Habermas s Discourse Ethics in Educational Practice

Transcription

1 DRAFT VERSION SIG 13 Symposium 2008 Habermas s Discourse Ethics in Educational Practice Lena Fritzén Växjö University SWEDEN Lena.Fritzen@vxu.se Anna Tapola University of Kalmar SWEDEN Anna.Tapola@hik.se In this paper we explore whether Habermas s discourse ethics can be an applicable theoretical framework in moral and democratic education within teacher training. First we introduce some key concepts lifeworld and system, different forms of rationalities, and the three spheres that comprise various areas of knowledge. By using these concepts, we scrutiny and assess if, why and how Habermas s theory can be useful. In order to shed light on the possible applicability, we also use excerpts from ten authentic texts where preservice teachers argue to support their position statements concerning an intricate but fictitious dilemma. We have identified two different modes where Habermas s discourse ethics can constitute potential analytical tools in moral and democratic education. The two modes are called The Preparatory Approach and The Retrospective Approach are further clarified in the paper. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether Habermas s discourse ethics can be an appropriate theoretical framework for moral and democratic education. The educational practice concerns preservice teachers and their positions on issues related to health and modern genetics, democratic versus totalitarian systems, and their future teaching practices. In the past few decades, the moral and democratic aspects of subject matter knowledge have become increasingly important in discussions within the schools and teacher education. Due to changes in the way the learning process is viewed, moral and democratic issues are also being seen in a new light (Fritzell, 2006). The previous firmly established philosophy of consciousness has had to give way to a more communicative way of viewing meaning-making (Habermas, 2001). In our part of the world, contemporary researchers in educational science relatively unanimously support educational practices whose starting points are based on the conceptions of the learners. These involve a greater interest in teaching practices that create greater space for dialogues, and that lead to deeper understanding and changes in action patterns (Apple, 2003; Fritzell, 2006; Giroux, 2001). However, it is not only a different view of learning that has caused moral issues to be seen in a new light. Our post-traditional, pluralistic and post-secular society has for the most part lost its traditional capacity to covey moral meaning. Overarching and common societal values such as unified religious values do not exist in today s society in the same way they used to in our 1

2 part of the world. Individuals must to an increasing extent find, articulate, and construe moral standpoints on their own (Sartre, 1943). From a moral-philosophic point of view, this places particular demands on social community (Taylor, 1989, 1991). The schools and teacher education have, in our view, a particular responsibility to contribute to developing such a social and societal sense of community. However, in the following we limit our discussion to teacher education. An application of parts of Habermas s discourse ethics is the focus of this paper. The discourse ethics is, however, closely related to Habermas s Theory of Communicative Action (1984), which we aim to tone down somewhat within the framework of this paper. This is rather difficult, however, because both concepts in addition to being quite extensive are also intimately linked. Regarding discourse ethics it is important to point out that Habermas discusses this from a discursive perspective. Moreover, he refers to a broad societal context without specifically mentioning schools and education. However, our intention is to explore whether Habermas s discourse ethics can be an applicable theoretical framework in moral and democratic education. To put Habermas s discourse ethics into concrete form, we use authentic examples that consist of the position statements expressed by preservice teachers. They wrote the texts in the concluding phase of a dilemma exercise. However, we would like to point out that the excerpts are just examples, and they shall not be viewed as a full analysis. We will return to the dilemma exercise and written position statements below. In the following, we begin by placing pedagogical practice at the tension-filled intersection of system and lifeworld. The next section is allocated for a brief introduction of the objective, social and subjective spheres that are imperative in Habermas s theory. After this, we present examples from teacher education in an attempt to show some possible implications of Habermas s discourse ethics for pedagogical practice. Finally, we will also discuss if, why and how the theory can be applied in educational settings. Pedagogical Practice, System, and Lifeworld Pedagogical practice, system and lifeworld are three central concepts needed to understand Habermas s discourse ethics. Pedagogical practice is situated in the tension-filled intersection between system and lifeworld (Habermas, 1987; Fritzén, 1998). The two key concepts system and lifeworld describe two different aspects of a societal phenomenon, for example teacher education. In this way lifeworld and system represent to dissimilar modes that we can choose between to approach and view the same object. One can either prefer to highlight system aspects of the teacher training, or one can decide to lift forward the lifeworld aspects. Taken as a whole, lifeworld and system are about