# 24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI

Size: px
Start display at page:

## Transcription

1 24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI free will again summary final exam info Image by MIT OpenCourseWare F11 1

2 the first part of the incompatibilist argument Image removed due to copyright restrictions. let C be a true statement of the initial conditions, and let L be a true statement of the laws of nature 1. you never had any control over whether C is true 2. you never had any control over whether L is true, so: 3. you never had any control over whether C&L is true F11 2

3 the second part of the incompatibilist argument 4. determinism is true, so: 5. C&L entails that you came to class today is true 6. if you never had any control over whether P is true, and P entails Q, then you never had any control over whether Q is true, so: 7. you never had any control over whether you came to class today, in which case you did not come to class of your own free will F11 3

4 a problem with the first part this principle of inference is questionable: 1. you never had any control over whether A is true 2. you never had any control over whether B is true, so: 3. you never had any control over whether A&B is true let A= this coin does not land heads, B= this coin does not land tails ; assuming the coin if tossed lands either heads or tails, A&B is equivalent to this coin is not tossed but we can hardly run this argument to show you never had any control over whether the coin is not tossed! F11 4

5 fixing the first part Image removed due to copyright restrictions. fortunately (3) is plausible enough on its own, so we can start the argument with that: 1. you never had any control over whether C&L is true F11 5

6 the incompatibilist argument, revised 1. you never had any control over whether C&L is true 2. determinism is true, so: 3. C&L entails that you came to class today is true 4. if you never had any control over whether P is true, and P entails Q, then you never had any control over whether Q is true, so: 5. you never had any control over whether you came to class today, in which case you did not come to class of your own free will F11 6

7 a parallel argument? 1. the thermostat never had any control over whether C&L is true Image removed due to copyright restrictions. 2. determinism is true, so: 3. C&L entails that the room temp. is 70 today is true 4. if the thermostat never had any control over whether P is true, and P entails Q, then the thermostat never had any control over whether Q is true, so: 5. the thermostat never had any control over whether the room temp is 70 today the incompatibilist must explain why her argument doesn t generalize to show that thermostats don t work the incompatibilist must explain why her argument F11 7

8 options free will compatible with determinism? yes no compatibilism incompatibilism determinism? yes hard determinism no libertarianism F11 8

9 the dilemma of determinism 1. if determinism true, we are not responsible for our actions, since our choices are determined by factors outside our control 2. if indeterminism is true, we are not responsible for our actions, since every choice occurs by chance. 3. either determinism is true or indeterminism is true, so: 4. we are not responsible for our actions F11 9

10 course overview 1. can computers think? 2. from dualism to functionalism a survey of theories of mind 3. externalism is the mind in the head? 4. perception 5. consciousness and the mind-body problem 6. free will F11 10

11 perception, consciousness, intentionality our travels perception externalism free will dualism functionalism consciousness argument D (D+) Chinese room Kripke s objection behaviorism F11 11 the identity theory

12 the final exam This final exam is CLOSED NOTES AND CLOSED BOOKS: you may not use any books, course notes, or other materials during the exam period in answering your questions. Cellphones must be switched off. Complete all four parts of the exam. Read the instructions carefully. Write clearly and legibly. Label each part (I, II, etc.) in your blue book. Start a separate blue book for part IV. You have three hours to complete the exam. Return this exam with your answers F11 12

13 part 1 PART I (15%): for each quotation (a) to (e) below provide (i) the author s surname; (ii) an explanation of the main point(s) of the quotation in your own words. (3 points each: 1 for the identification and 2 for the explanation) e.g. Clearly the same style of Knowledge argument could be deployed for taste, hearing, the bodily sensations and generally speaking for the various mental states which are said to have (as it is variously put) raw feels, phenomenal features or qualia. The conclusion in each case is that the qualia are left out of the physicalist story F11 13

