Francisco Suárez, S. J. DM XIII.1 1

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1 Last revision: November 14, 2014 Francisco Suárez, S. J. DM XIII.1 1 Sydney Penner 2014 <395, col. a> 2 I pass over a general discussion of the material cause as abstracted from the cause of substance or the cause of accident, since the strongest ratio of this cause is discerned in prime matter. And once it has been explained in that case, it will be easy to understand the remaining cases proportionately. Nor should there be any fear of censure from those who think that a treatise on prime matter in no way belongs to metaphysics but only to physics. For it was already shown in earlier disputations, especially in the introductory one, that many aspects of this work are relevant to metaphysics. For, although physics deals with matter under its proper and special character, insofar as it is a principle of natural generation and is a cause <col. b> or part of natural being, metaphysics, nevertheless, in considering the general ratio of material cause, which is proper to it, necessarily deals with the first cause of that genus, which is prime matter. 3 Also, when dealing with the essence of substance, one necessarily discusses matter, insofar as it is a part of the essence, as we will see below when talking about material substance. Therefore, in this place we treat matter under this consideration. And since the ratio of causing cannot be understood without first understanding material entity, we will first investigate whether there is matter, then what sort of being it is and what its essence is, then what its properties are, and then finally its causality. SECTION I. Whether it is evident to natural reason that there is given in beings a material cause of substances, which we name prime matter. 1 Translation is based on the 1597 edition. 2 Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivés edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition. 3 For the sake of readability, I have translated the Latin primus with both prime and first, but note that a connection that is evident in the Latin text is lost this way. In this sentence, for example, the Latin expressions translated as first cause and prime matter are prima causa and materia prima.

2 Suárez, DM XIII Because prime matter includes two aspects, it is necessary A taxonomy of the before doing anything else to explain the signification of this different kinds of expression with respect to both parts. Matter, then, is usually matter. divided into the matter from which (ex qua), the matter in which (in qua), 4 and the matter concerning which (circa quam). This division can be explained in different ways. In the first way it is not a division of things or of matters but rather of the respects or the functions of the same matter. For the same matter is called that from which either with respect to the composite that is constituted from it or with respect to the form that is educed from it. Hence, in the former respect the body of a human being is the matter from which, but not in the latter respect, since the form of a human being is not educed from the potency of the matter. Hence, with respect to such a form it is called the matter in which the form is introduced in such a way that that in which is said with respect to union rather than with respect to eduction. That in which can also be taken abstractly so that it includes a disposition (habitudo) to the form as inhering in the matter. But with respect to the agent the same matter is called that concerning which the agent operates. According to this interpretation of the terms, therefore, no member [of the division] can be excluded from the present consideration. For we are dealing with matter according to itself or as it includes all those dispositions (habitudines) in its adequate concept. But whether they pertain to different causalities and are distinct ex natura rei we will see later. In another way, matter concerning which is customarily taken as distinguished from matter from which and in which according to real union and inherence. In this way it properly expresses a respect to the agent by an immanent action and it is nothing other than the object concerning which such an agent turns. This signification of matter is metaphorical <396> and of no relevance at present, since that as such does not exercise material causality or either efficient or final causality, as we mentioned above. This discussion, therefore, is not about objective matter but about subjective matter. 4 It is sometimes suggested that materia in qua should be translated with matter of which rather than matter in which (e.g., by Gyula Klima in his translation of Thomas Aquinas s On the Principles of Nature). The thought is that the difference between materia ex qua and materia in qua is between transient and enduring matter. In the case of Suárez, at least, the distinction between transient and enduring matter is seen as one to be made within materia ex qua. See n. 2.

3 Suárez, DM XIII In turn, matter from which is customarily divided into transient and enduring matter. Wood, for example, is in the former way called the matter from which fire comes to be. In that signification that expression from which designates not only the disposition (habitudo) of a material cause but also includes the disposition (habitudo) of a terminus a quo. From this part that signification in no way pertains to the present disputation. Enduring matter, however, is a proper and internal material cause, which endures in the composite or in the terminus of generation, joining together in its way for the constitution of that composite. Finally, matter is customarily divided into metaphysical and physical matter. Metaphysical matter is the genus in relation to differentia. But that appellation is only through analogy and proportion to physical matter, which is matter properly and strictly speaking and which is what we are discussing here. With respect to metaphysical matter, beyond the things which we already said above when talking about universal unity, 5 we add some things in the last section of Disputation 15 when discussing metaphysical form But matter can be called prime both by negation of prior [matter] and by relation to secondary [matter]. Since, therefore, matter expresses the ratio of a subject, that is called prime which presupposes no prior subject. In this way Aristotle in Physics I.9 defined matter to be the first subject from which something comes to be. But that is called secondary matter which presupposes a prior subject. And thus many call a substantial composite secondary matter with respect to its accidents, since it is a subject of accidents in such a way that it stands on a former subject. For a similar reason those who admit multiple substantial forms in the same supposit, call the composite of matter and corporeal form, for example, the secondary matter of the soul. Matter that has been disposed or affected by accidental dispositions is often also called secondary matter, not because the composite itself of the matter and accidents is the subject in which the form is received but only because the reception of such dispositions precedes in the order of nature and establishes the matter as proximately fit for such a form. For this reason such matter is properly called proximate matter. But Aristotle in Metaphysics VIII, text. 11, calls proper or proximate matter transient matter 5 DM 6. 6 DM