relationships, cooperation, conflicts, conflict management, forces and counter-forces. In short, it is about the tension between intersubjective processes (lifeworld) on the one hand, and efficiency, power and the exercise of power (system) on the other. By practice, we refer to a social context that highlights the relationship between reflection and action (Johannessen, 1991). Practice emphasises that individuals actions are dependent on society; that contexts are vital for meaning-making; that meaning-making is of a relational nature (Fritzén, 1998). Pedagogical practice, however, refers to a social context in which the participants in our case teacher educators and preservice teachers develop facts, norms of action, and social capabilities. When teacher educators meet preservice teachers in pedagogical practice, and when they communicate content that is relevant for the preservice teachers, the participants lifeworld form the basis for communication. The lifeworld (Lebenswelt) concept has a long tradition within continental European philosophy. However, in this context we lean towards Habermas s use of the concept. The lifeworld is the background against which communication between participants occurs. It creates the foundation for people s orientation in their surroundings. The logic of the lifeworld involves making meaning in and about the world. For people, this means situating one s history, one s culture, and one s life circumstances in a context that becomes relevant and meaningful. And because each individual has more-or-less shifting life circumstances, this means that people need to create meaning together in 2

3 groups. Thus, meaning-making is an intersubjective process. This means that communication is the basis for the intersubjectivity of the lifeworld. This communication needs to be open, reciprocal, and involve changing perspectives. The latter is particularly important because meaning-making aims to create meaning and deeper understanding for and about people and their shifting life circumstances. The system, on the other hand, follows an entirely different logic. This logic is characterised by the system s requirements for efficiency and strategic action. It involves, for example, the utilization of resources, control and discipline of citizens, and how to appropriately approach this in order to carry out this strategy. In this case it is justified to ask questions such as these: How can economical and human resources be optimally utilized? How can the efforts of each student be checked? What type of assessment should be used to determine preservice teachers competence? How can students be tested as efficiently and effectively as possible so that they can complete their educations without excessively consuming resources? The question is, who are doing the utilizing, checking, determining, and testing in the examples listed above. Or in other words: Who legitimises the system s logic and its effects? This is where the lifeworld comes in. To gain legitimacy for its efforts and become more efficient, the system depends on the loyalty of the lifeworld. Even though the logic of the system and the logic of the lifeworld are incompatible in one sense, together they create an undeniable dialectic whole (Habermas, 1987). The system is dependent on the lifeworld in terms of loyalty and legitimacy, while the lifeworld is dependent on the system in terms of efficiency. An example of this interdependence is the design of teacher education: it cannot stand independent of preservice teachers and teacher educators lifeworld. The design of teacher education needs to be given legitimacy by these people. At the same time, in educational contexts it would be naïve to ignore the system s requirements that the participants attain certain established goals during their education. However, Habermas cautions against the system s tendency to, by virtue of its efficiency, overstep the boundaries of its legitimacy. This involves the system s colonisation of the lifeworld, colonisation that threatens to limit or eradicate people s autonomy, their emancipation, and their capacity as meaning-making subjects. Areas that are particularly sensitive to the colonisation of the system are for example, health care, elder care, and the schools. Thus, Habermas advocates that both of these areas should remain free from biased systemic actions. Our starting point is that pedagogical practice is situated in the tension-filled intersection of the system s demands for efficiency and individuals need for meaning-making in the lifeworld (Habermas, 1987; Fritzén, 1998). In our understanding, it is this dialectic that constitute the centre of Habermas s discourse ethics. The Objective, Social, and Subjective Spheres Habermas presents three spheres that are vital for our construal of the world. In our understanding, Habermas mainly refers to the three spheres when it comes to validity claims within the framework of The Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas, 1984). However, we wish to expand on the three spheres to be able to analyse the arguments that the preservice teachers lean towards in their position statements. However, before continuing this reasoning we present a brief description of each sphere. The objective sphere comprises the body of knowledge that rests on some form of objectivity. It involves arguments that are supported by tested, accepted, and established scientific findings. It is thus knowledge that we have reason to treat as indisputable truths for the time being. However, these truths are not assumed to hold for all eternity. Old truths will be subjected to new scientific enquiry. Eventually, new and just as well-tested, accepted and established scientific findings will replace the old truths in light of compelling new evidence. 3

