EPISTEMOLOGY IN CLASSICAL ISLAMIC THOUGHT Selected Readings and Texts

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1 K EPISTEMOLOGY IN CLASSICAL ISLAMIC THOUGHT Selected Readings and Texts

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3 EPISTEMOLOGY IN CLASSICAL ISLAMIC THOUGHT Selected Readings and Texts Selected, introduced and edited by Farshad F. Saniee

4 CONTENTS Preface Part 1 Analysis of Knowledge and Certitude Introduction Chapter 1: Preliminaries Reading 1. Ilm and Ma rifa: A Problem of Translation...21 Reading 2. A Lexicographical Note on Ma rifa...22 Reading 3. On the Meaning of Ilm...24 Reading 4. Definitions of Knowledge...24 Chapter 2: First Division of Knowledge and Knowledge by Presence Reading 5. An Introduction to the First Division of Knowledge and Knowledge by Presence...32 Reading 6. A Historical Background of ÑadrÁ s View on Knowledge by Presence...36 Reading 7. ÑadrÁ on Knowledge by Presence and Its Relation to Knowledge by Occurrence...37 Reading 8. Three Issues of Knowledge by Presence

5 E P I S T E M O L O G Y I N C L A S S I C A L I S L A M I C T H O U G H T Chapter 3: Basic Divisions of Knowledge by Occurrence Reading 9. On a Fourfold Division of Knowledge...47 Reading 10. Avicenna on Conception and Assent...52 Reading 11. Conception and Belief in ÑadrÁ...55 Reading 12. Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of His Al-ShifÁʼ...61 Reading 13. Types of Propositions Involving Assent...64 Reading 14. Varieties of Premises in Syllogistic Arts...67 Chapter 4: On Truth: Definitions and Criteria Reading 15. Introduction...73 Reading 16. Definitions of Truth...74 Reading 17. Criteria for Truth...80 Chapter 5: Certitude and Demonstration Reading 18. Certitude and Its Conditions in al-fárábð...87 Reading 19. On Certainty and Demonstration in Avicenna...95 Chapter 6: Induction and Methodic Experience Reading 20. Induction in al-fárábð s Epistemology Reading 21. Avicenna on Induction Reading 22. A Brief Note on Complete and Incomplete Induction Reading 23. Al-FÁrÁbÐ on Experience Reading 24. Methodic Experience in Avicenna Texts Text 1. On Some Primary Concepts: The Thing and the Existent Text 2. Absolute Certitude

6 C O N T E N T S Text 3. Permises That Are Not Certain and Are Unusable in Drmonstrations Text 4. Methodic Experience Part 2 Skepticism Introduction Chapter 7: Historical Considerations C Reading 25. Some Historical Points on Skepticism in Islamic Environments Reading 26. The Role of Skepticism in a Classical Islamic Context: A Historical Note Chapter 8: GhazÁlÐ,, Descartes and Skepticism Reading 27. Some Comparative Notes on Skepticism in al-ghazálð and Descartes (1) Reading 28. Some Comparative Notes on Skepticism in al-ghazálð and Descartes (2) Chapter 9: RÁzÐ R and Skepticism S Reading 29. Skepticism in Two Books of al-rázð Chapter 10: Responses to Some Skeptical Arguments Reading 30. Two Arguments for Doubting Human Knowledge: A Criticism Reading 31. A Discussion on Three Skeptical Objections Reading 32. Pyrrho and the Possibility of Knowledge Texts Text 5. Defense of the First Principle of Demonstrative Proofs Text 6. A Critique of Skepticism