4 Suárez, DM XIII.1 4 that is suitable for the generation of the thing, as wine is the matter of vinegar. Concerning this matter, the Commentator says in Physics II, <col. b> comm. 31, that it is the matter of alteration, not of composition. Thus every secondary matter presupposes prime matter and adds some form or disposition. The resolution of the question. 4. And from this it is clear that if we are speaking in general and, Prime matter is as it were, formally about prime matter that is, about the first inferred from the subject of changes or of forms by abstracting from the question necessity of a first subject in any change. what kind of this such a subject is or what kind of form is received in it, then it is just as evident that there is prime matter as it is evident that in things there are changes to different forms. For every change presupposes some subject, as was shown above and as is clear from experience. Therefore, either that subject presupposes another or it does not. If it does not presuppose another, then it is prime matter, and the intended result is had. But if it presupposes another subject, then I will ask [the same question] about it. But it is evident that this cannot proceed to infinity. Therefore, one must necessarily stop in some first subject or prime matter. The minor proposition last assumed is demonstrated by Aristotle concerning all the causes in Book II, yet it is in a certain way more evident in the case of the material cause, since it is an intrinsic foundation of the whole composite. Nor can a composite standing in itself be perceived by the intellect, where one part of the composite depends on another part and another part on another part, unless it is finally stopped in something that stands underneath all the other parts. Since, therefore, every natural composite is through itself in such a way that with respect to itself the whole does not depend in the genus of material cause on another subject that is extrinsic to it, it is necessary that it has within itself some subject that is prime with respect to all other entities out of which it is constituted and that are in the subject. In this way, then, it is evident that prime matter or a first subject is given in natural things. 5. Second, it is proven directly: for it is evident that genera- Matter is inferred from ble and corruptible things are thus transformed that some are generated from others in turn and mutually, at least mediately. Therefore, it is necessary that they agree in some common subject that endures in all of them, by reason of which they are suitable the continuous change of things.

5 Suárez, DM XIII.1 5 for those mutual transformations. Therefore, that subject is first and for that reason is the prime material cause of all things of that sort. The antecedent is evident from experience. For elements act on each other and one is converted into another, either mediately <397> or immediately, and mixtures are also generated from them and consequently also resolved into them. And so it is the case that all sublunary things, insofar as the force of their nature and composition is concerned, are mutually transformable. I say insofar as the force of their nature is concerned because it can happen that some parts of the elements are never transformed in virtue of the fact that they are in secluded and most remote places to which the actions of contrary agents never come. 6. The first consequence is proven, first: for there can be no natural transformation unless by a common subject enduring under each terminus. First, because otherwise the thing that is corrupted would entirely pass away according to itself as a whole, and the other thing that begins to be would come to be according to itself as a whole. And so one would pass over to nothing, another would come to be ex nihilo, and no common thing would endure under both. Therefore, one would be annihilated and another created, which is naturally impossible. Also, because otherwise the whole action of a natural agent would be either impossible or irrelevant to the generation of things. The consequence is shown by the fact that we can speak either: [i] about accidental alteration, which we experience and which obviously does not happen except in a subject and from a common subject that remains under each terminus, since it is clear from experience that this action does not come to be unless a subject is presupposed. For the accident that comes to be through it cannot naturally be except in a subject that sustains both the action and its formal terminus. From this subject the form or opposing privation is expelled. Therefore, a common subject is given in an action of this kind. Or [ii] we speak about that action or substantial transformation that comes to be in the terminus of an alteration in which the thing that passes away loses without qualification the being that it had before and another thing begins without qualification, as when fire comes to be from flax. And here, too, it is necessary for a common subject to endure. Otherwise, the entire preceding alteration or heating of the flax would be irrelevant to the procreation of the fire. For the heating in no way brings anything to the procreation of the fire, if it and its whole subject perishes entirely. At most it

