Squaring the Circle in Descartes Meditations

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Squaring the Circle in Descartes Meditations"

Transcription

1

2

3 Squaring the Circle in Descartes Meditations Descartes Meditations is one of the most thoroughly analyzed of all philosophical texts. Nevertheless, central issues in Descartes thought remain unresolved, particularly the problem of the Cartesian Circle. Most attempts to deal with that problem have weakened the force of Descartes own doubts or weakened the goals he was seeking. In this book, Stephen I. Wagner gives Descartes doubts their strongest force and shows how he overcomes those doubts, establishing with metaphysical certainty the existence of a nondeceiving God and the truth of his clear and distinct perceptions. Wagner s innovative and thorough reading of the text clarifies a wide range of other issues that have been left unclear by previous commentaries, including the nature of the cogito discovery and the relationship between Descartes proofs of God s existence. His book will be of great interest to scholars and upperlevel students of Descartes, early modern philosophy and theology. stephen i. wagner is Professor of Philosophy at St. John s University and the College of St. Benedict, Minnesota. He has published articles on Descartes and early modern philosophy in journals, including History of Philosophy Quarterly.

4

5 Squaring the Circle in Descartes Meditations The Strong Validation of Reason Stephen I. Wagner

6 University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. Information on this title: C Stephen I. Wagner 2014 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2014 Printed in the United Kingdom by Clays St. Ives, plc A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Wagner, Stephen I., 1946 Squaring the circle in Descartes Meditations : the strong validation of reason / Stephen I. Wagner. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN (hardback) 1. Descartes, Ren?, Meditationes de prima philosophia. 2. First philosophy. I. Title. B1854.W dc ISBN Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

7 To my dear wife, Kaarin Johnston, who has made this, and so much more, possible.

8

9 Contents Preface Acknowledgments page ix xi 1 A proposal for achieving the strong validation of reason A problem pointing to a solution The historical background of Descartes project Explaining Descartes silence Two cautious responses An interpretive approach 35 2 The experiential method of demonstration The Meditations as cognitive exercises Reason and experience A continuous line of discovery three experiences of causal power 44 3 Meditation I experiencing the causal power of the imagination Announcing the goal The arguments for doubt The transition to the experiential method of demonstration Imagining the demon doubting previous beliefs 67 4 Meditation II experiencing the causal power of the intellect Announcing the goal The stage two arguments The transition to stage three Investigating the wax discovering the essence and existence of the mind The results of the wax investigation Meditation III experiencing the causal power of God Stage one raising doubts and announcing the goal The stage two arguments The transition to stage three Proving the existence of God Resolving a tension Descartes letter to Silhon 188 vii

10 viii Contents 6 Meditation IV eliminating error Announcing the goals The stage two arguments The transition to stage three The stage three cognitive exercise Meditation V establishing the structure of science Announcing the goals The stage two arguments The transition to stage three The stage three cognitive exercise completing the validation project Conclusion 231 Bibliography 233 Index 238

11 Preface In this book, I offer a new account of Descartes epistemological and metaphysical project in the Meditations. On my reading of the text, his project differs in its broad strokes and in many of its details from the accounts that have previously been provided. For readers who are familiar with the long history of commentary on Descartes text, these claims may well be met with surprise. The intensive analyses of the Meditations, particularly over the past several decades, convinced many commentators that there was nothing fundamentally new to say about that work. However, this conviction arose alongside the fact that analyses of the text had not clearly resolved some of the central issues in Descartes thinking, such as the nature of the cogito discovery and the apparent circularity of his Meditation III proof of God s existence. We could attribute this lack of clarity to the fact that Descartes simply did not provide the resources in his text for clarifying his views. But from the beginning of my work on the Meditations, I rejected that idea. Rather, I believed we simply had not found an approach to the text that would make Descartes thinking clear and rigorous. Over a number of years, I developed a reading of the Meditations that, I believe, achieves this goal. The experience of working out this reading reflects the advice that Thomas Kuhn gave to his students about the apparent absurdities they might encounter in a text: When reading the works of an important thinker, look first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have written them. When you find an answer,... when those passages make sense, then you may find that more central passages, ones you previously thought you understood, have changed their meaning. 1 The glaring apparent absurdity in Descartes text is the circularity of his Meditation III proof of God s existence. In my earliest work on Descartes, I proposed a resolution of this problem and showed that the text of Meditation III supported that view. As I followed out the implications of that proposal in the rest of the Meditations, Kuhn s insight proved true. I was led to a reading of Meditation II 1 Kuhn (1977), xii. ix

12 x Preface that suggested a new view of the cogito and of the wax investigation. And I found other changes in meaning in working through Descartes Meditation III theory of ideas and the remaining steps in his project. 2 This book provides an analysis of the meditator s 3 progress, from Meditations I through V, showing how Descartes achieves his validation of reason without circularity. 4 I believe that this analysis provides a more thorough consistency to the text than previous readings and resolves a number of issues left unclear by previous commentaries. In addition, my reading offers new possibilities for understanding the tradition of thought deriving from Descartes work. This is a significant result, since we cannot overestimate the seminal role of the Meditations in the history of philosophy. My analysis offers new directions for understanding the relation of Descartes thought to the work of his contemporaries. And since Cartesianism is often taken as a central model for contemporary work in epistemology and philosophy of mind, the views I offer of Descartes criterion of knowledge and of his idea of the mind can stimulate new thinking in those areas. Finally, my discussion suggests that some contemporary criticisms of Descartes thought derive from misunderstandings of his ideas. In the Conclusion I explain these results more fully. 2 A number of these views are presented in Wagner (1995, 1996). 3 I have referred to the meditator with masculine pronouns throughout my discussion, retaining the historical usage of Descartes, of standard translations and of most past commentaries. This choice primarily reflects my attempt to portray Descartes as describing his own process of discovery while leading the meditator through that same process. Recently, commentators like Catherine Wilson (2003) and Carriero (2009) have provided us with models for broadening our gender perspective in contemporary discussions of Descartes ideas in the Meditations. 4 Since the validation project is completed in Meditation V, I do not provide a complete analysis of Meditation VI. At a number of points, I explain how my perspective offers new insights into Descartes central claims in that meditation.

13 Acknowledgments I want to thank a number of people who have offered me support and encouragement throughout my work on this project. Robert Gurland, my PhD dissertation advisor at New York University, enabled me to embark on this work. Margaret Wilson, who was nearby at Princeton University, kindly agreed to work with me on my thesis. She provided me with the kind of personal and philosophical guidance that she gave so generously to all of her students. Over the years, many colleagues and students at the College of St. Benedict and St. John s University have listened patiently to my ideas and have offered invaluable advice. I especially want to thank Eugene Garver, Timothy Robinson, Emily Esch, Rene McGraw, Scott Richardson and Margaret Cook for their helpful comments on my ideas and on sections of my book. Tom Prendergast, Geoffrey Gorham and Husain Sarkar read sections of my work and helped me to improve them. My friends Jack Zaraya, Jim Collins and Thomas Newton provided constant support. My former student and present friend, Karen Duffy, helped me polish the book. The editors of History of Philosophy Quarterly kindly allowed me to use material in this book from my articles published in their journal. Andrew Pyle and another reader for Cambridge University Press helped me to clarify the presentation of my ideas. Finally, editors at Cambridge University Press and their associates provided support and guidance throughout the process Hilary Gaskin, Rosemary Crawley, David Morris, Ekta Vishnoi, Anamika Singh and my copy-editor, Harry Langford. xi

14

15 1 A proposal for achieving the strong validation of reason Descartes Meditations presents a student of the text with a number of difficult problems. The most fundamental of these is the problem of defining the project that Descartes is undertaking. There are a variety of ways of understanding Descartes goals; our view of those goals will determine our approach to the other issues raised by the text. While this problem has been the subject of much debate, there is consensus about one approach to Descartes project. It is widely agreed that his project is doomed to circularity, or even absurdity, if we give his own skeptical doubts their strongest force and also see him as attempting to achieve the strong validation of reason. 1 The strong validation requires Descartes to establish three guarantees. First, he must prove that his clear and distinct perceptions correspond to the reality that God has created. Second, he must prove that his logical inferences are valid. Finally, he must establish that these perceptions and inferences are true not only at the moment that they are being perceived, but also remain true over time. Commentators have rejected the possibility of providing this validation while also giving Descartes skeptical doubts their strongest force. This project requires Descartes to doubt the reliability of the best use of his reason in each of his clear and distinct perceptions and logical inferences. Once he does so, it is difficult to see how he can, without circular reasoning, achieve the proof of God s existence and non-deception that must provide the three guarantees which he needs. 2 Although many of Descartes statements indicate that he was attempting this project, 3 commentators have overwhelmingly insisted that Descartes must 1 Hatfield (2003), , introduced this term. 2 For example, Nakhnikian (1967), 253 4, calls this reading of Descartes project his aberrant view, and insists that it can only entail absurdity: such doubts are radically self-stultifying. A man cannot philosophize without reasoning, and he cannot reason if he doubts even the simplest analytic propositions... Descartes ought to have disowned the aberrant view not only to avoid circularity in his own system but also to avoid utter absurdity. And Cottingham (1986), 42, sees the project of validating reason from the bottom up as a wildly impossible one. 3 I will indicate these as we proceed. I will also consider the passages that have been appealed to as evidence that Descartes was not attempting a strong validation particularly the much-quoted passage in the Second Set of Replies (AT VII, 144 5; CSM II, 103) which has been dubbed by 1