14 part II PART II (10%): Answer yes or no to the following questions. Put each answer on a separate line next to the question number in your blue book. (1 point each) e.g. Does the type-f monist (panprotopsychist) think that electrons have conscious mental lives like our own? F11 14

15 part III PART III (15%): Answer each of the following questions in a short paragraph. Explain any philosophical terminology. (5 points each) e.g. Standing on the beach in Santa Barbara a number of summers ago on a bright sunny day, I found myself transfixed by the intense blue of the Pacific Ocean. Was I not here delighting in the phenomenal aspects of my visual experience? And if I was, doesn t this show that there are visual Qualia? I am not convinced. Why isn t Tye convinced? F11 15

16 part IV PART IV (60%): Write essays on each of the following two questions. Your essays should include a clearly identifiable thesis and arguments supporting it. Explain any philosophical terminology. (30 points each) the two questions will be selected from the following four F11 16

17 1. (a) Give short explanations of the following five views: substance dualism, property (attribute) dualism, behaviorism, the identity theory, and functionalism. Give two objections to dualism and two to behaviorism. One objection to an identity theory for pain (say, pain = c-fibers firing) appeals to the premise that it is conceivable that there is pain without c-fibers firing, or vice versa. Does this sort of objection to the identity theory work equally well against functionalism? Why or why not? (b) Take what you think is the most promising of the five views, and defend it F11 17

18 2. What is physicalism? Carefully explain Jackson s Knowledge argument against physicalism. Assess the argument. Does it establish that physicalism is false? If not, why not? Compare and contrast the Knowledge argument with the argument of Nagel s What is it like to be a bat? F11 18

19 3. According to Searle, such great philosophers as Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant [believe] that we do not see the real world...in the past century philosophers usually put this point by saying We do not perceive material objects, we perceive only sense data. Explain this point without using the jargon of material objects or sense data. The argument from illusion is supposed to establish the conclusion that we only perceive sense data. What is that argument? Set it out in the form of premises and conclusion, commenting on whether the argument as you have set it out is valid. What is wrong with the argument, if anything? Finally, compare the argument from illusion with Valberg s presentation of the puzzle of experience F11 19

20 4. In Consciousness and its place in nature, Chalmers distinguishes Type-A Materialism, Type-B Materialism, Type-C Materialism, Type-D Dualism, Type-E Dualism, and Type-F Monism. Pick one that you think is false. Explain what this theory is, and why you think it s false. Now take the theory that you think is true (or, at any rate, is the least implausible of the lot). Explain what this theory is, and defend it against at least one objection F11 20

21 advice go to the review session time your answers in proportion to the points (so allow a little less than two hours for the essays) compose a one page essay plan for each of the four essay questions, and practice writing it out without notes stay for the entire time and, of course, you re most welcome to meet with any of us before the exam F11 21

22 THE END Image by MIT OpenCourseWare. 22

### 24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI

24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI perception Image by MIT OpenCourseWare. 1 reminder from first lecture: course overview 1. can computers think? 2. from dualism to functionalism a survey of theories

### 24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI

24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI more on the knowledge argument Nagel on bats 1 resisting the knowledge argument 1. imprisoned Mary knows all the physical facts, hence: 2. if physicalism is true,

### 24.09 Minds and Machines spring an inconsistent tetrad. argument for (1) argument for (2) argument for (3) argument for (4)

24.09 Minds and Machines spring 2006 more handouts shortly on website Stoljar, contd. evaluations, final exam questions an inconsistent tetrad 1) if physicalism is, a priori physicalism is 2) a priori

### Lecture 8 Property Dualism. Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia and What Mary Didn t Know

Lecture 8 Property Dualism Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia and What Mary Didn t Know 1 Agenda 1. Physicalism, Qualia, and Epiphenomenalism 2. Property Dualism 3. Thought Experiment 1: Fred 4. Thought

### George Berkeley. The Principles of Human Knowledge. Review

George Berkeley The Principles of Human Knowledge Review To be is to be perceived Obvious to the Mind all those bodies which compose the earth have no subsistence without a mind, their being is to be perceived

### Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2018 Test 3: Answers

Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2018 Test 3: Answers 1. According to Descartes, a. what I really am is a body, but I also possess a mind. b. minds and bodies can t causally interact with one another, but

### The Stimulus - Possible Arguments. Humans are made solely of material Minds can be instantiated in many physical forms Others?