4 The cycle we have sketched above deals with normal science, the role of scientific anomalies, scientific revolutions, and paradigm shifts. All of this has been thoroughly described by Kuhn (1963). Taken as a whole, in our view the objective sphere comprises what Kuhn calls normal science. Objectivity in this context involves the truth at this moment. The social sphere includes our accepted norms of action, cultural conventions, and our general ideas about how we should treat one another. The social sphere is thus characterised by relational factors. That is, in some sense we must try to agree to a certain extent within the social sphere. (Please, do not confuse this with the view that we must reach consensus in every detail. Instead, we do acknowledge a sundry of positions within the social sphere. However, we need to agree on certain basic ideas, for example how to carry out negotiations.) This requires various degrees of negotiation, which on the other hand, requires communication. This means that arguments that highlight the ability to communicate with others to create meaning and deeper understanding originate in the social sphere. The social sphere includes regulative strivings. It is about finding arguments and knowledge claims that include rightness. Rightness in this sense means intersubjetive agreements that include soundness of moral principles, or appropriateness, or suitability. However, what is considered be rightness in relation to an argument or knowledge claim, is hence an outcome from intersubjective dialogues. The subjective sphere comprises knowledge and arguments that are more personal. Thus, our subjective spheres are often vastly different. The subjective sphere is largely about identity, one s sense of self, and one s own development. This means that the subjective sphere includes selfrepresentation, its basic attitude is expressive, and within the subjective sphere we express our arguments and knowledge claims that we consider being truthful. Thus, truthfulness is the key characteristic of valid claims within the subjective sphere. Therefore it is significant that the subject in our case preservice teachers willingly expresses her sincere and truthful stance in the text examples that we will return to below. The three spheres and their interaction are of great importance for validity claims within the framework of communicative action. This implies that the validity claims that Habermas requires for communicative action also apply to what he calls moral rationality within his discourse ethics (see below). However, in this paper we limit our argument to discussing Habermas s discourse ethics. Within this framework we can speak of various forms of rationality, and this is where the objective, social and subjective spheres come in. That is to say, we can use these three spheres to determine which type of rationality forms the basis of the authentic examples presented below. Additionally, the composition of the arguments with respect to the proportions of the three spheres that may be present is important for determining how well developed moral and democratic aspects may be, and how well the arguments support the double assignment 1 (see also Habermas, 1984, p. 329). However, before we move on to discourse ethics and forms of rationality, we shall briefly present the background of the authentic examples. The Authentic Examples To clarify our understanding of Habermas s discourse ethics in the context of pedagogical practice, we present selected excerpts from the texts written by the Swedish preservice teachers. The excerpts used here were taken from ten different texts, chosen from a total of more than 250 written position statements. The texts consist of descriptions of preservice teachers own standpoints, and were written in the final phase of a compulsory exercise within the teacher education programme. The compulsory exercise dealt with a fictitious dilemma in which the preservice teachers were 1 The double assignment is often referred to in the Swedish educational system and teacher education. The school s double assignment involves two parts: to communicate knowledge about subject matter and to contribute to the democratic upbringing of the learners. For further clarification see Tapola and Fritzén (2008). 4

5 instructed to imagine themselves working at a particular agricultural college 2. It also included theoretical role plays in which each of the preservice teachers had to reach a decision about whether or not their own (fictitious) agricultural college would participate in a cooperative international project with a similar school in an Asian country. The exercise also included a number of intricate questions that highlighted various sensitive or delicate issues. Topics included democratic versus totalitarian states; the potential and limitations of gene techniques; the potential for working with the schools double assignment and core values; solidarity, aspects of post colonialism and so forth. For an in-depth background and discussion of the dilemma exercise, see Integrative Approach to Moral and Democratic Education (Tapola & Fritzén, 2008). In this parallel article we present results of our analysis of data originating from the same group of preservice teachers. However, the data in the parallel study is not identical to the authentic examples that we discuss in this paper. Still, both data categories derive from the same group of preservice teachers who completed the compulsory exercise. However, as yet we have not completed a full-scale analysis