16 2 A proposal for achieving the strong validation of reason have seen its impossibility. As a result, most analyses of Descartes response to skepticism have limited either Descartes doubts or his epistemological goal. Some approaches limit Descartes doubts by exempting a number of clear and distinct perceptions from the need for validation, making it possible for him to use those perceptions in a non-circular proof of God s existence. 4 Other analyses claim that Descartes goal is not to show that his clear and distinct perceptions are true, but to establish stability in his beliefs or the internal consistency of reason. 5 Although a variety of such less demanding projects have been proposed, no analysis of the Meditations has provided thoroughgoing clarification and consistency to Descartes texts. 6 I propose that Descartes goal is to establish the three guarantees I have described while insisting on the strongest force of his own doubts in Meditations I and III. 7 This is the project that I will call his strong validation of reason. It requires, primarily, that we take Descartes doubts at the start of Meditation III to be questioning the truth of all his clear and distinct perceptions and logical inferences, including the Meditation II certainties about his own essence and existence. To follow out his project, this is the force we must give to Descartes claim that, without the knowledge of a non-deceiving God s existence, it seems that I can never be quite certain about anything else. 8 I will show that if we pursue Descartes attempt to validate reason while insisting on this full force of his doubts, we can achieve a more thoroughgoing clarification of his texts than has previously been provided. The central obstacle to the strong validation project is the problem of the Cartesian Circle. My initial proposal is that this apparent obstacle can point us to the way in which the strong validation can be achieved. Hatfield (2006), 134, the limited aims passage. I will show that my reading can explain these passages better than other analyses. Throughout, the abbreviation AT refers to Descartes (1964), CSM refers to Descartes ( ) and CSMK refers to Descartes (1991). 4 For example: Kenny (1968), 193 5; Broughton (2002), especially ; Carriero (2009), especially For example: Gewirth (1941), Frankfurt (1970), especially ; Bennett (1990). I agree with the claim by Hatfield (2003), 174: Assuming, as seems reasonable, that Descartes was seeking metaphysical truths, the certainty, not truth approach neither accords with his intent nor reveals what he would need to achieve his goal. 6 The Meditations is the central text at issue, but we must surely also consider the Objections and Replies, theconversation with Burman, theprinciples of Philosophy, the Discourse on the Method and Descartes letters. 7 I will spell out the details of the Meditation I doubts in Chapter 3 and of the Meditation III doubts in Chapter 5. 8 AT VII, 36; CSM II, 25. In the Second Set of Objections, Mersenne asks Descartes directly whether he can know he is a thinking thing at the beginning of Meditation III, before he has proven God s existence (AT VII, 124 5; CSM II, 89). A full understanding Descartes answer (AT VII, 140 1; CSM II, 100) requires a consideration of the conclusion of his validation project in Meditation V. I will show in Chapter 7 that his response falls into line with my reading of his doubts and his validation project.

17 A problem pointing to a solution A problem pointing to a solution The doubts involved in the strong validation project raise the problem of the Cartesian Circle in its most difficult form. To understand the problem and to see how it can lead us to its own solution, we must first recognize the full impact of Descartes doubts. Their force is best made clear by Descartes doctrine of God s creation of the eternal truths. Descartes held the view that, since God is omnipotent, He is not bound by any standards in His creative activity. Moreover, God s perfection entails that His understanding and His creative will are united. Thus, God cannot contemplate possibilities prior to creating them; rather, by thinking them He also creates them as real. As a result, Descartes Creation Doctrine asserts that God could have created contradictions true together : God cannot have been determined to make it true that contradictories cannot be true together, and...hecould have done the opposite. 9 As commentators have now made clear, this view is central to Descartes thinking about God. 10 While he does not state this doctrine explicitly in the Meditations, 11 its skeptical force is reflected in his metaphysical doubt in Meditation III, when he suggests that God could have created us with faculties that lead us to go wrong even in our clearest thinking. 12 Since God s creative activity is not bound by the rational limits that restrict our thinking, the Creation Doctrine raises the possibility of a gap between our clear and distinct perceptions and the reality that God has created. To carry out the strong validation project, the meditator must eliminate the possibility of this epistemological gap by proving that God did not create his faculties in this deceptive way. The difficulty of accomplishing this goal has led commentators to deny the possibility of the project. One commentator has referred to the gap opened by the Creation Doctrine as a bifurcation between God s viewpoint and our own and has said, not only is it the case that the bifurcation... cannot be eliminated; it is quite difficult to see how Descartes could have thought even for a moment that it could be eliminated. 13 The problem of the Cartesian Circle can help us see how that goal can be achieved. In Meditation III, after raising doubt about the truth of his clear and distinct perceptions, Descartes tells us that he will establish their truth by proving that God exists and is not a deceiver. Within this attempt, the problem of the 9 AT IV, 118; CSMK III, Most influential in this regard has been Marion (1981). 11 He does state it in the Sixth Set of Replies (AT VII, 436; CSM II, 294). 12 AT VII, 36; CSM II, Carriero (1990), 110. As Carriero acknowledges, Margaret Wilson (1978), 127, first described the impact of Descartes Creation Doctrine in terms of this bifurcation.

18 4 A proposal for achieving the strong validation of reason Cartesian Circle poses three challenges. 14 First, Descartes proof will involve circular reasoning if it is a deductive demonstration that assumes the truth of the clear and distinct perceptions he uses as premises. Nor can Descartes assume the truth of any clearly and distinctly perceived steps of logical inference in his deductive proof. Second, Descartes argument will be circular if he establishes his conclusion by simply achieving a clear and distinct perception of God s existence. Arnauld made this challenge clear in his objections to the Meditations: I have one further worry, namely how the author avoids reasoning in a circle when he says that we are sure that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because God exists. But we can be sure that God exists only because we clearly and distinctly perceive this. Hence, before we can be sure that God exists, we ought to be able to be sure that whatever we perceive clearly and evidently is true. (AT VII, 214; CSM II, 150) The final challenge of circularity arises from Descartes claims in a letter to Regius. He explains that his demonstration of God s existence will eliminate the need to attend to the reasons that led to this result and to all of his other conclusions: a man who has once clearly understood the reasons which convince us that God exists and is not a deceiver, provided he remembers the conclusion God is no deceiver whether or not he continues to attend to the reasons for it, will continue to possess not only the conviction, but real knowledge of this and all other conclusions the reasons for which he remembers he once clearly perceived. (AT III, 65; CSMK III, 147) Descartes claims appear to commit him to circular reasoning because he can achieve the results he describes here only if the premises and reasoning used in his proof of God s existence are guaranteed to be true. In that case, he will know that his conclusion is true and he will not need to repeat his demonstration; and only in that case can his demonstration ground the truth of the other conclusions that he can demonstrate. 15 But if Descartes Meditation III doubts question his premises and reasoning, as the strong validation project requires, his demonstration can convince him that God exists only so long as he attends to it and is compelled to assent to its conclusion. Once his attention ends, he will 14 In this initial account, I am focusing on the circularity issue that arises in Meditation III. Some commentators suggest that we also find circular reasoning in Meditations IV and V. I will consider those other challenges as I proceed. 15 Scribano (2004), 11, has posed the circularity problem in this way by asking, can a deduction, which demonstrates the existence of God, validate the body of deductions that constitute science? She suggests that Descartes understood the problem of the circularity of his project: Descartes himself perfectly and consciously took on the risk of such a circularity, in defending the possibility of a knowledge of God, and therefore of the foundations of science, at the very heart of finite science, within the limits and according to the demands which are hers. My analysis explains how Descartes resolves this problem.

