Plato Lecture 1. Politics in Ancient Athens: The Birth of Democracy:

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1 Plato Lecture 1 Politics in Ancient Athens: The Birth of Democracy: The Ancient Greeks invented the idea and the practice of democracy. Of course, they invented the word too: the rule of the people. The classical origin of democracy as an idea and as a form of government is in Athens in the 5 th and 4 th centuries B.C. Some ancient Greek societies had a sort of democratic political system and thought democracy was a good thing. But for 2,000 years or so after that, most societies in the world were not democratic at all, and most people who thought about it believed democracy to be a bad thing. The main figures to discuss the theory of democracy for our purposes Plato and Aristotle were anti-democratic thinkers. The Polis. Athens, like other Greek towns, was an independent city-state, the Greek world for this is Polis. The central unit of government was very small, so that every fullfledged member could participate in its affairs. In the fourth century B.C., there were huge empires in Persia and Egypt, but in Greece there was a distinctive type of small institution with an accompanying strong sense of community. This was the polis. The Greek word polis is the root of our words politics, political, politician, policy, police, and polo. (Actually, that last one probably comes from pulu, the Tibetan word for ball ). The best translation for polis is city-state. Compared to modern nation-states, the average Greek polis was small. Athens, for instance, one of the biggest of the ancient Greek city-states, had approximately 40,000 citizens as part of a total human population of about 300,000 (including women, children, foreign residents, and slaves). So, the absolute numbers were roughly the same as London, Ontario today, although the entire citizen-population could fit into the TD Waterhouse Stadium. Some of these citizens were very wealthy; others were poor peasants. The society was characterized by significant equality before the law as well as considerable freedom of speech. Every citizen had the right to address the ecclesia, that is, the assembly of all citizens, which met around 40 times a year for 12 hour sessions in which citizens raised their hands to vote. In addition to this ecclesia, there was also a Council of 500 people, chosen by lot, with a regularly rotating membership, and which prepared the issues to be discussed in the assembly. The other important institution was the courts, whose juries were chosen by lot, usually numbering around 500. (At Socrates trial, there were 200 jurors). These were not only regular juries as we know them; they also reviewed the work of the Assembly. Athenian Democracy. Greek democracy was direct and participatory. The Assembly and juries were open to all citizens, and attendance at them was paid. Athenian democracy was both more and less democratic than today s democracies. It was more democratic in that all citizens took a direct part in the main decisions affecting them this is direct democracy whereas today s democracies are indirect or representative, that is, the citizens stand at some distance from the decisions made, say, in a parliament or Congress, where decisions are made by representatives. Direct democracy requires a citizen-body small enough to meet in one place, and where each citizen has enough time free of other responsibilities to enable them to deal properly with arguments for and against proposed policies. But Athenian democracy was less democratic than modern democracies in that it restricted

2 citizenship to free-born males: women, slaves and resident foreigners were excluded. These groups did the productive work that enabled the citizens to have the time to participate in political activity. Women in Athens had little in the way of legal rights, and were more or less confined to their homes: their most important job was to produce male children who would become future citizens and property owners. Until the twentieth century, modern democracies also excluded many potential citizens: women, the unpropertied, and so on, did not even get the vote until quite recently. And even today, many adult residents of countries are excluded from political participation, even though they contribute hugely to the productivity of the economy. (Think of the illegal aliens in California and elsewhere in the developed countries). Religion was the state religion. Also, the political and the social were not very sharply distinguished, so that the Olympics involved representatives from the different cities. Some Greek city-states were tyrannies, some were oligarchies (Sparta is the most notable oligarchy; it fought and defeated Athens, the greatest democracy, in the Peloponnesian War of B.C). But in all cases, public and private affairs were mingled together. It was the role of the state to provide for the moral education of its citizens. Our first theorist, Plato, was no democrat. He didn t much value liberty, thought equality was only valuable if it was amongst equals, and valued solidarity but thought it was best achieved by a kind of social unity in which democratic equality is specifically ruled out. Socrates ( B.C). Socrates is the central figure in most of the Platonic dialogues. He was an Athenian, born in 469 BC. He is reported to have been fairly funny looking, with a snub nose and big bulging eyes, and he could hold his liquor better than most. Amazingly, Socrates wrote nothing. For us, he