Aquinas on the Unity of the Virtues. - connected and equal

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1 Project-plan, Uppsala, Nov. 22 Aquinas on the Unity of the Virtues - connected and equal In Aquinas' writings on moral virtue, he connects to a central feature of ancient ethics: the idea that moral virtues are united in such a way that if one has one of the virtues, one has them all. In reflecting on this aspect of moral virtue, Aquinas follows a long tradition that began with Socrates and includes Aristotle, the Stoics and Augustine. In ancient times it was hard to find any moral philosopher who did not defend the unity of the virtues. 1 In medieval times, it became contested and one can find both defenders and critics. Most notable is the sophisticated and elaborate critique by Scotus and Ockham. 2 But Godfrey of Fontaines and Buridan defended the thesis. 3 This dissertation project aims at offering a detailed analysis of Aquinas' discussions and arguments for the unity of the virtues, including the substantial discussion of their sources in ancient and early medieval philosophy. In this plan I hope to show that the unity of the virtues is a central aspect of Aquinas' ethics and is historically important in understanding Aquinas' relation to both predecessors and followers. I hope the topic would be of philosophic interest 1 See John M. Cooper, The Unity of Virtue, Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 15, Iss. 01, pp , Whether Augustine defended this view is disputed. Aquinas thought he did but the many Franciscan writers thought he opposed it. (see Bonnie Kent, Aristotle and the Fransciscans: Gerald Odins' Commentary on the "Nicomahean Ethics, Ph.D, Colombia University 1984, pp ) For a discussion of Augustine's position see: John P. Langan, "Augustine on the Unity and Interconnection of the Virtues", Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 72, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Apr., 1979), pp See Kent for the broad overview of the conflict (Arisotle and the Fransciscans: Gerald Odins' Commentary on the "Nicomahean Ethics, pp ) 3 Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux 12e et 13e siècle, vol. 4.3:2, Gembloux, pp and James Walsh, "Burdian on the Connection of the Virtues", The Journal of History of Philosophy, vol 24, Num , pp

2 and to be relevant to contemporary concerns about virtue. 4 This project-plan will consist of five parts: (I) A short summary and presentation of Aquinas' arguments. (II) A discussion of the chosen terminology. (III) A discussion of the secondary literature and why it is not sufficient. (IV) A broad outline of what aspects of Aquinas' virtue theory and philosophical psychology are central for Aquinas' account. (V) A discussion of some major interpretative challenges. I Why does Aquinas think that if one has one virtue, one has them all? 5 We all can think of people who are courageous yet who are intemperate, for example. Central to Aquinas' way of approaching the topic is that such person would actually only have inclination (inclinatio) towards courage. These inclinations can either be natural or from habituation. It is important to note that such inclinations may also be used for doing something bad, and because no one can use a virtue badly" 6 such inclinations cannot count as full virtue. Only in regarding imperfect virtue (virtus imperfecta) can one have one virtue but not another. This is not possible in perfect virtue (virtus perfecta). We are presented with two basic arguments for why virtues are connected (virtutes connexae): One is ascribed to Augustine and Gregory the Great and another is ascribed to Aristotle. 7 The two arguments are based on two ways of dividing the cardinal virtues; 8 firstly according to general conditions (conditiones) and secondly in respect of their matters 4 Along with growing interest for virtue in contemporary ethics, the unity of the virtues have received more serious attention. In the last twenty years, one can see a rather remarkable change. The unity of the virtues was seen as an example of ancient philosophical dogma with little contemporary interest but which now is a position defended by prominent moral philosophers. See for example Julia Annas Intelligent Virtue, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp , 2011 and Susan Wolf Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues Ratio, Vol. 20, Iss. 2, pp , The connection of the virtues are discussed in Question 65 article 1 of prima secundae and in Disputed Questions on Virtue, Question 5 article 2. Also highly relevant is his discussion of why one needs prudence for moral virtue and moral virtue for prudence in Question 58 article 45 of prima secundae, his discussion of how prudence choses the mean in every virtue as seen in Question 47 article 7 of secunda secundae and also Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's account on phronesis in book six of Nicomachean Ethics. Aquinas also discusses these issues in Scriptum super Sententiis, III, Question 36 article 12 and Quodlibet. XII, Question 15, article 1. 6 Dist.Virt 5.2. This is Augustine definition of virtue (see Dist.Virt 1.2) 7 St Augustine, De Trinitate, VI, article 4 and Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, XXII, article1, Aristotle, EN, Book VI.13 8 Dist.Virt 5.1 and ST IaIIae