19 A problem pointing to a solution 5 have neither the conviction nor the real knowledge that Descartes describes to Regius. Thus, Descartes claims suggest that his demonstration of God s existence does involve circular reasoning. They appear to be assuming the truth of the premises and steps of reasoning used in a proof whose conclusion is needed to establish their truth. These challenges show decisively that the strong validation project must involve circular reasoning if Descartes attempts to prove God s existence through a deductive demonstration that relies on the truth of his clear and distinct perceptions. I propose, however, that this result does not show that the project is impossible. Rather, it directs us away from understanding Descartes proof of God s existence as a deductive argument. The problem of the Cartesian Circle challenges us to consider whether there is a different way in which the gap opened by the Creation Doctrine can be closed. There is such a way. The meditator can close the gap by achieving an experience of the God s-eye point of view, which shows him that his clear and distinct perceptions correspond to the reality that God has created. I propose that Descartes provides his strong validation of reason in precisely this way. I will argue that his decisive proof of God s existence in Meditation III is not achieved through a deductive argument, but by leading the meditator to an experience in which he recognizes that his activity of clearly and distinctly perceiving God is a participation in God s activity of thinking Himself. 16 This experience will prove God s existence without circularity since the meditator does not have to assume that the premises he uses to achieve the experience are true. Rather, Descartes can use the assent-compelling nature of those clear and distinct perceptions to move the meditator to the experience. And, as I will show, the experience itself will validate the meditator s clear and distinct perceptions of God s existence and non-deception. Thus, the meditator does not assume the truth of any clear and distinct perceptions prior to proving God s existence. Rather, his experience provides the ground for validating them all. I will show that this experience is achieved in the final stage of Meditation III, in what has traditionally been called Descartes second proof of God s existence. In that proof, Descartes first leads the meditator to the idea of God as an infinite being. He then directs the meditator to form the clear and distinct idea of God, which contains only the perfections of God that he can fully grasp. By attending to both of these ideas simultaneously, the meditator will recognize that he has received his clear and distinct idea from God and will experience his limited perception of God to be a participation in God s activity 16 I will clarify Descartes view of participation and its historical background in Section 1.2 and I will clarify the contrast between experience and reason in Chapter 2.

20 6 A proposal for achieving the strong validation of reason of knowing Himself. These discoveries are what experience tells us in the contemplation of God which concludes Meditation III: I should like to pause here and spend some time in the contemplation of God; to reflect on his attributes, and to gaze with wonder and adoration on the beauty of this immense light, so far as the eye of my darkened intellect can bear it. For just as we believe through faith that the supreme happiness of the next life consists solely in this (hac) contemplation of the divine majesty, 17 so experience tells us that this same contemplation, albeit much less perfect, enables us to know the greatest joy of which we are capable in this life. (AT VII; 52; CSM II, 36 (amended) 18 ) I will argue that the joy of this contemplation is provided by the meditator s participation in God s activity. Faith assures him that the next life will offer him an even greater happiness, provided by the more perfect and complete participation he will attain. In Chapters 3 through 5, I will explicate in detail the steps through which Descartes leads the meditator to this experience. In Chapters 6 and 7, I will explain how Meditations IV and V draw out from this experience the cognitions needed to complete the validation project. At this point, we must see more fully how my proposals regarding Descartes proof enable him to resolve the three aspects of the problem of circularity in a way that is supported by the text of Meditation III. The first aspect of the problem is that Descartes proof of God s existence will involve circular reasoning if it is a deductive demonstration using clearly and distinctly perceived premises or steps of inference. I have proposed that Descartes proof is not a deductive demonstration. But the text of Meditation III clearly indicates that Descartes does provide such a demonstration, in what has been called his first proof of God s existence. This proof uses clearly and distinctly perceived premises regarding formal realities and the objective realities of ideas to conclude that God must exist as the cause of the meditator s idea of Him. To see how my proposal fits the text, we need a preliminary look at my view of Descartes method of demonstration. On my reading, Descartes employs an experiential method of demonstration in Meditations I through V. The text of each meditation directs the meditator to this method, since each is divided into three stages. The first stage indicates the goal that is to be achieved. The second stage provides a logical and conceptual analysis of the issues that the meditator must consider. Then, in what I will call his transition passage, Descartes explains that his stage two analysis has not 17 CSM says, the contemplation of the divine majesty, but the Latin hac indicates my translation. This point is crucial for understanding Descartes claims about the possibility of intuitive knowledge of God in his letter to Silhon. I offer an analysis of that letter in Chapter 5. This point is also central to my discussion of the contrast between Descartes views on this issue and those of Aquinas and Suarez, in Section I will indicate throughout where I have amended the CSM and CSMK translations.

21 A problem pointing to a solution 7 achieved the meditator s goal with the force that is required by the validation project. 19 In the final stage of each meditation, Descartes leads the meditator to an experiential discovery that provides his goal. By imagining the idea of the demon in Meditation I, he experiences his ability to withhold his assent to all of his former beliefs. In Meditation II, the investigation of the wax brings him to the experience of his mind s power to clearly and distinctly perceive. In Meditation III, he achieves the perceptions of God that enable him to experience his participation in God s activity. And in Meditations IV and V, he achieves the additional experiences of participation in God s activity that are needed to complete the strong validation. The stage two analyses in each meditation are essential, since they enable the meditator to understand his stage three experiences. But only those experiences can provide his goals with the certainty required by the validation project. We can now see how Meditation III overcomes the initial challenge of the Cartesian Circle. The first stage of Meditation III announces that the meditator s goal is to prove God s existence and non-deception in order to validate his clear and distinct perceptions. In the second stage, Descartes provides the meditator with a theory of ideas that conceptually explains the issues involved in proving God s existence. He proceeds to offer a deductive argument using clearly and distinctly perceived premises to derive the conclusions that God exists and is not a deceiver. But, in his transition passage, Descartes indicates that his stage two demonstration does not suffice for the validation project. He does so by claiming that, although his reasoning has convinced him that God exists, when he relaxes his attention to the proof it becomes difficult to remember why the idea of a being more perfect than myself must necessarily proceed from some being which is in reality more perfect. 20 This claim shows that the stage two demonstration has not achieved the goal of the validation project that Descartes described to Regius. That is, it has not eliminated the need to attend to the reasons that established his conclusion that God exists. If it had done so, Descartes would not be troubled by his inability to remember those reasons. And we can understand why the stage two demonstration has not achieved that goal. 19 In Meditation I, Descartes explains that, despite his stage two arguments, My habitual opinions keep coming back (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). In Meditation II, Descartes explains that stage two has left him with the belief that corporeal things... are known with much more distinctness than this puzzling I which cannot be pictured in the imagination (AT VII, 29; CSM II, 20). As I will show in Chapter 4, this claim indicates that the meditator has not achieved a clear and distinct perception of his mind in stage two. I will consider the Meditation III transition passage below. And I will explicate the transition passages of Meditations IV and V in Chapters 6 and AT VII, 47; CSM II, 32 3.

22 8 A proposal for achieving the strong validation of reason Since the meditator s clear and distinct perceptions were put in doubt at the start of Meditation III, Descartes deductive demonstration cannot establish the truth of its conclusion that God exists. The proof can provide the meditator with only psychological certainty about that conclusion. That is, when he completes his deduction and concludes that God exists, he will experience the compulsion to assent that accompanies his clear and distinct perceptions. But when he relaxes his attention, his assent will end. At that point, he can question whether he was deceived in his previous assent. The best he can do to remove this doubt is to go through his proof again and re-establish his assent to God s existence. But he cannot eliminate the need to attend to the proof, since this same doubt can arise in the future. Thus, Descartes transition passage forces the meditator to recognize that the stage two demonstration has not established God s existence with the degree of certainty required by the strong validation project. It also forces him to recognize that he will be guilty of circular reasoning if he claims that the proof has achieved that goal. Since any other deductive proof will be subject to the same criticism, the meditator must recognize that a different method of demonstration is needed. The experiential procedure which Descartes employed in Meditations I and II has prepared him to expect that the final stage of Meditation III will provide an experiential discovery of the existence of a non-deceiving God. We can see, then, that the stage two deductive demonstration is essential to the meditator s progress in two ways. First, the theory of ideas which Descartes provides in that stage enables the meditator to understand the experience of participation to which Descartes will lead him in stage three. Second, the failure of the stage two proof shows the meditator that he must now achieve an experiential discovery of God s existence. Descartes will lead him to that discovery without relying on premises or logical inferences that are known to be true prior to achieving the experience. In this way, Descartes overcomes the first challenge of the Cartesian Circle. The second challenge, raised by Arnauld, is that the meditator s discovery that God exists cannot simply be provided by a clear and distinct perception of that fact. If it is provided in that way, before we can be sure that God exists, we ought to be able to be sure that whatever we perceive clearly and evidently is true. 21 My proposals respond to Arnauld s challenge by explaining how the stage three exercise validates, rather than presupposes, the truth of the meditator s clear and distinct perception of God s existence AT VII, 214; CSM II, A full explanation of Descartes response to Arnauld (AT VII, 245 6; CSM II, 171) requires an account of the completed validation project. I will consider that response in Chapter 7.