speaks in the works written by one of his followers, Plato. Socrates didn t subscribe to any particular philosophical or theoretical doctrine. (In the Republic, Socrates does offer some positive doctrines, but it s generally agreed that these theories are Plato s invention rather than Socrates own views. The Socrates of The Republic, Book I, is probably pretty close to the real Socrates). He cross-examined his fellow Athenians about their moral and political assumptions, and he made a lot of people angry (largely by questioning their confidently held but poorly thought-out beliefs). He seemed concerned most of all to follow an argument wherever it might lead. This attitude reflected his deep commitment to discovering the truth, whatever it might be. The Oracle at Delphi, a significant religious authority, called Socrates the wisest man in Greece. Since Socrates claimed to know that he wasn t wise, he sought out men with reputations for wisdom, but he found after pestering them and exposing their confused thinking that none of these people knew what they thought they knew. Socrates therefore took his own wisdom to consist in this: I don t think that I know things I don t know (Apology, 21d). Socrates made questioning, philosophical activity his life s work: as Socrates himself puts it: the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being (Apology, 38a). He wanted to discover the truth by appealing to argument rather than traditional authority. He was tried for corrupting the youth and not believing in the city s gods, and he was convicted and sentenced to deal. (On this, see the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, in The Trial and Death of Socrates). Life of Plato ( B.C). Plato Lecture 2 Plato was born into an aristocratic Athenian family in 427 B.C, when Socrates was 42 years old. At the age of 20, Plato joined the group of people who followed Socrates around; the years he spent as a follower of Socrates had a huge influence on Plato s subsequent development. There were no universities in those days, so obtaining a higher education involved associating with sophists (itinerant teachers). As we know, ancient Athens was a democracy. At the end of the Peloponnesian War (404 B.C),

3 that democracy was overthrown by a group of conservatives, including two of Plato s relatives, who ruled as the Thirty Tyrants for nine months. When the democracy was restored, it was a vengeful democracy, and in 399 B.C Socrates associate of some of the tyrants was tried and sentenced to death for corrupting the youth and not believing in the Athenian Gods. This must have had an enormous impact on the young Plato. A few years later, Plato founded the Academy, and institution resembling a modern research center. (Our word academic comes down to us by way of the influence of the Academy as the first of its kind in European cultural history). Plato remained head of the Academy until he died in 347 B.C. Plato is one of the finest writers of Greek prose, and he is considered to be among the greatest philosophers who have ever lived. His works are all in dialogue form, conversations, that is, between two or more people. Overview of The Republic. Here is a very rough outline of the main topics covered in The Republic. The dialogue begins by addressing a question, What is justice? Several participants try to answer the question, but Socrates tries to show them that their views are inadequate. After a heated discussion with Thrasymachus, Socrates then spends the remainder of the dialogue setting out his own answer to this question and the related one, Why be just? The account describes how justice is harmony between parts of the soul (or person) and analogously between classes of people in the city or polis, with each part or class fulfilling its proper role. A well-ordered soul or city is a happy soul or city, so justice is conducive to happiness (So, everyone has a reason to be just). The just polis is ruled by philosopher-kings. Philosophers are those who possess knowledge of the Forms, and only a select few are capable of possessing knowledge in this sense. The best form of state, therefore, will be a form of rule by the best rather than rule by the many. Plato rejects democracy, therefore, in part because it is an unjust form of rule. Here is a tip: to get an overview of the Republic, try reading Reeve s short introductions to each of the ten books or chapters in the Hackett edition. It s certainly no substitute for reading Plato, but it will give you some sense of the bigger picture. By the way, you should know about Stephanus Numbers and Letters. These are the traditional means of identifying passages in Plato. Their origin is a scholarly edition of Plato s collected works (the Republic runs from 327a-621d). Plato Lecture 3 Glaucon and the Conventional Origins of Justice. Reading: Book 2, 358b-362C (pp in Grube/Reeve translation, Hackett). In Book2, Glaucon makes a distinction between three kinds of goods, and links this distinction to a challenge to Socrates. The three kinds of goods are as follows: 1) Goods we desire for their own sake ( harmless pleasures Grube/Reeve translation). Modern example? Watching a good movie; 2) Goods we like both for their own sake and for their consequences ( knowing and seeing, and being health ); 3) Goods that are burdensome but ultimately beneficial, and which we therefore desire only for the results they bring (Examples: going to the doctor, working out, doing a job just to make money note that these are Plato s examples at 357c).