7 E P I S T E M O L O G Y I N C L A S S I C A L I S L A M I C T H O U G H T Part 3 Modes and Sources of Knowledge Introduction Chapter 11: Senses and Sense-Perception Perception Reading 33. Senses and Sensory Knowledge Reading 34. Avicenna on Perception and Sense-Perception Chapter 12: Imagination Reading 35. Ibn SÐnÁ and Imagination Reading 36. TakhyÐl as an Epistomological Concept Chapter 13: Intuition Reading 37. Intuition in Avicenna Chapter 14: 1 Levels of Knowledge Reading 38. Modes and Levels of Perception in ÑadrÁ Chapter 15: Intellect and Intellection Reading 39. Rational Faculty and Rational Knowledge Reading 40. An Introductory Note on Intellection in the Three Schools of Islamic Philosophy Reading 41. Avicenna & Intellectual Perception Reading 42. ÑadrÁ on Intellection and Unification of the Intellect and the Intelligible Chapter 16: Abstraction Reading 43. The Importance of Abstraction Reading 44. Abstraction in Avicenna Reading 45. A Brief Note on Abstraction in ÑadrÁ Chapter 17: Rationalism and Empiricism Reading 46. The Priority of Sensation or Intellection Reading 47. On Reliability of Rational Concepts and Beliefs

8 C O N T E N T S Reading 48. Rational and Empirical Doctrines Chapter 18: History Reading 49. History as a source of knowledge Texts Text 7. Intuition Text 8. Kinds of Intellection Text 9. Gradation in the Human Intellect Text 10. Unification of the Intellect and the Intelligible Text 11. Abstraction Part 4 Knowledge in the Holy Qurʼan Introduction Chapter 19: Some Epistemological Themes in the Qur an Reading 50. Qurʼanic Vocabulary Related to Knowledge Reading 51. Some Epistemological Terms and Issues Reading 52. On Human Knowing and Some Related Concepts Chapter 20: Acquiring Knowledge and Its Impediments Reading 53. Ways of Acquiring Knowledge Reading 54. Impediments of Cognition

9 TRANSLITERATION Arabic characters Roman Equivalent Arabic characters Roman Equivalent y ى ء ah ; at ة b ب state) t (construct ت ث ج th j Î Long Vowels ح Á ا kh خ Ù و d د Ð ي dh ذ ر r ز z Short Vowels س s a ش sh u ص Ò i ض Ã ط Ô Diphthongs ظ Û و aw ع ي (ay) ai Ð) ayy (final form ٸ gh غ Ù) uww (final form ۇ f ف ق ك ل q k l Persian letters added to the Arabic alphabet p ب m م ch ج n ن ه h ز zh و w ک g 10

10 PREFACE Epistemology, in general, is the study of knowledge and more technically is the branch of philosophy which deals with the nature, scope (possibility and limitations), modes and sources of knowledge. Epistemology, as a single coherent field in Western philosophy, arose in the twentieth century and became increasingly professional over the last fifty years. Apart from this turning point, however, reflection on knowledge and its characteristic features has been for centuries, during the ancient and medieval periods, at the core of philosophical considerations traceable back to its origin in the early Greek philosophers works. In traditional Islamic thought, particularly, in the classical Islamic philosophy and theology (falsafa and kalám), epistemology was not an explicitly developed discipline and there was no technical term equivalent to epistemology but the truly great Muslim philosophers (falásifa) and theologians (MutakallimÙn) were interested in problems related to human knowledge and developed some implicit theories of knowledge. Knowledge ( ilm and ma rifa) and the related concepts have been widely used in various fields of Islamic thought. As Franz Rosenthal points out there is no branch of Muslim intellectual life, of Muslim religious and political life, and of the daily life of the average Muslim that remained untouched by the all-pervasive attitude toward knowledge as something of supreme value for Muslim being. 1 This book is an attempt to represent some of the main concepts, 1. Rosenthal Franz, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p

11 E P I S T E M O L O G Y I N C L A S S I C A L I S L A M I C T H O U G H T theories and approaches in the study of classical Islamic epistemology, conceived as the Islamic theory of knowledge. It is based on various investigations during the twentieth century and especially in past several decades. This book contains 54 Readings as well as 11 Texts which are organized in 4 Parts and 20 Chapters. Each Part opens with an introduction that provides an overview of the central points in the Chapters. The Readings are selected from a wide range of significant articles and books written by contemporary scholars in the field of classical Islamic thought, they are edited, entitled and prepared for the relevant Chapters in accordance with the overall structure of the contents of the book. Apart from the Readings, each Part (except for Part 4) has a Texts Section. These texts are selected from some seminal works (books and epistles) by well-known and influential major figures in classical Islamic thought figures such as al-fárábð, Avicenna, MullÁ ÑadrÁ and TÙsÐ. They have been chosen and collected from their original Arabic sources which are translated in recent decades by the experts in the field. One point deserves to be mentioned here, in many cases, the titles and subtitles of the Readings (and the titles of the Texts) are not mentioned in the original sources, they are added to the selections chosen for this book, where editing and structure of debate required it. In the end, I must add an expression of sincerest gratitude to Dr. Seyyed Mohsen Miri for his patience, encouragement, criticisms and kind moral support during this work. My special appreciation and thanks goes to Pirooz Fatoorchi for his substantive help, advice, guidance and generous constant support. Farshad F. Saniee 12