6 Suárez, DM XIII.1 6 would serve to empty the place or space in which the thing to be procreated can be introduced. But the destruction of a thing is irrelevant for this. Local expulsion would suffice, and that can come about through the introduction of another thing in that space, as happens in local motion. 7. Also impossible would be such destruction of a thing through alteration, since an accident cannot, speaking per se, destroy its subject <col. b> since it is sustained by it and takes up being from it. That subject, then, is either simple or composite. If it is simple, it can in no way be destroyed through an action or through an accident that comes to be in it, since that being is necessary so that such an action or such an accident can be. But if that subject is a composite of a prior subject and another form, it will indeed be able to be destroyed by reason of an alteration and an accident introduced into it. But not per se but per accidens by reason of another action and form having followed the prior alteration. But this following cannot be understood unless the subsequent form is introduced into the same subject in which the former form was. For otherwise there would be no reason why the union between the former subject and its form is dissolved. Therefore, this whole natural transformation must necessarily be grounded in some common subject that endures under each terminus. 8. This can also be shown by an induction made over some From some special changes. transformations. When an animal, for example, is nourished by food, either something of the food remains in the end of nutrition and is conjoined to the living substance or the food and the whole that is in it is entirely destroyed through the action of the living being. If nothing of the food remains, the entire action of the living thing is superfluous and nothing can be aided by the food so that from it something grows or becomes stronger. For nothing becomes stronger or grows from that which perishes in the food. But if something in the food endures, that cannot be unless it is a common matter or subject. The same argument can be taken from the visible and improper nutrition of fire. For it does not increase except wood or something similar is presupposed nor is it conserved except it is nourished by oil or some similar matter. Therefore, this matter cannot be transient according to itself as a whole; otherwise, it would be useless and no reason could be given why it was necessary for such effects. Nor could it be shown what it contributed to those [effects]. That matter, therefore, in some way endures

7 Suárez, DM XIII.1 7 under the form of the thing that arises or is nourished. Therefore, it endures according to some common subject. 9. It is confirmed, finally, by the fact that otherwise the transformation of things would not be corruption and generation but a kind of transubstantiation, since the whole substance of one thing would perish and another whole substance would begin. In fact, it would be more than transubstantiation. For not only would there be that succession in whole substances but also in all their accidents, since if no common subject endures much less can the same accidents (which <398> depend on the subject for their being and their being conserved) naturally endure. But this kind of transformation is alien to every philosophy and every natural action. And beyond the nature of annihilation and creation, which it includes, as I said above, no reason can be thought of why those two things are connected in the nature of things in such a way that the destruction of one is necessary for the production of the other and conversely. Therefore, there is no natural transformation through complete destruction and inception, but only through transformation from some common subject. And this is what Aristotle s demonstration generally Physics I.6 and tends to, that this transformation is always from contrary to Metaphysics VIII.1. contrary (opposite privations being included under contraries), having a common subject. Therefore, it is evident that a common subject or material cause is given. 10. The second consequence of the principal argument by Matter is discovered by resolution to one first subject. which we inferred that this matter is the first cause in its order and in that sense is most truly to be named prime matter still needs to be proven. But this (whatever some might wish) cannot be shown in any more evident way than the one touched on above, namely, because one cannot proceed to infinity in proximate and remote subjects or in subjects and subjected (if I may speak in that way), but one must necessarily stop in some subject that is not subjected or even composed from a part that is in a subject. For every such composite can be resolved into simples in which there must be something that is wholly not in a subject. Nor does this discussion presuppose that there is not a procession to infinity of substantial forms in the same composite. For even if this is also obvious, still, if one imagined that per impossibile there were infinite forms in the same composite, on the part of the potency for receiving them it would be necessary to stop in some simple subject that is not in a subject, since the whole collection of such forms is in some subject. Therefore, that

8 Suárez, DM XIII.1 8 [subject] is simple, as we will demonstrate at once. Therefore, we call it prime matter. Beyond this, moreover, that consequence can also be proven from the community of this subject. For since all these lower things are transformed, immediately or at least mediately, as was said, it is necessary that what is presupposed in these transformations be first in the ratio of subject or matter. For if it were from another prior subject or constituting matter, then either it would also be transformable and then <col. b> it would not be a common subject for all transformations but that which endures after its resolution or it would not be transformable and then not every corporeal being would be transformable into any other, but we are presupposing the opposite (but more about this in 3). 11. Therefore, from everything that has been said it is gen- Inferred from every erally proven that in every order of transformation there must premise. be given some prime material cause. But it cannot be concluded from what was said that there is given true prime matter that is a material cause of some substance unless something is added. Hence taken formally the arguments that have been made equally prove that in any heavenly body there is given some first subject of the changes that happen in them. In fact, with the same proportion they also prove the same thing about any spiritual substance you please insofar as it is capable of real change, whether local, intellectual, or affective. For although that change is not corruptive but perfective, nevertheless, it necessarily presupposes some subject. And for that reason it is necessary that it be reduced to some first subject in its order, which can also be named the first material cause of that change, even though it is not called prime matter according to the common use of this expression. For it properly signifies the material principle of substantial change or of constitution. From this it also happens that even though things that in some way are transformed have a material cause of their transformation proportionate to them, nevertheless, if the transformation is not of one thing to another, it cannot be concluded from the force of the transformation that there is given some first material cause common to things of this sort. For example, although angels have a first subject of their changes and corporeal bodies similarly, nevertheless, since the latter cannot be transformed into angels nor conversely, it cannot be concluded from transformation that there is some first subject common to all things. And the same argument applies in the case of celestial bodies

