormous impact on eighteenth century intellectuals and contributed to the intellectual origins of the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of Locke's most influential work is the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published shortly after Newton's Principia, in 1689 when he was in his midfifties. I didn t find a convenient on-line version of the full Essay text, although many image based versions of the original publication are available. Reading the original text in facsimile form is very heavy going, so I stuck to Stephen Priest's book [27], and a very abridged version of the Essay at Squashed Philosophers[29]. Book I. Of Innate Notions Empiricism is the doctrine that all knowledge is acquired through experience. Innate knowledge is knowledge we are born with and so did not acquire through experience. It follows that empiricism logically implies that no knowledge is innate. In the Essay Locke adopts two main strategies to persuade us that there is no innate knowledge Book I seeks to refute a set of arguments for innate knowledge Book II [sets out] an empiricist epistemology designed to make the postulation of innate ideas redundant. Locke divided the arguments for innate ideas into two categories, 'speculative principles' and 'practical principles', and set out to refute them one by one. Speculative principles include fundamental axioms of logic, as first formulated by Aristotle; and practical principles are moral principles such as that one ought to keep promises. Locke refuted the arguments that speculative principles are innate as follows: Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 21

24 General consent everyone agrees that something is true, so it must be an innate idea. Locke denied the existence of principles that were assented to by all humans; and argued that even if such principles did exist universal assent does not prove that they are known innately. He concluded universal consent proves nothing innate. Unconscious knowledge some things are known to all unconsciously, even if they don't realise it, so these things must be innate. Locke's view was that unconscious thoughts could not exist, No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. The capacity for knowledge is innate we may not be born with innate thoughts but we have the innate capacity to acquire them. Locke dismissed this as a very improper way of speaking, it did not make sense to imply that what is learned is innate. Some things can be proved by pure reason children (and idiots) may come to understand things when they learn to follow rational argument, those things must be innate if no sensory perception is required. Locke denied that anything arrived at by reason could also be claimed to be innate. Self-evident truths are innate some things receive instant assent so they must be innate. Locke argued that such things may be true and understood but that did not make theme innate, they were merely tautological propositions as in 'bachelors are unmarried', 'white is not black', 1+2=3. He distinguished between a priori, meaning knowable without sensory perception, and innate as in knowledge we are born with which seems sensible to me, I still like true by definition. General and universal principles are innate even if 1+2=3 were not innate the underlying axiom (apparently) of identity is innate. Locke's response was that such things are analytic truths: propositions which are true by definition. Implicit knowledge must be innate. Locke could only interpret implicit in this context as meaning the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. In which case he could dismiss it in the same way as the capacity for knowledge is innate argument. In Chapter 3 of Book I in his Essay Locke refuted the arguments that practical principles are innate as follows: Faith and Justice by general consent similar to the argument for speculative principles but applied to the moral sphere, justice, and keeping of contracts, is that which most men seem to agree in. Locke denied that any such universally agreed moral principle exists whether there be any such moral principles wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. Practical principles are adhered to in thought if not in practice people may fail to act in accordance with practical principles, but they know that they should so the principles must be innate. Locke argued that a people's principles were demonstrated by their actions and it is very strange and Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 22

25 unreasonable to suppose innate practical principles that terminate only in contemplation. Additionally Locke observed that there exists a great variety of opinions concerning moral rules and gave examples including how in parts of Asia the sick are left exposed to the elements to perish without assistance or pity. If practical principles were innate then there would be no such diversity, it is inconsistent with the view that such principles are adhered to universally. This concluded Book I, having clearly demonstrated in Locke's view that Neither ideas or moral principles are innate. Book II. Of Ideas If knowledge is not innate, then how is knowledge possible? Locke's sustained reply which absorbs the whole of Book II of the essay is: 'Through experience' There are two, and only two, sources of knowledge according to Locke: 'All ideas come from sensation and reflection' Following this introduction from Priest, I will extract the glossary from Squashed Philosophers, which provides useful definitions of how Locke used these words: Ideas: The discrete mental objects which are in our understanding- not the objects which caused them. Ideas all derive from either sensation or reflection. Sensation, or Sense-Perception: The process by which external objects cause events in the mind. Reflection: The internal mental process of comparing ideas initiated by sensation. Primary qualities: "...such as are utterly inseparable from the body... which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number." Secondary qualities: "...such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c." In Book II Locke described his representational model [30] of perception. This not dissimilar to that of Descartes, which is sometimes lampooned as Cartesian Theatre, where the audience was his homunculus, or inner observer. Locke proposed that all ideas are either sensations, caused by perception of external objects via the senses; or reflections, developed by considering sensations and other reflections. Locke distinguished between simple and complex ideas. The former are the elementary building blocks of the latter. The mind can neither make nor destroy simple ideas, it is impossible to imagine (correctly) a colour one has never seen, or erase an unpleasant sensation. While the mind is passive in the reception of simple ideas the mind is active in the creation of complex ideas. In addition the mind has a measure of control over the existence and nature Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 23

