Universals. If no: Then it seems that they could not really be similar. If yes: Then properties like redness are THINGS.

Transcription

1 Universals 1. Introduction: Things cannot be in two places at once. If my cat, Precious, is in my living room, she can t at exactly the same time also be in YOUR living room! But, properties aren t like that. If I have something with the property circular in my living room, you CAN also have something in yours that is ALSO circular. I can take a pizza and slice it up and put PART of it in the kitchen, PART of it in the bathroom, and so on, but the entire pizza can never be WHOLLY located in many places at once. But, properties CAN be wholly and completely located in many places at once. This is the problem of the one and the many. It seems that there is just ONE property of circularity, but that this property is wholly instantiated in MANY different objects. Circularity is everywhere! As are properties like redness, horseness, and so on, as well as relations such as taller than, next to, etc. But, now, consider these two items: Are they similar in some way? It sure seems so. We can easily recognize that they are both red. Now ask: Is there something (i.e., some THING) that they have in common? If no: Then it seems that they could not really be similar. If yes: Then properties like redness are THINGS. 1

2 Intuitively, then, properties are THINGS. In philosophy, we call them universals. For instance, the universal redness is just that thing which the tomato and the rose above share in common. Recall that Plato believed that universals existed in a sort of heavenly realm called the realm of the Forms. All actual circles are just imperfect instantiations of the Form, Circularity. But, somewhere out there, in a supernatural realm, there exists the PERFECT CIRCLE. The FORM of circularity. While circularity needs objects to be instantiated in the actual world (for instance, one never finds circularity all by itself, but only circular THINGS like circular tires, plates, coins, and so on), in the realm of the Forms, circularity exists immaterially, in some abstract way. So, really, our entire world is just contains mere shadows of the true realm of being. So, Plato accepted the existence of abstract entities. This might seem weird, but don t you too? For instance, what are numbers? Ask: Is there a number between 10 and 12? Yes, you say. But, a-ha! You have just affirmed that such a thing DOES exist! And not merely the inky scratch that look like 11 on a piece of paper. No, the numbers are not the symbols themselves (e.g., 11, eleven, xi, and so on). Rather, they are the THINGS that those symbols REPRESENT. Numbers, therefore, seem to exist (as abstract things). Similarly, propositions seem to exist in some abstract way. Compare, for instance: (1) The cat is in the tree. (2) El gato está en el árbol. (3) Le chat est dans l'arbre. The visual symbols marked out in (1), (2), and (3) are clearly different. Furthermore, the auditory symbols that we use to refer to them are also different (i.e., we d VOCALIZE them differently when reading them). Nevertheless, (1), (2), and (3) all represent the same thing. Namely, they represent the same proposition. But, where is this proposition? It too seems to be an abstract thing. So too for things like humanity, horseness, redness justice, goodness, truth, and so on. Duns Scotus & Realism: Considerations like these led many Medieval philosophers to accept the existence of universals as existing, abstract things. This view is called Realism. Among other things, there was a theological motivation for this view. For instance, recall that Scotus has said that we can predicate things of both God and humans in a univocal way. This is just fancy talk for saying that there are some properties that are simultaneously both in God AND man. 2

3 2. Aquinas and the Problem of Individuation: But, a problem arises. A brief look at Aquinas s view will illustrate this. Aquinas asks, What is the essence of a human being? By this, he means to ask, what is the DEFINITION of humanity? What is it that makes something be THIS kind of thing rather than THAT kind of thing? Not ONLY matter: The nature, or definition, of a human being is not ONLY matter. First, because matter with no form is nothing at all. Second, that matter could have taken on an entirely different form (e.g., horse). Not ONLY form: Similarly, the nature of a human being is not ONLY its form. For, forms cannot exist on their own. They need some matter to form! Answer: The essence of human beings is to be a composite of matter and form. In short, we can define human being as: Human = The form of humanity + matter The Problem of Individuation: Here is where the problem arises. We have a definition of what makes something be this KIND (or species) of thing, but we haven t explained what makes something be this PARTICULAR (individual) thing. For instance, what Socrates IS is the composite of humanity + matter. But, what Plato IS is ALSO the composite of humanity + matter. They both seem to have one and the same essence. So, how is it that they are two different individuals? For, it seems that, if: Socrates = humanity + matter Plato = humanity + matter Socrates = Plato, and, then it follows that (which is clearly false) Answer: Thomas tells us that the essence, or definition, of human (as form of humanity + matter) doesn t refer to any PARTICULAR matter, just SOME MATTER OR OTHER. Meanwhile, the essence, or definition, of some PARTICULAR human, e.g., Socrates, (as form of human + matter) DOES refer to some particular matter namely, the matter that is in Socrates and no one else. He calls the matter in Socrates designated matter. THIS is what individuates different members of the same species. So, while you and I both have the same essence namely, what it IS to be you is to be human, and what it IS to be me is also to be human we are two different individuals because the matter of your body is not the same matter as the matter of my body. Aquinas writes, 3

