State in India : Ancient, Medieval and Modern (With special reference to Kautilya's Theory of the State, Asoka's Dhamma and Akbar's Ain-e-A kbari)

Transcription

1

2 Postgraduate Course Themes in Indian Political Thought CONTENTS: CHAPTERS I Introduction II. Epistemology : Indian Theories of Knowledge III. State, Subject, Citizen State in India : Ancient, Medieval and Modern IV. (With special reference to Kautilya's Theory of the State, Asoka's Dhamma and Akbar's Ain-e-A kbari) Conceptions of the Political Power and Authority Legitimacy and Obligation V. Conceptions of the Community VI. VII. VIII. IX. Rashtra/Janapada Qaum Millat Varna Jati Sangha Perspectives on Indian Society Brahmanical Buddhist Bhakti/Sufi Dalit-Bahujan The Nation in Indian Thought Religion and Politics Tolerance Acc ' ommodation Secularism/Communalism Morality a d Politics Ethics School of Open Learning UNIVERSITY OF DELHI 5, Cavalry Lane, Delhi

3 INDIAN POLITICAL THOUG HT- AN INT ROD UCT ION -Dr. R. K. Anand ' The science of state and governm ent or ' Politics' or Political Science. as is popularly called, has been var iously named in ancient literature. As early as in the Vedic literature (Chhandogya Upanisad) the term used for it is Kshatra vidya'. The Mahabharata has also referred to this term. Sankar in his commentary equates Kshatra vidya' with ' Dhanurveda'. Another term used to signify politics is Rajadharma has been mentioned an Apastambha Smriti. Manusmriti and a lso the Mahabharata. Agnipurana. Jataka Mala and Kritya Kalpataru. There are some variations of this as Rajashastra in the Mahabharata and the Sucldhacharit: Rajaniti ' in Agnipurana and Chandeshivara, and Raja vidya ' in Kamandakiya. The term Niti is also used for the science of government or Kamandaka Nitisara, Vaishampayana Nitiprakashika and Sukra Nitisara. The term ' Dandaniti ' is widely used for the science of state. The other expre ssion Arthashastra is directly equated with the science or state and government. Kautilya entitled his work on the subject as Arthashastra. But the term was familiar even earlier. the Ramayana. the Mahabharata and later Panchatantra, Devipurana and Vayupuran also refer to ' Artha shastra'. S6LH-ces of Political Thought The Vedic Literture: The Vedas are the oldest literature of the world. The Vedic literature is classfied into Shruti and Smriti. The Shruti includes the Sambita, Brabinan. Aranyaka and Upanishids. The four Sambitas are namely, the Rig. Yajus. Sama and Atharva. An other constituent of the Vedic literature the Upanishads. The principal of them are thirteen in bumb er. The Smriti literature is very wide and include the dharma shastra works. The dharma shastra literature deals with the organisation of the society. state. duties of the king and the people, taxation. property and inheritance. It also gives a conside rab le attention to civil and criminal jurisprudenc e - procedure. evidence. witn esses. crimes and punishment. law amendments and such other subjects. Epics, Novels and Dramas : The non-vedic literatrue is also in abundance and include the epics- The Ramayana, the Mahabharata, the Rughuvansha. (by Kalidasa), and novels- the Harsha. Charit (by Dandin ). stories and didactics - Panchatanlra, Hitupadesha, Vetul Panchtivinshati. Dasa Kumar Charit, Katha Sarit Sagar. Purana : The Purana literature is full of discussions on polity, king, law and society. The Purana composition extends from 4 B.C. to 5 A.D. Agni has detailed discussion on polity. The subject matter or the Puranas ranges from : creation of the universe its nature natural property: dissolution of the creation: a race. dynasty: period, age, time b: and history of a dynasty. Arthasastra : Arthashastra another non-vedic literature which treats the sub ject matter directly. The foremost or them is the Arthashastara of Kautilya. Kautilya is identified as the mentor-preceptor of Chandragupta Maurya of 4th Century B.C.. though some western scholars assign him a later date. Kautilya qotes at least five schools of thought on polity and thirteen scholars. a noth er work of importance on polity is the Nitisara by Shukra. Nitisara of Kamandaka has a close influence of Kautilya. Jain Litcrntur e : There are some works in fain literature which have references to polity and administration. They have several references which are parallel to Jataka and ' Santi parva of the Mahabharata. They among other things, discuss the origin of state, society, castes etc. Buddhist Literature The other non-vedic literature is the Buddhist, which is available in Pali and Prakrit. The vinaya Pitaka is a book of discipline and organization of the Buddh ist Church. Its chapters on Mahavagga and Chullavagga' are particularly interesting. The organ izat ion is democratic: the decisions are taken by majority after deliberations. Foreigners Travel Acco unts and Reports : Like indigenous literature. Indian references a reavailable in foreign languages also. Accounts or the historian or Alexander ( C.) give a description of the contemporary administration and society. Magasthanese was an Ambassador in the court of

