Joseph Kahiga Kiruki, Moi University Jason T. Eberl, IUPUI

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1 Joseph Kahiga Kiruki, Moi University Jason T. Eberl, IUPUI

2 Communalistic Predominant among African communities Confined to specific communities bounded by Tribe Culture Race Gender Religion Class

3 Transcendentalist Predominant among Western traditions Individual personal identity transcends aforementioned boundaries Persons have infinite moral value literally, without boundaries Persons as Self-conscious Rational Autonomous

4 In the Gikuyu language, human being is expressed by the term mundu Mu = being undu = reason or rationality Hence, a human being is a being with reason Aristotle: human beings are rational animals

5 From the African perspective, personhood may be diminished or lost in two ways: Lessening or loss of connection with other diverse beings Kiswahili: Mtu duni Being devoid of reason Gikuyu: kindu From the western perspective, personhood is an all or nothing affair Hence, it cannot be diminished by lack of interrelations with other beings or diminishment of rationality. Although, complete loss of reason may result in loss of personhood.

6 Performance theorists, including Peter Singer, Michael Tooley, and Mary Anne Warren, argue that a human being is a person only if they actively instantiate capacities such as: Self-consciousness Rationality Autonomous volition Ability to communicate using language

7 Other theorists, such as John Finnis, John Kavanaugh, Patrick Lee, and Eric Olson, argue that a human being is essentially a living animal of the species Homo sapiens. For Kavanaugh, Lee, and Finnis, all living human animals count as persons due to their intrinsic potentiality for self-conscious rational thought and autonomous volition, even if one cannot yet, or can no longer, actualize that potentiality. For Olson, personhood is a phase of a living human animal s existence. You and I are essentially living human animals, but not essentially persons.

8 From both African and western perspectives, human consciousness arguably transcends the limitations of matter. From the African perspective, consciousness attains transcendence through human communion. Self-consciousness is achieved through recognition within a specific community Lack of recognition of others results in discrimination and diminishment of personhood

9 From the western perspective, consciousness is argued to be an inherently transcendent property of persons. Jackson s knowledge argument Chalmers s zombie argument property dualism Swinburne s disembodiment argument substance dualism Aquinas: The intrinsic ontological nature of a person as a self-conscious rational and autonomous being metaphysically precedes the expression of this nature in extrinsic relationships. This leads to the moral obligation to recognize the presence of consciousness, and other essential qualities of persons, in all human beings, including those outside of one s specific community.

10 African communalistic concept of personhood: I am, because we are, and since we are, therefore I am. An individual person does not and cannot exist alone, only corporately. An individual s existence is owed to past generations, as well as contemporaries. Self-communication is essential to an individual person s existence as they are involved in a dynamic give-and-take relationship with their community.

11 Western solipsistic concept of personhood: I think, therefore I am (Descartes) An individual person s existence as a self-conscious rational and autonomous being is not essentially dependent upon there being any other persons.

12 Yet, according to Aristotle, human beings are inherent social animals. There is an inherently relational dimension to human personhood, as noted also by Aquinas, even if one s bare existence is not dependent on that of others. Alasdair MacIntyre: Human beings are dependent rational animals, which entails complementary virtues of acknowledged dependence and acknowledged responsibility. Hence, there can be both an I that is metaphysically unique, and a Thou to whom the I naturally gravitates.

13 Distinction between ontological and moral concepts of personhood: Person as being Person as agent Persons as agents, premised upon their basic existence as self-conscious and rational beings, actualize their capacity for autonomous volition freedom. This entails moral responsibility for one s freely willed actions. The moral self is shaped over time by one s freely willed interior and exterior actions. The ultimate goal of the moral self is to enter into meaningful and quality relationships with the other in community.

14 To be is to be substance-in-relation. Invokes the metaphysically prior bare existence of an individual substance of a rational nature (Boethius) influential in western ontology, as well as the inherently communal dimension of personhood common to African ontology. Self-realization beyond bare existence requires mutual recognition within an interconnected web of I-Thou relationships (Buber). Such self-realization allows for the construction of a person s authentic moral self (Taylor) and the exercise of true freedom within, and not in isolation from, one s community.

15 Buber, Martin (1970), I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann. Simon & Schuster. Chalmers, David J. (1996), The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. Clarke, W. Norris (2008), Person and Being: The Aquinas lecture, Marquette University Press. Eberl, Jason T. (2004), Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp Eberl, Jason T. (2006), Thomistic Principles and Bioethics. Routledge. Eberl, Jason T. (2013), Persons with Potential in Potentiality: Metaphysical and Bioethical Dimensions, ed. John P. Lizza. Johns Hopkins University Press. Kahiga, J. Kiruki (1997), Insights Into African Philosophy. Gicama Insight Publications. Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2010), Education for Transformation AFER Reconciliation Through Justice and Peace-3, Vol. 51, No. 4 & Vol. 52, No. 1, Gaba Publications, pp Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2011), The Challenges of Political Authority and Governance in Africa in Thoughts in the Humanities, ed. R. A. Akanmidu, Keffi, pp Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2011), Philosophical Fundamentals for Sustainable Development in Kenya Current Research Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2012), Liberation of The African Mind in Africa is not Destined to Die, ed. Ambrose John Bwangatto, Pauline Publications Africa, pp Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2012), Making a Difference to Patients: Perspectives of Health Care Ethics Current Research Journal of Social Sciences Vol, 4, No. 2, pp Kavanaugh, John F. (2001), Who Count as Persons? Human Identity and the Ethics of Killing. Georgetown University Press.

Kenyatta, Jomo (2004), Facing Mount Kenya. Kenway Publications. Kirkpatrick, G. Frank (1986), Community: A Trinity of Models. Georgetown University Press. Lee, Patrick and Robert P.

16 Kenyatta, Jomo (2004), Facing Mount Kenya. Kenway Publications. Kirkpatrick, G. Frank (1986), Community: A Trinity of Models. Georgetown University Press. Lee, Patrick and Robert P. George (2008), Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics. Cambridge University Press. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1999), Dependent Rational Animals. Open Court Press. Mbiti, S. John (1969), African Religions & Philosophy. East African Educational Publishers. Olson, Eric T. (1997), The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. Oxford University Press. Singer, Peter (1994), Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. St. Martin s Griffin. Swinburne, Richard (1997), The Evolution of the Souls, rev. ed. Oxford University Press. Taylor, Charles (1991), The Ethics of Authenticity. Harvard University Press. Taylor, Charles (1989), The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Harvard University Press. Tempels, Placide (1969), Bantu Philosophy. Presence Africaine. Tooley, Michael (1983), Abortion and Infanticide. Oxford University Press. Warren, Mary Anne (1997), Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford University Press.

17 What implications do you see of these differing views of personhood for the ethical conduct of research, particularly when western researchers are working within the African context? How might the African concept of personhood inform the manner in which, e.g., informed consent is obtained from potential research participants, or attendant risks and benefits are evaluated? Is there a danger that a communal concept of personhood may lead to the sublimation of individual rights in favor of the community s interests? If so, how could this danger be avoided in the research context? Does a communal concept of personhood entail ethical obligations on the part of individuals to voluntarily agree to participate in research that may benefit their community, even if doing so involves some individual risk? To what extent should researchers attempt to embed themselves within the communities in which they are conducting research to ameliorate their being perceived as other or potentially viewing research participants as such?

Reflections on the Ontological Status

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXV, No. 2, September 2002 Reflections on the Ontological Status of Persons GARY S. ROSENKRANTZ University of North Carolina at Greensboro Lynne Rudder Baker