9 Suárez, DM XIII.1 9 and sublunary bodies, since the latter cannot transform into the former nor conversely. In fact, the same thing is true about the heavens in relation to each other, since they are not mutually transformable, but each in itself can only be changed accidentally. This is a fortiori true in the case of created spiritual substances. In all these cases, therefore, it can only be concluded that one common subject of accidents is given, between which change happens. But in these lower substances and bodies, since they are mutually transformable, <399> it is rightly concluded that there is some subject both common and first. But in order to conclude that this subject is the material cause of the substances themselves of such things, it is necessary to add that mutual transformation of things with each other according to their substance and not only according to accidents. For if they are transformed only with respect to accidents, it will be enough that there be given a first subject for such accidents, whether that substance be simple or composite or whether it be of one nature in all things or different. 12. Therefore, in order to conclude that prime matter of the Transformation in sort that Aristotle posits is given, it remains to prove that the transformation of these lower bodies that we experience is not only accidental but also substantial. But beyond experience it seems sufficiently evident in itself not only in the case of elements and inanimate mixtures, but much more in living things, animals, and in us human beings since we are generated and we die beyond this experience, I say, it should be proven by reason from the necessity of substantial forms distinct from accidents. For if such forms are given, it is necessary that prime matter be given, since it is their subject and with them composes one integral substance, which is what it is to be the material cause of a substance. But substantial forms are given, as remains to be proven below in Disputation 15 and for that reason is now presupposed. Insofar as it has been demonstrated from that hypothesis, a true and proper prime matter is given in these things that are generated and corrupted. The consequence is evident and free of any difficulty. But the antecedent will be proven in the stated place. things not only in an accidental way but also substantial.

10 Last revision: November 14, 2014 Francisco Suárez, S. J. DM XIII.2 1 Sydney Penner 2014 <399, col. a> 2 SECTION II. Whether the material cause of generable and corruptible substances is single or multiple. 1. In this section and the following one we will briefly touch on the opinions of the ancient philosophers, whom Aristotle investi- Aristotle. gates more thoroughly and opposes in various places, especially in Metaphysics I.3 ff.; Physics I.2; On Generation and Corruption I.1 ff.; and On the Heavens III.7. The same things can be read about in Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Philosophers; Plato, Theaetetus and Sophist; Plotinus Enneads 9.2; Theophrastus, <col. b> Metaphysics, ch 3; and Plutarch, On the Opinions of the Philosophers 3 I.3. Among the Fathers, it is touched on in Augustine, On the City of God at the beginning of book VIII; Epiphanius [of Salamis], Panarion III.80; Irenaeus, Against Heresies II.19; Clement of Rome, Recognitions; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata I; Eusebius, Preparations for the Gospel at the beginning of book XIV; and Ambrose, Hexameron I.2. The views of these philosophers can be gathered under two headings: one for those who posit multiple material first principles (which we will discuss here) and the other for those who only posit one but err in assigning it (which we will discuss in the following section). The view of those positing infinite material principles. 2. The first view, then, was that the material cause of everything consists of indivisible corpuscles or atoms, which Leucippus, Democri- Leucippus. tus, Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Anaxagoras posited to be infinite. Democritus. Almost all of them thought these corpuscles to be similar to each Epicurus. Metrodorus. other and of the same ratio, and that they composed different beings Anaxagoras. 1 Translation is based on the 1597 edition. 2 Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivés edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition. 3 This work is no longer thought to be by Plutarch.