4 Chandragupta Maurya. The Chines sources are useful for the Gupta and post-gupta period. The travel accounts of Fah Hsien. reflect on the administration in Madhyadesh and Bihar. Archaeological and Archival Sources: Literary evidence is supplemented by archaeological and archival material. They evidence the polity in practice. Problems in understanding the sources The sources of Indian political tradition are rich enough to synthesize a consistent thought and theory. It should however be kept in mind that the scholars believed in unity and homogeneity of knowledge, they were conscious of the purpose, its application, and that knowledge is divine. T he social conduct of man and society is governed by ' dhrama ', a term which is more misunderstood than explained. The thougln, and li terature is conditioned by the philosophical value system of the time, advancement of knowledgement and information and means of communication. Since the span period of thought in India is is very long and which is broken by political upheavals, foreign subjugation, destruction of records, stag nat ion. chan ges in language, names and frontiers-all these and many other factors hinder a clear understanding and evaluation of the material available. The first problem is presented by the identification of authorship and fixation of the date of composition. This is so because many works have lost their details, or have no such details. In particular the Vedic literature may be cited as an example. The epics like Mahabharata and Ramayana are traditionally associated with Yyasa and Valmiki respectively but the period of their present day fo rm is disputed as critics suspect later additions and interpolations. For example, the Mahabharata must have passed several stages before the original ' Jaya' became ' Bha rata ' and finally developed into ' Mahabharata '. Confusion is also caused by the existence of traditions and schools of thought after the great Rishis. Centuries elapse between the first and the last. The Style of most of the works is didactic and morali stic, which does not suit a scientific inquiry. It prescribes what the kings should do. but does not analyze why. However, does not mean that the prescriptions are imagination, and do not have rationalization. It is true the treatment is brief and condensed. The whole Indian literature is not wo1th one shelf" - this remark shows the imperialistic bias of the British rulers. And the British scholars helped Macaulay in downgrading the Indian litarature, and deride the cultural heritage. The bias also palys its role when the whole thought and society is examined on the criterion of particular political philosophy, or present day conditions and norms. A serious handicap is felt in identifying old places, geographical sites or historical personalities which make the history mythical. creation of imagination. Links are also missing in the concepts and thought. Meanings ass igned to words and expressions have also changed. Sanskrit studies are losing interest. The result is that those who know the language, know little of the disciplines and the sub ject experts do not have a gfip over the language. Like Sanskrit texts. Pali and Prakrit are also becoming difficult to comprehend. For example critically ed ited Jain texts are not available. A similar difficulty exist with the G reek, Latin or chinese sources. A student has to depend on translations in English. and is led by them. An independent review is not possible. How authentic or faithful the translation is remains a question, besides how faitl1ful and authentic the account is. We have seen that political power has been always concerved to be a means. Wealth and power are important but not the final goal : spiritual development and self-contemp lation and realization stand higher. Hindu writers always stress that force should not be the basis of political power but that the latter shouldd have its foundation in discipline, self-restraint and the performance of the function for which power has been instituted. The view that the ancient Hindus gave primacy to spiritual values over political goals is demonstrated in the philosophy of Hindu social structure where the Brahmins. 'the people of knowledge and renunciation are placed higher in rank than the Kshatriyas- the political people and the fighter. 2

5 Absence of Political Thought One major charge levelled against political philosophy was that there was nothing like political thought in ancient India. With the discovery of Kautilya's Arthasastra and the intensive study of the works on Manu. Sukra. Kamandaka, Somadeva and the epics, it is now accepted that the ancient Indian thinkers did concern themselves with political enquiries. During the twentieth century attempts are being made to collect politically relevant passages from the poetic compositions of Kalidasa. Bharavi, Magha and Sri H arsha. the Bhattikavyam as well as the Buddhists and the Puranic literatures. Some defenders of Indian political thought like Sri Aurobindo have pointed out that the ancient Indians were not concerned with political abstract speculation; their special concern was to produce administrative manuals with the help of which the social and political organisations could be perfected. It remains nevertheless true that we do not find many major treatises of political theory in ancient India. Kautilya is the one which can be considered a major mature and detailed treatise on political. administrative and diplomatic matters. There is no doubt that political philosophy was not pursued at an intensive level in ancient India. There are pragmatic didactic and aphoristic sermons and statements. It is true that in the Santiparva there are long passages emphatically enunciating moral norms and postulates, but there are not to be found integrated discussions of political ethics, legal obligation or theories of punishment. It is a major problem for historians to determine as to why there is a dearth of political literature, political concepts and notions in ancient Indian thought. Hegel has pointed out that the existence of the fourfold social structure was a dominant inhibiting force to any kind of creative social and political theorisation in ancient India because this institutional pattern was based on the notion of rigid separation. Indian political theory was conceived in the context of a social order based on Varna srama. The notions of Svadharma and Svakarman were emphasized and the Gita even tried to give to these notions an ethical and philosophical content. But it cannot be helped saying that these notions and ideas were popularized in the social context of a privileged elite and a dependent, underprivileged and social base. They were found on the notions of differentiation and hierarchy depended upon the leadership of the king, his v irtues, and his ability to promote welfare of all. Absence of Rationality Another charge against Indian political thought is that it has no conception of a rational scheme of individual duty. It is true that it emphasizes duties and obligation and debts but these duties are not determined by the preferences and deliberate choices of the individual. There is no question of individual selection or choice amongst a scheme of duties. In other words, the freedom of volition does not operate in the social sphere. One's duties are laid down in the sastras and one has only to follow them. Thus. the accident of birth in a particular caste determines one's scheme of duties. It is 0bvious that such a scheme of ethics. the question of rational freedom or spontaneous determination of one's scheme of duties does not arise. The whole scheme of Hindu social philosophy and its entire theory of sixteen Arya Samskaras are based on the fact that an individual has, necessarily, to perform his obligations but there is no scheme of choice of goals and the subsequent consideration of one's duties and means for the realization of these chosen goals. The Indian political thought has developed in a distinct environment, which. no doubt, is dominated by the metaphysical inquiry into the origin of the world or cosmos. and also philosophical analysis of society and social relations. The metaphysical inquiry has deeply influenced the social organization and values. Secondly. the Indian civilization has an ancient origin. much of its records have been either lost or destroyed. There are gaps in intellectual pursuits. and links are missing. This has made the available literature obscure. imaginative or unreal. It has subjected them to interpretation. which is not free from bias. Finaifyit is true the ancient thinkers had a holistic view of life and so in their thought look it in totality not in fragments, as organic whole and not isolated ent itie s. The development of sciences is also integrated. and one science has incursions into other sciences. It is for this reason that in the whole of political thought man. his behaviour and conduct is the central point of inquiry, and since human thought and action are not, or cannot be confined to clear-cut limits. the discussion touches upon many subjects and spheres and 3

