Human Nature: the Categorial Framework

Transcription

1 Human Nature: the Categorial Framework

2 Human Nature: the Categorial Framework P. M. S. Hacker Fellow of St John s College Oxford

3 2007 by P. M. S. Hacker blackwell publishing 350 Main Street, Malden, MA , USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK 550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia The right of P. M. S. Hacker to be identified as the Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. First published 2007 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hacker, P. M. S. (Peter Michael Stephan) Human nature : the categorial framework / P. M. S. Hacker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Philosophical anthropology. I. Title. BD450.H dc A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Set in 10.5/12.5pt Sabon by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong Printed and bound in Singapore by Markono Print Media Ltd The publisher s policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards. For further information on Blackwell Publishing, visit our website:

4 For Hans Oberdiek

5 Contents Preface xi Chapter 1 The Project 1 1. Human nature 1 2. Philosophical anthropology 4 3. Grammatical investigation 7 4. Philosophical investigation Philosophy and mere words A challenge to the autonomy of the philosophical enterprise: Quine The Platonic and Aristotelian traditions in philosophical anthropology 21 Chapter 2 Substance Substances: things Substances: stuffs Substance-referring expressions Conceptual connections between things and stuffs Substances and their substantial parts Substances conceived as natural kinds Substances conceived as a common logico-linguistic category A historical digression: misconceptions of the category of substance 51

6 viii Contents Chapter 3 Causation Causation: Humean, neo-humean and anti-humean On causal necessity Event causation is not a prototype The inadequacy of Hume s analysis: observability, spatio-temporal relations and regularity The flaw in the early modern debate Agent causation as prototype Agent causation is only a prototype Event causation and other centres of variation Overview 88 Chapter 4 Powers Possibility Powers of the inanimate Active and passive powers of the inanimate Power and its actualization Power and its vehicle First- and second-order powers; loss of power Human powers: basic distinctions Human powers: further distinctions Dispositions 118 Chapter 5 Agency Inanimate agents Inanimate needs Animate agents: needs and wants Volitional agency: preliminaries Doings, acts and actions Human agency and action A historical overview Human action as agential causation of movement 153 Chapter 6 Teleology and Teleological Explanation Teleology and purpose What things have a purpose? Purpose and axiology The beneficial A historical digression: teleology and causality 181

7 Contents ix Chapter 7 Reasons and Explanation of Human Action Rationality and reasonableness Reason, reasoning and reasons Explaining human behaviour Explanation in terms of agential reasons Causal mythologies 226 Chapter 8 The Mind Homo loquens The Cartesian mind The nature of the mind 248 Chapter 9 The Self and the Body The emergence of the philosophers self The illusion of the philosophers self The body The relationship between human beings and their bodies 276 Chapter 10 The Person The emergence of the concept An unholy trinity: Descartes, Locke and Hume Changing bodies and switching brains: puzzle cases and red herrings The concept of a person 310 Index 317

8 Preface Philosophy is of little worth unless it aspires to give an overview of a whole domain of thought, to display the ramifying network of conceptual relationships that characterize it, and to resolve problems and puzzlements that characteristically accompany reflection on it. As I reached the end of my academic career, I felt a powerful urge to paint a last large fresco that would depict, sometimes with broad brush, sometimes in fine detail, themes which I had studied and reflected on for the last forty years. The domain I have striven to portray in this book is that of human nature. I have tried to give a perspicuous representation of the most fundamental concepts and conceptual forms in terms of which we think about ourselves. These range from the most general categorial concepts of substance, causation, power and agency to the more specific and specifically anthropological concepts of rationality, mind, body and person. This book, Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, sketches the structural background and paints the central landmarks of the panorama I have in view. I intend to continue my endeavours in a volume entitled Human Nature: The Cognitive and Cogitative Powers that will add to the fresco more and finer detail. If time and fortune permit, I hope to write a concluding volume, Human Nature: The Affective and Moral Powers. To enable readers, especially students, to take in at a glance some parts of my argument and some of the classifications elaborated, I introduced the occasional tree diagram and comparative list. These are often no more than illustrations to the text, sometimes oversimplifying for purposes of surveyability. They are meant to illuminate the argument, as a picture illustrates a story, not to be a substitute for it.

9 xii Preface Many friends and acquaintances have encouraged me and given me moral support in the course of writing this book. One of the delights of philosophy is discussion with others who toil on the same rocky pathways and jungle trails, and who not only hold out a helping hand when one slips, and correct one when one takes a wrong path, but also help one blaze a trail. I have been blessed with such friends. If, in the course of these numerous discussions, merriment kept breaking through as indeed it did I never found this an impediment to philosophy, but a mark of shared delight in the common pursuit of understanding. I am grateful to Maria Alvarez, Erich Ammereller, Hanoch Ben-Yami, Stephan Blatti, John Dupré, Hanjo Glock, the late Oswald Hanfling, John Hyman, Wolfgang Künne, Anselm Müller, Bede Rundle, Constantine Sandis, the late Peter Strawson, and David Wiggins, who all read one or more (and some read many more) of the chapters and gave me the great benefit of their criticisms and suggestions. I should like to record my gratitude to Anthony Kenny, whose encouragement in this enterprise, as in others in the past, spurred me on. I have learnt more from his luminous writings and incisive remarks than I can say. I owe a special debt to Hans Oberdiek and to Herman Philipse, who kindly read the whole draft, and whose detailed comments and suggestions were invaluable. I am, as I have so often been in the past, much indebted to Jean van Altena for her expert copy-editing and judicious advice. I am happy to record my gratitude to my college, St John s, which is unstinting in its support of scholarship, the pursuit of knowledge and the quest for understanding. Chapter 2 of this book is a modified version of the paper entitled Substance: Things and Stuffs, published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 78 (2004), pp A much shortened version of chapters 8 and 9 was delivered as a plenary lecture at Kirchberg, August 2006, and is to be published in the Proceedings of the 29 th International Wittgenstein Symposium. A variant of the same paper was delivered as the opening address at the meeting of the British Society for the Philosophy of Education in Oxford, March A part of chapter 7 is to be published in Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. P. M. S. Hacker St John s College, Oxford July 2006

10 ... les principes sont dans l usage commun et devant les yeux de tout le monde. On n a que faire de tourner la tête, ni de se faire violence; il n est question que d avoir bonne vue. Mais il faut l avoir bonne, car les principes sont si déliés, et en si grand nombre qu il est presque impossible qu il n en échappe. Or l omission d un principe mène a l erreur. Ainsi il faut avoir la vue bien nette pour voir tous les principes, et ensuite l esprit juste pour raisonner faussement sur des principes connus.... the principles are found in common use, and are there for all to see. One has only to look, and no effort is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good, for the principles are so subtle and numerous, that it is almost impossible but that some escape notice. Now the omission of one principle leads to error; so one needs very clear sight to see all the principles, as well as an accurate mind to avoid drawing false conclusions from known principles. Pascal, Pensées, I, 1