of the preservice teachers position statements. Instead, we use them as authentic examples of how preservice teachers can argue when they are obliged to take a stance on complex issues. We hope that the authentic examples will help readers to understand the conceptual components that are a part of Habermas s discourse ethics. Habermas s Discourse Ethics People continually face various problems and choices that must be dealt with in practice. This involves what Habermas calls practical reason (practische Vernuft), and it is based on various forms of rationality. It is the practical reason and the forms of rationality we choose with its inherent reasons that determine the direction of our moral actions (Habermas, 1993). In the exercise, when the preservice teachers were supposed to reach a decision about whether or not to expand their college s cooperation with the fictitious Asian agricultural college, they were faced with a dilemma that required them to take practical standpoints. Thus, the basic questions of practical reason include the following: How should we act? What should we do? Why should we act in a particular way? Rationality is an important concept in Habermas s discourse ethics. Habermas differentiates between three forms of rationality for practical reason: pragmatic rationality, ethical rationality, and moral rationality (Habermas, 1993). Historically these forms have been considered as separate entities within philosophy: utilitarianism, Aristotelianism, and Kantianism. However, in Habermas s view these three forms of rationality are complementary. This implies a dialectic relationship among them. Nothing is solely practical, ethical, or moral. Our choice of action depends upon the situation. In any specific situation we can choose to complement one form of rationality with another. From a pedagogical perspective it is significant to discuss the extent to which people can learn to choose motivations and rationality forms for their actions. Pragmatic Rationality Pragmatic rationality is characterised by a focus on benefits. It is not about which ends are to be reached, but about the means that are to be used to reach them. Pragmatic rationality is expressed in various ways in the preservice teachers arguments for and against cooperation with the fictitious Asian agricultural college. One of the preservice teachers expressed the benefit aspects in the following way: 2 In Sweden there are more than 50 agricultural colleges that provide education at upper secondary school level. This means these colleges are part the non-compulsory school system, but not part of higher education. All agricultural colleges offer The Natural Resource Use Programme, which may attract pupils who are interested in agriculture, forestry, hunting and wildlife, environment, animal care, gardening, and so forth. 5

6 The advantages for the Swedish agricultural college are many, not least for its pupils. A cooperation would give them good opportunities to develop their democratic viewpoints, and they would learn about how agriculture works in other countries. I don t think that cooperating with an undemocratic country would be bad publicity for the Swedish college [...] The Swedish college could use this to create some kind of democracy project. The internationalisation created by the cooperation also creates opportunities for language learning. If pupils have contact with the Asian college via the Internet and in real life, they will be forced to use expressions that are advanced but that still belong within their own field, so to say. And as we all know, language skills are extremely important for working abroad. (Student 4) In this preservice teacher s view, the purpose is to accomplish a competitive agricultural college, which strengthens its position through international cooperation. Because the pupils would be given the opportunity to observe an undemocratic college, they would presumably gain a better understanding of the value of their own democracy. Additionally, having to communicate with the Asian pupils would presumably help the Swedish pupils to develop their language skills more efficiently. Two of the spheres seem to be represented in the excerpt above. By stating a cooperation would give them good opportunities to develop their democratic viewpoints, student 4 implicitly relates to the social sphere. It appears as if this preservice teacher at least tries to indicate that intersubjective dialogues with others could lead to some sort of rightness concerning democratic viewpoints. However, this is a logical pitfall. Since the pronoun their in the excerpt exclusively refers to pupils at the Swedish college, the proposed intersubjectivity does not include any Asians. So if student 4 is referring to the social sphere, that sphere is restricted to a very small group of people. On the other hand, the same student is very much clearer in expressing his or her own stance. This is related to the subjective sphere. By stating I don t think that cooperating with an undemocratic country would be bad publicity for the Swedish college the preservice teacher expresses truthfulness in some sense, and there is no doubt about who is expressing the position in the quote. However, the objective sphere is not represented in the excerpt above. We return to this issue below. One of the preservice teachers who decided to forgo the cooperation with the Asian agricultural college listed economic reasons: It would be a long project and would cost a lot of money to finance. There isn t any certainty either that it would cure any diseases. In 20 years or so perhaps all diseases will be eliminated because people have found another method