6 draws from them: so it may appear confused. Such factors and many others have often led scholarsto question the existence of political thought. In modern India, important volumes and treatises are being produced on the Dharmasastras. The Dharmasastras occupy a great place in the history of Sanskrit literature. The concepts of legal equality, equal protections of laws. inalienable natural right of man. and social equality. and economic justice are beyond the comprehension of these apologists of Brahmanical supremacy. From the standpoint of the social and behavioural sciences, several objection can be raised a gainst ancient Indian political thought. According to the modern qualitativists even the writings of Krabe. Barker. Maciver and Laski be long to the real political philosophy and cannot be called scientific political theory. Unless stat istical and mathematical techniques and models are employed. it is said. we cannot have political science. If this criterion were to be followed and if even the works of Laski and Maciver were to be banished from the field of scientific political theory. it goes without saying that ancient Indian political thought cannot claim the appellation of science. Indian Contribution to Political Thought Indian philosophy has made some significant contribution to political thought. Of them some have not received due attention, some have been misinterpreted, while some others have been subjected to criticism. But there are some concepts which have made their impact on thought. The following are the significant contr i but ions. A fundamental contribution of the Vedic literature to political philosophy is the notion of Abhayam or Fearlessness. The Atlwn'aveda exalts the concept of Abbayam. It prays for fearlessness from friends and foes. fearlessness in day and night and fearlessness from the known and the unkn own. This concept of universal fearlessness is on the prime motivational foundations of political individualism. inalienable and fundamental rights as well as disobedience of unjust laws and ordinanc es. Another major contribution of ancient Indian political thought to political philosophy and human civilization is the concept of the 'good of all' or Sarvabhutahita. Indian philosophical idealists. both of thevedantic and the Buddhistic schools. have exalted the notion of the good of all living beings. The Vedant supp orted this notion on the metaphysical ground of one spiritual entity be4ng the dominant rea li ty. Hence, all living being including animals were considered as only aspects or manifestations of the same dominant reality. Buddhism supported the notion of universal, good of all living beings because it is an advocate of compassion or Karuna. The Jatakas contain numerous stories wherein it is taught that Gauta ma Buddha in his previous existences, as Bodhisattva sacrificed himself for saving the lives of an ima ls. It is also true that for the solution of social economic and political tensions in the present Indian society. the valuational significance of Indian ethical notions which have. through centuries, become a part of the intellectual-moral structure of the Indians, cannot be neglected. Tensions and struggles are certainly there. but according to Indian thinkers, concord and harmony have their vital role to play in society. The moral sentiment may. partly. reinforce the purely political justifications in defence of a democratic po li ty. Hence. there is relevance of Indian social and political thought even to modern social sciences in I nd ia. We can. today. hope for some kind of a synthesis in which those elements in ancient Indian political thought which could be legitimately supported on the basis of rea son, should be integrated with some of the important concept of modern civilization like reason. individuality, critical orientation, etc. Hence. we can make efforts for building up a rational and modern society in the light of ancient Indian philosophic idealism and the political notion of Abbayam. 4