23 A problem pointing to a solution 9 On my view, the meditator does not establish God s existence by simply perceiving it clearly and distinctly. Rather, as I have suggested above, his discovery of God s existence proceeds in two steps. Descartes first leads him to the idea of God as an infinite being, in what has traditionally been seen as a regress argument. 23 I will show that this idea provides the meditator with an experience of God s self-creative power moving his will. Although the meditator cannot clearly and distinctly grasp all the perfections contained in this idea of God, the self-creative power it contains shows him that God must exist. 24 Thus, the first part of Descartes response to Arnauld s challenge is that the meditator discovers God s existence by experiencing His power. Descartes also directs the meditator to recognize two features of God s power that will be crucial in the final steps of the proof. First, Descartes points out that God perceives Himself. In doing so, He possesses ideas of all the perfections that the meditator conceives to be in Him. 25 Second, Descartes indicates that God s power is characterized by the unity of His attributes. 26 In particular, God s intellect and creative will are united. Thus, when God perceives something He creates the reality corresponding to it. In the next step of the exercise, Descartes leads the meditator to form the limited clear and distinct perception of God. This idea provides the meditator with an awareness of the perfections of God that he can fully grasp. And it also contains God s essence, that is, His self-creative power. Since this power is more perfect than that of the meditator, he cannot be the cause of the idea, as the stage two demonstration emphasized. To show the meditator experientially that God is the cause of this idea, Descartes directs him to perceive, at the same time, the two ideas of God that he has achieved. When he does so, he will experience the power contained in his idea of God as an infinite being to be the source of the power contained in his clear and distinct perception of God. And since God s intellect and will are united, the meditator will experience God s power providing an idea to his intellect and moving his will to a posture of assent. In this way, he will experience his activity of clearly and distinctly perceiving God to be a participation in God s more perfect activity of generating the idea of Himself. This experience will validate the meditator s clear and distinct perception of God in the following way. Since God s power is creative and unified, His 23 AT VII, 49 50; CSM II, In Chapter 5, I will explain how this idea of God as an infinite being shows the meditator that he has broken out of the realm of his ideas, so he is sure that God exists. The explanation of this crucial point requires the account of Descartes theory of ideas, which I will provide in that chapter. 25 AT VII, 50; CSM II, Descartes says, the unity, the simplicity or the inseparability of all the attributes of God is one of the most important of the perfections which I understand him to have (AT VII, 50; CSM II, 34).

24 10 A proposal for achieving the strong validation of reason will must create the reality corresponding to any idea He is perceiving. And since God is providing the meditator with the clear and distinct idea of Him, God must create the reality corresponding to this idea, which both He and the meditator are perceiving. Thus, the meditator s experience shows him that this limited idea of God represents a being that really exists. In this way, his experience validates his clear and distinct perception of God. This view of the meditator s discoveries clarifies Descartes explanation, in the final steps leading to the experience of participation, that God is not a deceiver since He is subject to no defects whatsoever and all fraud and deception depend on some defect. 27 The non-deception that is crucial for the success of Descartes proof concerns the meditator s compelled assent in his clear and distinct perception of God. If God s power possessed the defect of disunity, it could compel the meditator s assent in this clear and distinct perception without creating the reality corresponding to what he is perceiving. But God does not possess that defect; He must create what both He and the meditator are perceiving. Thus, the meditator knows that he is not being deceived by being compelled to assent to a false idea of God. We see, then, that the unity of God s intellect and creative will plays the central role in validating the meditator s clear and distinct perception of God. We have also seen that this same unity is the ground of Descartes Creation Doctrine and of the skeptical doubt it entails. That is, God s unity entails that God creates whatever He thinks, rather than choosing what to create based on the same rational limits that constrain the meditator s thinking. So we can see, in a preliminary way, that the ground of Descartes doubt ultimately provides the resolution of that same doubt. In the context of the Meditation III experience of participation, the unity of God s faculties closes the gap opened by the Creation Doctrine with regard to the meditator s clear and distinct perception of God. When experienced further in Meditations IV and V, God s unity will guarantee the truth of all the meditator s clear and distinct perceptions. Finally, we can see how the meditator s experience overcomes the third aspect of the problem of circularity. This final challenge demands that the proof of God s existence in Meditation III eliminates the need to attend to the reasons used in that proof and in all the other demonstrations of science. By experiencing God s self-creative and unified power, the meditator comes to know that God must exist and cannot be a deceiver, and he validates his clear and distinct perception of God. But the meditator is not only certain about these conclusions while he is having the experience. Rather, by providing knowledge of these conclusions, the experience eliminates the precise reasons for the metaphysical doubt about matters which seemed most evident which 27 AT VII, 52; CSM II, 35. Descartes attributes the clarity of this perception to the natural light. I will clarify the issues surrounding that notion in Chapter 5.

25 A problem pointing to a solution 11 Descartes raised at the start of Meditation III namely, the possibilities that God might not exist or might be a deceiver. 28 By removing these reasons for doubt, the meditator s experience establishes the existence of a non-deceiving God with metaphysical certainty. So there is no need for the meditator to repeat his experience or to recall the reasons that led him to it. In the future he only needs to remember that he had an experience that guaranteed God s existence and non-deception. Moreover, once the meditator has drawn out from his experience a validation of all his clear and distinct perceptions, he will have established the metaphysical certainty of all the demonstrations of science. Prior to the Meditation III experience, the premises, steps of reasoning and conclusions of those demonstrations possessed only psychological certainty the meditator was convinced of them while he was clearly and distinctly perceiving the proofs, but he could raise doubt about them afterwards by imagining that God was deceiving him into assenting to false beliefs. The experience of participation eliminates this reason for doubt regarding his clear and distinct perception of God. Meditation IV will draw out from this experience a guarantee that all of his clear and distinct perceptions are true when they are perceived. Meditation V will use the experience of participation to show him that these perceptions are necessarily true; since they are perceptions of true and immutable natures and their properties, they remain true over time. On the basis of these results, the meditator s memory of his Meditation III experience will eliminate the possibility of raising doubt about his conclusions, even when he is no longer attending to their demonstrations. In this way, the experience provides the ground for transforming all of his psychological certainties into metaphysical certainties, validating the body of deductions that constitute science. 29 Descartes Meditation III proof overcomes the final challenge of circularity by providing the foundation for science that guarantees its truth and stability. 30 To complete my initial proposals regarding Descartes strong validation project we can see, in a bit more detail, the roles of Meditations IV and V. Meditation IV establishes the method to be used in scientific investigation by showing the meditator that only his clear and distinct perceptions are guaranteed to be true. To provide that guarantee, Descartes must explain to the meditator how he is able to make mistakes. This explanation is needed because the 28 AT VII, 36; CSM II, Descartes describes this progression to Regius in terms of persuasio and scientia: I distinguish the two as follows: there is conviction (persuasio) when there remains some reason which might lead us to doubt, but knowledge (scientia) is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any stronger reason. Nobody can have the latter unless he also has knowledge of God (AT III, 65; CSMK III, 147). The experience of participation provides the meditator with the strong reason which establishes scientia. 30 The meditator s experience of participation must also validate his perception of his mind as a participator in God s activity. I will explain how it does so in Chapters 5 and 6.