11 Suárez, DM XIII.2 2 only through variety in position, figure, and order. They thought that corruption of things was nothing other than the scattering and disorder of atoms but that generation is a new composition of them. But Anaxagoras posited atoms that are partly similar and partly dissimilar, so that homogeneous things come to be from similar atoms and dissimilar things from dissimilar atoms as in the case of heterogeneous parts of organic bodies (for example, flesh from flesh atoms, but bone from bone atoms, and so on for the others). In turn, certain of them seem to have posited these atoms as wholly indivisible. For this reason, in order so that those atoms can compose a body, they said the body coalesces not only from those atoms but also from some emptiness or void. For if they were all immediately and solidly conjoined, a large mass would never accrete, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I.4. But others seem not to have thought them mathematically indivisible but only physically indivisible. According to this interpretation it is not necessary to place some void between those atoms in order for the magnitude of a body to increase from them. In turn, some of these philosophers did not posit any efficient cause beyond these atoms nor any final cause. Rather, they thought that some things dissolve from the various coming together of these atoms and from their perpetual movement, and other things spring up by chance. And for this reason, as <400> Aristotle relates, Epi- In the cited places and in Metaphysics IV.1. curus said that these corpuscles have a natural weight by which all things are brought about. But others, such as Anaxagoras, posited an efficient cause acting with intellect and will, and composing different things from these corpuscles. 3. But that part pertains to the disputations about the efficient The proposed view is and final causes. Now, as far as the present issue is concerned, refuted. these philosophers do not, in the first place, think that there is a true material cause, which is a potency physically receptive of any act. For those atoms are not in potency to receiving some physical form. Nor can they be called the matter of a whole composite except in the way in which integral parts are called the matter of the whole and the way in which stones and wood are called the matter of a house. A further result is that according to that way of philosophizing the forms of natural beings are, as it were, only artificial forms, namely, a kind of figure arising from the different positions and orderings of atoms. And thus there will be no true substantial The absurdity following generation and corruption, but only various coordinations and dissolutions of atoms. And, although Anaxagoras posits atoms from a view asserting that atoms are the material cause.

12 Suárez, DM XIII.2 3 of different rationes, nevertheless, it is necessary to posit all [of them] confused and mixed together in individual things so that through their being drawn out one thing can be generated from another. And thus all things differ only in that certain things have certain atoms more openly or in more exterior parts while others are more concealed or in more hidden parts, which difference is only one of position and coordination of atoms. Add that it cannot be understood how such different corpuscles having repugnant conditions are intimately conjoined in individual things. It is no less inexplicable how bringing these hidden corpuscles from some thing or other forward into the light seems to give rise to or rather to compose other things. 4. Another thing that is absurd in all these philosophers is that they posit an infinite multitude of these corpuscles. For either they think that there is an infinite multitude of these atoms in individual natural entities or only in the whole universe while there is only a finite multitude in individual bodies or their parts. The view in the former sense is utterly absurd. For it cannot be that infinite atoms compose some body, unless they grow into an infinite magnitude. For if <col. b> atoms are not fashioned mathematically indivisible but physically indivisible, each will have some magnitude. Either they will all have equal magnitude, since there is no ratio of inequality, or at least a minimal atom can be assigned to which all the others will be equal or greater. Therefore, an infinity of atoms of this sort necessarily compose an actually infinite magnitude. But if the atoms are mathematically indivisible, they cannot compose a magnitude except empty space be interposed, which space will be divisible and of some magnitude. From this it is likewise concluded that an infinity of atoms thus distant from each other necessarily effect an infinite body, occupying or including infinite space, partly empty and partly filled with atoms. Nor can a counterexample be produced from the infinite points existing in a line. For in that case there are no immediate points, since the whole line is continuous. But in the case of the atoms it would be necessary given that any designated atom be some proximate distance from it through a some certain and definite distance and so on for the remaining ones it would therefore be necessary that those infinite corpuscles occupy infinite space in that way. 5. But the view taken in the latter sense is also improbable. In the first place, all the things that Aristotle writes in Physics III and On the Heavens I against the infinite magnitude of the world

13 Suárez, DM XIII.2 4 go against it. Furthermore, it is evident that the whole sphere of generable and corruptible things is finite, since it ends at the sphere of the moon. To attribute a composition from atoms to the heavens and to extend those to infinity cannot be philosophical, since neither experience nor reason can lead us to thinking that. Finally, if some body of finite magnitude is constituted of only a finite number of atoms, then this fashioning of atoms cannot suffice for the generations and corruptions of things. First, because almost an infinite variety of things can be generated from the same thing. Also, because the magnitude of a body must always be greatly diminished in any generation and corruption through the dissipation of atoms, yet experience makes clear that that does not always happen. Unless perhaps it is said that a certain rotation of atoms, as it were, always comes to be, while the interior atoms are drawn out to the external parts while the exterior ones are pushed to the inmost parts, and for that reason the magnitude of the thing is not diminished. But nothing could be more absurd than this. For whence does it happen that nothing of the thing itself can be changed except according to place or external appearance. And that drawing out and pushing in of atoms is contrary to experience. <401> For when fire is generated from flax, the generation happens not only in the exterior parts but in the inmost parts and in the whole magnitude. And when a human being dies, the corruption happens in all the parts, in the internal parts as much as in the external parts. This view, therefore, is utterly absurd. Nor does it have any foundation that is necessary to address. For we will explain later what the true sense is of the principle out of nothing nothing comes, the principle in which the cited philosophers are grounded as much as others. The opinion of those positing multiple but finite principles. 6. The second view also posits multiple principles or multiple first material causes of generable things, but only a finite number. Empedocles thinks this. He says that the four elements fire, air, Empedocles. water, and earth are the four first material causes out of which mixtures are generated. But those four do not have a prior cause or material principle. Nevertheless, this view is false and can obviously be refuted. The preceding view is For in the first place, although it touches on the composition or refuted. generation of mixtures from elements, it does not, however, consider the transformation of the elements into each other. Yet it is clear