7 Chapter II PISTEMOLOGY: INDIAN THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE Dr. Brahma Bharadvaja Indian Epistemology deals with four questions, viz., what is the nature of pramana, what is the nature of prama, what is the nature of pramata, and what is the nature of prameya. It deals with the last two questions in order to throw light upon the nature of prama and pramana. They are rather strictly ontological questions which are necessarily connected with epistemology. But the most important question in Indian Epistemology is the question of pramanya. How does the validity (pramanya) of knowledge arise? Or what is the cause of valid knowledge? And how can we determine the validity of knowledge? Or how can the validity of knowledge be known? All the questions of Western Epistemology are involved in the above questions, though they do not present themselves to the Indian thinkers in the same way. Here we shall briefly consider the questions of pramana, prama, and pramanya. The Nature of Pramana Pramana literally means the principal instrument (karana) of valid knowledge (prama). Vatsyayana distinguishes pramana from pramata, prameya. and pramiti. Pramata is the cognizer of valid knowledge, who is induced to exertion by the desire to acquire or discard the objects of kn owledge. Prameya is the object of valid knowledge. Pramiti or prama is the valid knowledge of the object. And pramana is the principal instrumental cause of valid knowledge. But what is the real nature of pramana? Opinions differ as to this question. Some hold that it is of the nature of apprehension and non-apprehension. Others hold that it is of the nature of apprehension alone. We briefly consider below the different views of pramana. The Naiyayika View: For the production of valid knowledge the cognizing agent (pramata) and the cognized object (prameya) both are necessary. Should they be Included, then, in pramana or instrument of right cognition? They cannot be included in pramana, because, in that case, there would not be the fourfold distinction of Pramata, or cognizer, prameya or cognized object, pramiti or valid cognition, and pramana or instrument of valid cognition. So, the later Naiyayikas have defined Pramana as the entire aggregate of conditions (karanasamagri), apart from the cognizing agent (pramata) and the cognized object (prameya), which partaking of the nature of both apprehension and non-apprehensi on, bring about the cognition of an object, which is free from uncertainties and mistakes, and which apprehends the real nature of the object. The earlier Naiyayikas erroneously defined pramana as the entire collocation of circumstances, which, being of the nature of apprehension and non-apprehension both, bring about the uncontradicted and undoubted cognition of an object. The Samkhya View : According to the Samkhya, the function of the intellect (buddhi) which takes in the form of an object, when it has come into contact with a sense-organ, discriminated by the manas, and as perceived by the ahankara or empirical ego. is called pramana. This unintelligent psychic mode casts its reflection upon the transcendental self (purusa) which. being thus coloured by the psychic mode, becomes the spectator or seer of all objects. Thus the pure transcendental self is the cognizer (pramata), the unconscious psychic mode is the instrument of valid cognition (pramana), the reflection of the psychic mode transformed into the form of its object, upon the pure self is valid knowledge (prama); the object that transforms the function of the intellect into its own form and is ultimately reflected on the conscious self (purusa) is called the object of valid knowledge (prameya). 5 I

8 The Naiyayika criticizes this doctrine of pramana from his own standpoint. According to the Samkhya that in which the cognition appears or that which is transformed into the form of an object is unintelligent and material buddhi, while that to which the object of knowledge is presented is the intelligent self (purusa) ; the former is the pramana. while the consciousness of the purusa, which is due to the reflection of the unintelligent psychic mode on it, is valid knowledge (prama); so that the pramana and the prama do not inhere in the same substratum. The Mimamsaka View: The Bhatta Mimamsaka regards a cognition as a means (pramana) and apprehendedness (jnatata) in the object of cognition produced by the cognition as the result (phala) of pramana. According to him cognition is of the nature of activity, and as activity is always in ferred' from its result (phala), the activity of cognition or cognitive activity is inferred from its result in the form of apprehendedness or manifestness (prakatya) in the nature of its object and this inferable cognitive activity is the instrument of valid knowledge (pramana). This is the view of the Bhatta Mimamsaka. Parthasarathimisra, a Bhatta Mimamsaka. defines pramana as the cognition of an object which has not already been cognized, which:is free from contradiction and the causes of wl)':ich are free from defects. According to Prabhakara direct and immediate apprehension (anubhuti) is pramana; and it is not inferred from its result in the form of apprehendedness ; it is self-lu minous. A cognition directly reveals itself and the cognizing self as the subject of cognition or cognizer. It sometimes directly reveals its object as in perception, and sometjmes indirectly, as in inference and other kinds of knowledge. The labia View: The Jaina also holds that cognition itself is a pramana, which apprehends both itself and its object. But the cognition must be of a definite character. According to the Bhatta, a cognition can be inferred from the apprehendedness (inatata) in its object. According to the Jaina, a cognition is self -lu minous ; it apprehends itself directly. and apprehends its object (s\;aparaprakasa). According to the Naiyayika, a cognition apprehends its object (paraprakasa), but can never apprehend itself; it is apprehe nded by some other cognition (anuvyavasaya) ; it is not self-luminous or self manifesting (svaprakasa) but othermanifesting (paraprakasa). According to Prabhakara, a cognition reveals itself, its object and the self; there is the triple consciousness of the object, the subject, and the cognition in a single cognition (triputisamvit). The Buddhist View: According to some Buddhists there is a parallelism between a cognition and its object which arise simultaneously from the same complement of conditions. According to them both objects and ideas, which are momentary, are produced by the same stuff, viz., the matter stuff and the mind -stuff together. In the production of a cognition the mind-stuff is the material cause (upadanakarana) and the mindstuff is the auxiliary cause (sahakarikarana), while in the production of an object, the matter-stuff is the material cause, and the mind-stuff is the auxiliary cause. Thus a cognition is produced both hy consciousness and by an object; and an object also is produced both by an object and by consciousness. But the difference between an object and a cognition is due to the different roles played by the matter-stuff and the mind-stuff in producing them. Thus a cognition simultaneously arising with its object from the sa me matter-stuff and mindstuff becomes the apprehender (grahaka) of the latter (grahya), and, being in agreement with the object, is called pramana. According to this doctrine neither a cognition is produc d by its object, nor is the object produced by a cognition; they are generated simultaneously out of the same stu ff; and the cognitio n, being in harmony with its object, is called pramana. Jayanta Bhatta criticizes this doctrine of pramana from the Naiyayika standpoint. 6

