ATHEISM, AGNOSTICISM, & THEISM

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1 ATHEISM, AGNOSTICISM, & THEISM (A seminar room in a university somewhere in the Peloponnese. Two undergraduates, Mel Etitis and Kathy Merinos, are chatting as they wait to meet their philosophy lecturer, Anna Kalypsas, at the beginning of term.) Kathy: I was always told at school that there was no such thing as a real atheist people who call themselves atheists are really agnostics. Why did they say that? What reason did they give? Kathy: I don t know. I mean, perhaps I ve forgotten, but I think I never knew; they never explained it, they just used to say it. Well, when Anna comes we can ask her. I m sure I ve heard her say that she s an atheist, and she must have thought about something like that. Kathy: Anna? Sorry, I mean Dr Kalypsas. I ve been taught by her before, and she always likes us just to call her Anna. (Anna arrives, accompanied by a man whom the two students haven t seen before.) Ah, hello you two; sorry I m a bit late. This is a friend of mine, Dr Theo Sevvis. he s interested in religion, so when I bumped into him outside and he said he was free, I thought that he d make a useful addition to our tutorials. Theo: Hello. Kathy & Hello. Are you a lecturer here, Dr Sevvis? Theo: No, no though I do some teaching occasionally, for the Theology Department; I drop in to the Philosophy Department sometimes, and they enjoy arguing against what they see as my religious fundamentalism. They call me the apologist, as most of my colleagues are rather mor inclined to appeal simply to faith and the Bible than to argument.

2 Atheism, Agnosticism, & Theism page 2 Look, it s really stuffy in here, and it s a gorgeous day; why don t we sit outside somewhere? (They all agree, and the four leave the university buildings and walk down to a café by the town s harbour, where Theo buys them all coffees.) Theo: What is today s tutorial going to be about? Well, actually, as this is the beginning of term, we were probably just going to sort out what we d be doing during the course the topics we d be covering. (She pulls out some hand-outs, and gives one to each.) As you ll see, there are more topics in the hand-out than we can hope to cover in a single term. Some of the topics are too important not to cover, and we ll probably start with those; that ll take up most of the term, to be honest, but there ll be one or two choices to be made at the end. We ll only be meeting formally for tutorials a couple of times over the term, but I ll be happy to meet you informally more often. and we can discuss the various topics. We ll need to start with at least one, perhaps two of the arguments for the existence of god; then we should look at the problem of evil, the connection between morality and religion, religious experience, with special emphasis on miracles, and the relationships between faith, knowledge, and belief. Some of those will take more than a week, I should think, but there should be at least a couple of weeks left free for you to choose from the other topics. You don t have to decide now, but read through the other topics, and think about what you find most interesting. (Seeing a question in Kathy s eyes:) Don t worry everything in the handout is likely to come up in the exam. Kathy: Actually I was going to ask whether we need to read all these books and articles each week. Oh, good grief no. Two or three pieces from each list will be fine four as an absolute maximum. Any more than that and you ll just find that you re getting more confused. OK, if that s all, we can meet again for the first proper meeting next week. Unless you have any other questions? Well, actually Anna, I wonder if we could clear something up first? I ll try; what is it? About the course?

3 Atheism, Agnosticism, & Theism page 3 Yes, in a way. Just before you came, Kathy was saying that she was told at school there weren t any real atheists, only agnostics. Kathy: But I can t remember why. So we wondered if you knew why someone might claim that sort of thing. Hmmm, I think that I have heard someone say something like that before. What about you, Theo? Theo: Yes, so have I. To be frank I forget what was said exactly, but I imagine that it was bound up with a common confusion between two different sorts of atheism. This should appeal to a philosopher like you, Anna, because it involves the drawing of a distinction. Guilty as charged! There s nothing a philosopher likes more than a nice juicy distinction. Oh, hang on though are you talking about strong and weak atheism? Theo: Yes, quite; but you seem not be very enthusiastic about it. No. Well, no, I must admit that it s the sort of distinction whose main point is to create divisions between people. Still, as Mel and Kathy have brought it up, I suppose that we should try to get clear about it and it might turn out to be useful, who know? I don t think that I ve ever heard of it. No, no, there s no reason that you should have done. It s not a distinction that s found much in philosophy, or in any other serious discipline; as I say, it s more polemical than genuinely useful. It s also very, very confused; there are almost as many versions as there people who draw it. Theo: Well, I have no very strong view on the matter, but I should be inclined to give it more credit than that. Oh, I don t want to give the impression that I reject it altogether, or even that it mightn t occasionally be useful; it s just that it more often provokes heat than light. But look, let s start with a slightly easier distinction: atheism and agnosticism. Are we happy with that one? The atheist is a-theos without god and the agnostic is a-gnostos without knowledge; is that right? Kathy: But what exactly does that mean?