14 Suárez, DM XIII.2 5 that air is converted into fire and water into earth and conversely. But the elements cannot be the material principle of this kind of transformation. Rather, there must be some subject common to all of them. But perhaps Empedocles thinks that the elements are not transformed substantially and for this reason are not constituted of matter and substantial form but are a kind of wholly simple being subject to accidents. But against this we will in the first place show below that it is no less certain that there are substantial forms of the elements than of any other natural beings and, consequently, they are truly and substantially transformed into each other. Furthermore, even if we were to admit them, there would be no grounds for multiplying matters or first substantial subjects. One should say, rather, that in all elements there is the same substantial subject, which is called distinct elements as affected by different accidents. And since that would also be the subject or material principle of mixtures, the result is that in the thing itself and substantially there is only one first material cause for all things. 7. But suppose Empedocles were to say that that diversity of natural accidents <col. b> that is observed in the elements sufficiently indicates an essential distinction between substantial subjects. From this is taken an effective argument ad hominem. When air is transformed from fire such that it remains affected by the proper accidents of the fire, not only does a change happen in the accidents but also in the substance itself. But it cannot happen in the whole substantial entity on account of the reasons given in the section above concerning annihilation and creation. 4 It is necessary, therefore, also to admit that there is in the elements some subject prior to them and common to them by reason of which they can be mutually transformed. Therefore, they are not first material causes, but something else is prior to them out of which they are constituted. And from this it is also concluded that these elements are not the first material causes of mixtures, since in them themselves is given a prior matter for them. That prior matter is also a material cause of the mixtures, since it remains in them and is informed by their forms. That, therefore, is also the first cause in that order of the mixtures, especially in view of the fact that according to the true view the elements do not remain formally in the mixture. That is, they do not remain according to the proper substantial forms, since the substantial form of a mixture cannot fall (if I may speak in this way) above the form of an element 4 DM

15 Suárez, DM XIII.2 6 or inform matter as already informed by the form of an element. Therefore, the elements according to their proper substances are not enduring and proper material causes of mixtures. But the same matter that is the first material cause of the elements themselves is also the first material cause of the mixtures. The resolution of the question. 8. It should be said, therefore, that there is only one prime matter or first material cause of all sublunar things. This is the common view of all the philosophers to whom we refer in the following [sections]. It is sufficiently proven by the argument already made against Empedocles and by the latter discussion given in the previous section, where we show from the common and mutual transformation of sublunar things that there is a common matter. For that argument equally proves that the subject that remains under all these transformations is only one, both because the contrary principles from which generations and corruptions come about must concern the same thing and also because that subject is of itself indifferent to any forms whatsoever of corruptible things and to their dispositions. And therefore no distinction or multiplication in it is required. In fact, there is nothing from which it would have that. Conversely, every <402> form of a generable thing of any species can be introduced in any part whatsoever of this matter, if it is appropriately disposed. This is a sign that this matter in itself is one and of the same ratio and sufficient in its genus for causing all the effects that can be materially caused in these things if the other causes in the other necessary genera are applied or concur. 9. The only possible objection is that, since the material cause An objection is is intrinsic and essential and since these generable and corruptible addressed. things are essentially diverse, therefore one and the same matter cannot be in all of them. But this objection touches on the question whether matter is a part of the quiddity of material substances. We will discuss this question below in the more appropriate place. DM For now it is briefly responded that the essences of these material things are diverse or dissimilar with respect to forms but similar with respect to prime matter. Nor does this pose any obstacle to essential difference. For essential diversity does not exclude agreement and similarity in some part.