9 If the object and the cognition are produced at the same moment out of the common stuff, why should the former manifest the latter, and why should they correspond with each other? They cannot give any answer to it. According to the Buddhist subjective idealist, the formless consciousness is the common stuff of all the determinate cognitions of blue, yellow, and so on; and when this formless consciousness is modalized hy various contents of blue, yellow. and so on, this modalized consciousness or the determinate cognition with a particular form is called pramana. According to this view there are no external objects ; nor is there any permanent self; there are only ideas or momentary cognitions. How. then, can there be the fourfold distinction of pramata, pramana, pramiti, and prameya which are said to exhaust the whole of reality? The Buddhist subjective idealist says that this distinction is possible even within the stream of cognitions or ideas. A cognition that superimposes upon itself the form of an unreal external object (e.g., blue, yellow, etc.) is called prameya; the manifestation of this apparent ly external object is called pramiti ; the power or capacity of manifesting it is called pramana; and the substrate of this power of manifestation is called pramata; and all these are in one and the same cognition. Hence the distinction among these four factors involved in knowledge is an ideal distinction within one and the same cognition. Thus, according to the Buddhist subjective idea lis t, though the object of perception (anubhava), the agent of perception (anubhavita) and the act of perception (anubhavana) are not different from perception itse lf, still the division of pramana, pramcya. pramata. and pramiti is a creation of the imagination. This is the view of a Yogachara school of Buddhis m. But the Yaibhasikas and Sautrantikas are realists; they believe in the real ex is tence of extra -mental objects; the fonner regard the extramental reality as the object of perception, while the latter regard it as the object of inference. According to the Vaibhasika an external object, whjch is perceptible, is the object of valid knowledge (prameya); the negation of non-manifestation of the object is valid knowledge (pramiti); and the negation of incapacity of manifesting the object is the means of valid knowledge (pramana). According to the Sautrantika an external object, which is infe1ted from its cognition, is the prameya; the correspondence of the cognition with its object is the pramana, and the consciousness of that correspondence between the cognition and the cognized object is the pramiti. Dharmottara defines right knowledge as the knowledge that is in harmony with its object. A cognition can be known to be in harmony with its object, if it can le ad the cognizer to the actual attainment of the object. This harmony of a knowledge with its object is called pramana, which consists in the capacity of leading to the actual attainment of the object. The Samkara-Vedantist View: The Advaita Vedantist also regards a cognition as the pramana. In fact, according to the Samka.rite, the fourfold distinction of pramata, pramana, pramiti, and prameya is within the eternal consciousness modalized by different determinants. One and the same eternal consciousnes s or Brahman is differentiated into four kinds of consciousness by four different determinants or limiting conditions (upadhi). The cognizing self (pramata) is the consciousness determined by the internal organ (antahkarana) which is a modification of nescience. The instrument of valid knowledge (pramana) is the consciousness determined by the mental mode or function of the internal organ. The object of valid knowledge (prameya) is the consciousness determined by an empirical object. And the result of the act of valid knowledge (pramiti) is the consciousness manifested by the apprehending mental mode or function of the internal organ (antahkarana). 7