4 Atheism, Agnosticism, & Theism page 4 It means that, unlike the atheist, the agnostic doesn t say anything about whether there is or isn t a god she just says that she doesn t know whether there is one or not. Theo: Or sometimes the agnostic claims that it is impossible for us to know that belief is necessarily unjustified either way. Yes, that s right. In some ways that s a more interesting version, but they both count as agnosticism. Theo: In fact, I prefer to limit the term agnostic to those who hold that stronger position. that is why I am inclined to find the distinction between strong and weak atheism somewhat useful. The strong atheist believes that there is no god, while the weak atheist merely lacks belief in a god. Kathy: Don t they come to the same thing, Dr Sevvis? Theo: I don t think so, er... Kathy?...yes, Kathy. One can lack a belief because one has never thought of the proposition in question, or one can lack the belief because one has considered and rejected it. For example, I doubt that you believe that there exists a mysterious race of albino apes inhabiting caves beneath the Sahara desert. Kathy: Um, well, no, I suppose I don t. Theo: Now, before I mentioned it, you had never even thought about such a thing but now that I have mentioned it, you have considered it albeit briefly and decided against it. Before, your lack of belief corresponded to the weak atheist s, but now it corresponds to the strong atheist s. Kathy: I see. But isn t what you re calling the weak atheist the same as what most people call the agnostic? Good, yes you re quite right Kathy. And I suppose we have a choice; there are three basic positions (she writes on the back of the bill for their coffees): A. I can t have a (justified) belief for or against god B. I don t have a belief in the existence god C. I have a belief in the nonexistence of god. Now, we can call A. agnosticism, B. weak atheism, and C. strong atheism, or we can call A. strong agnosticism, B. weak agnosticism, and C. atheism. in other words, we can choose to

5 Atheism, Agnosticism, & Theism page 5 divide up agnosticism into two varieties, or atheism; both approaches make sense. What s more, there isn t much difference between them. OK, Anna, you re saying that the distinction can be drawn in different ways but what s wrong with it? Now remember that I said that I didn t dismiss it altogether. Still, if we were going to criticise it, where should we begin? Well, Theo s explanation of the distinction pointed to one line of argument; how many people have never thought about the concept of god? And however many there are, why should we be interested in them from the point of view of philosophy, I mean? I suppose a missionary might be interested in such people, but we re concerned with people s reasoning. Theo: I appreciate that, Anna, but although my example was of someone who has never come across the notion of god, that was simply to make the notion clear. It would surely be possible for someone have encountered the concept of god and yet still to lack any belief for or against his existence to withhold assent. To sit on the fence? Theo: Well, if you like though I think that that is rather unfair. Yes, sorry Theo, I was being flippant. There are times when a philosopher or other thinker has to remain, well, professionally detached, I suppose you could say. We have to suspend judgement on an issue, and consider a proposition without assenting to or dissenting from it. The thing is, though, that we always really have one of three attitudes to it; either we accept it, don t accept it, or don t know which to do. As philosophers, or theologians, or whatever, we have to behave as though we have no view we have to think about it completely disinterestedly; as people, of course, it s a different matter. Theo: But surely, even in our mundane lives we are able to consider a proposition without accepting or rejecting it. Perhaps but what we ve called the weak atheist isn t someone who s rejected belief, just someone who doesn t have it; so if you re considering the existence of god without going one way or the other, you re an atheist, at least in that sense. You lack a belief in god. So isn t there any difference at all?