26 of complex ideas that is wholly lacking in regard to simple ideas; they are subject to the will. He went on to classify complex ideas into three kinds, modes, substances and relations. And to introduce the concept of abstract ideas: the mind makes the particular ideas, received from particular objects to become general. Ideas then, for Locke, are simple, complex or abstract. Ideas are mental and experiential contents, but they also represent physical objects in the external world which cause them What is a physical object? Physical objects are characterised by qualities, the power or disposition of an object to produce ideas in us. Primary qualities are such that the ideas they produce are truly representative of the object itself, but ideas produced by secondary qualities may not resemble the object at all (shades of Descartes' piece of wax). An object's primary qualities include its solidity; extension; figure; motion or rest; and number and its secondary qualities include its colour; sound; taste; and smell; which are deemed more to be in the sense of the beholder (as it were). Apparently this classification of primary and physical properties was a widely held view at Locke's time, Galileo, Descartes, Boyle and Newton all subscribed to something like this. And that real physical objects didn't do secondary, the mind-independent universe was thought to consist in the movement of silent, bulky objects possessing only shape, size and solidity while their colour, sound, taste and smell was the product of a causal relationship with conscious beings. Locke did attempt to tackle the question 'if an object is characterised by its qualities, exactly what is it that is characterised?' but didn't find a very satisfactory answer. It involved the notion of substance. This is in the context of his representational model and his theory of perception. He believes that perceiving an object consists of mentally representing it: perceiving an idea which represents it. It follows that we are never directly acquainted with physical objects themselves, but only with ideas of them. So, 'not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call substance'. At one point he conceded that using the word substance is one of those cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas. Locke's uncertainty about physical objects and material substance extends to his consideration of minds and mental substances: Because we believe that 'operations of the mind, viz., thinking, fearing, reasoning etc.,' do not occur on their own account, nor are they straightforwardly characteristics of a physical object, 'we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which we call spirit'. So, although Locke was an empiricist and opposed Descartes' innate truths he was a mind-body dualist, he did not insist, as Hobbes did, that in order to exist the mind must be a material object. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 24

27 Locke continues in Book II of his Essay to discuss problems relating to personal identity, in particular whether a person remains the same person over time. This has important implications in terms of responsibility, for how long does a person remain responsible for his/her actions? is what I assert tomorrow as valid as what I assert today? Locke dealt with The Identity of Vegetables, and of Animals, and of Man; but I have not found time to study it. I know this is a very interesting area though, from my old axe (which has had 3 new heads and 5 new handles) to the ship of Theseus [31]. In my database work I frequently have to determine what combination of attributes uniquely identifies a thing (and what becomes of it if one of them changes) so although that is entirely mundane I feel a certain affinity for the consideration of identity. The issue of identity arises when considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time. Locke was meticulous, so naturally he dealt thoroughly with the question 'What are space and time?' He treated space and time under separate headings in the Essay, but I have not studied them. I wonder what Locke would have made of The Shape of Time [32] in Stephen Hawking's book? Locke also dealt with the issue of numbers, which could be quite difficult for an empiricist. As we have seen, numbers and other abstract geometrical concepts are high on Descartes list of things which are certain beyond doubt, arrived at by pure reason from innate truths. But Locke had no problem dismissing that treatment, his view was that the idea of number depends on the idea of unity or one, which is a thoroughly empirical concept. He felt that every object our senses are employed about, every idea in our understandings, every thought in our minds, brings this idea along with it. Then 'one' is a simple idea and any larger number is a complex idea, and the process of arithmetic may be derived using mathematical logic. Book III. Of Words One way of posing the central question in the philosophy of language is to ask: What makes black marks on a piece of paper, or sounds emitted from someone's mouth, into words and sentences? What is it for a piece of the world to be language? Locke tackled this in the third book of his Essay: Central to Locke's theory of meaning is the claim that 'words in their immediate and primary signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that useth them' Most of Book III was devoted to the meaning of general terms, referring to abstract general ideas. Apparently most words in any language are of this sort. There is a problem for the empiricist here because experience is necessarily of particular objects, so general terms must refer to complex ideas developed by abstraction from simple ones. Thus, the meaning of general terms cannot exist in reality, only in the mind. I don't have much Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 25

