The latter, Leibnizian argument, is represented by Van Cleve as such:

Transcription

1 Refutations and Representations: Borges and Van Cleve on Time *** 0. Abstract In his essay A New Refutation of Time, Jorge Luis Borges attempts a reductio ad absurdum for a brand of idealism which he attributes to George Berkeley and David Hume, arguing that such an idealism cannot in principle maintain the reality of time. In Time, Idealism and The Identity of Indiscernibles, however, James Van Cleve presents objections which he thinks saves idealism from such a commitment. I will first (1.) outline his representation of and main objections to Borges argument for the unreality of time, then (2.) draw critical attention to its limitations in a hope to show that Van Cleve fails to provide convincing, or even relevant, counterarguments, for (3.) Borges project is more nuanced than how it has been represented. 1. Van Cleve s Representation & Objections Van Cleve identifies three axioms of time order which Borges is meant to target in order to deny time reality: that time, conceived serially, is (a) a single whole, (b) asymmetric ( if event e precedes f, then f does not precede e ) and irreflexive ( no event precedes itself ), and (c) transitive ( if e precedes f, and f precedes g, then e precedes g ). 1 He argues that Borges provides an argument from Berkeleyan idealism which is meant to refute (a), and an argument from Leibniz s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (henceforth PII), against (b); at least, against (b) and (c) holding together. The former argument is represented as follows: (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) For something to be is for it to be perceived. [esse-est-percipi] To be F is to be perceived as having property F, where F includes relational properties. [B1] No one perceives the successiveness of events (relational property), apart from within a single percept, such as those separated by significant spatio-temporal distance. Therefore, as there is no perceiving of connections between percepts, there is no unified series of percepts and (a) does not obtain. 2 [B2, B3] The latter, Leibnizian argument, is represented by Van Cleve as such: (L1) There can be perceptual episodes, e and e', which are temporally distanced but perfectly indiscernible. (L2) If e and e' are indiscernible, they are numerically identical. [PII] (L3) Therefore, e is (numerically) identical to e. [L1, L2] (L4) Therefore, e precedes itself and (b) does not obtain. 3 I will consider the objection Van Cleve presents (1.1.) from perceptual succession, which he believes is a fundamental objection to the Berkeleyan argument, followed by (1.2.) his objection from the incoherence of PII, and (1.3.) from the insufficiency of the Leibnizian argument Objection 1: Perceptual Succession Van Cleve believes that there are two ways wherein we may conceive of perceptual succession. Either as a singular percept containing the sequence e, f, represented as p(esf), or as two percepts in sequence, 1 James Van Cleve, Time, Identity, and The Identity of Indiscernibles, Philosophical Perspectives 16 (2002):379-93, p Ibid., p Ibid., p

2 the percept of e followed by the percept of f, represented as p(e)sp(f). That is, the perception of succession or the succession of perception p(esf) Van Cleve argues that Borges, in B2, is committed to the position that an idealist can only account for temporality in [ ] the perception of succession. This position, Van Cleve argues, may be taken to mean that no fact obtains unless it is perceived as obtaining, which he dubs super-idealism. 5 Accordingly, super-idealism (every fact is a posteriori) is meant to be problematic in leading to an infinite regress. For if someone were to perceive an object, that cannot be factual unless that were itself perceived (if intentionality can at all be externally perceived), and in turn, that has to be perceived by a subject in order to exist, ad infiniutm. Further, it undermines the Berkeleyan argument in two ways: undermining B3 and self-referential incoherence. In the case of the former, it seems that such propositions are not properly objects of perceptions themselves, and the latter, that esse-est-percipi would undermine itself as it is not itself an object of perception (perhaps in the same manner which p(e)sp(f) one might say that the Verification Principle undermines itself). Van Cleve argues that for idealism to be coherent, it must not extend esse-est-percipi to relational properties but only intrinsic ones. That is, while no sensible thing exists without it being perceived, this percept, as a monadic fact does not include relational properties. 7 For according to Berkeley, we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas, which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. 8 That is, Berkeley is committed to facts which exist apart from perception. From this, we may understand his later remark that time exists insofar as the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. 9 Thus, if esse-est-percipi is taken as super-idealism, the premises against (a) falls into incoherence. But if taken in its deflated sense, B2 is false. Either way, the Berkeleyan argument fails Obj 2: Incoherence of PII Van Cleve turns to the coherence of PII in order to object to the Leibnizian argument, proposing two conceptions of it: a weak, relational one, where if two objects or events are indiscernible in the sense that they share all their properties (relational as well as nonrelational), they are really one and the same ; or a strong, non-relational one, where if two objects or events are indiscernible in the sense that they share all their intrinsic properties, they are really one and the same. 10 Both conceptions in Borges argument, Van Cleve suggests, lead to incoherence Weak/Relational PII Van Cleve points out that if we were to include the Berkeleyan argument such that no relations obtain but perceived relations, and thereby obtain weak PII, there would be no basis on which we may say, e and e' are indiscernible as two objects, 11 for both objects would occupy, exhaustively, the same space- 6 4 Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p George Berkeley, Principle of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues, ed. Howard Robinson, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999, p Ibid., p Van Cleve, Time, p Ibid., p. 387.