6 Atheism, Agnosticism, & Theism page 6 The only useful distinction that I can think of is that the weak atheist, in Theo s terms, is justified simply by the lack of reasons to believe. It can be argued that he strong atheist needs more needs to have arguments against the existence of god. But really, in the end I don t think that it makes much difference. the real question is this: do you believe in god? There are three no, four main answers: the atheist says no, the theist says yes, the agnostic says we can t know either way, and the positivist says the question doesn t make sense, and nor does nay answer. Kathy: Oh, positivism I wondered why you hadn t mentioned that before. Theo: Yes Anna; when I was studying all this, the positivists seemed to be quite central to it all. Hah! You re showing your age, I m afraid. Now don t get me wrong I m not saying that positivism had no good effects on philosophy (though I think it did more harm than good, to be honest), but it s been a long time since there were many philosophers who took it seriously. But look, we might come back to this later in the term, but let s make some basic assumptions for most of our discussions. We ll assume that it makes sense to ask whether or not god exists, what sort of being he is, etc., and we ll assume that it s possible and important to have rational grounds for any of our beliefs (or non-beliefs), religious or otherwise. If we don t, we won t really be able to get anywhere. Is that OK with you all? (They all nod assent, but Mel is still a bit worried) Ann: But we shall talk about faith and belief, you said? Oh yes. don t worry that s a topic that we really can t miss out. But we ll probably get on to it nearer the end of the course. Oh, good. And I expect Dr Sevvis will want to talk about that too. Theo: In fact, Mel, although I am interested in the notion of faith from a theoretical I suppose a philosophical point of view, my own position is that religious belief that is not grounded firmly in reason is shallow and unsatisfactory. But Anna, if we could return to the issue of atheism for a moment. Let us set aside these disagreements about nomenclature, and tackle the main point. Is it possible... perhaps I should ask, is it intellectually defensible to be what people call a weak atheist rather than an agnostic? That is, I can see that if someone believes himself to have

7 Atheism, Agnosticism, & Theism page 7 grounds for disbelief, then disbelief is respectable but is it respectable to disbelieve simply because one lacks grounds for belief? Kathy: I see what Dr Sevvis means, I think. How can someone be sure that god doesn t exist? Even if none of the arguments for his existence work, even if you reject all the evidence of miracles and such like, that should leave you being at most an agnostic. Well, think of it this way. I don t believe in the existence of thousands of gods: I don t believe in Jehovah, Vishnu, Allah, Quetzalcoatl, the Dagda, Aphrodite, Chukwu, Anubis, Ahsonnutli, Amatterasu-Omikami, Mars, Kwoth, Ahura Mazda, Thor, Enlil, Jumala Ukko, Svarog... oh, thousands and thousands of gods, many of them I ve not heard of yet, and many more I never shall, but I don t believe in them anyway. (And that s just the gods; there s a vast number of demons, saints, bodhisattvas, angels, pixies, bogles, kobolds, demi-gods, and who knows what else I don t believe in any of them either.) Now no-one else here believes in the existence of thousands of gods either; the difference between me and Theo, at least, is that he believes in the existence of just one of them. So it seems to me that, if justifying disbelief is a problem, we both have it to an almost equal degree only he has the additional problem of justifying the one belief that he does have. Theo: Conversely, then Anna, you are in essentially the same position as I am, are you not Anna? I believe that god exists, you believe that god does not exist; they are both beliefs, both in need of justification rather than being a rational sceptic, you are a reverse theist. Look, I m a real cricket fan I never miss a match; are you a fan too? Theo: Not at all; I never watch the game. What, never? Theo: I promise you that I have not watched a single match. Then you can t say that you re not interested in cricket you re as fanatical as I am, but in reverse... You re a cricket anti-fan. Theo: No, I assure you Anna that I am not in the least fanatical; I am simply not interested. So you re happy with the idea that two different attitudes to something needn t be mirror images; then why do you insist that be when it comes to religion? Why do you need me to be just like you but in reverse?