The Stimulus - Possible s Humans are made solely of material Minds can be instantiated in many physical forms Others? Introduction Begin your intro by briefly describing the video (1 sentence) and the

### The knowledge argument

Michael Lacewing The knowledge argument PROPERTY DUALISM Property dualism is the view that, although there is just one kind of substance, physical substance, there are two fundamentally different kinds

AS A COURTESY TO OUR SPEAKER AND AUDIENCE MEMBERS, PLEASE SILENCE ALL PAGERS AND CELL PHONES Please remember to sign-in by scanning your badge Department of Psychiatry Grand Rounds James M. Stedman, PhD.

### Minds and Machines spring The explanatory gap and Kripke s argument revisited spring 03

Minds and Machines spring 2003 The explanatory gap and Kripke s argument revisited 1 preliminaries handouts on the knowledge argument and qualia on the website 2 Materialism and qualia: the explanatory

### Courses providing assessment data PHL 202. Semester/Year

1 Department/Program 2012-2016 Assessment Plan Department: Philosophy Directions: For each department/program student learning outcome, the department will provide an assessment plan, giving detailed information

### Mind s Eye Idea Object

Do the ideas in our mind resemble the qualities in the objects that caused these ideas in our minds? Mind s Eye Idea Object Does this resemble this? In Locke s Terms Even if we accept that the ideas in

### 24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI

24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI dualism, contd. 1 Image by MIT OpenCourseWare. argument A again 1. 2. C. I cannot doubt that I exist I can doubt that my body exists [or that anything physical

### Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2015 Test 3--Answers

Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2015 Test 3--Answers 1. According to Descartes, a. what I really am is a body, but I also possess a mind. b. minds and bodies can t causally interact with one another, but

### General Philosophy. Dr Peter Millican,, Hertford College. Lecture 4: Two Cartesian Topics

General Philosophy Dr Peter Millican,, Hertford College Lecture 4: Two Cartesian Topics Scepticism, and the Mind 2 Last Time we looked at scepticism about INDUCTION. This Lecture will move on to SCEPTICISM

### PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 4 : I M M A T E R I A L I S M, D U A L I S M, & T H E M I N D - B O D Y P R O B L E M

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 4 : I M M A T E R I A L I S M, D U A L I S M, & T H E M I N D - B O D Y P R O B L E M AGENDA 1. Quick Review 2. Arguments Against Materialism/Physicalism (continued)

774 Book Reviews rates most efficiently from each other the complexity of what there is in Jean- Jacques Rousseau s text, and the process by which the reader has encountered it. In a most original and

### Dualism vs. Materialism

Review Dualism vs. Materialism Dualism: There are two fundamental, distinct kinds of substance, Matter: the stuff the material world is composed of; and Mind: the stuff that that has mental awareness,

### Introduction to Philosophy Philosophy 110 CRN Sec 018 Fall Term 2009 Purdue University Instructor: Daniel Kelly

1. Course Description Introduction to Philosophy Philosophy 110 CRN 25219 Sec 018 Fall Term 2009 Purdue University Instructor: Daniel Kelly Syllabus There are two main goals of this course. The first is

### Berkeley, Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous focus on p. 86 (chapter 9) to the end (p. 93).

TOPIC: Lecture 7.2 Berkeley Lecture Berkeley will discuss why we only have access to our sense-data, rather than the real world. He will then explain why we can trust our senses. He gives an argument for

### Philosophy of Mind PHIL 255. Chris Eliasmith T/Th 4-5:20p AL 208

Philosophy of Mind PHIL 255 Chris Eliasmith T/Th 4-5:20p AL 208 The Traditional View: Dualism A healthy body is a guest chamber for the soul: a sick body is a prison. (Francis Bacon) We are bound to our

### Kant Lecture 4 Review Synthetic a priori knowledge

Kant Lecture 4 Review Synthetic a priori knowledge Statements involving necessity or strict universality could never be known on the basis of sense experience, and are thus known (if known at all) a priori.