or vaccine to cure them with. In that case, all the money that had been invested would have been a total waste. (Student 2) A third preservice teacher found the venture to be too risky. This future teacher assessed the costs and benefits and found that the losses would be greater than the gains, and decided therefore to abstain from the project. This cooperative project seems too risky given that the mass media is controlled by the military and it is also enormous and costly. Another negative factor is that the people who have been offered the project by the biotech company 3 are oppressed and in a dependent position. (Student 9) 3 The written dilemma also included a fictitious international biotech company that offered the Asian agricultural college to cultivate genetically modified crops. For example, this means the modified citrus fruits were supposed to contain a protein that would function as oral vaccine. 6

7 What kind of argument is involved in [t]his cooperative project seems too risky given that the mass media is controlled by the military? In our understanding, what is considered to be risky or not in this context, is not related to the objective sphere. Rather, we assess that this statements is either related to the social or the subjective spheres. On the other hand, this preservice teacher does not make clear who is the actor. Obviously, it is neither (explicitly) the student himself or herself, but the statement is nor (explicitly) a result from intersubjective negotiations. Instead, this is an example about how an author can choose to grammatically hide who is doing what in the sentence. In our view, this is a fairly common phenomenon, and we return to this in the Discussion. Arguments that revolve around personal gain, economic factors, or personal risks involve strategic attitudes and thus belong to the logic of the system. The starting point is that there is an asymmetric relation to the party with whom one is supposed to cooperate. The preservice teachers who wrote the standpoints above never asked for communication on equal terms with the Asian pupils and teachers. For example, it was not a question of creating understanding between pupils. Instead it was about using the other party as a means to reach one s own personal objectives. These personal objectives included creating a more attractive agricultural college, improving one s own language skills, or upholding one s own security level. For students 4 and 9 it was strategically correct to refrain from cooperation with the Asian college. The system-focused logic is clear within this pragmatic rationality. Actions with this motivation become instrumental and strategic in accordance with system-focused logic. In pedagogical practice this means that everyone, or at least one s own group, chooses the way they find most suited to the purpose at hand. Ethical Rationality Ethical rationality focuses on the goal itself. Doing good means acting in a manner that allows one s own goals or the goals of one s group to be achieved. So far we have not found any clear signs of ethical rationality in the preservice teachers statements. One reason for this could be that the preservice teachers believed that the divide between the two colleges common value systems would be too great. For some of the preservice teachers, their own common value systems internationalisation, sustainable development, democracy are so superior that they decided to refrain from cooperating with the Asian college. However, there are examples of arguments that are tangent to ethical rationality. I don t think that we should enter into the cooperation that the Asian college wants to have with us. My main reason for this is that our agricultural college in Sweden has democracy and sustainable development as a guiding principle throughout our entire education. For this reason we cannot cooperate with a military dictatorship that oppresses human rights and only considers what is best for the regime. (Student 6) Student 6 uses arguments based on the values that have been selected for development and improvement in Swedish schools. In some way, it seems as if student 6 thinks that these values are possible to develop in isolation from the surrounding world. This preservice teacher leans heavily on the subjective sphere. For example, in the first sentence ( I don t think that we should enter into the cooperation that the Asian college wants to have with us. ) we assess that the student expresses truthfulness, and there is no doubt who is holding the statement in question. In the college we work with internationalisation, and of course we want to work together with other countries. But it has to be with a country that has the same kind of democracy that we have. (Student 7) The excerpt above is interesting in several ways. At first sight, this preservice teacher appears to acknowledge that some sort of intersubjective dialogues is needed. Consequently, such stance 7