3 (materias). 9 According to the first perspective, discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude. 10 The virtues are connected because strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. 11 The argument is that every fully virtuous act requires the general conditions of the four cardinal virtues. According to Aquinas, the Aristotelian argument for the unity of the virtues is that all the moral virtues are connected one with the other by prudence (per prudentia) 12 One cannot have a moral virtue without having prudence and one cannot have prudence without moral virtue. This argument relies heavily on Aquinas' account of practical rationality. Every act of virtue requires prudence in order to find the mean (medium) within that virtue. 13 He states: "Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing (habitus electivus). 14 Prudence is also equally dependent on moral virtue. Prudence requires an end (as theoretical reasoning requires fundamental principles) and this end is set by the moral virtues. In this argument, Aquinas relates to Aristotle's idea that "such a man is, such does the end seem to him (quia qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei)" 15 Aquinas thinks that a consequence of seeing the virtues as united is that they are also in a sense equal (aequalis). 16 Firstly, this is because all four general properties have to be present equally in every act of virtue. And secondly, because prudence finds the mean in every virtue and this makes all virtues equal according to their formal perfection (aequales secundum formalem perfectionem). 17 The virtues can be unequal in the same way in which they can be unconnected. Rather than seeing the equality-thesis as a separate idea, I will consider both connection and equality as aspects of Aquinas' unity-thesis. I will now shortly discuss what terminology I find proper for discussing these issues. 9 ST IaIIae.65.1c 10 ST IaIIae.65.1c 11 ST IaIIae.65.1c 12 Com.EN.1287 (1144b a2) 13 ST IIaIIae ST IIaIIae ST IaIIae.58.5c 16 Aquinas discusses equality of the virtues in three places: Question 66 article 15 of prima secundae, Disputed Questions on Virtues, Questions 5, Article 3 and Scriptum super Sententiis, III, Question 36 article 4 17 Dist.Virt 5.3c 3

4 II A problem in approaching the question of unity is that 'unity' can mean a lot of different things. It can be applied to many different levels and kinds of virtue (intellectual, theological and moral virtues). An important part of the project will be to find terminology for discussing these issues. When I am simply referring to the unity-thesis, I am concerned with unity of the moral virtues. Aquinas also accepts unity in theological virtues but denies it regarding the intellectual virtues and in the arts. 18 Charity is supposed to have a similar role to prudence in the virtues. 19 It is important to have in mind that Aquinas does not think that theological virtues are necessary for moral virtue but rather that theological virtue is a higher state of perfection than moral virtue. 20 Important to note is that the relation between the moral virtues and theological virtues themselves is a unity-relation but the relationship between moral virtues and theological virtues is one of hierarchy. One might want to claim that the use of the 'unity' in relation to Aquinas is misplaced. He does not say himself that virtues are united only in that they are connected (connexae). My way of approaching the topic is to regard the virtues as being connected, and this being one of many ways of seeing virtues as united. Annas chooses to call Aristotle's thesis the 'reciprocity of the virtues' in contrast with the Stoic and Platonic 'unity of the virtues'. 21 My main reason to use the term 'unity' for the overarching thesis is more conventional than philosophical. I am following a convention in both the secondary literature, in history of philosophy and in contemporary debate. I want it to be clear that Aquinas' discussion is very connected to the ancient (Plato, Aristotle and Cicero) and early medieval tradition (Augustine and Gregory the Great). Aquinas is also involved in a similar problem as some contemporary virtue ethicist, 18 Aquinas denies the Platonic idea of unity where, if one has wisdom, one has all the virtues (intellectual and moral) 19 ST IaIIae Aquinas believes that if one has theological virtue, one will have all the moral virtues as well. Interestingly, he uses the unity of the moral virtues to explain why this is. He uses the Aristotelian argument to say that if one has charity, one will have prudence and all other moral virtues will follow. The relation between the theological virtues and moral virtues is central to understand the Aquinas' ethics at large. To understand how Aquinas thinks prudence unites virtue will also be an important part of understanding that relationship (ST IaIIae ). 21 The Morality of Happiness, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, p