4 Glaucon challenges Socrates to show that justice is to be preferred to injustice. If justice is to be recommended, it s because it s either good in itself and for its consequences, or good only for its consequences. Socrates says that justice fits into category 2): justice is akin to health (in fact, in Book 4, he likens it to mental health). Glaucon points out that the common view puts justice into category 3, and he wants to hear Socrates reply to Glaucon s argument that justice is good only for its consequences. Socrates says that justice is valuable both for itself and for its consequences, but (according to Glaucon) most people think you should be just only for popularity and reputation, that is, only for its consequences. After all, it s burdensome to be just. According to Glaucon, justice is a compromise between the natural good of doing injustice and the natural evil of suffering injustice. The evil is much worse than the good here, so people agree not to do injustice so that they won t be a victim of it (358e-359a). The best state of affairs is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer injustice without being able to take revenge: people value justice because they re unable to do injustice with impunity. So Glaucon is arguing that the rules of justice arise from agreements between people, each pursuing their own interests (358e-359b). Justice is valued only for its consequences: anyone who could get away with violating the rules of justice would do so (as did the ancestor of Gyges with his invisibility ring) (359b-360d). In other words, if they had the power to be unjust without getting caught, then they would be unjust. Because people believe that the only reason to be just is to avoid suffering the socially imposed consequences of getting caught acting unjustly, everyone would behave unjustly if they had the magic ring (since they could guarantee not being caught). It s natural for us to try to dominate others; but if everyone acted in this natural way, we re all in danger of being exploited, so we have agreed to outlaw it: justice is based on convention, on a social contract. As Plato memorably puts it, nature is forced by law into the perversion of treating fairness with respect (359c, Reeve translation). It benefits all of us to have rules of justice restraining our conduct, but the best state of affairs is where everyone else abides by those rules while I violate them and get away with it. At 360e-362c, Glaucon asks us to compare the lives of two hypothetical people: 1) the just man who is universally believed to be unjust, and 2) the unjust man with a great reputation for being just. The second man becomes rich, powerful, and well thought-of. The first person will be whipped, stretched on a rack, chained, blinded with fire, and, at the end, when he has suffered every kind of evil, he ll be impaled, and will realize then that one shouldn t want to be just but to be believed to be just (361e). In short, what matters is not whether you re just but rather whether you have a reputation for being just. It s important only to seem to be just (361e). Glaucon wants Socrates to show that person 1) is happier than person 2), which doesn t look easy. Adeimantus adds that common opinion also maintains that it is a reputation for justice that matters rather than being just (362e-363a). The poets too (Homer, Hesiod) claim that justice and moderation are fine things, but hard and onerous, while licentiousness and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire and are shameful only in opinion and law (363e-364a). So why should we be just when we can act unjustly with impunity? Adeimantus challenges Socrates to offer an argument showing injustice to be the worst thing a soul can have in it (366e), to show what justice and injustice do to those who possess them (367b), and to explain what are the intrinsic benefits of justice to its possessor (367d). The rest of the Republic constitutes Plato s reply. The First Cities, The Naturalness of Justice (and the analogy between City and Soul).