12 PART 1 ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND CERTITUDE 13

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14 INTRODUCTION In epistemology, the analysis of knowledge is intended to provide an answer to the question: what is knowledge and its main characteristics? It is evident that in our way to reach this goal we should pay attention to the central divisions of knowledge. On the other hand, since the discussions we are going to mention in the Readings and Texts of this book are based upon original resources which are mainly written in Arabic language, problem of translation shows itself in various ways. In dealing with this important issue, chapter one (entitled preliminaries) sets out some useful points. The first Reading, by Franz Rosenthal, concentrates on two key Arabic terms: ilm and ma rifa. Rosenthal describes that although ilm is more or less well rendered by knowledge, it falls short of expressing all the factual and emotional contents of ilm. Transference from one language to another, he concludes, always disturbs unique thought patterns. The second reading of this chapter devoted to a brief lexicographical note on ma rifa and some other related terms like idrák and naûar. This reading contains some useful points regarding different usages of this kind of terms. Some further points on the meaning of ilm will be mentioned in Reading 3. In analyzing a concept such as knowledge, naturally, it would be expected to give several clear definitions and this is why one can find various definitions in the logical, theological and philosophical writings by Islamic philosophers (falásifa), theologians (MutakallimÙn). This diversity of definitions can help us in learning more about different aspect of knowledge or, say, seeing it from different angles. In Reading 4, we have provided a collection of nineteen selected definitions which are classified into four groups. It should be noted, 15

15 E P I S T E M O L O G Y I N C L A S S I C A L I S L A M I C T H O U G H T however, that most Islamic philosophers maintain that knowledge ( ilm or ma rifa) is among self-evident concepts which can not be truly defined. In this view, the notion of knowledge is logically primitive or basic and it can not be broken down into simpler components. Consequently, it is not possible to provide non-circular analysis of what is knowledge; and this is tantamount to saying that no real definition (Îadd or rasm) could be available at all. Therefore, what we will see in Reading 4 should not be counted as real definitions of knowledge. Rather, they are explications of the notion, using other synonymous terms.1 Chapter 2 deals with first division of knowledge into presentational knowledge or knowledge by presence ( ilm ÎuÃÙrÐ) and knowledge by correspondence or knowledge by occurrence ( ilm ÎuÒulÐ). Because of the paramount significance of knowledge by occurrence and its exclusive role in Islamic epistemology, the major part of this chapter is devoted to knowledge by presence and its main features. Reading 5 provides an introduction to the abovementioned division of knowledge with particular attention to knowledge by presence. This Reading shows, among other things, why the cases of knowledge by presence are fundamentally infallible. Although what is known as knowledge by presence was developed initially by SuhrawardÐ, ÑadrÁ s influential role in promoting and shaping this area of Islamic philosophy is indubitable. A brief discussion about historical background of ÑadrÁ s view can be found in Reading 6. Knowledge by presence and particularly its relation to knowledge by occurrence from ÑadrÁ s point of view will be examined in Reading 7. It will be shown, in the case of human being, that knowledge by presence precedes knowledge by occurrence. In general, this chapter will remind us about the relationship between epistemology and philosophy of mind (or soul). Because, as we will see in this chapter, some key concepts in current philosophical debates about mind and 1. For more on this see: NaÒÐr al-dðn TÙsÐ, SharÎe al-ishárát wa-al- TanbÐhÁt, (Qum: Daftar Nashr KetÁb, 1983), Vol. 2, pp ; and Al-Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn, al-óabáôabá Ð, The Elements of Islamic Philosophy (BidÁyat al-íikmah), trans. Sayyid AlÐ QulÐ QarÁ Ð, (London: ICAS, 2003), p