26 12 A proposal for achieving the strong validation of reason Meditation III experience has focused exclusively on the meditator s capacity to participate in God s thinking. As a result, he might conclude that his mind is not capable of error. But since he can make mistakes, Descartes must explain the source of those errors in order to eliminate all doubt about the mind s nature. Thus, the central issue in Meditation IV is a doubt about the meditator s nature, not a doubt about whether God is a deceiver; the Meditation III experience has resolved the latter. This view falls into line with the strong validation project by showing that the meditator s doubts in Meditation III about his earlier understanding of his essence and existence cannot be fully resolved until God s existence has been proven. Descartes provides this resolution by leading the meditator to recognize that that I also participate in some mode in nothingness or non-being, 31 so that he is something intermediate between God and nothingness. 32 By clarifying the meditator s capacity for error that is, his participation in nothingness through the misuse of his will, Meditation IV completes the investigation of his mind s nature which began in Meditation II. And it validates the method to be used in scientific investigation by showing him that his clear and distinct perceptions are true. It does so by leading him to recognize that whenever he clearly and distinctly perceives, he participates in God s activity. Thus, all of these perceptions are guaranteed to reflect the truths that God thinks and creates. Meditation V provides the structure to be used in scientific investigation by putting in place a deductive order of true and immutable natures and their properties deriving from the idea of God. On my reading, Descartes proof of God s existence in this meditation does not provide further support for his conviction that God exists; the Meditation III experience has provided all the support that is needed. Rather, the Meditation V proof leads the meditator to translate his experiential discovery of God s existence into the form of a deductive connection between the ideas of God s essence and His necessary existence. 33 This connection serves as the first truth in the deductive order of scientific knowledge that derives from the idea of God. 34 Descartes will also show the meditator that his clear and distinct perceptions of the true natures 31 etiam quodammodo de nihilo, sive de non ente, participo (AT VII, 54). CSM omits the also (CSM II, 38) as does the French version (AT IX-1, 43). 32 AT VII, 54; CSM II, My view agrees with the claim by Gueroult (1953), [Ariew (1984), 241 3], that the Meditation V demonstration depends on the proof in Meditation III. For different reasons than Gueroult s, I also agree with his stronger claim that the Meditation III proof is the sole proof of the existence of God. 34 In this way, my analysis explains why the Meditation V proof comes first in Descartes deductive presentations of his system in The Second Set of Replies (AT VII, 166 9; CSM II, ) and the Principles of Philosophy (AT VII-1, 10 13; CSM I, ). I will further clarify the relation between the Meditation III and V proofs in Chapter 7.

27 A problem pointing to a solution 13 and their properties are contained in his idea of God. By validating this feature of the idea in his stage three cognitive exercise, the meditator will guarantee that the work of science can proceed by completing the deductive chains of reasoning deriving from the idea of God. 35 In this way, Meditation V puts in place a stable and enduring structure for the truths of science. At this point, the validation project is complete; the meditator has closed the gap that was opened by the Creation Doctrine. When he began the Meditations he had to acknowledge the possibility that God could have created reality in a way that does not correspond to the best use of his reason. By the end of Meditation V he has learned that God has not done so. The foundations of science have been laid. After Descartes leads the meditator back to his life as a union of mind and body in Meditation VI, the work of scientific investigation can proceed. We have now seen how my proposals regarding the Meditation III proof enable Descartes to overcome the Cartesian Circle. As a further step in setting out my proposals, it will help to understand the reasons that have led past commentators to rule out the resolution I have proposed. Only a few commentators have considered the possibility that Descartes believed the human mind could participate in God s activity of thought; all of them have rejected this possibility. 36 Although not all of these commentators have explicitly explained their reasons for doing so, it seems clear that their rejections have primarily derived from the same element of Descartes thought his assertion of the differences between God s faculties and our own. As Descartes says in the Second Set of Replies: of all the individual attributes which, by a defect of our intellect, we assign to God in a piecemeal fashion, corresponding to the way in which we perceive them in ourselves, none belong to God and to ourselves in the same sense. (AT VII, 137; CSM II, 98) Two differences between God s faculties and our own might appear to rule out our participation in His activity. 37 First, the unity of God s intellect and will contrasts with the lack of unity that Descartes attributes to our own faculties. 35 As work on Descartes scientific views has shown, this deductive order of scientific truths does not eliminate the need for empirical research to identify the features of experience that must be explained by those truths. 36 Gueroult (1953), 246 [Ariew (1984), 173], denies our participation in God. Devillairs (2004), 247, sees Descartes as excluding the idea of participation of the human understanding in the intellect of God. Alqui é ( ), Vol. 1, 606, note 3, implicitly rejects the view by interpreting tout ce peu que je participais de l être parfait in the Discourse on the Method (AT VI, 35; CSM I, 128) as tout ce peu que je tenais de l être parfait. I will look at Marion s rejection of the idea of participation later in this chapter and in my discussion of Descartes letter to Silhon in Chapter In line with my claims, Jean-Marie Beyssade (1992), 191 3, explains that the lack of univocity which Descartes describes in this claim is not tantamount to mere equivocity between God s faculties and our own. Nevertheless, Beyssade maintains that, although we know God by

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND GOD

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND GOD THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND GOD Self-evident-truths was a profound phrase used by the drafters of the American Declaration of Independence to insist on their rights and freedom from oppressive

More information

acting on principle onora o neill has written extensively on ethics and political philosophy

acting on principle onora o neill has written extensively on ethics and political philosophy acting on principle Two things, wrote Kant, fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. Many would argue that since Kant s day the

More information

KANT S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

KANT S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON KANT S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON In this new introduction to Kant s Critique of Pure Reason, explains the role of this first Critique in Kant s critical project and offers a line-by-line reading of the major

More information

1/9. Leibniz on Descartes Principles

1/9. Leibniz on Descartes Principles 1/9 Leibniz on Descartes Principles In 1692, or nearly fifty years after the first publication of Descartes Principles of Philosophy, Leibniz wrote his reflections on them indicating the points in which

More information

Philosophy 203 History of Modern Western Philosophy. Russell Marcus Hamilton College Spring 2010

Philosophy 203 History of Modern Western Philosophy. Russell Marcus Hamilton College Spring 2010 Philosophy 203 History of Modern Western Philosophy Russell Marcus Hamilton College Spring 2010 Class 3 - Meditations Two and Three too much material, but we ll do what we can Marcus, Modern Philosophy,

More information

Cartesian Rationalism

Cartesian Rationalism Cartesian Rationalism René Descartes 1596-1650 Reason tells me to trust my senses Descartes had the disturbing experience of finding out that everything he learned at school was wrong! From 1604-1612 he

More information

Cartesian Rationalism

Cartesian Rationalism Cartesian Rationalism René Descartes 1596-1650 Reason tells me to trust my senses Descartes had the disturbing experience of finding out that everything he learned at school was wrong! From 1604-1612 he

More information

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. These famous words of David Hume, on his inability to perceive

More information

The Paradox of the stone and two concepts of omnipotence

The Paradox of the stone and two concepts of omnipotence Filo Sofija Nr 30 (2015/3), s. 239-246 ISSN 1642-3267 Jacek Wojtysiak John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin The Paradox of the stone and two concepts of omnipotence Introduction The history of science

More information

NATURALIZING EPISTEMIC VIRTUE

NATURALIZING EPISTEMIC VIRTUE NATURALIZING EPISTEMIC VIRTUE An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other intellectually valuable goal. Current work in epistemology

More information

Clear and Distinct Perception in Descartes's Philosophy. Shoshana Rose Smith. B.A. University of California Los Angeles, 1995

Clear and Distinct Perception in Descartes's Philosophy. Shoshana Rose Smith. B.A. University of California Los Angeles, 1995 Clear and Distinct Perception in Descartes's Philosophy by Shoshana Rose Smith B.A. University of California Los Angeles, 1995 A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the

More information

An Introduction to Metametaphysics

An Introduction to Metametaphysics An Introduction to Metametaphysics How do we come to know metaphysical truths? How does metaphysical inquiry work? Are metaphysical debates substantial? These are the questions which characterize metametaphysics.

More information

The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism

The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism What is a great mistake? Nietzsche once said that a great error is worth more than a multitude of trivial truths. A truly great mistake

More information

1/8. Descartes 3: Proofs of the Existence of God

1/8. Descartes 3: Proofs of the Existence of God 1/8 Descartes 3: Proofs of the Existence of God Descartes opens the Third Meditation by reminding himself that nothing that is purely sensory is reliable. The one thing that is certain is the cogito. He

More information

DESCARTES ON THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF MATERIALLY FALSE IDEAS

DESCARTES ON THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF MATERIALLY FALSE IDEAS DESCARTES ON MATERIALLY FALSE IDEAS 385 DESCARTES ON THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF MATERIALLY FALSE IDEAS BY DAN KAUFMAN Abstract: The Standard Interpretation of Descartes on material falsity states that Descartes

More information

Sufficient Reason and Infinite Regress: Causal Consistency in Descartes and Spinoza. Ryan Steed

Sufficient Reason and Infinite Regress: Causal Consistency in Descartes and Spinoza. Ryan Steed Sufficient Reason and Infinite Regress: Causal Consistency in Descartes and Spinoza Ryan Steed PHIL 2112 Professor Rebecca Car October 15, 2018 Steed 2 While both Baruch Spinoza and René Descartes espouse

More information

Descartes Theory of Contingency 1 Chris Gousmett

Descartes Theory of Contingency 1 Chris Gousmett Descartes Theory of Contingency 1 Chris Gousmett In 1630, Descartes wrote a letter to Mersenne in which he stated a doctrine which was to shock his contemporaries... It was so unorthodox and so contrary

More information

Cambridge University Press The Sublime Seneca: Ethics, Literature, Metaphysics Erik Gunderson Frontmatter More information

Cambridge University Press The Sublime Seneca: Ethics, Literature, Metaphysics Erik Gunderson Frontmatter More information THE SUBLIME SENECA This is an extended meditation on ethics and literature across the Senecan corpus. There are two chapters on the Moral Letters, asking how one is to read philosophy or how one can write

More information

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion provides a broad overview of the topics which are at the forefront of discussion in contemporary philosophy of

More information

SELF-AWARENESS IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

SELF-AWARENESS IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY SELF-AWARENESS IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY This important book investigates the emergence and development of a distinct concept of self-awareness in post-classical, pre-modern Islamic philosophy. presents the

More information

From the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and hence that he really exists.