### Minds and Machines spring Hill and Nagel on the appearance of contingency, contd spring 03

Minds and Machines spring 2003 Hill and Nagel on the appearance of contingency, contd. 1 can the physicalist credibly deny (1)? 1. If I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition p to be true, then

### Introduction to Philosophy Philosophy 110 Fall Term 2010 Purdue University Instructor: Daniel Kelly

1. Course Description Introduction to Philosophy Philosophy 110 Fall Term 2010 Purdue University Instructor: Daniel Kelly Syllabus There are two main goals of this course. The first is to introduce students

### Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is

Summary of Elements of Mind Tim Crane Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is intentionality, the mind s direction upon its objects; the other is the mind-body

### INTRODUCTION THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

GENERAL PHILOSOPHY WEEK 5: MIND & BODY JONNY MCINTOSH INTRODUCTION Last week: The Mind-Body Problem(s) Introduced Descartes's Argument from Doubt This week: Descartes's Epistemological Argument Frank Jackson's

### THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND ITS SEMANTIC PREMISE

Diametros nr 29 (wrzesień 2011): 80-92 THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND ITS SEMANTIC PREMISE Karol Polcyn 1. PRELIMINARIES Chalmers articulates his argument in terms of two-dimensional

### PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 3 D A Y 2 : I M M A T E R I A L I S M, D U A L I S M, & T H E M I N D - B O D Y P R O B L E M

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 3 D A Y 2 : I M M A T E R I A L I S M, D U A L I S M, & T H E M I N D - B O D Y P R O B L E M AGENDA 1. Quick Review 2. Arguments Against Materialism/Physicalism

### Chalmers, "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature"

http://www.protevi.com/john/philmind Classroom use only. Chalmers, "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" 1. Intro 2. The easy problem and the hard problem 3. The typology a. Reductive Materialism i.

### Test 3. Minds and Bodies Review

Test 3 Minds and Bodies Review The Questions What am I? What sort of thing am I? Am I a mind that occupies a body? Are mind and matter different (sorts of) things? Is conscious awareness a physical event

### A Posteriori Necessities

A Posteriori Necessities 1. Introduction: Recall that we distinguished between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge: A Priori Knowledge: Knowledge acquirable prior to experience; for instance,

### Constructing the World

Constructing the World Lecture 1: A Scrutable World David Chalmers Plan *1. Laplace s demon 2. Primitive concepts and the Aufbau 3. Problems for the Aufbau 4. The scrutability base 5. Applications Laplace

### There are two explanatory gaps. Dr Tom McClelland University of Glasgow

There are two explanatory gaps Dr Tom McClelland University of Glasgow 1 THERE ARE TWO EXPLANATORY GAPS ABSTRACT The explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal is at the heart of the Problem

THE NATURE OF MIND Oxford University Press Table of Contents General I. Problems about Mind A. Mind as Consciousness 1. Descartes, Meditation II, selections from Meditations VI and Fourth Objections and

### Intro to Philosophy. Review for Exam 2

Intro to Philosophy Review for Exam 2 Epistemology Theory of Knowledge What is knowledge? What is the structure of knowledge? What particular things can I know? What particular things do I know? Do I know

### 1/10. The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism

1/10 The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism The Fourth Paralogism is quite different from the three that preceded it because, although it is treated as a part of rational psychology, it main