5 who also aim at specifying the role of practical rationality in virtue. III The topic of unity and equality of the virtues in Aquinas has not attracted a lot of scholarly attention. Three explicit studies have been made: a chapter by Odin Lottin in Psychologie et morale aux 12e et 13e siècles, two articles by Jean Porter in The Unity of the Virtues and the Ambiguity of Goodness: A Reappraisal of Aquinas's Theory of the Virtues and Thomas Osborne "Thomas and Scotus on Prudence without the major moral virtues". 22 None of these studies are very extensive. Porter does not address Aquinas' detailed discussion in the Disputed Questions on Virtue and Osborne is limited to a making a contrast between Aquinas and Scotus. Lottin's work is excellent in tracing the predecessors and the followers of Aquinas. Porter and Osborne both raise interesting questions but they also misrepresent Aquinas on central issues. Porter has presented a general interpretation of the unity of virtues in Aquinas. She states, concerning the two arguments for unity: This distinction suggests, in turn, that Aquinas's claim that the virtues are connected should be understood as a psychological thesis about what is characteristic of the virtuous person's distinctive way of acting, as well as a thesis about the interrelationship between different cardinal virtues considered as discrete normative ideals. 23 Porter wants to look at the unity of virtue through Aquinas' account of the meaning of action and a unified self. She points out that Aquinas is concerned in his virtue theory about the relation between reason and passion. In order to have virtue, one needs harmony between passion, will and reason. For example, incontinence is, for Aquinas, a failure in prudence. 22 Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux 12e et 13e siècle, vol. 3.2:1, Gembloux, pp , Jean Porter, The Unity of the Virtues and the Ambiguity of Goodness: A Reappraisal of Aquinas's Theory of the Virtues, The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 1993), pp Thomas Osborne, Thomas and Scotus on Prudence without All the Major Virtues: Imperfect or Merely Partial? The Thomist, vol. 74, pp. 1-24, Porter, The Unity of the Virtues and the Ambiguity of Goodness, p

6 Important to have mind is that this kind of unity is not something which Aquinas thinks is unique of a virtuous person but also is present for the vicious person. Disunity in this sense is characteristic of the continent and incontinent person. 24 She is, of course, right that Aquinas is concerned in discussing the unity of the virtues with the structure of soul in a broad sense. What is actually meant by psychological in this context is never specified. Porter makes clear what is meant by virtues being discrete normative ideals. As far as I can see, Porter's general approach is too broad and unclear. The fact that Aquinas has two arguments, according to Porter, makes his account more interesting but does not provide an account of relation between the arguments. 25 Osborne rightly focuses on the importance of prudence in Aquinas' argumentation and makes an important contrast to Soctus. However, Osborne misrepresents Aquinas' position in relation to Scotus. Osborne frames the conflict between Aquinas and Scotus in the following way: "should we say that someone who lacks prudence in one area but possesses it in another has imperfect [Aquinas] or partial [Scotus] prudence?" 26 There are two problems with Osborne's formulation. Firstly, Aquinas' main point is that a person who performs courageous actions but is intemperate only has inclinations towards one virtuous activity but not another. Such a person does not have prudence in either "area". It is not the prudence which is imperfect but moral virtue that is imperfect without prudence. Secondly, I take Aquinas to contest that there is an "area" for courage in the first place. For there to be an area of courage, one must be able to single out fear from our other passions. According to Aquinas, this is impossible. I will explicitly discuss this below. Osborne wants to highlight the conflict between Aquinas and Scotus through looking at Cajetan and the Salmanticenses defense of Aquinas. Through looking at these later Thomists, he makes two important points: Prudence is need in every virtue because "virtuous actions are interrelated and ordered" 27 and prudence relates to life as a whole. But why does Aquinas 24 ST IIaeIIae A major problem with Porter is that she has a rather simplified picture of prudence. She states that prudence "is simply the capacity to apply one's general knowledge of the true human good to particular circumstance". This seem to make Aquinas too Platonic. Moral virtue makes a person desire certain ends and not others because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him". To be moral is not only knowing the good but to regard a certain end as worthwhile for oneself. Strictly speaking, moral virtue is not the knowledge of the good but an elective habit. The application to action, "is the end of the practical reason"(st IIaIIae.47.3). 26 Osborne, "Thomas and Scotus on prudence without all the major virtues", p Osborne, "Thomas and Scotus on prudence without all the major virtues", p