28 problem with that, it seems reasonable to me. But I have only skimmed this section, and Locke encountered serious objections from Wittgenstein. Book IV. Of Knowledge and Opinion Book IV includes chapters on: Of Knowledge in General Of the Degrees of our Knowledge Of the degrees, or differences in clearness, of our knowledge: Of the Extent of Human Knowledge Of the Reality of Knowledge Of Universal Propositions: their Truth and Certainty Of our Threefold Knowledge of Existence Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God Of Reason Of Enthusiasm which is too much for me just now. But, naturally, I did check out the chapter on God, which is reminiscent of Descartes. Locke wrote: We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God. Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though he has stamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us. But, though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet it requires thought and attention. He used a kind of cosmological argument: from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what has a beginning must be produced by something else. Having argued for what has always existed, he believed that must be God because being eternal implies possessing attributes including eternity; omnipotence; omniscience etc. I get a déja-vu feeling about here and begin to lose the plot again. In his book, Priest commented Locke's proof of the existence of God is nearly as Cartesian as his mind-body dualism. 6 Political Philosophy In this chapter I will switch from summarising the works of individual philosophers to dealing with individual philosophical topics, as treated by various philosophers. This broadly follows the DACE class curriculum as we moved through Descartes, Hobbes and Locke and opened out to discuss more political philosophy. Roger Scruton [33] commented: Modern writers have tended to regard epistemology and metaphysics as the central areas of philosophy, and to treat political thought as an implied branch of the subject. Of the two greatest modern philosophers Kant and Wittgenstein the first wrote in a scattered and fragmentary way about politics, while the second ignored it altogether. Be that as it may, it seems to me that political philosophy, as well as the philosophy of morals and ethics, might be of the Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 26

29 most practical use. The mind-body problem may be intriguing, but it doesn't seem to shed much light on how we should behave. 6.1 The Social Contract Ben Dupré [34] has a good introductory section on this, including the views of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jaques Rousseau. Dupré begins by quoting Hobbes from Leviathan [28]: During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in a condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short. Hobbes had lived through the English Civil War and had developed an abiding aversion to anarchy; and a bleak and pessimistic view of humanity: Out Of Civil States, There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE. Thus, to keep the PEACE he advocated a common Power to keep them all in awe. His big idea, as a means of extricating people from a perpetual state of warre, was a social contract between each person and the sovereign power (which could be monarch or state he preferred the former). Through the social contract some individual freedom was surrendered in return for a degree of security, legislation and protection provided by the sovereign power. In the DACE class we considered with what authority the sovereign might wield power, but now I think that Hobbes viewed the social contract simply as a kind of transaction. The people purchased the conditions for an ordered society and a peaceful life from the sovereign power; and the price was surrendering some freedom and obeying the law. The sovereign's authority for wielding power was in the fulfilment of its side of the bargain, by delivering the goods as per the contract. Figure 1 shows Abraham Bosse's [36] great etching for the famous frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan; and also Alasdair Gray's great adaptation of it from his novel, Lanark[37]. In Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 27

30 the Lanark version the sovereign power presides over central Scotland and it features (as well as the sword of force and the mitre of persuasion), the Trident submarines at Faslane, and Alasdair's dad. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 28