4 Such [designated] matter is not placed in the definition of man as man, but it would be placed in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition. Rather, it is non-designated matter which is placed in the definition of man; for this bone and this flesh are not placed in the definition of man, but bone and flesh absolutely. These latter are man s non-designated matter. It is clear, therefore, that the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ, except as the non-designated from the designated. (Being and Essence, 23-24) Hence this flesh and these bones, along with the accidental features that demarcate this matter, are not included in humanity. Yet they are included in any individual human. Thus an individual human contains something that humanity does not contain. (Summa Theologiae, I.3.3) 3. Duns Scotus: Scotus rejects this solution. Consider these questions: (a) Aquinas has said that the DEFINITION of me is the form of humanity + THIS particular material (i.e., the matter that composes my actual body). But, imagine that, centuries after my death, another human being comes to exist (call her Chadweena), and Chadweena s body just happens to be composed of exactly the same material that mine is presently composed of. According to Aquinas s proposal, she and I are numerically one and the same human being (because we have the same essence; or, form of humanity + this particular, designated matter). But, that can t be right. (b) I pitched the problem of individuation in terms of a challenge to explain why two humans are not identical; e.g., why Plato Socrates. Aquinas tells us that the reason why Plato is not the same human being as Socrates is that they are composed of different matter. But, does that really solve the problem of individuation? For NOW we need an explanation for why Plato s MATTER is not identical to Socrates MATTER; i.e., why Plato-Matter Socrates-Matter. In short, he s just pushed the problem back one level. So far, we ve seen that Realists accept the existence of a common nature that makes something be a particular KIND of thing. For instance, your humanity is what makes you be a human being, and not, say, a horse. Scotus s solution to the problem of individuation is just like this, only on the level of the individual instead of the species: He says that, what makes you be YOU, and not, say, Socrates is that, in addition to have a specific (i.e., species) nature (humanity), you must also have an INDIVIDUAL nature. For, instance, in addition to Socrates having humanity, he must also have Socrateity. The former is what makes him human, while the latter is what makes him THIS PARTICULAR HUMAN. 4

5 This solves problem (a) above: Even though we both have the form of humanity and share the same matter, Chad Chadweena, because I have something that she doesn t namely Chaddity. In turn, she has something that I don t: Chadweenaeity. These individuating natures have come to be known as haecceities. Literally, haecceity translates as thisness. Formal Distinction: Technically, Scotus is not arguing that my humanity and my Chaddity are TWO distinct entities that exist in the world. Rather, my Chaddity JUST IS my humanity, restricted or contracted into my unique Chad-human form. This is why Scotus says that they are only formally distinct but not REALLY distinct entities. It s like you have your humanity, but it s sort of squished into a YOU-shape, while I have my humanity, squished into a ME-shape. The thing that I have is really the exact same thing that you have, but they have slightly different forms. Not Platonism: Note that this is not full-blown Platonism. Scotus is not positing the existence of a realm of Ideal Forms out there somewhere. Very few Medievalists accepted the existence of such a realm. The closest sort of thing to that realm that they accepted was just the mind of God itself (e.g., perhaps all of the Ideal Forms are in God s thoughts). For Scotus and Aquinas, the universals, or forms, never exist without being IN some particular object. 4. Ockham s Nominalism: Ockham rejects this entire project as absurd. Against the existence of universals, there are some obvious objections. For instance: (1) Scotus says that you and I share some THING in common our common nature, humanity. But, how in the heck can one individual thing (e.g., humanity) be in many places at once? (2) Scotus says that Socrates IS (i.e., is identical to) his humanity, and that Plato IS (i.e., is identical to) his humanity. They share a common nature, but Socrates and Plato are not identical to each other because Socrates s humanity is formally distinct from Plato s humanity. That is, Socrates s humanity is sort of squished into the form of Socrateity, while Plato s humanity is sort of squished into the form of Platoeity. Ockham rejects formal distinctions. Either (a) Socrates s humanity is numerically distinct from Plato s humanity, or (b) It is not. If (a), then is not really a COMMON nature (or a UNIVERSAL) at all! If (b), then Scotus has not really explained how Socrates and Plato are distinct after all. Scotus seems to want both (a) AND (b) to be true, but this is absurd (says Ockham). He can t have it both ways. 5