7 think these are central features of prudence? These aspects of Aquinas' account have their basis in a specific account of practical rationality and in an action-theoretical framework. It seem to me that Scotus works from a very different framework that enables him to deny the unity. The difference between Scotus and Aquinas can be seen as a sign of a much deeper conflict. With Aquinas' framework, it makes little sense to say humans have many prudences. I think that any comparison with later medieval developments will be lacking if one does not have a clear picture of what kind of account of prudence is at work in Aquinas' argumentation for unity. None of these studies have looked at the equality of the virtues. I think this topic is both important for the unity of the virtues and it is also interesting in its own right. The discussion shows Aquinas' ability to employ Aristotle's theoretical philosophy in the development of his own practical philosophy. In this discussion, he reflects on ideas that are not directly found in Aristotle's corpus. Furthermore, he sorts and distinguishes arguments found in previous thinkers. Aquinas uses a conception of equality in Aristotle Metaphysics to distinguish precisely between different ways that something can be equal. Aquinas' rather technical account of equality enables him to say that virtues are not equal in the sense that some virtues are greater then others (justice is greater then temperance). This also enables him to deny the Stoic idea that two people can't be unequally virtuous. For the Stoics, unity was very closely connected to the idea that either one has virtue or one does not have it. Augustine criticizes this Stoic idea in one of his letters to Jerome. 28 In this letter, he refutes Cicero's picture where virtue is like a man that does not get any air before he reaches the surface of the water. It is irrelevant how far underwater the person is. 29 Augustine instead alludes to the picture of a person walking out of cave where it gradually gets brighter and brighter. This letter to Jerome will later be important in the Franciscan critique of the unity-thesis. Aquinas does not himself refer to the letter but his elaboration of equality enables him to read Augustine in such a way that the critique of the Stoic either/or-idea is not also a critique of the unity of the virtues. 28 The Confessions and Letters of St. Augustine in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1 trans. and ed. Philip Schaff, pp See Cicero De Finibus, III. 48 and IV An important reason for Aquinas, and other medieval philosophers, is that the Stoic position seems to imply that every not fully virtuous person is equally sinful. This would be an untenable position for any Christian thinker. 7

8 IV If one considers how Aquinas distinguishes the virtues and ascribes different functions to different virtues (especially the role prudence in every virtue), I think it becomes clear that the unity of the virtues is not an issue which can be separated from Aquinas' ethics at large. In ST and in the previous question in Disputed Questions on Virtue, he has created the basis for unity of the virtues. I will here outline some issues of how virtues are divided and the role of prudence in virtue that I think will become central in my study. One way of approaching the unity of the virtues is to argue that different virtues are in fact one virtue. For Aquinas, virtues are distinct. He has provided a rather elaborate theory as to how and why. The distinction between intellectual and moral virtue (concerning the appetitive soul) is central. An important reason for distinguishing the moral from the intellectual, as Porter has pointed out, is that if virtue is regarded only as knowledge then we cannot account for incontinence/akrasia. 30 A perfection of the appetitive soul is also needed. On a general level, moral virtue is concerned with the good, and intellectual virtue with the truth. 31 We are motivated by our will for a certain end. For Aquinas: A universal and necessary good, when considered in its universality does not produce movement. 32 He wants to emphasize both the appetitive and intellectual aspects of virtue. Prudence is, strictly speaking, an intellectual virtue but counts as a moral virtue because it is concerned with what is done. Moral virtue is about ends and prudence about the mean. Practical reasoning is for Aquinas a kind of reasoning which takes its start in the desire for an end. As we saw above, Aquinas bases the two arguments on two general ways of dividing the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, temperance and courage). He identifies the first way of looking at the virtues with Augustine and the other church fathers, and the second one with Aristotle. 30 ST IaIIae 58.2 (Porter, The Unity of the Virtues and Ambiguity of Goodness, p. 145) 31 ST Ia Com.DeAn., 433b