8 is related to the social sphere. On the other hand, this student seems to exclude others that hold different democratic views than we do, from taking part of the dialogues. It is like stating the others must agree with us, if we are going to cooperate with them. In our interpretation, such standpoints are typical in ethical rationality. This means the student is referring to something that we would call an imaginary social sphere. Still for student 7, international cooperation is meaningful, but it should be limited to a narrow circle of like-minded parties. Even the next preservice teachers highlights the differences between the European and the Asian agricultural colleges: [Our interest in] sustainable development and democracy, in my opinion, completely speaks against this cooperative project. The two colleges are vastly different, given our stamp of democracy and the Asian dictatorship. Moreover, the Asian college doesn t place any emphasis on sustainable development. (Student 10) Student 10 is abundantly clear. The implication of this excerpt is that sustainability and democracy are given meaning and develop by themselves. We would rather stress it is people for example pupils and teachers who give the concepts meaning by developing the meaning-making of the concepts through intersubjective dialogues. But student 10 does not appear to realise this. Instead, the preservice teacher pits his or her own democracy and the Asian dictatorship against each other in terms of right and wrong. Democracy and dictatorship become a dualism that is impossible to transcend. The statements of students 6, 7 and 10 suggest a strong feeling of togetherness. If they had been convinced that the Asian agricultural college shared their values, a cooperation might have been seen in a different light. Others, who supported the idea of entering into cooperation with the Asian college, wanted to help the Asians to develop the common value system that they are part of themselves. As a democracy we have greater opportunities to choose from, and can thus influence and help a country like Asia [sic]. [...] As a fellow human being I would like to see countries with better conditions help us if the opportunity arises. After all, this is about the children in the country. The children are their future, just as our own children and young people stand for our own future. That is why I think that they should have the same environmentally ethical status as we have. The people in the country have definitely not chosen to live in a dictatorship like the one they have now. (Student 3) Student 3 expresses a degree of symmetry with regard to communication with the Asian pupils in terms of them being fellow human beings. However, student 3 s choice of verb help points to a more asymmetric attitude. Helping someone develop a common value system involves power relationships in which those who help are superior to those who are helped. Student 8 uses the verb support instead of help. However, even support points to a certain asymmetry in this case. It can be understood to imply that one party is weaker than the other and therefore needs support: What is important if the cooperation is to work is that the college makes demands, and that Sweden should support the college in its cooperation with Asia. (Student 8) For a school with a clearly expressed value system, which is true for the Swedish school system, ethical rationality becomes a tool for strengthening its sense of community. Within the educational framework there should be good conditions for equal communication that can strengthen democracy in the own group. However, based on ethical rationality, there are no demands to reach beyond the schools common value system. In pedagogical practice where ethical rationality 8

9 is dominant, moral issues must be handled based on the interests of one s own group and local community. So far, we have not found any arguments in any of the ten text examples that are thoroughly grounded in the objective sphere. That means none of the preservice students refers explicitly to what we would call biological normal science. This is a remarkable shortcoming because it effects the truth validity in the arguments. However, in almost all text examples there are some weak tendencies toward arguments grounded in the objective sphere. For example, some of the students wrote that inoculation might hinder infectious diseases to break out. Such an argument is certainly true and according to normal science, but it is hardly a well-developed and thorough argument, i.e. the argument rather rest on common everyday knowledge. The question is whether the preservice teachers base their statements on scientific fact, or if they trust more or less irrational emotional attitudes to make up an enough solid grounding for their decisions? We will return to this issue below. Moral Rationality Similar to ethical rationality, moral rationality also focuses on goals. However, there is a clear difference between ethical and moral rationality. While ethical rationality involves those who share my values, moral rationality involves interacting with those with whom I do not share values. Moral rationality involves the logic of the lifeworld. Thus, moral rationality is grounded in what Habermas calls communicative action (Habermas, 1984). It is when people meet on equal terms in a symmetrical relationship that they can agree on which practical actions are the right ones. Habermas makes great demands on intersubjective discussions. For a discussion to be valid, its arguments must be well grounded. First of all, arguments must have an objective basis. This is about truth in the objective sphere. Related to our examples, this means that in the dilemma exercise the preservice teachers should have had objective knowledge about, for example, genetically modified crops, irrigation, oral vaccines, etc. Secondly, arguments must be grounded in a social context. The teachers and pupils in both countries would need to consider the conditions that apply for each party, and hence search for arguments and knowledge claims that include rightness. Thirdly, arguments must be truthful. That is, each participant in the dialogue is responsible for seeing that nobody is manipulated or misled in any way. None of the preservice teachers in our authentical examples supplied arguments based on moral rationality. The question is, then, how