From the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and hence that he really exists. FIFTH MEDITATION The essence of material things, and the existence of God considered a second time We have seen that Descartes carefully distinguishes questions about a thing s existence from questions

More information

CARTESIAN IDEA OF GOD AS THE INFINITE

CARTESIAN IDEA OF GOD AS THE INFINITE FILOZOFIA Roč. 67, 2012, č. 4 CARTESIAN IDEA OF GOD AS THE INFINITE KSENIJA PUŠKARIĆ, Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, USA PUŠKARIĆ, K.: Cartesian Idea of God as the Infinite FILOZOFIA

More information

1/10. The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism

1/10. The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism 1/10 The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism The Fourth Paralogism is quite different from the three that preceded it because, although it is treated as a part of rational psychology, it main

More information

MIND, LANGUAGE, AND METAPHILOSOPHY

MIND, LANGUAGE, AND METAPHILOSOPHY MIND, LANGUAGE, AND METAPHILOSOPHY This volume presents a selection of the philosophical essays which Richard Rorty wrote during the first decade of his career, and complements four previous volumes of

More information

Cartesian Aseity in the Third Meditation

Cartesian Aseity in the Third Meditation University of Utah Abstract: In his Mediations, Descartes introduces a notion of divine aseity that, given some other commitments about causation and knowledge of the divine, must be different than the

More information

Ethics and Religion. Cambridge University Press Ethics and Religion Harry J. Gensler Frontmatter More information

Ethics and Religion. Cambridge University Press Ethics and Religion Harry J. Gensler Frontmatter More information Ethics and Religion Ethics and Religion explores philosophical issues that link the two areas. Many people question whether God is the source of morality. Divine command theory says that God s will creates

More information

POLLUTION AND RELIGION IN ANCIENT ROME

POLLUTION AND RELIGION IN ANCIENT ROME POLLUTION AND RELIGION IN ANCIENT ROME Pollution could come from any number of sources in the Roman world. Bodily functions, sexual activity, bloodshed, death any of these could cause disaster if brought

More information

G. J. Mattey s Lecture Notes on Descartes s Fourth Meditation 1

G. J. Mattey s Lecture Notes on Descartes s Fourth Meditation 1 Lecture Notes on Meditation Four G. J. Mattey February 3, 2011 The Synopsis states that there are two results of Meditation Four (M4): a proof that everything that we clearly and distinctly perceive is

More information

SQUARING THE CARTESIAN CIRCLE

SQUARING THE CARTESIAN CIRCLE SQUARING THE CARTESIAN CIRCLE Charles Hucnemann University of Illinois at Chicago The lasting objection against Descartes's Meditations seems to be that his reasoning is circular. On the one hand, he uses

More information

Can A Priori Justified Belief Be Extended Through Deduction? It is often assumed that if one deduces some proposition p from some premises

Can A Priori Justified Belief Be Extended Through Deduction? It is often assumed that if one deduces some proposition p from some premises Can A Priori Justified Belief Be Extended Through Deduction? Introduction It is often assumed that if one deduces some proposition p from some premises which one knows a priori, in a series of individually

More information

A Studying of Limitation of Epistemology as Basis of Toleration with Special Reference to John Locke

A Studying of Limitation of Epistemology as Basis of Toleration with Special Reference to John Locke A Studying of Limitation of Epistemology as Basis of Toleration with Special Reference to John Locke Roghieh Tamimi and R. P. Singh Center for philosophy, Social Science School, Jawaharlal Nehru University,

More information

Wiley is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Noûs.

Wiley is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Noûs. Descartes: The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness Author(s): Margaret D. Wilson Source: Noûs, Vol. 10, No. 1, Symposium Papers to be Read at the Meeting of the Western Division of the

More information

Fourth Meditation: Truth and falsity

Fourth Meditation: Truth and falsity Fourth Meditation: Truth and falsity In these past few days I have become used to keeping my mind away from the senses; and I have become strongly aware that very little is truly known about bodies, whereas

More information

In Search of the Ontological Argument. Richard Oxenberg

In Search of the Ontological Argument. Richard Oxenberg 1 In Search of the Ontological Argument Richard Oxenberg Abstract We can attend to the logic of Anselm's ontological argument, and amuse ourselves for a few hours unraveling its convoluted word-play, or

More information

CONSTRUCTIVISM IN ETHICS

CONSTRUCTIVISM IN ETHICS CONSTRUCTIVISM IN ETHICS Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather

More information

Introduction to Philosophy Russell Marcus Queens College http://philosophy.thatmarcusfamily.org Excerpts from the Objections & Replies to Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy A. To the Cogito. 1.

More information

in this web service Cambridge University Press

in this web service Cambridge University Press THE DIVINITY OF JESUS CHRIST THE DIVINITY OF JESUS CHRIST A study in the history of Christian doctrine since Kant Hulsean Lectures, igj6 by JOHN MARTIN CREED, D.D. Ely Professor of Divinity in the University

More information

Testimony and Moral Understanding Anthony T. Flood, Ph.D. Introduction

Testimony and Moral Understanding Anthony T. Flood, Ph.D. Introduction 24 Testimony and Moral Understanding Anthony T. Flood, Ph.D. Abstract: In this paper, I address Linda Zagzebski s analysis of the relation between moral testimony and understanding arguing that Aquinas

More information

John Locke s Politics of Moral Consensus

John Locke s Politics of Moral Consensus John Locke s Politics of Moral Consensus The aim of this highly original book is twofold: to explain the reconciliation of religion and politics in the work of John Locke and to explore the relevance of

More information

A Philosophical Guide to Chance

A Philosophical Guide to Chance A Philosophical Guide to Chance It is a commonplace that scientific inquiry makes extensive use of probabilities, many of which seem to be objective chances, describing features of reality that are independent

More information

THE EMERGENCE OF ETERNAL LIFE

THE EMERGENCE OF ETERNAL LIFE THE EMERGENCE OF ETERNAL LIFE The question of whether life exists beyond death remains one of the most pertinent of our existence, and theologians continue to address what relevance the answer has for

More information

- We might, now, wonder whether the resulting concept of justification is sufficiently strong. According to BonJour, apparent rational insight is

- We might, now, wonder whether the resulting concept of justification is sufficiently strong. According to BonJour, apparent rational insight is BonJour I PHIL410 BonJour s Moderate Rationalism - BonJour develops and defends a moderate form of Rationalism. - Rationalism, generally (as used here), is the view according to which the primary tool

More information

2017 Philosophy. Higher. Finalised Marking Instructions

2017 Philosophy. Higher. Finalised Marking Instructions National Qualifications 07 07 Philosophy Higher Finalised Marking Instructions Scottish Qualifications Authority 07 The information in this publication may be reproduced to support SQA qualifications only

More information

The Solution to Skepticism by René Descartes (1641) from Meditations translated by John Cottingham (1984)

The Solution to Skepticism by René Descartes (1641) from Meditations translated by John Cottingham (1984) The Solution to Skepticism by René Descartes (1641) from Meditations translated by John Cottingham (1984) MEDITATION THREE: Concerning God, That He Exists I will now shut my eyes, stop up my ears, and

More information

POETIC ETHICS IN PROVERBS

POETIC ETHICS IN PROVERBS POETIC ETHICS IN PROVERBS Th e book of Proverbs frequent use of binary oppositions righteous and wicked, wise and foolish has led many to assume that its vision of the moral world is relatively simplistic.