9 The first way of regarding the cardinal virtue is as the: general conditions of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. 33 The cardinal virtue as mentioned by Augustine represents for Aquinas some general conditions (generales conditiones). Aquinas interprets these general conditions to be also represented in Aristotle. Aristotle writes: "first, if he does them knowingly, secondly if he decides to do them, and decides to do them for themselves, and thirdly if he does them from firm and unchanging disposition" 34 Aquinas thinks the four cardinal virtues can describe this conditions. 35 Aquinas here makes the traditions seem homogeneous. 36 A second way to distinguish the virtues is according to their 'matter' (materia). This is, according to Aquinas, the way that Aristotle divides the virtues. It is far from clear what 'matter' in this context means. Aquinas thinks that generally habits are different because they have different objects. 37 I take Aquinas to mean that two virtues differing in matter also differ by their objects. To understand what actually is meant by this scholastic terminology, is central to my project. As I see it, the point of speaking about inclinations as 'matter' is that prudence "makes" them into proper moral virtues. This gives prudence a special role in relation to the other moral virtues because it is involved in every virtue. Aquinas states that the second way of discussing the virtues is better. 38 I take Aquinas to mean that it is better because it actually distinguishes the virtues as separate habits. I will discuss below how one should think of relation between these two arguments. A central task in this project is to find a description of prudence that can make sense of the 33 ST IaIIae EN 1105a In Disputed Questions of the Virtues, question 5, article 1 we get a more detailed account of how the cardinal virtues can be seen as descriptions of general conditions of virtue. 36 A will below discuss if Aquinas is not actually misrepresenting Gregory's position. 37 ST IaIIae ST IaIIae.54.2c 9

10 Aristotelean argument; a concept that makes it clear what is meant by finding a mean in virtue and what kind of practical reasoning is involved in that process. What is entailed by saying ends are principles in practical reasoning? How is prudence only concerned with the means? 39 With a more refined conception, I think we can better approach Aquinas' overall argumentation for the unity of the virtues and, more specifically, why there cannot be many prudences. For Aquinas, it is impossible to have prudence concerning just things yet not courageous things. Why can't a person be perfectly virtuous in one domain of life but not in another? As we have seen, Aquinas is skeptical of such a strict division. He states: Moral principles (principia moralium) are related to others in such a way that lacking one would result in lacking others. 40 Aquinas focuses on how, if one person should fail in temperance, he would also eventually fail in justice and so on. In order to have a better grasp of these issues, it is necessary to make a comprehensive comparison between prudence and Aquinas' account of other forms of knowledge and reasoning, and especially the skill-based. In considering why prudence is a single virtue, Aquinas relates to his view of the passions. He states that the virtues are connected because human passions are connected in such way that they arise in certain initial passions and terminate in others. 41 Aquinas' argument is presented in ST in a very condensed form. Through an exploration of his psychology, we can find a clear and fundamental argument against certain divisions of different domains of prudence. According to Aquinas, we fear to lose what we love, we desire what we love and we get pleasure in getting what we desire. We need to consider that all passions have their bases in what one perceives as good and evil. 42 Our emotional life is not divided in such a way that courage is unconnected with temperance. Therefore, prudence, which concerns the mean in virtue, cannot be restricted to only one virtue and not another. Central to this question is looking at the interaction between the sensitive soul and prudence. We have some reason to think that some aspects of prudence actually consist of being in a certain sensitive state. Certain kinds of fear are maybe needed for the awareness of the things at stake in a situation. For example: If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, 39 For enveloped account see Daniel Westberg, Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Dist.Virt 5.1ad4 41 ST IaIIae.65.1.ad3 42 ST IaIIae

11 without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness. 43 V I would like to discuss some main problems of interpretation (1) what kind of thesis is the unity-thesis? (2) Which of the two arguments are more fundamental? (3) How successful is Aquinas' response to the problem of magnificence? (4) Does Aquinas' argument actually work? Is full moral virtue necessary for prudence? (1) What kind of thesis is it? A certain kind unity seem to stem already from the definition of virtue as something one cannot make bad use of. Is the unity-thesis a conceptual point about what virtue is supposed to mean? Then, what is the psychological basis for the unity-thesis? Would it be a problem if it is psychologically impossible to obtain such unity? Aquinas seems to think that we have reason to accept the unity-thesis because of how our passions are constituted. As we have seen above, one important argument for why prudence is one, is that our passions have their basis in love and hate. Aquinas also thinks that to develop one virtue will help in developing others. For example: Who can restrain their appetites so as not to pursue desires for pleasure will be more able to restrain the stirrings of daring in the face of danger" 44 Virtue concerning some passions will have a certain overflow into virtues concerning others. Would it be a problem for Aquinas' overall argument if one could demonstrate this as false? (2) Is one argument more fundamental than the other? What is the relation between the two? Bonnie Kent has argued that the first argument is only alluding to tradition. 45 Porter has stated that it makes Aquinas' argument more interesting. We have some reason to follow Kent. In Disputed Questions on the Virtues, the Augustinian argument plays a very little role and is only mentioned in a short passage in the end. Nor does Aquinas use the argument to solve any of the contra-arguments he discusses. As we have seen above, Aquinas gives the Augustinian discussion of virtue an Aristotelian reading. As we have said above with general conditions, 43 ST IaIIae.44.2ad2 44 Dis.Virt 5.1.ad1 45 Kent, Aristotle and the Fransciscans: Gerald Odins' Commentary on the "Nicomahean Ethics, pp