### Grounding and Analyticity. David Chalmers

Grounding and Analyticity David Chalmers Interlevel Metaphysics Interlevel metaphysics: how the macro relates to the micro how nonfundamental levels relate to fundamental levels Grounding Triumphalism

### Metaphysics & Consciousness. A talk by Larry Muhlstein

Metaphysics & Consciousness A talk by Larry Muhlstein A brief note on philosophy It is about thinking So think about what I am saying and ask me questions And go home and think some more For self improvement

### 1/12. The A Paralogisms

1/12 The A Paralogisms The character of the Paralogisms is described early in the chapter. Kant describes them as being syllogisms which contain no empirical premises and states that in them we conclude

### Philosophy 5340 Epistemology Topic 4: Skepticism. Part 1: The Scope of Skepticism and Two Main Types of Skeptical Argument

1. The Scope of Skepticism Philosophy 5340 Epistemology Topic 4: Skepticism Part 1: The Scope of Skepticism and Two Main Types of Skeptical Argument The scope of skeptical challenges can vary in a number

### Property Dualism and the Knowledge Argument: Are Qualia Really a Problem for Physicalism? Ronald Planer Rutgers Univerity

Property Dualism and the Knowledge Argument: Are Qualia Really a Problem for Physicalism? Ronald Planer Rutgers Univerity Abstract: Where does the mind fit into the physical world? Not surprisingly, philosophers

### 24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI

24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HSS-D CI Kripke s objection to the identity theory Image by MIT OpenCourseWare. 1 the necessity of identity consider any object o o is identical to itself further, o couldn

### From Descartes to Locke. Consciousness Knowledge Science Reality

From Descartes to Locke Consciousness Knowledge Science Reality Brains in Vats What is the point? The point of the brain in a vat story is not to convince us that we might actually be brains in vats, But

### The readings for the course are separated into the following two categories:

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (5AANB012) Tutor: Dr. Matthew Parrott Office: 603 Philosophy Building Email: matthew.parrott@kcl.ac.uk Consultation Hours: Thursday 1:30-2:30 pm & 4-5 pm Lecture Hours: Thursday 3-4

### Test 3. Minds and Bodies Review

Test 3 Minds and Bodies Review The issue: The Questions What am I? What sort of thing am I? Am I a mind that occupies a body? Are mind and matter different (sorts of) things? Is conscious awareness a physical

### Machine Consciousness, Mind & Consciousness

Machine Consciousness, Mind & Consciousness Rajakishore Nath 1 Abstract. The problem of consciousness is one of the most important problems in science as well as in philosophy. There are different philosophers

### PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (7AAN2061) SYLLABUS: SEMESTER 1

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (7AAN2061) SYLLABUS: 2016-17 SEMESTER 1 Tutor: Prof Matthew Soteriou Office: 604 Email: matthew.soteriou@kcl.ac.uk Consultations Hours: Tuesdays 11am to 12pm, and Thursdays 3-4pm. Lecture

### The knowledge argument purports to show that there are non-physical facts facts that cannot be expressed in

The Knowledge Argument Adam Vinueza Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado vinueza@colorado.edu Keywords: acquaintance, fact, physicalism, proposition, qualia. The Knowledge Argument and Its

### Xi an Jiaotong University

General Information: Xi an Jiaotong University School of Management Course Code: PHIL 011 Course Name: Introduction to Philosophy Term: 2018 Summer Session Instructor: Staff Class Sessions Per Week: 5

### PHIL 011: Introduction to Philosophy

General Information PHIL 011: Introduction to Philosophy Term: 2018 Summer Session Class Sessions Per Week: 5 Instructor: Staff Total Weeks: 4 Language of Instruction: English Total Class Sessions: 20

### New Chapter: Epistemology: The Theory and Nature of Knowledge

Intro to Philosophy Phil 110 Lecture 12: 2-15 Daniel Kelly I. Mechanics A. Upcoming Readings 1. Today we ll discuss a. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (full.pdf) 2. Next week a. Locke, An Essay