31 Figure 1: Images of Sovereign Power, from Leviathan and Lanark

32 John Locke developed a version of the social contract too, although he termed it an original compact. His view of humanity was less bleak than Hobbes's even suggesting that people recognised certain 'laws of nature' which they would uphold if they did not conflict too strongly with their self-interest. These laws of nature led him to the concept of 'natural rights' which are independent of any local legislation. As with a great deal of Locke's political philosophy this idea had far-reaching significance, and is echoed today in the international notion of 'human rights'. Locke's original compact was not between free people and sovereign power, but between free people and each other. The people realised, he argued, that the laws of nature were not sufficient in themselves and that their common good was well served by establishing a civil authority and surrendering to it a degree of their personal freedom. Jean-Jaques Rousseau's version came later on, he published his On the Social Contract in The introduction to Rousseau at Squashed Philosophers [35] begins: On The Social Contract has been the handbook of rebels from Robespierre to Pierre Trudeau. Mallet du Pan called it "the Koran of the Revolutionists", and Thomas Carlyle thought that its author was "the Evangelist of the French Revolution". Its style and romantic outlook inspired Shelley, Byron, and Wordsworth, yet Voltaire said that Jean-Jacques was to philosophers what the ape is to man, while Napoleon, musing before Rousseau's tomb, is said to have wondered whether it might not have been better for the world if neither of them had ever been born. Published some thirty-five years before the French Revolution, this book seems less than exciting nowadays, and its writer an odd sort of revolutionary. Rousseau popularised a very sentimental vision of the 'noble savage', who was quite different from Hobbes's brutish men in their natural state. Rousseau believed that man is naturally good but is somehow turned bad under the influence of society and civil institutions: Can there can be any sure and legitimate method of civil administration, which will take men as they are, and laws as they might be? MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in irons. How did this come about? Hobbes and Aristotle thought some are born for slavery, and others for dominion. BUT no man has natural authority over others, and force creates no right. Legitimate authority comes only from agreed conventions. Rousseau's Social Contract demanded: EACH man alienates, by the Social Contract, only such of his powers, goods and liberty as it is important for the community to control; but the Sovereign, under the direction of the General Will, is sole judge of what is important. Why, then, is it that the General Will is always in the right? Because every man thinks of "each" as meaning him, and considers himself when voting for all. Thus the justice created by equality originates in the preference each man Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 30

33 gives to himself. Thus, from the very nature of the contract, every act of Sovereignty, of the General Will, binds or favours all citizens equally. 6.2 Personhood I have struggled a bit with the concept of the person since we started discussing it in the DACE class. We began by attempting to enumerate the essential attributes which comprise a person, as distinct from an animal or an alien. We came up with short lists of material and mental attributes which seemed to be key aspects of personhood: body mind size/weight etc consciousness bounded in time (b. d.) communication (=language?) member of species Homo Sapiens(?) idea of self The most useful article I have found on this is by Bob Harrison [39] in Philosophy Now, useful to me because it is quite short and summarises most of the issues we discussed. He says: What is a person? John Locke offers a suggestion: what person stands for... a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding This is Locke s famous theory that psychological continuity is the key to personal identity: the idea that if you can remember doing something, it was you who did it, and if you can t remember doing it, it wasn t you, but a different person. What is the use of making, as Locke does, a distinction between a man the living, thinking body and a person the living, but purely mental being? Locke would answer this question by explaining that he was concerned with two questions. Firstly, just what would stand before God at the Great Judgment, and be recognised by the Almighty as me (or you, or anyone)? Would it be our bodies, our souls, or both? Secondly, on a more down-toearth level, Locke wanted to answer an intriguing question about criminal responsibility. Should the present person be found guilty of the crime if the drunkenness or amnesia had so changed his psyche that, at the time, he wasn t his true self? Psychological continuity was, Locke claimed, the answer to the question. The accused, considered as a man, the physical being, is certainly guilty. His own hand struck the blow, his own voice had risen in anger. But if the person, the psychological being, cannot remember one atom of it, then he is not guilty. But though Locke s theory answered the question, it s not certain that it solved the problem; for it raises a paradox that will try the wits of the jurists: the Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 31