10 According to the Advaita Vedanta the translucent mobile internal organ (antahkarana) moves out through the channel of the external sense-organs to an object and is transformed into the form of the object. This moving out of the antahkarana from the psycho-physical organism to the object is called the vritti or mode of the antahkarana; it is an apprehending mental mode; it siands between the organism and the extra - organic object. The so-called object too veils the eternal consciousness. And this veil of nescience is broken by the apprehending mental mode, which manifests the consciousness in the object. Now, the consciousness, which is determined by the internal organ (antahkarana), is called the pramata; it is confined within the organism. The consciousness detennined by the apprehending mental mode standing between the organ ism and the extra-organic object is called the pramana. The consciousness determined or veiled by the extra - organic empirical object is the prameya. And the consciousness manifested by the apprehending mental mode.- which was so long veiled by the empirical object- is called the pramiti. The Nature of Valid Knowledge (Prama or Pramiti) Prama means valid knowledge. What is the real nature of prama? As to this question also there are different views in Indian Phil osophy. There are different types of realism. idealism. and pragmatism in Indian Epistemology. These different types of thought define the nature of prama in different ways. It is beyond the scope of our short treatise on Indian Epistemology to attempt an elaborate treatment of this vast subject. Here we shall simply refer to the different views in Indian Philosophy as regards the nature of valid knowledge (prama). The Nyaya Vaisesika View: The Nyaya-Vaisesika, the Mimansaka, the.taina, the Vaibhasika, the Sautrant i ka, and the Samkhya-Patanjala are realists. though they differ from one another in many respects. Some Yogacaras are subjective idealists. The Madhyamika is an absolutist. The Samkara -Vedantist is an absolute idealist. Ramanuja is an objective idealist. The Nyaya realism and the Jaina realism are affiliated to pragmatism, so that they may he called realistic pragmatism. The Buddhist realism and idealism both are of a pragmatic type, so that one may be; called realistic pragmatism, and the other, subjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism. The Samkarite absolute, idealism also is affiliated to empirical realism and empirical pragmatism. Ramanuja's objective idealism also is pragmatistic, and it may be termed absolute pragmatism. The Nyaya-Vaisesika advocates uncritical and naive realism and believes in the correspondence theory of knowledge. We know the external objects with their qualities. actions, generalities, etc., by sense - perception. That knowledge is valid, which represents the real nature of its object. There is a corre spondence between knowledge and its object. When there is a disagreement between the two. the knowledge is invalid. But how can this agreement or disagreement between knowledge and its object be kn own? Here the Nyaya realism offers a pragmatic test. According to the Nyaya. the validity or invalidity. in other words, the agreement or disagreement of knowledge with its object, can be known only by its practical efficiency or ine fficien cy. When a knowledge leads to fruitful activity it is valid. When it leads to fruitless activity it is invalid. Thus the Nyaya realism affiliates itself to pragmatism; it is realistic pragmatism. The problem of the test of truth or the criterion of the validity of knowledge is reserved for the next section. Here we give a few definitions of prama or valid knowledge offered by the Nyaya-Vaisesaki realis ts. Vatsyayana defines valid knowledge as the cognition of an object in something in which it is, that is. the cognition of an object as it really is. Uddyotakara accepts the same definition. The later Nyaya-Vaisesika defines prama as the knowledge of the generic nature as abiding in its own subject. Sivaditya defines prama as the apprehension of the real nature of an object. Udayana defines prama as the true ascertainment of an object. Others define it as the true apprehension of an object. 8

11 These Nyaya-Vaisesika realistic definitions of prama are based upon dualistic metaphysics. They presuppose the existence of the knowing self and the known object. And they recognize the correspondence between the prama and the object of prama or prameya. But the Nyaya-Vaisesika does not define the exact nature of the correspondence between the two. It is a fact of experience and so cannot be challanged. It is proved by its practical usefulness. The Nyaya-Vaisiesika realism is practical in its attitude towards the problem of epistemology. The extra-mental reality is a fact of experience. It is real, and so cannot be idealised. lt is exactly represented by valid knowledge. And this correspondence too between prama and prameya is a fact of experience. It cannot be explained away. It is proved only by its pragmatic utility. The Jaina View : The Jaina agrees with the Nyaya-Vaisesika in his theory of valid knowledge (prama). He also advocates realistic pragmatism. For him, valid knowledge (prama) is the determinate cognition of itself and its object, and invalid knowledge (aprama) is the determinate cognition of an object in something in which it is not, that is,-the determinate cognition of an object as different from what it really is. And valid knowledge (prama) is capable of practical efficiency in the form of the selection of good and the avoidance of evil. The validity of a cognition consists in its agreement with the object cognized, and the invalidity of a cognition consists in its disagreement with the object cognized. And both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge arise from extraneous circumstances, viz., the special virtues (guna) and the defects and imperfections (dosa) respectively in their originating causes. But they are self-evident or determined by themselves in the case of habituated cognitions, and they are known from extraneous circumstances, viz., the knowledge of harmony or disharmony, and the presence or absence of contradicting experience, in the case of unhabituated or initial cognitions. The Mimamsaka View : Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as direct and immediate apprehension, which is different from recollection (smriti). Recollection is invalid as it depends upon the subconscious impression left by past experience. All cognitions per se are valid. Prabhakara says, "It is strange indeed how a cognition can be said to apprehend an object, and yet be invalid". The inherent validity of a cognition is disproved only when it is found to be not in agreement with the real nature of its object. Here Prabhakara means by pramana valid cognition, not the means of valid cognition. He identifies the pramana with prama. According to him all cognitions as cognitions are valid; their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects, so that wrongness does not belong to the cognitions themselves but to the things cognized. Siddhasena, though a Jaina logician, accepts the same view. He says that perception is never wrong, since it is always recognized as valid; to speak of it as valid, and at t he same time, as wrong would be a contradiction in terms. Kumarila also,accepts the view of Prabhakara as to the nature of valid know le dge. According to him, the validity of a cognition consists in its being an apprehension; this validity can be set asid e only by such discrepancies as the disagreement of the cognition with the real nature of its object and so forth. Parthasarathimisra, though a follower of Kumarila, puts forward the following definition of valid knowledge. A valid cognition is the cognition of an object, which has not already been apprehended, which is free from contradiction and which arises from causes free from imperfections. A valid cognition is the cognition of an object, which has not already been apprehended, truly representing the real nature of the object. Thus, according to the Bhatta Mimamsaka, knowledge, in order to be valid, must truly represent the real nature of its object, and must be characterised by novelty, and must be generated by causes which are untainted by impe rfections. The Bhatta Mimamsaka theory of valid knowledge (prama), too, is realistic. 9