16 Last revision: December 1, 2014 Francisco Suárez, S. J. DM XIII.3 1 Sydney Penner 2014 <402, col. a> 2 SECTION III. Whether the single first material cause of generable substances is some simple body or a whole ( integra) substance. 1. As Aristotle and the other authors cited in the preceding section report, the ancient philosophers who posited only one material principle of all natural things almost all thought that it is some whole substance or simple body (of the sort that Averroes thinks celestial body to be). But there were many opinions among them about that body or material cause. The opinions of the philosophers about the one material principle. 2. First, it was asserted that this principle is water. The author of this view was Thales of Miletus. But others, such as Plutarch, think the origin is more ancient and drawn from Orpheus. 3 The second opinion attributes this function to air. Anaximenes [of Miletus] and Diogenes of Apollonia taught this, as Aristotle reports in Physics I.3 and as Simplicius shows in the same place. The third opinion was that fire is a cause of this sort. Hippasus and Heraclitus taught this and the Stoics followed the same opinion, as it in Cicero, De natura deorum 3. 4 <col. b> The fourth view can elect earth to this office from the fact that it stands under all things and is, as it were, the common mother of all things. Nevertheless, Aristotle says in Metaphysics I.7 that this was the vulgar opinion but that none of the philosophers are inclined towards it by the fact that Anaximenes. Diogenes. Aristotle. Simplicius. Hippasus. Heraclitus. 1 Translation is based on the 1597 edition. Paragraph numbering, however, in which the 1597 and Vivés editions do not agree in this case, follows the Vivés edition, since it is the most widely used edition (The 1597 paragraph numbers are included in square brackets). Numbers in angle brackets also indicate page numbers in the Vivés edition for ease of reference. 2 Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivés edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition. 3 De Isis et Osiris 34? 4 Vivés edition cites book 2 instead.

17 Suárez, DM XIII.3 2 earth on account of its excessive density and dryness seems to be unsuitable for receiving the forms or figures of other things. Nevertheless, Hesiod in his Theogony unreservedly calls earth the material principle of all things and Theodoretus in De materia et mundo reports that Pherecydes [of Syros] thinks the same thing. The fifth opinion attributes this function to none of these four elements but to a certain insensible body in the middle of or between water and air, as Aristotle reports in Metaphysics I.7, or between air and fire, as Anaximander reports, who adds that this intermediate body is infinite lest generation cease at some point. From this it seems to be gathered that this philosopher did not consider this body incorruptible. Otherwise, there would be no reason to fear that it could be consumed through a succession of generations if it were finite, although one can hardly understand how he made it corruptible if he considered it to be simple and the common subjects of generation. Hesiod. Pherecydes. 3. It would be long-winded and superfluous to report the proper A judgement is brought regarding the aforementioned views. motive of all these philosophers, as a result both of being uncertain and of not wear any probability or verisimilitude on their sleeves, so that it will become clear from what will be said along the way. But what seems to have been common to all is that they thought that nothing new could come to be strictly speaking. For from nothing nothing can come to be. For this reason they seem to recognize neither substantial forms nor substantial generation or corruption. In fact, many of them proclaimed that there are no accidental forms that are true beings, since they did not understand that some new true thing can come to be. They thought that every change that we experience consists in various ways (in variis modis) of holding itself of that thing which they thought was common matter. From this some progressed further than that so that they did not say that the material cause of all beings is one but that all beings are one, not in number but in substance and essence. Although what they said is false and improbable, nevertheless they spoke logically (consequenter) if they were dealing only with generable bodies. For if these are not transformed substantially and do not differ through substantial forms but only through accidental forms or through <403> holding themselves in different ways, no material cause of substance is really given, but only a simple substance that is not essentially one and another, but is one holding itself in one way and another way under different accidents. 4. And this was the opinion of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Xenophanes. Melissus, who in this sense said that everything is one being and Parmenides. Melissus.

18 Suárez, DM XIII.3 3 whatever is beyond that is not being. For they do not count accidents or the modes of those beings as beings. Consequently, they get rid of every generation or change strictly speaking by the fact that they make that being ungenerable and incorruptible and by the fact that they do not think that accidental changes merit the absolute title of change since they do not give being strictly speaking. But some of these philosophers are interpreted in other ways, namely, that through one being they understood one universe that contains all things, as Aristotle hints at in De generatione I.8 and Simplicius in Physics I.2. Or through one being they understand God, who alone truly is. For Aristotle in Metaphysics I.5 and Cicero in Academica 2 report that Xenophanes named that one being God. And thus many, weighty authors deem these philosophers to have spoken through enigmas and to have hidden the truth through figurative expressions. But Aristotle attacked their views insofar as they seem to be advanced through the surface appearance of those words. Concerning this matter, one can read St. Thomas in Metaphysics III, text. 15; Philoponus and Simplicius in Physics I.2; Agostino Steuco, De perenni philosophia III.5; Giovanni Francesco Pico della Mirandola 5 Examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium VI.1, and St. Thomas. Philoponus. Simplicius. Steuco. Mirandola. Bessarion. Basilios Bessarion, Contra calumniatorum Platonis. What these philosophers think or what mystery they hide with their words is of little importance for us. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that if they disregard substantial forms as they seem to have disregarded them, given that they make no mention of them, they could consequently easily and sufficiently have fallen into that view as described by us. Hence, this a proof and confirmation of substantial forms will refute this view just as well as others. 5 [4]. But one can refer in this place to another view, which The opinion asserting many of the modern philosophers follow and which places in prime matter a form of corporeity that is coeval with it and inseparable from it. For although with respect to such a form its material cause is simple that is, apart from essential and physical composition nevertheless, the common subject that <col. b> remains through every transformation and that is the universal material cause of every generation and of every substantial form that comes to be through eduction and of every composit that is generated, that subject, I say, is not simple according to the just-mentioned opinion. Rather, it is essentially composite and is some body that is not mixed, nor something from the elements, nor something intermedi- 5 An Italian philosopher and nephew of the better-known Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. that the form of corporeity is coeval with matter.