### Compatibilism vs. incompatibilism, continued

Compatibilism vs. incompatibilism, continued Jeff Speaks March 24, 2009 1 Arguments for compatibilism............................ 1 1.1 Arguments from the analysis of free will.................. 1 1.2

### Reading Questions for Phil , Spring 2012 (Daniel)

Reading Questions for Phil 251.501, Spring 2012 (Daniel) Class One: What is Philosophy? (Jan. 17) How is philosophy different from mythology? How is philosophy different from religion? How is philosophy

### Examining the nature of mind. Michael Daniels. A review of Understanding Consciousness by Max Velmans (Routledge, 2000).

Examining the nature of mind Michael Daniels A review of Understanding Consciousness by Max Velmans (Routledge, 2000). Max Velmans is Reader in Psychology at Goldsmiths College, University of London. Over

### Seeing Through The Veil of Perception *

Seeing Through The Veil of Perception * Abstract Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world, that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our

### Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia

Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia The following is excerpted from Frank Jackson s article Epiphenomenal Qualia published in Philosophical Quarterly in 1982, and his article What Mary Didn t Know published

### Causation and Free Will

Causation and Free Will T L Hurst Revised: 17th August 2011 Abstract This paper looks at the main philosophic positions on free will. It suggests that the arguments for causal determinism being compatible

### Review Tutorial (A Whirlwind Tour of Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion)

Review Tutorial (A Whirlwind Tour of Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion) Arguably, the main task of philosophy is to seek the truth. We seek genuine knowledge. This is why epistemology

### National Quali cations SPECIMEN ONLY. Date of birth Scottish candidate number

N5FOR OFFICIAL USE S854/75/01 National Quali cations SPECIMEN ONLY Mark Philosophy Date Not applicable Duration 2 hours 20 minutes *S8547501* Fill in these boxes and read what is printed below. Full name

### HABERMAS ON COMPATIBILISM AND ONTOLOGICAL MONISM Some problems

Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2007 HABERMAS ON COMPATIBILISM AND ONTOLOGICAL MONISM Some problems Michael Quante In a first step, I disentangle the issues of scientism and of compatiblism

### Qualia Ain't in the Head Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye

Qualia Ain't in the Head Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye D.M. Armstrong Department of Philosophy (T&M) Sydney University SYDNEY

### Am I free? Free will vs. determinism

Am I free? Free will vs. determinism Our topic today is, for the second day in a row, freedom of the will. More precisely, our topic is the relationship between freedom of the will and determinism, and

### PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 3 : N A T U R E O F R E A L I T Y

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 3 : N A T U R E O F R E A L I T Y AGENDA 1. Review of Personal Identity 2. The Stuff of Reality 3. Materialistic/Physicalism 4. Immaterial/Idealism PERSONAL IDENTITY

### Lecture 7.1 Berkeley I

TOPIC: Lecture 7.1 Berkeley I Introduction to the Representational view of the mind. Berkeley s Argument from Illusion. KEY TERMS/ GOALS: Idealism. Naive realism. Representations. Berkeley s Argument from

### What is consciousness? Although it is possible to offer

Aporia vol. 26 no. 2 2016 Objects of Perception and Dependence Introduction What is consciousness? Although it is possible to offer explanations of consciousness in terms of the physical, some of the important

### Reading Questions for Phil , Fall 2012 (Daniel)

Reading Questions for Phil 251.200, Fall 2012 (Daniel) Class One: What is Philosophy? (Aug. 28) How is philosophy different from mythology? How is philosophy different from religion? How is philosophy

### Introductory Kant Seminar Lecture

Introductory Kant Seminar Lecture Intentionality It is not unusual to begin a discussion of Kant with a brief review of some history of philosophy. What is perhaps less usual is to start with a review

### Hume on Ideas, Impressions, and Knowledge

Hume on Ideas, Impressions, and Knowledge in class. Let my try one more time to make clear the ideas we discussed today Ideas and Impressions First off, Hume, like Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley, believes