16 A N A L Y S I S O F K N O W L E D G E A N D C E R T I T U D E consciousness, (like: self, self-knowledge and conscious experience) are at the core of philosophical issues of knowledge by presence. One of the best resources on the subject of knowledge by presence is The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy, by MehdÐ HÁ irð YazdÐ. Reading 8 contains a selection of this book which discusses three related important issues from analytical and historical perspectives. Chapter 3 covers a well- known basic division of knowledge by occurrence into conception (taòawwur) and assent (taòdðq) which in turn is subdivided into primary (or self-evident) and acquired. This epistemic fourfold division is taken up with some important historical considerations in Reading 9 as a short selection from Harry Wolfson s classical work on taòawwur and taòdðq, and then in Reading 10 we look at the same divisions from Avicenna s view. The relationship between conception, assent and judgement have for a long time been the subject of debate between Islamic philosophers which has considerable epistemological implications for the analysis of knowledge and its main components. A short introduction to this debate with paying attention to ÑadrÁ s view will be mentioned in Reading 11. Although the self-evident assents (taòdðqát badðhð) are of more epistemic important in our way to acquire new knowledge, the influential role of the self-evident conceptions should not be neglected. Bearing this point in mind, in Reading 12 we look at Avicenna s view on primary concepts in the metaphysics of al- ShifÁ. The first Text of our selected Texts in this book is a selection from Avicenna s al-shifá which focuses on the same issue. For Avicenna, the primary concepts are epistemologically prior to the acquired concepts and assents, forming a necessary condition for the latter s acquisition. In Islamic epistemology, the foundation of knowledge consists of different types of basic propositions involving assent (or simply, assents). Of course, it is clear that not all propositions involving assent can lead to certitude (yaqðn) the most assured form of knowledge. Before we can deal with the specific assents or propositions which are eligible to be used in our ways to reach certitude, we should first learn more about different types of basic propositions involving assent, in general. Reading 13 provides two classifications of these propositions with some useful clarifications and comparisons derived from Avicenna s writings. The five types of syllogistic arts demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, sophistry and 17

17 E P I S T E M O L O G Y I N C L A S S I C A L I S L A M I C T H O U G H T poetics are among the most important debates in Islamic epistemological speculations. Islamic philosophers agree that the syllogistic arts comprise a hierarchy of epistemic goals, from certitude to poetic imagination. In this regard, the question of how to distinguish a variety of assents or propositions that are used in different syllogistic arts would be of central epistemic importance. Reading 14 deals with this issue and considers that assent itself need not always be the goal of the syllogistic processes, and that not all syllogistic premises need to evoke our assent. It is well-known that in contemporary epistemology truth is counted as a crucial concept of knowledge. Further, justification by its very nature has some kind of connection with truth. One can see this by noting that there is something fundamentally wrong with supposing that a belief being justified has nothing whatever to do with its truth. However, perhaps because the truth condition has been subsumed under the conditions of certitude, we would not find a detailed account or serious discussion about truth in classical resources of Islamic epistemology. In such a context, MuÔahharÐ s discussion of truth in chapter 4 is indispensable for obtaining some insightful ideas we need to be acquainted with when we are seeking appropriate topics and issues relevant to the nature and criteria of truth, especially in connection with classical Islamic epistemology. This chapter is organized into two main sections: definitions of truth (Reading 16) and criteria for truth (Reading 17). These include a refutation of truth-relativism as well as an objection to action as criterion for truth. In chapter 5, we deal with yaqðn and burhán as two very important epistemological notions. YaqÐn, which is best translated as certitude, is the most genuine and authentic instance of knowledge; in other words, if we accept the hierarchical picture of knowledge, certitude lies at the highest level; hence, certitude has been the ultimate concern in the classical Islamic epistemology. Clearly, all the discussions related to analysis of certitude and its components, conditions and main characteristics constitute the most significant part of epistemology in Islamic philosophy. In this regard, al-fárábð s and Avicenna s writings have been the best resources on the subject of certitude. Not only does al-fárábð discuss the concept of certitude extensively in a number of his logical writings (including his own KitÁb al-burhán), he also devotes an entire treatise, known as the 18