6 But, especially interesting are Ockham s objections based on God s omnipotence. As we will continue to see, Ockham takes God s omnipotence very seriously. And the existence of universals seems to hinder God s power: (3) Creation Objection: If God is omnipotent, then He should be able to create a human being ex nihilo (i.e., out of nothingness). However, if universals exist, then God cannot do this. Why not? Let s say that God wants to create Sally. Sally will be composed of humanity + matter. Perhaps God can create the MATTER ex nihilo. But, the form of humanity already exists (since there are already other human beings). Perhaps God could create some NEW form but, then she would not belong to the same species as human beings. In order for Sally to be genuinely human, she must have EXACTLY the same form as you and I. So, God cannot create Sally from nothingness. (4) Annihilation Objection: If God is omnipotent, then He should be able to completely annihilate a human being (i.e., completely reduce them to nothingness) without destroying any other human beings. But, if universals exist, then He cannot do so. Why not? Because, at best, He can only do one of the following (to, e.g., Sarah): (a) God can totally annihilate Sarah. However, in doing so, he also kills every single other human being in the universe. For, in annihilating everything that Sarah is composed of, He has annihilated the universal humanity, which is also in all other humans. (b) God can annihilate Sarah s MATTER, but not her form, thus saving the rest of humanity from death. However, now God has not COMPLETELY annihilated Sarah. Against relations: Elsewhere, Ockham uses similar arguments against other kinds of universals. Keep in mind that, in addition to universals like horseness, proponents of universals also accept the existence of properties and relations, such as redness and brotherhood. But consider: If brotherhood were a real THING, then it stands to reason that an omnipotent God could create it without creating any actual brothers! This is absurd. So, brotherhood is not a real THING that exists. Conclusion: Ockham takes each of these to be a violation of God s omnipotence, and therefore unacceptable. So, he rejects the existence of universals. One more objection: Another worry is that, if there were some THING that all humans are partially composed of and share in common, then Jesus (which Christians take to literally BE God) would be partially composed of the exact same part that, e.g., Judas is composed of namely, human nature. Ockham finds this to be a repugnant claim. 6