12 Aquinas refers to what Aristotle discusses in book II of EN. If we take this into account it becomes clear that they are not two arguments for the same thesis. I would say that Aquinas may want to make the tradition seem more homogeneous then it actually is. If we look at what Gregory is actually saying: And so one virtue without another is either none at all or but imperfect. For that (as it has seemed best to some persons) I may speak of the four first virtues, viz. prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, they are severally so far perfect, in proportion as they are mutually joined to one another. But separated they can never be perfect. For neither is it real prudence which has not justice, temperance, fortitude, nor perfect temperance which has not fortitude, justice, and prudence, nor complete fortitude which is not prudent, temperate, and just, nor genuine justice which has not prudence, fortitude, and temperance. 46 He discuses descriptions of virtue, not the kind of conditions of virtue Aristotle discuses in book II.4. This might be very important in considering how Aquinas relates to his predecessors. (3) A general problem of the unity of virtues is that some virtues seem to require external goods. Can one obtain the virtue of magnificence if one is poor? Aquinas' response is that the poor person can develop to be liberal (liberalis) and if one has liberality, one will acquire magnificence with little effort. He states: Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality (in potentia propinqua). Because when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice... according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): 'That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all.'" 47 Aquinas' answer is problematic in many ways. Is Aquinas right that the liberal person would easily acquire magnificence? Does being liberal with small resources prepare a person for having large resources? Aquinas generally thinks that virtue needs experience and comes from 46 Moralia in Iob, XXII, article 1 47 ST IaIIae.65.1.ad1 12

13 habituation, but in this passage, Aquinas wants to speak of potential virtue. Does it make sense to speak of potential virtue? (4) According to Elizabeth Telfer, Aristotle's argument for unity does not work because: "we cannot maintain that practical wisdom generates all the moral virtues; practical wisdom is compatible with the excess of deficiencies in emotional disposition." 48 Self-control is sufficient according to Tefler. In Aquinas' terminology, prudence would actually be compatible with continence. This enables a person, for example, to be fully courageous with perfect prudence but only to be continent regarding, for example, pleasures. Telfer questions if perfect moral virtue is necessary to have the right view of one's end. It might only be necessary to be continent. This is a serious argument against anyone who argues for unity through prudence (or phronesis). I hope in the dissertation to explore at least two ways Aquinas might respond to this. One line of reasoning would focus on the way in which Aquinas regards command as the chief act of prudence. 49 A continent person's actions are imperfect (not in their end or in deliberation) but in their execution. Another way of dealing with this argument is to take into account how one comes to have one virtue perfectly. Aquinas thinks principles of morals are inter-linked so it is impossible to learn one virtue in isolation (as explained above). I do not think Aquinas would say that such a process can be successful in a truly continent person and h does not seem to regard continence as a stable state. A continent person will either develop virtue or will fall for his passion (with the consequence of destruction of prudence). Aquinas is very aware of how sensitive our reasoning is about particular situations to our passions. 50 I think that Aquinas would regard it as impossible to develop any virtue with very violent passions. 48 Elizabeth Telfer, The Unity of the Moral Virtues in Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 90,, pp. 40 ( ) 49 ST IIaeIIae ST IaIIae

14 VI In this project-plan, I have argued that a more substantial study of Aquinas' account of the unity of the virtues is needed. The relevant aspects of Aquinas' virtue theory regarding this topic have been outlined. I have also presented some relevant interpretative challenges and how we might responded to them. Primary sources: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (translation Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae (translation: Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Second and Revised Edition, 1920) Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Sententia libri Ethicorum) (translation: McInerny, R.,Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, 1964) Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima (Sententia libri De Anima), (translation. Robert Pasnau translation with New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). Disputed Questions on Virtue (Quaestiones disputatae De virtutibus), (translation, Jeffery Hause and Claudia Eisen Murphy, Hackett, Cambridge, 2011) Quaestiones de quolibet Scriptum super Sententiis (Aquinas' corpus in Latin found on: St Augustine, De Trinitate, trans. Edmund Hill, New City Press, New York,

15 Cicero, De Finibus, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Revised edition, Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, (translation: John Parker and J. Rivingston, London, 1844) 15