More information

General Philosophy. Dr Peter Millican,, Hertford College. Lecture 4: Two Cartesian Topics

General Philosophy. Dr Peter Millican,, Hertford College. Lecture 4: Two Cartesian Topics General Philosophy Dr Peter Millican,, Hertford College Lecture 4: Two Cartesian Topics Scepticism, and the Mind 2 Last Time we looked at scepticism about INDUCTION. This Lecture will move on to SCEPTICISM

More information

P. Weingartner, God s existence. Can it be proven? A logical commentary on the five ways of Thomas Aquinas, Ontos, Frankfurt Pp. 116.

P. Weingartner, God s existence. Can it be proven? A logical commentary on the five ways of Thomas Aquinas, Ontos, Frankfurt Pp. 116. P. Weingartner, God s existence. Can it be proven? A logical commentary on the five ways of Thomas Aquinas, Ontos, Frankfurt 2010. Pp. 116. Thinking of the problem of God s existence, most formal logicians

More information

1/12. The A Paralogisms

1/12. The A Paralogisms 1/12 The A Paralogisms The character of the Paralogisms is described early in the chapter. Kant describes them as being syllogisms which contain no empirical premises and states that in them we conclude

More information

First Principles. Principles of Reality. Undeniability.

First Principles. Principles of Reality. Undeniability. First Principles. First principles are the foundation of knowledge. Without them nothing could be known (see FOUNDATIONALISM). Even coherentism uses the first principle of noncontradiction to test the

More information

In Part I of the ETHICS, Spinoza presents his central

In Part I of the ETHICS, Spinoza presents his central TWO PROBLEMS WITH SPINOZA S ARGUMENT FOR SUBSTANCE MONISM LAURA ANGELINA DELGADO * In Part I of the ETHICS, Spinoza presents his central metaphysical thesis that there is only one substance in the universe.

More information

BERKELEY S A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

BERKELEY S A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE BERKELEY S A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE George Berkeley s A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge is a crucial text in the history of empiricism and in the history

More information

Klein on the Unity of Cartesian and Contemporary Skepticism

Klein on the Unity of Cartesian and Contemporary Skepticism Klein on the Unity of Cartesian and Contemporary Skepticism Olsson, Erik J Published in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00155.x 2008 Link to publication Citation

More information

Philosophy 203 History of Modern Western Philosophy. Russell Marcus Hamilton College Spring 2016

Philosophy 203 History of Modern Western Philosophy. Russell Marcus Hamilton College Spring 2016 Philosophy 203 History of Modern Western Philosophy Russell Marcus Hamilton College Spring 2016 Class #7 Finishing the Meditations Marcus, Modern Philosophy, Slide 1 Business # Today An exercise with your

More information

PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE IN CICERO S LETTERS

PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE IN CICERO S LETTERS PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE IN CICERO S LETTERS Cicero s letters are saturated with learned philosophical allusions and arguments. This innovative study shows just how fundamental these are for understanding Cicero

More information

1/7. The Postulates of Empirical Thought

1/7. The Postulates of Empirical Thought 1/7 The Postulates of Empirical Thought This week we are focusing on the final section of the Analytic of Principles in which Kant schematizes the last set of categories. This set of categories are what

More information

Ayer and Quine on the a priori

Ayer and Quine on the a priori Ayer and Quine on the a priori November 23, 2004 1 The problem of a priori knowledge Ayer s book is a defense of a thoroughgoing empiricism, not only about what is required for a belief to be justified

More information

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE by SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON O.M., M.A., D.Se., LL.D., F.R.S. Plum ian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy in the University

More information

THE KING JAMES BIBLE

THE KING JAMES BIBLE THE KING JAMES BIBLE The King James Bible (KJB) was the result of an extraordinary effort over nearly a century to take many good English translations and turn them into what the translators called one

More information

Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief

Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief This collection of new essays written by an international team of scholars is a ground-breaking examination of the problem of divine hiddenness, one of the most dynamic

More information

MEDITATIONS ON THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY: THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

MEDITATIONS ON THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY: THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT MEDITATIONS ON THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY: THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT René Descartes Introduction, Donald M. Borchert DESCARTES WAS BORN IN FRANCE in 1596 and died in Sweden in 1650. His formal education from

More information

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The Physical World Author(s): Barry Stroud Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 87 (1986-1987), pp. 263-277 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian

More information

From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction

From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction Let me see if I can say a few things to re-cap our first discussion of the Transcendental Logic, and help you get a foothold for what follows. Kant

More information

in this web service Cambridge University Press

in this web service Cambridge University Press Luther s Legacy In this new account of the emergence of a distinctive territorial state in early modern Germany, examines how the modern notion of state does not rest on the experience of a bureaucratic

More information

in this web service Cambridge University Press

in this web service Cambridge University Press Off the Beaten Track This collection of texts (originally published in German under the title Holzwege) is Heidegger s first post-war book and contains some of the major expositions of his later philosophy.

More information

Understanding Truth Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002

Understanding Truth Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002 1 Symposium on Understanding Truth By Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002 2 Precis of Understanding Truth Scott Soames Understanding Truth aims to illuminate

More information

Adding Substance to the Debate: Descartes on Freedom of the Will

Adding Substance to the Debate: Descartes on Freedom of the Will Essays in Philosophy Volume 14 Issue 2 Cartesian Virtue and Freedom Article 6 July 2013 Adding Substance to the Debate: Descartes on Freedom of the Will Brian Collins University of Iowa Follow this and

More information

THE CRISIS OF THE SCmNCES AS EXPRESSION OF THE RADICAL LIFE-CRISIS OF EUROPEAN HUMANITY

THE CRISIS OF THE SCmNCES AS EXPRESSION OF THE RADICAL LIFE-CRISIS OF EUROPEAN HUMANITY Contents Translator's Introduction / xv PART I THE CRISIS OF THE SCmNCES AS EXPRESSION OF THE RADICAL LIFE-CRISIS OF EUROPEAN HUMANITY I. Is there, in view of their constant successes, really a crisis

More information

Volume 161. Cambridge University Press Covenant Renewal and the Consecration of the Gentiles in Romans: Volume 161

Volume 161. Cambridge University Press Covenant Renewal and the Consecration of the Gentiles in Romans: Volume 161 COVENANT RENEWAL AND THE CONSECRATION OF THE GENTILES IN ROMANS In his letter to the Romans, Paul describes the community in Rome as holy ones. This study considers Paul s language in relation to the Old

More information

Spinoza and German Idealism

Spinoza and German Idealism Spinoza and German Idealism There can be little doubt that without Spinoza, German Idealism would have been just as impossible as it would have been without Kant. Yet the precise nature of Spinoza s influence

More information

Man and the Presence of Evil in Christian and Platonic Doctrine by Philip Sherrard

Man and the Presence of Evil in Christian and Platonic Doctrine by Philip Sherrard Man and the Presence of Evil in Christian and Platonic Doctrine by Philip Sherrard Source: Studies in Comparative Religion, Vol. 2, No.1. World Wisdom, Inc. www.studiesincomparativereligion.com OF the

More information

EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS

EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS This book offers a new and compelling account of distributive justice and its relation to choice. Unlike luck egalitarians, who treat unchosen differences in people s circumstances

More information

Unifying the Categorical Imperative* Marcus Arvan University of Tampa

Unifying the Categorical Imperative* Marcus Arvan University of Tampa Unifying the Categorical Imperative* Marcus Arvan University of Tampa [T]he concept of freedom constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason [and] this idea reveals itself

More information

Logic, Truth & Epistemology. Ross Arnold, Summer 2014 Lakeside institute of Theology

Logic, Truth & Epistemology. Ross Arnold, Summer 2014 Lakeside institute of Theology Logic, Truth & Epistemology Ross Arnold, Summer 2014 Lakeside institute of Theology Philosophical Theology 1 (TH5) Aug. 15 Intro to Philosophical Theology; Logic Aug. 22 Truth & Epistemology Aug. 29 Metaphysics

More information

Descartes and Foundationalism

Descartes and Foundationalism Cogito, ergo sum Who was René Descartes? 1596-1650 Life and Times Notable accomplishments modern philosophy mind body problem epistemology physics inertia optics mathematics functions analytic geometry

More information

In Defense of Radical Empiricism. Joseph Benjamin Riegel. Chapel Hill 2006

In Defense of Radical Empiricism. Joseph Benjamin Riegel. Chapel Hill 2006 In Defense of Radical Empiricism Joseph Benjamin Riegel A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