34 man in the dock may be guilty, but not the person in the man! And if the man is punished, he will experience the pain, but the wrong person will suffer it. Apparently even Locke would find the accused guilty, because he could not be sure the prisoner actually had no memory of his crime, as witnessed by others. It seems that Locke felt the burden of proof that it was another person that done it fell on the defence, not the prosecution. I am not so concerned about criminal responsibility but the notion of personhood being inextricably involved with psychological continuity through time is interesting. It seems that personhood is like a third person notion of self, it refers to an identified individual, and that individual must be continuous through time ie have a past (since birth), and a future (until death). When the temporal continuity is bodily only, because psychological continuity is interrupted (by amnesia, or coma, or drunkenness, or Alzheimer's Disease ) then we can start arguing about whether one person can become another but I'm not going there now. In the DACE class we briefly speculated whether an intelligent machine (a computer) could ever be considered to be a person, maybe not unless it could remember growing up! Similarly I might regard the scope of my own present self to extend back only as far as my most distant memory, like the Brave Officer [40] proposed by Thomas Reid to undermine Locke's theory of personal identity. Certainly it is tempting to say now that any long forgotten previous misdemeanours must have been committed by another person, I couldn't possibly behave like that now. And maybe I couldn't, everything changes, why do we expect to be the same person now as we were then? Bob Harrison quotes a bit more of Thomas Reid, which I may be taking out of context, but it seems relevant just now: Reid claims there is a manifest absurdity in the psychological account of personhood, for it claims that the person reduces to simply a succession of thoughts. For this reductionism Reid has no time at all: I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling: I am something that thinks, acts and [feels]. Fair enough. So My thoughts, and actions and feelings, change every moment they have no continued, but a successive existence; but that self or I, to which they belong, is permanent. Not that the story ends there, for if Reid has trounced Locke, David Hume too has dismissed Locke, together with Bishop George Berkeley. Hume said that if he looked into his own consciousness, he found not a soul nor a psychologically defined person, but only a bundle of sentiments, impressions, ideas what we would today call mental states and events. Reid, by the way, was no more awed by Hume than by Locke, and dismissed them both, along with Berkeley, because one thing Locke, Berkeley and Hume shared was what Reid called the ideal system. This was not to say that their system was ideal in the sense of being perfect; but that it claimed our knowledge reached us through the intermediary of ideas, a sort of mental go-between, giving us information about the world outside ourselves. Reid Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 32

35 thought that idea was an entirely superfluous concept which only complicated things, and claimed that they all needed a more common sense approach. Reid used 'the ideal system' in the immaterialism sense, because he was a materialist who dealt with common sense. But he still finds My thoughts, and actions and feelings, change every moment they have no continued, but a successive existence; but that self or I, to which they belong, is permanent. [my underlining]. So even as he finds the psychological account of personhood absurd, he recognises a permanent self or I who is the owner of his thoughts, and actions and feelings. I have a fairly clear idea of my present self, and that seems clearly continuous with my recent self, we are definitely different episodes of the same person. But my infant and early childhood self seem very distant, hardly remembered (more reported by others and depicted in photo albums) I could be persuaded that he was a different person, certainly I don't feel responsible now for how he behaved then. There is a kind of sorites paradox [41] here, how many grains make a heap of sand? Through my lifetime am I a series of different persons, one morphing into another as My thoughts, and actions and feelings, change every moment according to Reid? And if so where are the boundaries between them? What does it take to change one person into the next? Maybe I'm just progressing through Shakespeare's seven ages of man, from mewling infant to oblivious second childhood, but does my personality change as I go? I rather think not, how often do you try to make a fresh start in new circumstances and with new people and turn out just the same? No, there is something quite persistent about my self, which I will have to accept is me. So I'm reverting to the single person per lifetime idea, while making caveats about amnesia and drunkenness and any behaviour which I couldn't possibly do if I was feeling quite myself. And I'll leave aside considering criminal responsibility just now, although it seems to me that there might quite often be circumstances in which a person should be forgiven past transgressions based on circumstantial evidence and the likelihood of repeat offending. Bob Harrison went on to discuss a modern development of the idea of personhood involving glass tunnels as explained by an Oxford philosopher, Derek Parfit. I haven't pursued this but it is something about whether human (and possibly animal) minds could all be (mentally) coextensive in a whole stream of consciousness and not necessarily only human consciousness, but perhaps that of all sentient things (or even of all living things?). So far we have considered that the mind is an immaterial thing (without spatial extension etc) and that it is an important attribute in personhood. In that respect we have rather assumed that a person should be a determinate self, bounded in space and time by the material limits of the body, and quite distinct from other persons. But maybe the mind isn't so determinate as its attendant body, maybe people's consciousness could overlap somehow? Apparently Parfit thinks that we each confine ourself to a glass tunnel, as if we were an atomistic individual, which Parfit says we are not. He would like to find a way of escaping the tunnels by developing empathy with one s fellows to such effect Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 33