5 From 368 (middle of Book 2) through to near the end of Book 4, Socrates tries to show that a just soul that leads to just conduct also leads to a happier person. Since there s justice not only in the individual soul but also in the city, Socrates proposes to focus first on the city and then on the individual (368) the theory of the Forms implies that the character or idea of justice will be the same in each case, and it is easier to see bigger things than it is smaller ones. Socrates aims to give an account of justice in the human soul, but he begins by saying that justice in the individual is small and therefore hard to detect, and for that reason we should begin by investigating justice in the city (368c-d). So he starts by describing the just city, that is, by giving Plato s political ideal. Books 5 to 7 constitute a further development of some parts of the just city, and they include an account of the most famous elements of Platonic metaphysics, i.e., his account of the nature of reality. In Book 8, Plato eventually gets back to his argument that justice is better than injustice. At this stage, in Book 2, we get the beginnings of parallel accounts of justice in the city and in the human soul or personality. So, for Plato, there are important links between the individual and society. People can be just only if they are raised in a just society: a just polis is a necessary condition for justice in the soul. Recall that the central questions of the Republic are: What is justice? How does it pay? How can we make people just? Glaucon s story about the origins of justice stressed the conventional character of justice, the idea that human societies are based on a consciously conceived compromise amongst people. Socrates now offers an alternative history, aimed at showing that society and justice are natural, not conventional. Again, the distinction is between a naturalistic account (described in terms of our needs and lack of self-sufficiency) and an account of justice as artificial or conventional (something we created to protect ourselves from being harmed by others). On this alternative story, a city comes to be because none of us is self-sufficient (369b). Moreover, we all have basic needs for food, shelter, and clothing. We form communities to satisfy these needs. We need farmers, builders, weavers, and cobblers: in short, there arises a division of labour (369d). This division of labour is helped by the fact that we each have different natures, and we are naturally suited to different tasks (370a). Each person should do the one task for which they are best suited, because that s more efficient (370c). One person cannot do many jobs well (374a). The principle of the division of labour is crucial to Plato s argument. Adeimantus says that justice is to be found in the mutual dependence of the citizens on one another (372 a). Justice itself is each class of person doing its own task. The first city constitutes the original pattern of justice (443c) because in it everyone benefits reciprocally from the division of labour and the exchange of goods and services (the division of labour maximizes efficiency because it enables each individual to focus their activities on the work for which they re naturally best suited). Glaucon says that the first city is a city for pigs (372d), not human beings. Socrates says that the true city is a healthy one, but he ll go on to describe the sick city, the luxurious city. In addition to the necessities already mentioned, the second city provides all the luxuries (from hookers, to perfume, to gold (372e-373a)). Clearly, Plato frowns on the pursuit of luxuries, and later he creates a class of philosopherrulers who restrict the masses desires for luxury. If people are going to eat meat, they ll need more cattle, and therefore more land. Consequently, we ll have to attack our neighbours to get their land; and they ll have to do the same. This is the story of the origins of war. And since people are suited only to particular tasks, we ll need an army of professional soldiers (373c-374a). Note that all of this stems from going beyond what we need to live well. It comes from having adopted a misguided goal: the endless acquisition of money (373d).

6 From 376c-412a, Plato changes tack: here we have his account of the guardians early education. At 412, the guardians are subdivided into two classes (see also 414b): the best are the rulers; the others are their auxiliaries. Tripartite Conception of the City (Book 3, 412ff). The city is made up of three classes, each with its own function: first, the guardians, the ruling class, rulers, philosopher-kings and queens; second, the auxiliaries (414b), the military class, who obey the rulers orders and defend the city from its enemies (both internal and external) the rulers and auxiliaries together are referred to as the guardians; third, the farmers, traders, and craftsmen: the producers, the economic class. Plato describes in detail the city s educational system which, if it performs as it should, will ensure that the auxiliaries remain loyal to the rulers and that the rulers make decisions in the common interest. In order to get everyone to go along with this arrangement, the people should be told a myth, the myth of the metals (414b-415c): your memory of your upbringing is a dream; the reality is that we were all nurtured by mother-earth, and then we sprang up like mushrooms when she decided we were ready. So we re all brothers, all children of the earth. And those who are fit to rule have gold mixed into them, because they are the most valuable; silver is mixed in with the auxiliaries, and iron and bronze with the farmers and craftsmen. The main thing the rulers should guard against is the mixture of the metals in the souls of the next generation (415b). (Later, at 546e-547a, Plato says that the