7 Nominalism: Ockham rejects the existence of universals. There is no such THING as human-ness (or redness, or circularity, etc.). (Note: Ockham was not the first Nominalist. For instance, Peter Abelard before him proposed something like Ockham s view.) We predicate terms like human and red to objects. But, predicates are just TERMS; i.e., language things. They are not substances out there in the world. You simply can t predicate substances of things. Furthermore, terms are just in our MINDS. There is an activity of the mind where, when two objects resemble one another, we abstract a notion of their similarity and put a label on it, mentally. A universal is nothing more than this mental label. [Note: Originally, Ockham proposed that a universal is a THING in the mind (a thoughtobject ) called a fictum a sort of mental picture. But, later, he rejected even this. There is no THING at all that is a universal. There are just actions of the mind.] In short, the Nominalist believes that there are only objects in the world. Sometimes we put labels on them when they resemble one another. But, terms like human, red, circle, etc. are just that: TERMS; i.e., names, or mere WORDS, for those resemblances. But, out there in the world, humanity is nothing more than the collection of human beings (i.e., those individuals which we have mentally lumped together as seeming to us to bear a certain resemblance to one another). A Contemporary Objection to Haecceities: Another bizarre implication of haecceitism is that the identities of things don t seem to depend on any observable features of those individuals. For instance, imagine me EXACTLY as I am same parents, same fetus, same experiences, same atoms, everything. According to haecceitists, this person might have ALL of that stuff, but still not be Chad. Namely, if he lacks the crucial ingredient: Chaddity. Believe it or not, many philosophers today still believe in haecceities. My dissertation advisor (Graeme Forbes) is a famous opponent of this view. He writes, you are invited to imagine a possible circumstance in which The Eiffel Tower does not exist but in which exactly the same events occur up to and including 30 June 1887, and on July 1 the same 250 men assemble the same 18,000 precisionmanufactured pieces in precisely the same way as they actually did, using precisely the same 2,500,000 rivets in precisely the same positions, under the direction of Gustave Eiffel. You are also to imagine that during the construction period and thereafter, there is to be no further difference between the actual course of events and the imagined possible course of events. Yet The Eiffel Tower is not to exist. (Note: The reason that the Eiffel Tower supposedly wouldn t exist in this scenario is because it has a different haecceity than the tower in the actual world.) 7

8 Is this a possible scenario? That is, is there a possible world where a tower is built in Paris from exactly the same parts, arranged in exactly the same way, built by exactly the same men, according to exactly the same blueprints, designed by exactly the same designer as The Eiffel Tower was actually built and designed by but where that tower is NOT The Eiffel Tower? To Forbes, this seems absurd. If it is, then we must resist haecceitism. Rather, intuitively, it DOES seem as if there can be no difference in identity without any other kind of difference. Why should we care? If haecceitism is true (i.e., if there can be differences in identity without any observable difference), then there is a possible world that is indistinguishable from the actual world that is, every single discernible feature of the actual world is duplicated in that possible world but where the person writing this is YOU, and the person reading it is ME. In short, the haecceitist is committed to the conclusion that I could have lived your life (been born from your parents, had your experiences, looked exactly like you, etc.), and you could have lived mine! To most of us, that seems absurd. Ockham s Razor: By now, you may see why the scientist s claim that, if two hypotheses explain the same phenomenon, we should accept the simpler of the two, has come to be known as Ockham s Razor. As Ockham put it, It is futile to do with more what can be done with fewer. And elsewhere, Plurality should not be posited without necessity. Though this maxim is not unique to Ockham (most before him would have agreed with it), Ockham was perhaps the most devoted to adhering to it. He finds a way to explain the world WITHOUT appealing to the existence of universals or haecceities, and so he carves away these unnecessary entities with his razor. We can do without them. 5. Objections to Nominalism: There are problems with the claims that universals are (a) just the collections of the things themselves, and (b) mind-dependent objects. (a) According to Nominalism, if we destroyed all of the red things, then redness itself would cease to exist. There would be no such thing as redness. Some find this implausible. If so, then universals are not merely the collections of the things themselves. [What do you think?] (b) According to Nominalism, prior to the existence of intelligent beings, there was no such thing as, say, sharks or dinosaurs (since there were no minds to give these categories existence). Furthermore, if no one has seen something red, then nothing in the universe is red. If no one has compared the heights of two things, then giraffes are not taller than squirrels. And so on. This seems implausible. If so, then universals do not depend on minds for their existence. [Is this plausible?] 8

9 There is a further problem regarding (a). What ARE these supposed resemblances that the Nominalist talks about? It is difficult to see how two things could resemble one another if they share nothing (i.e., no THING) in common. Furthermore, if properties are just the collections of the things themselves, then what can the Nominalist say when two seemingly distinct properties share the same members? For, often (always?), groups of objects will resemble one another in MORE THAN ONE WAY. Consider these objects: The above objects resemble one another in MORE THAN ONE WAY (e.g., they are all both red AND round). Imagine that these are the only 4 things that exist. If redness JUST IS the collection of red things, and roundness JUST IS the collection of round things, then we will have no way to distinguish redness from roundness. 9