### Final Paper. May 13, 2015

24.221 Final Paper May 13, 2015 Determinism states the following: given the state of the universe at time t 0, denoted S 0, and the conjunction of the laws of nature, L, the state of the universe S at

### Dualism: What s at stake?

Dualism: What s at stake? Dualists posit that reality is comprised of two fundamental, irreducible types of stuff : Material and non-material Material Stuff: Includes all the familiar elements of the physical

### (add 'PHIL 3400' to subject line) Course Webpages: Moodle login page

Date prepared: 6/3/16 Syllabus University of New Orleans Dept. of Philosophy (3 credits) SECTIONS 476 & 585 Contact Information Instructor: Dr. Robert Stufflebeam Office: UNO: LA 385 Office Hours: M-T-W-Th,

### Lecture 18: Rationalism

Lecture 18: Rationalism I. INTRODUCTION A. Introduction Descartes notion of innate ideas is consistent with rationalism Rationalism is a view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification.

### PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY Paper 9774/01 Introduction to Philosophy and Theology General comments Candidates had a very good grasp of the material for this paper, and had clearly read and researched the material

### The Phenomenal Concept Strategy

Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet 1 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession

### DECONSTRUCTING NEW WAVE MATERIALISM

In C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds., Physicalism and Its Discontents (Cambridge University Press, 2001) DECONSTRUCTING NEW WAVE MATERIALISM Terence Horgan and John Tienson University of Memphis. In the first

### Syllabus. Mr. Israelsen Office: 7145 Beering Hall Spring Term Office Hours: Wednesday 12:30 2:00pm and by appointment

Introduction to Philosophy Philosophy 110 Sec 019 LLEC Spring Term 2012 Purdue University Instructor: Daniel Kelly Teaching Assistants: Mr. Andrew Israelsen and Mr. Chapman Waters 1. Course Description

### Cartesian Dualism. I am not my body

Cartesian Dualism I am not my body Dualism = two-ism Concerning human beings, a (substance) dualist says that the mind and body are two different substances (things). The brain is made of matter, and part

### INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY Brandeis University Fall 2015 Professor Andreas Teuber

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY Brandeis University Fall 2015 Professor Andreas Teuber I. Introduction The course seeks to understand as well as answer a number of central questions in philosophy through the

### The Zimboic Hunch By Damir Mladić

The Zimboic Hunch By Damir Mladić Hollywood producers are not the only ones who think that zombies exist. Some philosophers think that too. But there is a tiny difference. The philosophers zombie is not

### Perception and Mind-Dependence: Lecture 2

1 Recap Perception and Mind-Dependence: Lecture 2 (Alex Moran, apm60@ cam.ac.uk) According to naïve realism: (1) the objects of perception are ordinary, mindindependent things, and (2) perceptual experience

### The Department of Philosophy and Classics The University of Texas at San Antonio One UTSA Circle San Antonio, TX USA.

CLAYTON LITTLEJOHN ON THE COHERENCE OF INVERSION The Department of Philosophy and Classics The University of Texas at San Antonio One UTSA Circle San Antonio, TX 78249 USA cmlittlejohn@yahoo.com 1 ON THE

### PHENOMENALITY AND INTENTIONALITY WHICH EXPLAINS WHICH?: REPLY TO GERTLER

PHENOMENALITY AND INTENTIONALITY WHICH EXPLAINS WHICH?: REPLY TO GERTLER Department of Philosophy University of California, Riverside Riverside, CA 92521 U.S.A. siewert@ucr.edu Copyright (c) Charles Siewert

### Formative Assessment: 2 x 1,500 word essays First essay due 16:00 on Friday 30 October 2015 Second essay due: 16:00 on Friday 11 December 2015

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: FALL 2015 (5AANB012) Credits: 15 units Tutor: Dr. Matthew Parrott Office: 603 Philosophy Building Email: matthew.parrott@kcl.ac.uk Consultation Hours: Tuesday 5-6 & Wednesday 3:30-4:30

### The Mind-Body Problem

The Mind-Body Problem What is it for something to be real? Ontology Monism Idealism What is the nature of existence? What is the difference between appearance and reality? What exists in the universe?