3 time coordinates. One would then have to to discern their indiscernibility, 12 that there are even two and not one, and the utterance would be senseless. L1 therefore cannot hold. The incoherence of weak PII, further, allows Van Cleve to justify his decoupling of the Berkeleyan and Leibnizian arguments Strong/Non-Relational PII If, on the other hand, we consider the strong form, wherein two objects would be considered indiscernible on the basis of only intrinsic properties, our utterance that two objects are indiscernible would be made on the basis of its relational difference. This however, is untenable as it is perfectly conceivable that there should be two billiard balls, or two raindrops, or two elections that are perfectly alike in all their intrinsic properties. 13 Therefore, if we were to hold that these were numerically identical despite their relational differences, Van Cleve claims we would fall into absurdity. L2 is thusly false Obj 3: Non-Linear Time Van Cleve argues that even if we accept the Leibnizian conclusion, that there are events that precede themselves, this would not lead to a disintegration of time. 14 For the argument is only sufficient to deny a linear topology of time (see Diagram 1, below). If we were to consider closed time(see Diagram 2, below), we find that (b) is denied although there is no actual breakdown, e may precede itself nonthreateningly. Diagram 1: Linear Time Diagram 2: Closed Time e f g e 2. Response to Van Cleve Despite a couple of illuminating insights made by Van Cleve, the above objections presented are ultimately unsatisfactory, which also, as I will show later, is partly a result of misrepresenting Borges project. A central dissatisfaction is the exclusion of Borges appeal to Hume and his denial of the subject behind the perception of changes. 15 Given Borges admitted lack of complete fidelity to their texts, 16 the New Refutation is meant to be understood as an internal critique of the idealist tradition, showing that given Berkeley s denial of the object-behind-perception, and Hume s denial, it was only a g f 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., p Ibid. 15 Jorge Luis Borges, A New Refutation of Time, in Selected Non-Fictions, ed. Eliot Weinberger, New York: Penguin Books, 2000, p Ibid., p. 317.