18 A N A L Y S I S O F K N O W L E D G E A N D C E R T I T U D E Conditions of Certitude (Shari at al-yaqðn), to the project of specifying the criteria according to which a cognizer can be said to have certain knowledge of any proposition. Reading 18 considers al-fárábð s view on the criteria and conditions of certitude. In addition, a selection of al-fárábð s Conditions of Certitude is provided as Text 2 at the end of part 2 (Texts section). Also Avicenna s view on the conditions of certitude is considered briefly at the beginning of Reading 19. The second subject matter of chapter 5 is burhán which is rendered by the term demonstration. The vital epistemological importance of demonstration will be evident if we consider its central role as the safest way that leads exclusively to the highest form of knowledge the certitude. Avicenna s Book of Demonstration (KitÁb al-burhán) provides the most detailed discussions of various aspects and types of demonstration and the related issues. Reading 19 is a very short selection of this book which is mostly devoted to the types of demonstration as well as to the conditions and some basic features of demonstrative knowledge. It is clear that in our way to gain certitude and to use demonstration, in a proper manner, we need to know premises that are not certain and are not usable in demonstration. This will be addressed in Text 3. Induction (istiqrá) and experience (tajriba; or methodic experience) are employed in many branches of human inquiry. Induction is a kind of inferential reasoning which is not deductive. Inductive inference is often taken to be reasoning from observations about particular matter of facts to an unobserved universal generalization. It should be noted, however, that there is a more intricate and technical Aristotelian notion of induction which (as we will see in chapter 6, Reading 21) has been criticized by Avicenna. In al-fárábð s and Avicenna s discussions about demonstration and particularly in Avicenna s Book of Demonstration, we find that they pay attention to induction and experience and examine the reliability and main features of these two epistemic notions. Their views and discussions will be considered in chapter 6. For al-fárábð, as we will see in Reading 20, the certitude of induction is restricted because by definition it remains on the level of the particular and extends only to those determinate individuals that the knower has actually sensed. Experience, by contrast, is universal, and it arises when we have reached the point where we make a general judgement of the subjects of these premises that includes both what we have 19

19 E P I S T E M O L O G Y I N C L A S S I C A L I S L A M I C T H O U G H T sensed and what we have not sensed. In addition, it will be shown that al-fárábð s remarks on the certitude of experience and its distinction from induction has resurfaced in a more developed form in Avicenna s account of experience in his own Book of Demonstration and in his discussions of the epistemic status of empirical premises. In Reading 21, we will read about Avicenna s interesting critical assessment of Aristotle s notion of induction. While like Aristotle before him Avicenna takes a staunchly empirical approach to the sciences, it is on the subject of induction, which is frequently considered a cornerstone of empiricism, that Avicenna most notably parts way with Aristotle and his epistemology and philosophy of science. Reading 22 gives a brief discussion about an important distinction between two types of induction: complete and incomplete. It will be indicated why complete induction is said to be demonstrative. There are two Readings in this chapter which deal with analysis of experience and its main features from al-fárábð s and Avicenna s perspectives. In Reading 23, it will be mentioned that for al-fárábð, experience can provide us with certain knowledge (or certitude) about a universal characteristic that is common to all instances of a well-defined variety, while being based on a close consideration of all, or most of them. Hence, in this view, the universality involved in «experience» is not an absolute universality, but a qualified one. Avicenna, as we will consider in Reading 24, wants to replace the technical Aristotelian notion of induction with his own conception of methodic experience (= experience), which like induction has both a sensory and rational, or syllogistic, component. Also, it will be mentioned that Avicenna is critical of the notion of induction that he inherited and wants to replace it with his own conception of methodic experience. In Text 4, there is a selection of Avicenna s debate on methodic experience, derived from his Book of Demonstration within which he discusses, among other things, why is it that methodic experience provides humans with knowledge that scammony purges bile in a manner that is different from that by which induction provides it? 20