moral rationality could have been expressed in this particular context. Because of the lack of authentic examples thus far, we have constructed an invented preservice teacher (Student X). Using this fabricated example, we may explore how standpoint might appear if it were based on moral rationality. For clarity we have also supplemented the example below with the spheres in question within brackets: I strongly advocate that democracy, sustainable development and internationalisation, which our college has chosen as its profile, are something we have to develop together with others [subjective and social spheres]. Because there is no right answer about what democracy is or what sustainable development means, we must work together with others to negotiate common understandings of these terms [social sphere]. When it comes to sustainable development, I realise this is in some sense a political catchword [subjective sphere]. Nevertheless, there are unfortunately unambiguous and very convincing scientific proofs that for example, global warming and climate change are parts of our common reality [objective sphere]. UN s scientific climate panel (IPCC) was actually awarded The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 for their endeavours to build up and spread scientific knowledge about human-made climate change [objective sphere]. However, there is no consensus about what we need to do at our local colleges to counteract these devastating scenarios, and that is why do 9

10 need to communicate with others if we ever are going to be able to solve the problems [social sphere]. That is why I think it s so important to collaborate with the Asian college [subjective sphere]. If we teachers in Europe and in Asia can create conditions that promote mutual interests, then students can formulate many important questions together [social sphere]. (Student X) Our invented student X does not see her own college as isolated from the surrounding world. On the contrary, in Student X s view, democracy and sustainable development must be developed in dialogue with others. These concepts are not universally self-evident, accepted distinctions. Rather, they need to be worked with continually. It is in dialogues with others that the concepts take on their real meanings. Student X is also aware that dialogues of this nature do not take place without teachers active participation. Moral rationality places great demands on teachers and pupils alike. Expecting a cooperation like this to uphold moral rationality in all situations is somewhat utopian. From a pedagogical perspective in which meaning-making is in focus it is important, however, to work towards moral rationality. Seen from Habermas s discourse ethics, this implies a particular interest for communicative procedures that make it possible to agree upon the rightness of an argument. Additionally, discourse ethics has two other important consequences. First of all, Habermas maintains that questions about the good life lie within the domain of reason (Vernuft). In his view, we cannot leave ethical questions at the mercy of irrational emotional attitudes and decisions. Secondly, Habermas s discourse ethics imply that even self-reflection has to be in some sense intersubjective in discussions with others we reflect upon ourselves, and on our opportunities to test ourselves. However, no explicit form of moral rationality was found in the authentic examples written by the preservice teachers. We will return to this in the discussion. Discussion In our view, Habermas s discourse ethics have the potential to work as both an instrument for analysing arguments, and as a feasible terminological framework that can be used to prepare for tasks involving argumentation. Both applications appear to have great potential within moral and democratic education in teacher training, as well as in other educational settings. Additionally, discourse ethics embodies a potential to maintain and develop the double assignment. We will return to these two applications below. However, before describing The Preparatory Approach and The Retrospective Approach, we would like to comment some of our observations concerning the authentic examples that we have scrutinised in this paper. Our authentic examples show that the preservice teachers to a great extent use pragmatic rationality as their starting point. Potential benefits and a strong attachment to their own agricultural college s chosen profile appear to narrow their outlook. This implies that the logic of the system has colonised their way of arguing. The preservice teachers seem to neglect the possibility to meet their cooperative partners in a process that would expand their own frames of reference and provide deeper awareness of, and understanding for, health and modern genetics, democratic versus totalitarian systems, and what cooperation could contribute for pupils and personnel in both of the fictitious agricultural colleges. However, it is uncertain whether the preservice teachers have access to an appropriate terminological framework for understanding the import of what they wrote in their position statements. Rather, we do doubt that the preservice teachers and possibly also a large fraction of the teacher educators have access to analytical tools and an appropriate terminological framework for in-depth discussions about issues such as these. If so, this is a serious shortcoming that must be remedied by those who are responsible for teacher education. Yet it is also important to emphasise that doing something about these shortcomings would require much time and effort. Moral and democratic argumentation must also be tried out in all subject areas and in many different situations within teacher education. Throwing in a dilemma exercise here and 10