4 matter of time, or rather logical progression, within this tradition, that time had to be denied and given the unpalatable implications of this (e.g. the denial of individual lives), such idealism is absurd Reply to Obj 1: On the Subject of Hume With Hume s denial of the subject, then, the super-idealism described by Van Cleve is not as untenable as he makes it out to be. For there need not be a perceiver-regress as a result of needing the perception of a-subject-perceiving-an-object there is simply no subject. All that would be present at hand would be the percept qua percept, as opposed to qua percept indexed to an ego. Van Cleve s insightful charge that such a position leads itself into self-referential incoherence, however, is more difficult to deny and will not be attempted here. But if the charge were to be accepted, Borges would no longer be operating within the idealist framework and, further, it suffices to show that the deflated alternative Van Cleve provides still does not save idealism from the conclusion of the unreality of time. For if it were take Hume into account, it collapses back into super-idealism. Van Cleve s alternative, p(e)sp(f), runs into a fundamental problem with Hume s denial of the self, for succession presupposes a background of persistence as an organising principle for sequence and connection. Otherwise, it would simply be the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of unconnected multiple percepts. Therefore, if there were to be a succession such as p(e)sp(f) without a persistent subject (and external world), then the succession of perceived objects cannot but be of a larger percept, giving us p(esf). This is supposedly what happens within the specious present whereto Borges refers. But as a miniseries it does not by itself imply the vast temporal sequence needed for time Reply to Obj 2: Upholding PII Van Cleve acutely observes that weak PII leads to the incoherence of L1, but this acumen does not seem to carry over to his arguments against strong PII. It does not seem likely, if at all possible, for two billiard balls or rain drops to be intrinsically similar down to subatomic levels. Yet even if we consider two electrons, which are intrinsically indistinguishable from each other, it is not a physical impossibility (one-electron universe), much less conceptual impossibility, that they are actually numerically identical. 17 Further, a single electron may be said to persist over time (undergo changes in relational properties) yet remain numerically identical. Van Cleve s mere assertion that such a position is absurd is simply unconvincing, if not question-begging Reply to Obj 3: The Relevance of Topology In considering Van Cleve s proposition that closed time embraces asymmetry and reflexivity but does not disintegrate time, we must now turn to consider a better understanding of Borges actual project. If we were to indeed accept the redefinition of time and exclude (b), we may indeed find that the Leibnizian argument fails its objective. I submit, however, that with a more faithful re-presentation of Borges project as a whole, the closed topology suggested by Van Cleve and the problem of weak PII becomes irrelevant. 3. Borges Philosophical Project On a closer reading, the second and third axioms of time order identified by Van Cleve are really only peripheral concerns of Borges. There are indeed two main strands of argumentation involved, but not as presented by Van Cleve in (1.). In order to begin to better understand Borges agenda, we may turn to his comparison of his thesis to Zeno s Paradox of the Arrow or Nagasena s chariot analogy (without evaluating them). 18 Zeno s strategy in the paradox is to argue that the parts of the moving arrow s 17 Richard Feynman, The Development of the Space-Time View of Quantum Electrodynamics, Nobelprize.org, Nobel Media AB 2013, date accessed: 9 Dec 2013 < 18 Borges, New Refutation, p. 317.

5 motion (instants wherein the arrow is at rest) do not sufficiently account for the motion as a whole. Therefore, assuming these parts are exhaustive, the moving arrow is motionless. 19 Similarly, Nagasena argued that King Milinda s use of the designation chariot is empty, for all [the] parts of it are not a chariot, nor is there anything outside them that is the chariot The Unreality of Time With this in mind, therefore, we can see that Borges strategy is to show that, within the idealist framework, time is not a combination of its parts, nor does it exist outside of them. That is, (i) the summation of atomised percepts does not sufficiently constitute time, and (ii) neither can time exist apart from them. These are the negations which Borges himself identifies as sufficient to deny time: (i) denying the succession of the terms in a series, that is, chronological determination of an event [ ] is alien and exterior to the event ; and (ii) denying the synchronism of terms in two series, that is, there is no external chronological determination which connects one miniseries (specious present) to another into a universal one. 21 Here, in fact, we may begin to observe some parallels between Borges strategy and J. M. E. McTaggart s in The Unreality of Time, if we take Borges atomised percepts as analogous to McTaggart s events. The problem wherewith Borges is concerned in (i), therefore, is the inability of a group of percepts to organise themselves by themselves sequentially. Similarly, for McTaggart the B-series, without its organisation from the A-series, is simply a C-series without directionality (what Borges calls succession). 22 And where McTaggart aims to show that the A-series is impossible, Borges aims in (ii) at negating any possibility of an external organising principle connecting multiple miniseries by synchronism. This may be best illustrated with Borges employ of the Butterfly Dream passage in the Qiwulun of the Zhuangzi. 23 Zhuangzi has (i) two self-sufficient percepts (as butterfly and Zhuangzi) whose contents do not at all imply the succession or precedence of each other (memory is irrelevant in a dream), and (ii) [w]ith space and self abolished, in a thorough-going idealism, we lack an external organising principle to link those dreaming moments to his waking moments and the feudal age of Chinese history. 24 Where, then, does PII fit? I submit that in (i) & (ii), Borges has already negated the reality of time simply through negating (a), where an organising principle for percepts is non-existent. But as a coup de grâce against the possibility of such an organising principle, he invokes PII in order to demolish any possibility of sequencing a temporal series based on the other axioms but even then, only hypothetically. Explicit mention of Leibniz s principle is not found in his revision of the earlier version (Part B is revised Part A), nor does it feature as prominently in his essay as Van Cleve misreads. Every reference to the repeatability of percepts is a postulate or work of fiction. That is, as Ned J. Davidson points out, they are a form of aesthetic persuasion, just as the essay s presentation of both Parts A & B is itself an attempt to recreate such a repetition in the reader. 25 So even if we were to accept Van Cleve s argument that weak PII poses a conceptual problem, or turn to closed time (which still requires sequencing), we have not refuted Borges central refutation. 19 Richard D. McKirahan and Patricia Curd, A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia, Second Edition, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011, DK 29A T. W. Rhys Davids trans.,the Questions of King Milinda, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1890, p Borges, New Refutation, p J. M. E. McTaggart, The Unreality of Time, Mind 17 (1908):457-74, p Brook Ziporyn trans., Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009, p Borges, New Refutation, p Ned J. Davidson, Aesthetic Persuasion in A New Refutation of Time, Latin American Literary Review 7 (1979):1-4, p. 3.