intermixing of iron with silver and bronze with gold leads to unharmonious inequality and war). Of course, this myth is false. But it expresses Plato s ideal city: a human nature-based class system, a strong sense of community across all three classes, and a ruling class which aims to preserve this community and the accompanying class system. So we have the nature-based class system and social unity based on a sense of community. While this is anti-democratic, since the ruling class alone has a say in decision-making, it nonetheless stresses social unity, so Plato would reject societies like the one described by Thrasymachus in Book 1, that is, a class system where the lowers classes are exploited by the rulers. Plato thinks that the greatest evil for a city is whatever destroys its unity (462a-b). The guardians function is to see to it that citizens do not want to harm the state and that external enemies won t be able to harm it (414b). They do this by controlling education and reproduction, and by preserving social unity. Won t the guardians exploit the others? No, says Plato, because they cannot possess private property beyond what s necessary (416d-e and 464 b-c). They ll live in common and believe that they don t need human gold because they already have divine silver and gold in their souls (416e). Adeimantus asks: Won t the guardians then be unhappy? (419a) Socrates: They probably will be happy (since they don t value mere material wealth very much), but in a way, this issue is besides the point, since the aim is to make the whole city happy, not just one class (420b). And the guardians will be happy because they preserve the whole city (465d). Does this mean that Plato thinks we should aim at the happiness of the whole polis in the sense of a super-individual, distinct from and morally superior to the individuals who make it up? (See Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, p.76). No, says Gregory Vlastos (1977, 14ff). Accoding to Vlastos, Plato is concerned to promote the happiness of the whole polis, as against the happiness of a particular group within the polis: he never pits the whole polis against all of the people within the polis (Vlastos, 1977, p.15). Wisdom, Courage, Moderation, and Justice.

7 The city is wise, courageous, moderate, and just. The city is wise because the rulers (the smallest class, who possess wisdom) rule intelligently with regard to the internal and external affairs of the city (428c-429a). The city is courageous because its auxiliaries are brave; they will maintain their views about right and wrong despite the temptations of power. The soldier class preserves true beliefs about what is to be feared (429b and 430b). The city is moderate because all three classes willingly accept their role in the community. Moderation is a kind of harmony (431e), it is agreement between the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which of the two should rule (432a). Again, it is moderate because the proper desires of the superior few control the desires of the inferior many; the better class rules the city in the interests of everyone (430d-432a). The fourth and final virtue is justice, which is doings one s own work and not meddling with what isn t one s own (433a-b). Justice is everyone doing the job for which he s naturally best suited (433a). Justice is the having and doing of one s own (433e-434a). Justice is found where the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes each do their own work in the city (434c). Plato is not claiming that each individual should do the task for which he is best suited; he is saying that class members should perform the tasks of this class. When important decisions are at issue, they should be made by the philosopher-rulers whose role it is to consider the common interest. Injustice, on the other hand, is meddling and exchange between the three classes (434b-c). So, that s Plato s theory of justice in the state (the first part of his reply to Glaucon). He still needs to give an account of justice in the individual. The Greek work dikaiosune doesn t translate precisely into our word justice. So is Plato correctly regarded as having given us what we would call a theory of social justice? (See Vlastos, 1977, for a defence of the claim that Plato is in fact offering a theory of what we could call social justice). Tripartite Conception of the Soul, and Justice in the Individual. The has parts and justice is each part doing its proper work: see especially Plato, Republic Book IV, 435c-442d (pp in Hackett edition). Justice in the individual, for Plato, is psychic harmony, or mental health. The three parts are Desire, Spirit (Emotion), and Reason. Plato tries to show that there are three parts of the soul by showing how inner mental conflict exists. Something and its contradictory cannot both be true at the same time and in the same respect. Plato is arguing for the claim that the soul has three parts or elements: reason, spirit, and appetite. Immediately following this discussion, he repeats the soul-city analogy, claiming that justice in the soul consists in rule by the rational part (as justice in the city consists in rule by philosophers, the lovers of wisdom in whom reason rules). There seem to be three distinct arguments here; when combined they amount to the claim that the soul has three elements. All of the reasoning here depends, in part, on the principle of non-contradiction, namely, that the same thing cannot display opposite characteristics at the same time, in relation to the same thing (436b). For instance, someone cannot be both at rest and in motion in the same respect, at the same time. Thus, if she is standing still but moving her arms, she is not both standing still and moving in the same respect, since she is stationary (her feet are not moving) while her arms move.