36 that the glass disappears and we perceive ourselves together as some kind of a continuous self, ie recognising ourselves, to be in fact indeterminate: continuous with each other in a shared identity and interests. Could be interesting. In respect of what differentiates human persons from animals I suspect that language might be very important. In the DACE class we first listed communication as a key attribute of personhood and we debated briefly about how animals, and infants, can communicate without sophisticated verbal or written language. We were inclined to admit neonates as persons, but maybe not animals but we were not unanimous. Stephen Priest [42] explained Hobbes's view on language: For Hobbes, thought is prior to language because some thought could exist without language but no language could exist without thought. Language is the vehicle for the expression and communication of thought: 'the generall use of Speech, is to transfere our Mentalle Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts into a Trayne of Words (L 101)' This suggests that language is a consequence of the causal chain which begins with the motion of external objects. Objects cause sensations. Sensations cause thoughts. Thoughts are expressed in language. However in human beings language transforms thinking. Mere imagination, the train of images, is raised to a level of understanding by the use of words, and this is what distinguishes humans from animals: 'That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the manes of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech. (L 93-94) So language makes possible propositional thought, the thought that such-andsuch is or is not the case, and animals allegedly lack this. Language exists in two forms: writing and speech. The main function of writing is the recording of thoughts, so written language is an extension of human memory. The main use of speech is communication I am pretty much with Hobbes on all that I think, and I endorse the Homo Sapiens condition for personhood that was proposed at the DACE class. Certainly, animals communicate, and have ideas and consciousness. Some of them are quite clever and many of them are social but in my opinion none of them qualify as persons. And I suspect language is a key differentiator. I got into trouble for suggesting that we humans represent the 'pinnacle of evolution', as if that might justify our self-indulgence. While I accept that the evolutionary process does not converge to a single 'fittest' species, I still consider that our dominance might somehow justify our self-indulgence. 6.3 Freedom Moving on from personhood, I want to consider more about 'natural rights' and freedom etc which often seem to follow on from considerations of personal identity. But why should the idea of individual persons imply anything about Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 34

37 them having certain rights (including to life and property)? And if they should have rights, who or what should grant them? Nigel Warburton has a good chapter [36] on Politics, including sections on Freedom, Removing Freedom and Civil Disobedience. 7 Mathematics, pseudo-science, and semantics This is another short 'parking-lot' chapter I am starting to gather my present misgivings about claims for 'mathematical' rigour in philosophy. They crop up in many different areas, usually offered as some kind of 'proof' for a dubious argument. I learned some physics and maths at school and university and work with logic and identity in the computer programming sense of those words, but I would not claim to be an expert. Nevertheless, the use of mathematical terms by philosophers often makes me uncomfortable and so far I have found it quite unhelpful. Of course if the meaning of life and how we should behave could be deduced exactly by First-order logic (FOL); first-order predicate calculus (FOPC); the lower predicate calculus; predicate logic; then we amateur philosophers are clearly wasting out time. We should find someone who understands all that to tell us what the answer is. They might even have to resort to higher-order logic or possibly higher-order thought (HOT), but it would surely be worth it. Of course it may be that I am sceptical simply because I don't understand those techniques, and that if I did I could deduce any required answer for myself. Or it may be that some people have misunderstood the scientific method and think that it can be applied to all problems with equal success. in the computer programming sense of those words highlights (or italicises) another difficulty with philosophy which must be almost unavoidable, that we have to choose our words very carefully and try to avoid misunderstanding. I feel that if philosophy is to be useful, it must somehow be expressed in terms that quite a lot of people can understand. And that if philosophy is to be useful, it must somehow apply to the real world. So we need to try and avoid using a whole set of commonly used words in a special philosophical sense. I understand that is quite difficult and am unsure how it should be achieved, certainly stopping at almost every word and saying 'what exactly do we mean here by person (or idea, or mind, or God, or proof, or identical, or ideal or true )?' can get very tedious. The next few sections will be for examples as I come across them. Later on I might try to summarise. 7.1 Leibniz's law In the DACE class we re-visited personal identity and discussed qualitative identity and numerical identity. The former is identical as in identical as two peas in a pod, the latter is identical as in the pea that hit me in the eye is identical to the one you fired from your pea-shooter it is the same pea. So if two things are numerically identical they are one and the same thing and if they are qualitatively identical there are two of them. Numerically then, there Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 35