12 The Bhatta Mimamsaka differes from the Naiyayika in two respects. In the first place, according to the former, the validity of knowledge is self-evident, and the invalidity of knowledge is inferred from the knowledge of imperfections in its causes, and the knowledge of its disagreement with its object, while, according to the latter, both validity and invalidity of knowledge are inferred from fruitful and fruitless activity respectively. In the second place, the former does not appeal to the pragmatic test, while the latter applies the pragmatic criterion to knowledge. The former advocates realism, pure and simple, while the latter advocates realistic pragmatism. According to the Bhatta Mimamsaka, truth is its own criterion; it is self-evident or self-validating; it does not require any extraneous evidence for its validity; it is.its own light; it cannot be shown by any other light of evidence; but invalidity or falsity or knowledge cannot be known by itself; it can be known through the knowledge of the discrepancy of the knowledge with its object, and the knowledge of imperfections in its originating causes, e. g., sense - organs, etc. According to the Naiyayika, on the other hand, both truth and error can be proved only by fulfilled and unfulfilled activity respectively; both validity and invalidity of knowledge are not inherent characteristics of knowledge: they are the adventitious marks of knowledge borrowed from extraneous circumstances. TheAdvaita Vedantist View: According to Samkara Brahman alone is the ontological reality, and the other objects are superimposed on the eternal consciousness by nescience, and have only an empirical existence (vyavaharika satta) as distinguished from ontological existence (paramarthika satta). So the Advaita Vedantist distinguishes between empirical validity and ontological va li dity. The knowledge of one undifferentiated consciousness or Brahman has ontological validity, and the knowledge of empirical objects or the world of appearance (prapancha) has empirical validity. A knowledge is empirically valid if it represents the nature of its object and is not contradicted by any other valid cognition. The Advaita Vedantist does not necessarily exclude recollectipn (smriti) from valid knowledge. The above definition of valid knowledge iscommon to both apprehension (anubhuti) and recollection (smriti). A valid apprehension (anubhuti) is the knowledge of an object, which has not already been apprehended by a previous cognition, - -and which is, not contradicted by a subsequent valid knowledge. The Advaita Vedantist agrees with the Mimamsaka, that the validity of knowledge is its inherent character, and that the invalidity of knowledge is an adventitious mark of knowledge due to extraneous circumstances. The validity of knowledge arises from itself, and is known by itself. But invalidity of knowledge arises from extraneous circumstances, and is known through them. The Advaita Vedantist, however, differs from the Mimamsaka in the fact that he also appeals to the pragmatic criterion. He defines validity of knowledge as the character of a cognition of an object as it really is ; which is conducive to fruitful activity. Thus, the Advaita Vedantist advocates the doctrine of empirical realism as opposed to the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of ontological realism of a pragmatic type; it may be termed pragmatic empirical realism or empirical realistic pragmatism. And this doctrine is affiliated to the main Vedantist doctrine of absolute idealism, according to which, Brahma n, the absolute, or.the one eternal consciousness alone, is ultimately real. This absolute idealism of Samkara is opposed to the objective idealism of Ramanuja. 10