### What is Physicalism? Meet Mary the Omniscient Scientist

What is Physicalism? Jackson (1986): Physicalism is not the noncontroversial thesis that the actual world is largely physical, but the challenging thesis that it is entirely physical. This is why physicalists

### Kripke on the distinctness of the mind from the body

Kripke on the distinctness of the mind from the body Jeff Speaks April 13, 2005 At pp. 144 ff., Kripke turns his attention to the mind-body problem. The discussion here brings to bear many of the results

### Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia

24.09x Minds and Machines Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia Excerpts from Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-136 (1982). Jackson begins by describing the popular doctrine

### Consciousness and explanation

01-Weiskrantz-Chap01 7/8/08 11:17 AM Page 1 Chapter 1 Consciousness and explanation Martin Davies 1.1 Two questions about consciousness: what? and why? Many aspects of our mental lives are conscious an

### Think by Simon Blackburn. Chapter 3b Free Will

Think by Simon Blackburn Chapter 3b Free Will Review of definitions Incompatibilists believe that that free will and determinism are not compatible. This means that you can not be both free and determined

### CAUSAL-RECOGNITIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS: AN ALTERNATIVE PHYSICALIST ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

CAUSAL-RECOGNITIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS: AN ALTERNATIVE PHYSICALIST ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS Adeyanju Olanshile Muideen Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife Abstract This

### SUPPORT MATERIAL FOR 'DETERMINISM AND FREE WILL ' (UNIT 2 TOPIC 5)

SUPPORT MATERIAL FOR 'DETERMINISM AND FREE WILL ' (UNIT 2 TOPIC 5) Introduction We often say things like 'I couldn't resist buying those trainers'. In saying this, we presumably mean that the desire to

### Syllabus. Tiffany Montoya Office: 7143 Beering Hall Office Hours: 9:00am 11:00am Monday and by appointment

1. Course Description Introduction to Philosophy Philosophy 110 Fall Term 2014 Purdue University Instructor: Daniel Kelly Teaching Assistants: Tiffany Montoya and Zach Murphy Syllabus There are two main

### Realism and instrumentalism

Published in H. Pashler (Ed.) The Encyclopedia of the Mind (2013), Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 633 636 doi:10.4135/9781452257044 mark.sprevak@ed.ac.uk Realism and instrumentalism Mark Sprevak

### IN THIS PAPER I will examine and criticize the arguments David

A MATERIALIST RESPONSE TO DAVID CHALMERS THE CONSCIOUS MIND PAUL RAYMORE Stanford University IN THIS PAPER I will examine and criticize the arguments David Chalmers gives for rejecting a materialistic

### Is phenomenal character out there in the world?

Is phenomenal character out there in the world? Jeff Speaks November 15, 2013 1. Standard representationalism... 2 1.1. Phenomenal properties 1.2. Experience and phenomenal character 1.3. Sensible properties

### BOOK REVIEW: Gideon Yaffee, Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid s Theory of Action

University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy Philosophy, Department of 2005 BOOK REVIEW: Gideon Yaffee, Manifest Activity:

### spring 05 topics in philosophy of mind session 1

24.500 spring 05 topics in philosophy of mind session 1 self-knowledge 24.500 S05 1 no class next thursday 24.500 S05 2 self-knowledge = knowledge of one s mental states But what shall I now say that I

### The Extended Mind. But, what if the mind is like that? That is, what if the mind extends beyond the brain?

The Extended Mind 1. The Extended Body: We often have no problem accepting that the body can be augmented or extended in certain ways. For instance, it is not so far-fetched to think of someone s prosthetic