38 are more qualitatively identical things than numerically identical things. But that might be confusing, better maybe to say mathematically identical as some people do. What is mathematical about recognizing yourself in an old photo I am not sure, but I thought I understood the question, is that person you? Leibniz's law of identity was explained to help us: X is the same thing (or person) as Y iff whatever is true of X is also true of Y. [iff is not a typo, it is an esoteric abbreviation short for if and only if (ie there is only one condition to be met)] So it is clear, given that explanation of Leibniz's law, that the boy on the photo is not numerically equal to the man looking at it 16 years later the two people have different ages, to name but one different property. I think this is a good example of pseudo-science in philosophy, we have a 'law' which seems good for proving one thing only, that everything is numerically identical with one thing only: itself. Which is self-evident. Somehow though, I don't think that is what Leibniz intended. I tend to agree with the Wikipedia contributor[43] who added: One might see all this and conclude, "Well, Leibniz's Law must not be a law at all, but a false claim! X and Y do not need to have all the same properties to be the same thing." But I don't know why he/she bothered with Leibniz's Law can be saved, by saying: Properties are to be described as occurring at particular times and a long and complex get-out-of-jail plot for Leibniz. Another bit from Wikipedia[44] on identity leads to two important principles which can only be expressed in second order logic: 1. The indiscernibility of identicals o For any x and y, if x is identical to y, then x and y have all the same properties. o For any x and y, if x and y differ with respect to some property, then x is non-identical to y. 2. The identity of indiscernibles o For any x and y, if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y. o For any x and y, if x is non-identical to y, then x and y differ with respect to some property. Aye, right. I rest my case. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 36

39 7.2 When is a person not a person? This is an example about semantics and the difficulties we can get into. In the HAID class we were considering a seven year old photo of ourselves. What might it be about the person in the photo which made him (numerically) identical to me? I had been considering this kind of stuff already (for 6.2 Personhood) and I began talking about a (quite hypothetical) case of a man whose mother eventually became very badly affected by Alzheimer's disease to the extent that she no longer recognised any of her family or had any recollection of her previous 'self'. I said that if I were that man I would not consider that person to be my mother, meaning person in the philosophical sense. Then I got into semantic trouble when asked would you deny then, that that person was your mother? Of course not, that woman is clearly my mother, but she is not the person who brought me up. There was some good natured point scoring about self-contradictory sentences and contradiction but it reminded me how careful we must be. 7.3 The law of transitivity Euclid probably stated this first in his Elements of 300 BC. He stated it as the first of his Common Notions[45] in Book I of the Elements: 1. Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another. Euclid considered that the Common Notions were self-evident truths, not specific to mathematics, and the law of transitivity seems to fit the bill. The statement above is just about its simplest form but that is sufficient for our considerations of identity so far, and sufficient for Thomas Reid's brave officer attack on Locke. Not all relationships are transitive but equality is one of them, and being a sibling is transitive, but being a parent is not. I have no problem with the law of transitivity per se, but its use in philosophical arguments as by Thomas Reid of Locke's theory of personal identity and by the DACE class of the Ship of Theseus conundrums seems almost unnecessary, and sometimes unhelpful. In Ship of Theseus type arguments it is usually used in an attempt to defeat the proposal that identity of a thing over time can survive the alteration or gradual replacement of some (eventually most) of its parts. As in all the cells of a human body are replaced every seven years so the replaced cells are identical to the original person but the present person is not. Often we get to entertaining paradoxes where law of transitivity 'proves' that two things which are clearly different are in fact the same (as in the maintained Ship of Theseus and the replica constructed from its discarded parts). Then people often fall back on the common sense notion as their guide, I often think they should have stuck with that in the first place. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 37