8 Applying this principle to the case of the human person or soul, Plato points to familiar instances of inner psychological conflicts to show, in each case, that there must be distinct elements at work within us. The first argument is designed to show that reason is distinct from appetite or desire. If a human person is a simple unity, then he cannot be both attracted and repelled by the same thing at the very same time. I want a drink because I m parched: my appetites crave satisfaction in this way. But at the same time I might believe that the glass in front of me contains polluted water that would make me ill. Hence, reasons Plato, there must be something in me (my appetite) bidding me to drink while something else in me (my reason) forbids me to do so (439c). Therefore, our soul contains a rational, calculating part, and an appetitive, lusting, pleasure-seeking, irrational part (439d). The logical principle of non-contradiction, used as a premise in this argument, is an extremely plausible claim. It therefore constitutes a very solid supporting reason (when combined with other such reasons). But is it the case that I simultaneously want and do not want to drink water that I believe to be poisoned? One might say that what is actually happening is that I flip-flop back and forth, now wanting it, now shunning it. If that is the case, the non-contradiction principle is no help to us here. On the other hand, Plato might reply that this flip-flopping shows that there are soul parts because the reasons why we experience both desire and aversion are different types of reasons. That is, the desire is purely concerned to quench a thirst, while the aversion involves a chain of reasoning, say, about the polluted well from which the water was taken. And it makes no sense to relate the latter sorts of reasons to someone considered purely as a thirsty person. Plato then argues that there is a spirited part of our souls, distinct from the appetitive part (439-40). He uses the example of Leontius, who wants to look at a pile of decaying corpses (just for the thrill of it!) but who feels ashamed of himself for having such a desire (after all, it shows disrespect for the dead). Leontius s lowly appetites, in this case especially his sexual desires (see Reeve s footnote at 440a), overpower his desire to act in accordance with the dignity of the dead, so he gets angry at himself. He both wants to look (appetite) and doesn t want to look; when he does look, his spirited part becomes angry that he has given in to his lustful cravings. In other cases, too, reason and appetite are in conflict while the spirited element comes to reason s aid. Even if we accept that there is a spirited element distinct from the appetitive one, we might question the claim that spirit (emotion) always sides with reason against appetite. Aren t there cases in which we might be angry with ourselves for acting with too much regard for long-term consequences, rather than giving in to our appetites? If that reply is not persuasive, consider the claim that our emotional side contains its own type of rationality. For instance, there are circumstances where becoming angry is the rational thing to do (say, where someone has shown serious disrespect and violated the basic rights of another person). In support of Plato here, one might argue that the so-called rationality of emotion is undeniable, yet that this is simply another way of saying that emotion is reason s ally: it is rational to become angry in some circumstances is just another way of saying that reason demands, in this case, that one get angry. The third argument maintains that reason is distinct from spirit. The simple supporting reason, along with the non-contradiction principle, points to children, who possess spirit from birth but who develop reason (if at all) only later (441a). One might worry here about Plato s claim that reasoning abilities exist from the start, that is, the fact that these capacities develop over time does not entail that they do not exist at birth. Moreover, one could argue that a person s noble emotions develop over time, that is, the depth of one s courage or pride or indignation is in part a function of one s maturity. Plato might respond by noting that these emotions are nonetheless qualitatively different from the kind of rational calculation of interests associated with the rational part of the soul. Justice in the Individual. The just man doesn t let the parts of his soul interfere with each other or usurp each other s functions. He has set his own life in order; he is his own master. Reason is the seat of wisdom (441c), thumos is where we get our courage (441d), and moderation is all three parts agreeing that reason should rule (442c-d).