19 Suárez, DM XIII.3 4 ate between them through a participation in them, but is absolutely a body through the cutting away of all lower forms. Avicenna holds this opinion in The Book of Healing I.2. Its foundation is that the subject of generation must be corporeal and extended and consequently a quantity, but it cannot be something of this sort unless it has some substantial form. Scotus and Henry of Ghent follow this view in part. For the former thinks in IV, dist. 11, q. 3, art. 2, that this kind of form of corporeity or of mixture (as he puts it) is necessary in all and only living things. But the latter in Quodlibet 2, qq. 2 and 3, and Quodlibet 3, qq. 13 and 14, thinks that it should only be admitted in the case of human beings on account of the divisibility of the rational soul. Hence, these two authors do not posit this form as inseparable from matter nor as per se necessary for the first material causality of the subject of generation, but on account of other special reasons. For this reason their opinion does not pertain to the present topic. Resolution of the question. Avicenna. Scotus. Henry. 6 [5]. It should be said first, then, that the material cause that is The first conclusion. universal and first in its order is not something from the sensible bodies or elements that are affected by contrary qualities. This assertion is contrary to the first four opinions and it is evident from what was said in the preceding section. If these elements and all sensible bodies are substantially transformed into each other, none of them can be the first subject of transformation. For the first subject, which is the first material cause which we are seeking, is not transformed and neither does it withdraw from its substance. Otherwise, it would resolve into some prior subject and thus would not be the first subject. Furthermore, since generation takes place between contraries, it is necessary that the common subject of generation not have any of the contraries naturally innate in itself. Otherwise, it will either never be capable of the other contrary or it will be destroyed through the casting down of what is connatural to it, just as an element is destroyed when a quality <404> that is necessary to it is removed. Since, therefore, the individual elements are affected by proper qualitied having contraries, none of them can be a suitable subject of generation. Therefore, neither can any of them be the first material cause of natural beings. 7 [6]. From here a third argument arises, since there is no

20 Suárez, DM XIII.3 5 reason why this causality is attributed to one element rather than to another, nor why it is more repugnant to all of them at once than to some one of them. But it was shown that it cannot agree with all of them. Therefore, it is not truly attributed to any of them. The former part of the major proposition is shown by the fact that the individual elements are simple bodies. And each of them is designed for and suitable for the generation of mixtures, and none of them can in any way be constituted from the others. For each has proper qualities repugnant to the others. Therefore, in all of them there is an equal ratio or repugnance, so that they cannot be the common matter of all generable things. For that in certain things there are certain conditions accommodated to the office of common matter as is, for example, subtlety in fire, by reason of which it can easily penetrate all things, and in air, which almost is the common place of all things and easily receives external impressions, and humidity in water since it is conjoined to density, which seems to be proportionate for constituting nourishment for all things these conditions, I say, are of no relevance. First, because they are of more help for the ratio of effecting or for the ratio of transient matter than for the proper and intrinsic ratio of a material cause. Second, because these conditions also are just as accommodated to certain things as they are repugnant to others. For the subtlety of fire has proportion with the matter of subtle things but not with the matter of dense things. Likewise for the others. But the first material cause, since it is common to all things, must of itself be indifferent to all things. 8 [7]. The other part of the major proposition is proven by the fact that all elements at once cannot be the common matter, since they are substantially transformed into each other. But this argument works equally well for each element taken in itself. Therefore. Hence, finally, it is confirmed: for no element can be the matter of other elements, as seems to be known per se, since they are repugnant to it. Nor can it be the matter of some mixture while remaining in its own nature, since the form of the mixture is also repugnant to the form of the element. Therefore, no element <col. b> can be the common matter of all natural things. And these reasons a fortiori establish [the case] concerning all mixtures, especially since these are constituted from the elements. For this reason no one has so far attributed this causality to any mixture. 9 [8]. I say, second: prime matter is not some body or some The second conclusion. complete substance, both whole in essence and in a species of substance. That matter is a substance of this sort can be understood in two ways. First, such that it alone is the substance of all generable