13 The Samkhya View : According to the Samkhya valid knowledge is the consciousness of the self, which is due to the reflection on the self, of the mental mode, which has, for its object, something which has not already been apprehended, and which is free from doubts and discrepancies. According to this view both validity and invalidity of knowledge are the inherent characteristics of know le dge; and they can be known by themselves. A cognition is either intrinsically valid or intrinsically inva li d. Its validity or invalidity is not due to extraneous circumstances. The Samkhya theory of knowledge too is realis tic. It is based on metaphysical dua lis m. The validity of knowledge consists in the correspondence of knowledge-forms with the object-forms. But how can knowledge copy or represent the reality? The Samkhya holds that the transparent unintelligent intellect (buddhi), in which the sattva is the predominant factor and the tamas is in the minimum is transformed into the form of an object which is conveyed to it through the medium of external sense-organs, the central sensory or the mind (manas), and the empiric al ego (ahamkara). and is intelligized by the transcendental self (purusa) which comes to have a knowledge of the object owing to the reflection' of the intelligized function of the intellect on itself. The Buddhist View: The Buddhist identifies pramana with prama. According to the Buddhist realist, a valid knowledge is a cognition, which is in harmony with its object. and this harmony between a cognition and its object is known by fruitful activity or the actual attainment of the object. Thus the Buddhist realist advocates realistic pragmatism. But the Buddhist differs from the Naiyayika in that only the validity of knowledge, according to him. is due to. and known by. fruitful activity. but that the invalidity of knowledge is inherent in itself, not being due to extraneous circumstances. According to the Buddhist subjective idealist also the validity of knowledge consists in the harmony of experience. Dr. B. N. Seal puts it thus: "The ultimate criterion of Truth is found, not in mere cognitive presentation, but in the correspondence between the cognitive and the practical 'activity of the self, which together are supposed to form the circuit of consciousness. That knowledge is valid which prompts an activity ending in fruition...truth is not self-evidence. not the agreement between ideas, nor the agreement of the idea with the reality beyond. if any, for th is cannot be attained direct, but the harmony of experience (samvada). which is implied when the volitional reaction. that is prompted by a cognition. and that completes the circuit of consciousness. meets with fruition. i.e., realizes its immediate end''. This doctrine of prama may be termed suhjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism as distinguished from realistic pragmatism. This distinction also applies to the realistic pragmatism of the Buddhist realist. the Jaina, and the Naiyayika, and the subjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism of the Buddhist subjective idealist. I A Review of the Theories The different theories of the test or truth or pramanya may be grouped under four heads : (1) The Samkhya holds that both the validity and invalidity of cognitions are inherent in themselves. (2) The Naiyayika holds that both of them are adventitious, owing their origin to other extraneous circumstances. (3) The Buddhist holds that cognitions are intrinsically invalid, and that they owe their validity to other extraneous circumstances. (4) The Mimamsaka and the Advaita Vedantist hold that cognitions are intrinsically valid, but that their invalidity is due to other extrinsic circumstances. The Samkltya Doctrine : Does the Samkhya mean that one and the same cognition is both: valid and invalid? Or does it mean that some cognitions are valid and others are invalid? The first view is selfcontradictory. I 11

14 The second view also is impossible. What determines the validity of some cognitions, and the invalidity of other cognitions? Both of them are of the nature of consciousness; and no other circumstance is admitted by the Samkhya to determine the validity of some cognitions and the invalidity of others. Take, for instance, the cognition of silver in a nacre. Is it valid or invalid? If it is cognized as valid, why does it not lead to the actual attainment of silver? If it is cognized as invalid. why does it induce the cognizing agent to exert himsel f to get the silver? Hence the Samkhya doctrine of validity or invalidity of knowledge cannot be maintained. Criticism of the Buddhist Doctrine: Jayanta Bhatta, a Naiyayika, refutes the Buddhist view in the following manner. It cannot be held that cognitions are inherently invalid, but that they derive their validity from extraneous circumstances. If cognitions were inherently invalid, they could not lead to exertion for the attainment of their objects. Moreover, the invalidity of a cognition depends, for its production, upon the defects of its causes, and it is recognised as such only when it is contradicted by another valid cognition. Thus the invalidity of a cognition depends, for its production, upon certain defects in its causes, and it depends, for its ascertainment, on the sublating cognition which contradicts it. So a cognition cannot be regarded as intrinsically invalid. It has been argued by some that the invalidity of a cognition is not due to the fact that it is produced by certain defects in its causes, but that it has no real object for its objective basis. But this argument is invalid. Many invalid cognitions. such as doubtful and illusory perceptions. have a reality for their objective basis. Hence. cognitions cannot, in themse lves. be. invalid. Criticism of the Naiyayika Doctrine: The Mimamsaka criticises the Nyaya view in the following manner. According to the Naiyayika validity and invalidity do not belong to cognitions by their very nature, but they are due to extraneous circumstances. By the validity of a cognition he means the agreement of a cognition with its object, or the manifestation by a cognition of the real nature of its object. The Miman1saka asks: ' Does the validity of a cognition depend upon extraneous circumstances. (I) for its own origination. (2) or for the production of its effect, (3) or for the determination of its validity? (I) On the first alternative, does the validity of a cogpition depend. for its origination, merely upon the essential nature of its causes, or upon some special virtues (guna) inherent in its causes? If the validity of a cognition is said to originate merely in the essential nature of its causes, then the Mimamsaka has no objection to this view. He himself admits that a valid cognition arises from the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, whereas an invalid cognition arises from its causes impaired by certain defects; otherwise there would be nothing to regulate the effectuation of valid and invalid cognitions. But this dependence of the validity of a cognition, upon the causes of the cognition does not, in any way, stand in the way of its sel[-validity (svatah praman ya). But. if it be arg ued, as the Naiyayika does. that the validity of a cognition not only depends upon the nature of its causes, but upon certain special virtues (guna) of its causes, then the Mimarhsaka objects to it. The so -called special virtues of the sense-organs and the like can never be known through any source of valid knowledge. The validity of perception depends merely upon the essential nature of the sense-organs, free from all taint of imperfection, but not upon any special virtues of the sense-organs. If there were three kinds of cognitions, viz., valid cognitions, invalid cognitions, and cognitions, which are neither valid nor invalid, then they would be accounted for by three kinds of causes. The valid cognitions would have for their origin certain special virtues (guna) in their causes; the invalid cognitioi1s would have for their origin certain defects (dosa) in their causes : and the epistemologically neutral cognitions would have for their origin merely the essential nature of their causes, which are neither endowed with special virtues nor tainted with any defects. 12