40 8 God, Free Will and Determinism In the last DACE class we did a whistle-stop tour of God, Free Will and Determinism, touching on the main arguments and problems relating to several Modern Philosophers. To summarise that here would just be to reproduce Dimitris Platchias's [46] handout, which I'm sure he would supply on request. 8.1 Paradoxical problems relating to Free Will For most theists God is omniscient, including knowledge of the future (eg Judas's betrayal of Jesus). Then the notion of Free Will must surely be meaningless because whatever choice we make, the future is already determined. Some theists respond to this by conceding that God's omniscience does not extend to the future because there no future exist. God knows everything there is to know but the future does not exist yet. This response conflicts with the normal Christian position that even future events are known by God. Another theist response is that God exists 'outside time' so that people altering their timelines by making free choices is immaterial to Him, and He is not concerned with their future actions. This response seems at odds with the notion that people are somehow created in God's image and that He is essentially like us. We also discussed the problem of Free Will and Determinism, if the world is deterministic (a strict causal product of its previous state) how can people truly have Free Will? Some philosophers (incompatibilists) argue that Determinism and Free Will cannot co-exist, while others argue against incompatibilism. Hume differentiated between free and unfree actions: free actions are a result of choosing to act to achieve a desired result, acting in some coerced way is unfree. I am unclear why it seems axiomatic that the world should be deterministic, but apparently that way lies madness. Certainly physical science has come to terms with events which cannot be predicted (eg the way in which a nucleus might disintegrate) and many processes are nondeterministic (eg the weather) but that does not rule them out as subjects for scientific enquiry (both empirical and theoretical). An interesting notion is that we can never follow the path which we did not choose (eg Ian only lives in one of the 5 houses he considered, and John did attend the last DACE class). Did we really have Free Will at all? 8.2 To be continued?... These notes are far from complete and have been written so far as a kind of blog of my DACE course. They have not even been reviewed properly or revised. But the course has ended, Christmas is a coming and next term I begin a class on Humanism. I have quite enjoyed my introduction to Modern Philosophy, even though it has raised far more questions than it has answered. At least I have now glimpsed the enormity of the subject, and I intend to explore it further when time allows. Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 38

41 9 References Many of which are WWW resources, all of which I have found useful in some way, none of which I have found entirely unhelpful. Some of the books, principally Philosophy: The Basics and 50 philosophy ideas are popular 'introductions to philosophy' with bite-size articles and many references, but both these are very useful for all that. 1. These notes may be downloaded from the sidebar menu at 2. Descartes' Meditations at being his blog of First Meditation in Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T Ross in the Philosophical Works of Descartes. vol 1 (Cambridge University Press. 1975) Meditations One and Two pp Introduction to Logic at 6. Second Meditation in Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T Ross in the Philosophical Works of Descartes. vol 1 (Cambridge University Press. 1975) Meditations One and Two pp Cogito ergo sum in 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know Ben Dupré (Quercus) pp The mind-body problem in 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know Ben Dupré (Quercus) pp Third Meditation in Descartes Philosophical Writings, Anscombe and Geach (Nelson's University Paperbacks. 1972) pp Descartes in A Short History of Modern Philosophy, Roger Scruton (Routledge Classics, Second Edition, 1995) pp The ontological argument in Philosophy: The Basics, Nigel Warburton (Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2004) pp Validity at Entails: Follows at The problem of evil in Philosophy: The Basics, Nigel Warburton (Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2004) pp Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 39

42 Fourth Meditation Sixth Meditation in Descartes Philosophical Writings, Anscombe and Geach (Nelson's University Paperbacks. 1972) pp Metaphysics, Aristotle (350 BC) translated by W.D. Ross at The tripartite theory of knowledge in 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know Ben Dupré (Quercus) pp The Third Set of Objections & Replies containing the Controversy between Hobbes and Descartes in Descartes Philosophical Writings, Anscombe and Geach (Nelson's University Paperbacks. 1972) pp Locke and Berkeley in A Short History of Modern Philosophy, Roger Scruton (Routledge Classics, Second Edition, 1995) pp Faith and reason in 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know Ben Dupré (Quercus) pp Mind in Philosophy: The Basics, Nigel Warburton (Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2004) pp "Descartes' Myth" by Gilbert Ryle in Introducing philosophy : a text with integrated readings / Robert C. Solomon.Robert C. (New York, N.Y. ; Oxford : Oxford University Press, c2005.) 27. The British Empiricists : Hobbes to Ayer, Stephen Priest ( Penguin, c1990.) The veil of perception in 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know Ben Dupré (Quercus) pp The ship of Theseus in 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know Ben Dupré (Quercus) pp The Shape of Time in The Universe in a Nutshell, Stephen Hawking (Bantam Press, 2001) pp Political philosophy from Hobbes to Hegel in A Short History of Modern Philosophy, Roger Scruton (Routledge Classics, Second Edition, 1995) pp Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 40

43 34. Leviathan in 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know Ben Dupré (Quercus) pp Politics in Philosophy: The Basics, Nigel Warburton (Routledge, Fourth Edition, 2004) pp The brave officer in 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know Ben Dupré (Quercus) p The sorites paradox in 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know Ben Dupré (Quercus) pp The British Empiricists : Hobbes to Ayer, Stephen Priest ( Penguin, c1990.) pp mailto:d.platchias@philosophy.arts.gla.ac.uk Notes on Modern Philosophy version page 41

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