More information

Meditation 1: On what can be doubted

Meditation 1: On what can be doubted Meditation 1: On what can be doubted Descartes begins the First Meditation by noting that there are many things he once believed to be true that he has later learned were not. This leads him to worry which

More information

VOLUME VI ISSUE ISSN: X Pages Marco Motta. Clear and Distinct Perceptions and Clear and Distinct Ideas: The Cartesian Circle

VOLUME VI ISSUE ISSN: X Pages Marco Motta. Clear and Distinct Perceptions and Clear and Distinct Ideas: The Cartesian Circle VOLUME VI ISSUE 1 2012 ISSN: 1833-878X Pages 13-25 Marco Motta Clear and Distinct Perceptions and Clear and Distinct Ideas: The Cartesian Circle ABSTRACT This paper explores a famous criticism to Descartes

More information

Lonergan on General Transcendent Knowledge. In General Transcendent Knowledge, Chapter 19 of Insight, Lonergan does several things:

Lonergan on General Transcendent Knowledge. In General Transcendent Knowledge, Chapter 19 of Insight, Lonergan does several things: Lonergan on General Transcendent Knowledge In General Transcendent Knowledge, Chapter 19 of Insight, Lonergan does several things: 1-3--He provides a radical reinterpretation of the meaning of transcendence

More information

Philosophy Epistemology. Topic 3 - Skepticism

Philosophy Epistemology. Topic 3 - Skepticism Michael Huemer on Skepticism Philosophy 3340 - Epistemology Topic 3 - Skepticism Chapter II. The Lure of Radical Skepticism 1. Mike Huemer defines radical skepticism as follows: Philosophical skeptics

More information

Religious Pluralism and Values in the Public Sphere

Religious Pluralism and Values in the Public Sphere Religious Pluralism and Values in the Public Sphere How can we, as people and communities with different religions and cultures, live together with integrity? Does tolerance require us to deny our deep

More information

Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza: Concept of Substance Chapter 3 Spinoza and Substance. (Woolhouse)

Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza: Concept of Substance Chapter 3 Spinoza and Substance. (Woolhouse) Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza: Concept of Substance Chapter 3 Spinoza and Substance Detailed Argument Spinoza s Ethics is a systematic treatment of the substantial nature of God, and of the relationship

More information

Today s Lecture. René Descartes W.K. Clifford Preliminary comments on Locke

Today s Lecture. René Descartes W.K. Clifford Preliminary comments on Locke Today s Lecture René Descartes W.K. Clifford Preliminary comments on Locke René Descartes: The First There are two motivations for his method of doubt that Descartes mentions in the first paragraph of

More information

REASONS, RIGHTS, AND VALUES

REASONS, RIGHTS, AND VALUES REASONS, RIGHTS, AND VALUES A central concern in recent ethical thinking is reasons for action and their relation to obligations, rights, and values. This collection of recent essays by presents an account

More information

! Jumping ahead 2000 years:! Consider the theory of the self.! What am I? What certain knowledge do I have?! Key figure: René Descartes.

! Jumping ahead 2000 years:! Consider the theory of the self.! What am I? What certain knowledge do I have?! Key figure: René Descartes. ! Jumping ahead 2000 years:! Consider the theory of the self.! What am I? What certain knowledge do I have?! What is the relation between that knowledge and that given in the sciences?! Key figure: René

More information

Freedom as Morality. UWM Digital Commons. University of Wisconsin Milwaukee. Hao Liang University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Theses and Dissertations

Freedom as Morality. UWM Digital Commons. University of Wisconsin Milwaukee. Hao Liang University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Theses and Dissertations University of Wisconsin Milwaukee UWM Digital Commons Theses and Dissertations May 2014 Freedom as Morality Hao Liang University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.uwm.edu/etd

More information

Duns Scotus on Divine Illumination

Duns Scotus on Divine Illumination MP_C13.qxd 11/23/06 2:29 AM Page 110 13 Duns Scotus on Divine Illumination [Article IV. Concerning Henry s Conclusion] In the fourth article I argue against the conclusion of [Henry s] view as follows:

More information

Definitions of Gods of Descartes and Locke

Definitions of Gods of Descartes and Locke Assignment of Introduction to Philosophy Definitions of Gods of Descartes and Locke June 7, 2015 Kenzo Fujisue 1. Introduction Through lectures of Introduction to Philosophy, I studied that Christianity

More information

Foundationalism Vs. Skepticism: The Greater Philosophical Ideology

Foundationalism Vs. Skepticism: The Greater Philosophical Ideology 1. Introduction Ryan C. Smith Philosophy 125W- Final Paper April 24, 2010 Foundationalism Vs. Skepticism: The Greater Philosophical Ideology Throughout this paper, the goal will be to accomplish three

More information

A Multitude of Selves: Contrasting the Cartesian and Nietzschean views of selfhood

A Multitude of Selves: Contrasting the Cartesian and Nietzschean views of selfhood A Multitude of Selves: Contrasting the Cartesian and Nietzschean views of selfhood One s identity as a being distinct and independent from others is vital in order to interact with the world. A self identity

More information

Critique of Cosmological Argument

Critique of Cosmological Argument David Hume: Critique of Cosmological Argument Critique of Cosmological Argument DAVID HUME (1711-1776) David Hume is one of the most important philosophers in the history of philosophy. Born in Edinburgh,

More information

God and the Founders Madison, Washington, and Jefferson

God and the Founders Madison, Washington, and Jefferson God and the Founders Madison, Washington, and Jefferson Did the Founding Fathers intend to build a wall of separation between church and state? Are public displays of the Ten Commandments or the phrase

More information

Time 1867 words Principles of Philosophy God cosmological argument

Time 1867 words Principles of Philosophy God cosmological argument Time 1867 words In the Scholastic tradition, time is distinguished from duration. Whereas duration is an attribute of things, time is the measure of motion, that is, a mathematical quantity measuring the

More information

Themes in the Objections & Replies: Selected Objections and Replies to Descartes s Meditations Organized Topically with New Introductory Material

Themes in the Objections & Replies: Selected Objections and Replies to Descartes s Meditations Organized Topically with New Introductory Material Themes in the Objections & Replies: Selected Objections and Replies to Descartes s Meditations Organized Topically with New Introductory Material Draft, for use in Philosophy 203: History of Modern Western

More information

Aspects of Western Philosophy Dr. Sreekumar Nellickappilly Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

Aspects of Western Philosophy Dr. Sreekumar Nellickappilly Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Aspects of Western Philosophy Dr. Sreekumar Nellickappilly Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Module - 21 Lecture - 21 Kant Forms of sensibility Categories

More information

PORPHYRY S COMMENTARY ON PTOLEMY S HARMONICS

PORPHYRY S COMMENTARY ON PTOLEMY S HARMONICS PORPHYRY S COMMENTARY ON PTOLEMY S HARMONICS Porphyry s Commentary, the only surviving ancient commentary on a technical text, is not merely a study of Ptolemy s Harmonics. It includes virtually free-standing

More information

Gender Hierarchy in the Qurʾān Medieval Interpretations, Modern Responses

Gender Hierarchy in the Qurʾān Medieval Interpretations, Modern Responses Gender Hierarchy in the Qurʾān Medieval Interpretations, Modern This book explores how medieval and modern Muslim religious scholars ( ulamā ) interpret gender roles in Qur ānic verses on legal testimony,

More information

Naturalized Epistemology. 1. What is naturalized Epistemology? Quine PY4613

Naturalized Epistemology. 1. What is naturalized Epistemology? Quine PY4613 Naturalized Epistemology Quine PY4613 1. What is naturalized Epistemology? a. How is it motivated? b. What are its doctrines? c. Naturalized Epistemology in the context of Quine s philosophy 2. Naturalized

More information

Introduction to Philosophy

Introduction to Philosophy Introduction to Philosophy Descartes 2: The Cogito Jeremy Dunham Descartes Meditations A Recap of Meditation 1 First Person Narrative From Empiricism to Rationalism The Withholding Principle Local Doubt

More information

Descartes: A Guide for the Perplexed

Descartes: A Guide for the Perplexed Praxis, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2011 ISSN 1756-1019 Descartes: A Guide for the Perplexed Reviewed by Chistopher Ranalli University of Edinburgh Descartes: A Guide for the Perplexed By Justin Skirry. New

More information

A DEFENSE OF CARTESIAN CERTAINTY

A DEFENSE OF CARTESIAN CERTAINTY A DEFENSE OF CARTESIAN CERTAINTY by STEPHANIE LARSEN WYKSTRA A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey In partial fulfillment of the requirements

More information