6 3.2. Unfortunately Real If we take Borges brief acknowledgment of Henri Bergson seriously, however, we may perhaps understand Borges as raising the problem of deriving flow, or rather durée, through mere series. That is, for atomised perceptions/events, even if they were somehow organised in an order, do not intrinsically imply temporality because they lack durée. Time properly understood, as durée, wherein successive moments [ ] interpenetrate each other, 26 can only be grasped through intuition in ourselves by ourselves, not the atemporal logic of an atomistic explanatory framework which spatialises time and thereby ignores it altogether. 27 Recalling that the essay is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum of an obsolete system, 28 and given Borges poetic refutation of his own logical refutation of time in his concluding paragraph, we might justifiably read the New Refutation as a Bergsonian rejection of a discrete account of reality, if at least one only constituted by percepts. That is, in the words of William James: Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows, and surrounds it Consolatio Philosophiae Greater detail and the success of Borges re-presented project cannot be adequately examined within the confines of this essay (and other issues such as the extent to which it bears the influence of Bergsonism). But we must at least observe that our dizzying experience, intellectual or aesthetic, of Borges erudition, with refutations upon refutations, leaves us in sheer wonder. And wonder, according to the Socratics, is not a bad state to be in for lovers of wisdom but perhaps I am simply longing for secret consolations against the fiery tiger that is Borges. 26 Eva Brann, What, Then, Is Time?, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, p Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme, New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1912, p Borges, New Refutation, p William James, A Pluralistic Universe, Rockville, Maryland: Arc Manor, 2012, p. 86.

7 Bibliography Berkeley, George 1999: Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bergson, Henri 1912: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme, New York: The Knickerbocker Press. Borges, Jorge Luis 2002: A New Refutation of Time, in Selected Non-Fictions, ed. Eliot Weinberger, London: Penguin Books, pp Brann, Eva 2001: What, Then, Is Time?, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Davidson, Ned J. 1979: Aesthetic Persuasion in A New Refutation of Time, Latin American Literary Review 7:1-4. Feynman, Richard 2013: The Development of the Space-Time View of Quantum Electrodynamics, Nobelprize.org, Nobel Media AB 2013, date accessed: 9 Dec 2013 < nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1965/feynman-lecture.html>. James, William 2008: A Pluralistic Universe, Rockville, Maryland: Arc Manor. Hume, David 1888: A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: The Clarendon Press. McKirahan, Richard D. and Curd, Patricia 2011: A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia, Second Edition, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. McTaggart, J. M. E. 1908: The Unreality of Time, Mind 17: Turetzky, Philip 1998: Time, London: Routledge. Rhys Davids, T. W., trans. 1890: The Questions of King Milinda, Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Van Cleve, James 2002: Time Idealism and The Identity of Indiscernibles, Philosophical Perspectives 16: Ziporyn, Brook, trans. 2009: Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.