11 THE THREE FORMS OF RATIONALITY The Preparatory Approach THE THREE SPHERES LIFEWORLD & SYSTEM The Retrospective Approach Figure 1 Habermas s Discourse Ethics in Educational Practice The model shows two approaches that we suggest can be applicable within pedagogical practice. Both approaches use key concepts from Habermas s comprehensive theory. By applying suggested approaches, the participants can develop in-depth analysis and thereby increase their meaning-making in matters related to moral and democratic education. there is not enough to bring about a change in action patterns. Thus, in actuality it is not about dilemma exercises. Instead, it is about launching the terminological framework that is embedded in Habermas s discourse ethics. Consequently, we propose that Habermas s discourse ethics can be a useful theoretical framework in moral and democratic education within teacher training. Preservice teachers and teacher educators alike can use the theoretical terms that are parts of discourse ethics for example, lifeworld and system, the three spheres, and the three forms of rationality to retrospectively analyse various teaching sequences. The terminological framework gives analysts access to potent analytical instruments for studying the degree of moral and democratic aspects that are present in arguments. We call this analytical potential The Retrospective Approach (Figure 1). The same is valid for the opposite situation, that is, preservice teachers and teacher educators can use this same terminological framework while they discover, articulate, and construe their arguments and position standpoints. In this way the lifeworld and system; the objective, social and subjective spheres; the pragmatic, ethical and moral rationalities, may serve as preparatory tools in order to reach more developed arguments. This is what we call The Preparatory Approach (Figure 1). By applying The Preparatory Approach we would even like to suggest that preservice teachers and teacher educators can use Habermas s discourse ethics and its associated terminology to more consciously ensure a greater degree of moral and democratic aspects in the education. Finally, we would like to present a few preliminary thoughts about our future plans. We plan to move forward with a full-scale analysis of the preservice teachers arguments and position statements. The authentic examples that we have presented above clearly show that a full-scale analysis is warranted. Therefore we plan to return with a study of this type at a later date. Such an analysis could involve discourse analysis in which we use the terminological framework of Habermas s discourse ethics that we have introduced in this paper. The future analysis may, however, even be complemented by linguistic methods. Examples of these include transitivity analysis, in which we focus on the semantic and grammatical roles in the texts. Who is active and who is passive in the preservice teacher s written statements? And 11

12 what potential actors are not present in their texts? Another alternative form of analysis focuses on lexical phenomena in the text. We primarily have in mind preservice teachers choices of verbs, which we have very briefly touched upon above. It is our hope that a lexical analysis will provide an added dimension, and will aid in explaining the rationalities that form the grounds for different arguments and standpoints. So far, we have also found several interesting key words that we would like to use as a sort of parameters in the future study. Power is an example of such key word. This means we intend to use the analytical methods mentioned above in order to analyse power relations, possible hierarchies, asymmetries and symmetries in the position statements. Another keyword concerns biased preconceived knowledge, which includes post-colonial aspects, prejudices, stereotypical apprehensions, and so forth. References Apple, M.W. (Eds). (2003). The State and the Politics of Knowledge. New York and London: RoutledgeFlamer. Fritzell, C. (2006). On the Reconstruction of Educational Science. Educational Philosophy & Theory, 28, Fritzén, L. (1998). Den pedagogiska praktikens janusansikte. Om det kommunikativa handlandets didaktiska villkor och konsekvenser. (Diss). Lund: Lund University Press. Giroux, H. A. (2001). Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition. London: Bergin & Garvey. Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action. Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Vol 1. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action. The Critique of Functionalist Reason. Vol 2. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (1993). Justification and application. Remarks on Discourse Ethics. Cambridge (MA): The MIT press. Habermas, J. (2001). Moral Conciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge (MA): The MIT press. Johannessen, K. S. (1991). Rule Following, Intransitive Understanding and Tacit Knowledge In B. Goranzon & M. Florin (Eds), Skill and Education: Reflection and Experience (Artificial Intelligence and Society). London: Springer-Verlag. Kuhn, T. (1963). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Sartre, J-P. (1943). L être et le néant : essai d ontologie phénoménologique. Paris: Gallimard. Tapola, A. & Fritzén, L. (2008). Integrative Approach to Moral and Democratic Education. Paper presented at SIG 13 symposium in, August. Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Taylor, C, (1991). The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge. (MA): Harvard University Press. 12