8 Atheism, Agnosticism, & Theism page 8 But to go back to all those gods and goddesses in which you don t believe; in fact, think of all the non-religious things you don t believe either, such as the existence of an invisible alien sitting at the table with us and keeping away the lions. Are you merely agnostic about that alien, or do you disbelieve? Theo: But that is completely different... (Anna raises a sceptical eyebrow)... oh, very well, then yes, I do not believe in your invisible alien. But it is different, surely? After all, there are no grounds whatsoever for believing in the alien, and it is such a ridiculous notion. And you have clearly just made it up. Well, precisely and the atheist says that there are no grounds for believing in god, that we can explain the world perfectly well without bringing a god into it, and that people have clearly made up the various notions of god. You see, your disbelief in the invisible alien has the same basis as the atheist s disbelief in god, and neither of us needs to have arguments against their existence. Theo: I see what you mean, but there is still a difference: the notion of the invisible alien is ridiculous, and no-one would believe it in fact you did not expect me to believe it. The notion of god is very different, for there are millions of believers. But many, perhaps most, atheists find the notion of god to be just as ridiculous as the invisible alien. And you re also beginning to head towards a sort of argument from common consent you know: if everyone believes something then it must be true. Only you re trying for a weaker version: if a lot of people believe something then it s reasonable to believe it too. I mean, the strong version doesn t work, so the weaker version... Theo: Yes, yes, I see what you mean. Nevertheless, you seem to be saying that the atheist disbelieves purely from lack of evidence yet surely the fact of finding the notion of god ridiculous cannot be wholly basic. That is, there must be some reason or set of reasons for one person to find a notion absurd when another does not. Right, I see what you mean. I suppose that you re right, Theo. I m tempted to say that the atheist s view of the notion of god is the natural human position, and that it s only absent if there s some strong belief system some religion, probably is in place to counteract it. But of course that won t do. I mean, it might be true, but I don t see how I could prove it. Sorry, but does it mater that much? I mean, if the atheist thinks that the notion of god is absurd, and the theist thinks that it isn t well, they sort of cancel out, don t they?

9 Atheism, Agnosticism, & Theism page 9 Well, ye, I see what you mean, Mel. Even if we agree that there are no good grounds for either of them, the atheists and the theist are on equal footing. But that doesn t really help me, I m afraid. I was trying to argue that atheism is the natural human position, and that one needs reasons for agnosticism or theism. No, I think that the real point is that my analogy does work after all. Theo is more than simply agnostic about the invisible alien for exactly the same reasons that the atheist is more than simply agnostic about god. In both cases they think that the ideas are far-fetched, so that they d need good reason to believe. So someone can be a natural atheist if she happens to find the idea of god absurd, but otherwise she s either an agnostic or has to have some positive reason for atheism? Well, yes but it s not quite that simple. Whether or not you find the idea of a god absurd isn t just a natural fact about you. It s going to be bound up with your upbringing, the kind of explanations that satisfy you, the background metaphysical and epistemological theories that you hold, and so on. Still, getting back yo your initial question... the main point, I think, is that it s certainly possible to be an atheist, and for many people it s agnosticism that isn t a genuine option. Kathy: I don t really understand, though; why does all this really matter? I mean, isn t the simple fact that there are two main sets of people: the ones who believe in god, and the ones who don t? Yes, I couldn t agree more. What we re going to be looking at at the beginning of the course, anyway are arguments for and against belief and it doesn t matter whether people call themselves strong or weak atheists or agnostics, or whatever. What matters is whether the arguments work, and that s what we ll be concentrating on. There s no formal tutorial scheduled for next week, but if you d like to meet at about the same time, here perhaps, we can go over the argument in its different forms, and see what you think of it. And Theo, you re very welcome to come along, if you ve nothing else to do. Theo: I should be delighted; I am always ready to discuss these matters, and I shall be getting a free education into the bargain. Til next week then.

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