9 A person with a properly ordered, that is, just soul, won t do anything regarded as unjust. This will be the case as long as no parts of the soul meddle in each other s business (443d-444a). No meddling! Unjust actions stem from one s soul being dominated by one s appetites. So anyone would realize that being just is good in itself, because it is the condition of being mentally healthy. Justice is good for the just person, not merely instrumentally or merely for others. The account is still incomplete, however, because Plato hasn t yet told us the content of the knowledge possessed by the rational part of the soul: what is it that is known? Justice isn t concerned with someone doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other (443c-d). According to the traditional view, justice means not violating the rules, not taking unfair advantage of other people, not cheating, and so on. Justice is understood in terms of what one should or should not do. For Plato, however, justice has to do with the order or arrangement of one s soul. How much does it matter that these are two different senses of justice? Hobbes Human Nature Reading: Leviathan Chapters 1-13; 17; Review and Conclusion Hobbes s treatment of human nature is important to his argument. He will argue that in situations without government, police and the rule of law people would find themselves in such a miserable condition that they would create a political order which solved the problems that this condition generated. One important consideration here is what people are like. Some people suggest that Hobbes has a dim view of human nature, that he considers all people to be evil or entirely self-promoting and desirous of wealth and power. To begin, consider the following passages: Ch. 13, Par. 10; Review and Conclusion, par.1-4; Ch. 17, par Is Hobbes consistent here in how he portrays humanity? (Ch.1-4): How does Hobbes understand sense, memory, and imagination? (Ch.6): How does Hobbes understand voluntary motion and the will? (Keep in mind the definition he earlier gives of imagination.) Do you agree with him? The full implications of these definitions come later. See for example, Chapter 21 and the discussion of freedom. Notice that desire and aversion are the key passions in everyone. We are either motivated toward things or away from things or are indifferent and neither love nor hate particular things. In his mechanical portrayal of human behaviour, the things we love quite literally move us, they corroborate our vital motion, they give us a buzz. Hobbes doesn t tell us here what are the objects of our desire or aversion and they differ in different people but he does say that the terminology of good and evil are subjectively attached to the things we either desire or hate. This is in contrast to an objective science of virtue and good which he elaborates in Ch (see especially Ch. 15, par.40.) and to which we will return in looking at his treatment of morality. Notice also the fact that among the passions of humankind which Hobbes elaborates are passions usually associated with a positive view of human nature: for example, par. 22: desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE. Everyone necessarily acts to pursue an apparent future good; but what we take to be good can be as in the

10 case of Sydney Godolphin to whom Leviathan is dedicated altruistic actions toward others. There are also some people who are motivated by the passion of curiosity and the pleasure of learning and knowledge a pleasure, Hobbes tells us, which exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure. In Ch. 10, par. 1 Hobbes tells us that the power of a man is his present means to obtain some future apparent good. When he subsequently points out that everyone is generally inclined to a perpetual and restless power after power that ceaseth only in death, I don t think he is ruling out people like Sydney Godolphin or Sister Theresa. Of course, nasty and selfish people will have a steady desire for power after power after power in order to achieve what they take to be their apparent future good. Yet, even altruists need power in order to achieve their ends; indeed, altruists like Sister Theresa need a steady progression of powers in order to achieve their particular sense of felicity. They won t be able to rest contentedly after only one act of selfless generosity. The things we desire have implications for our interpersonal relationships. Consider, for example, Ch. 11, par Explain Hobbes s position in the above passage (11;3-6) *** The State of Nature as a State of War and Enmity Give special consideration to chapter 13; in it Hobbes reveals a critical feature of his argument, the state of nature, or the natural condition of mankind. Hobbes will argue that the natural human condition with neither laws in place nor police to enforce compliance - would be a state of war. Life would be, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Given the compelling reality of that situation, people would necessarily extricate themselves by devising a very particular kind of political solution. That solution is the Leviathan the artifice designed to address the problems of anarchy. But for Hobbes s argument regarding political authority to be convincing, we need to examine his portrayal of the state of nature. Explain what Hobbes takes to be the inevitable causes of war in the natural condition of humankind. Hobbes Natural Right and Natural Law Reading: Leviathan, Chapters 14, 15, 31 Chapter 14 introduces a new kind of discourse to the work. Up until now Hobbes has largely been making empirical claims. That is to say that he has been talking about the way things are or would be in given situations: this is what science is, this is what humans are like, this is what the natural condition of humans would be like, and so on. We might want to distinguish among the kinds of empirical claims he makes but generally what they are not are normative claims. That is, they do not specify what ought to be the case in a moral sense. But here in chapter 14 we see the language of rights which is not about what people happen to do; rather, it is about what they can be said to be entitled to do, what they are morally permitted to do. We see also the language of natural law which suggests what people are obliged to do or even (although as we ll see, this is problematic given the details of Hobbes s argument) morally required to do. A lot of questions arise: where exactly do these normative claims come from? What argument or evidence is used to sustain them? It s a good idea to approach these issues with some attention to your own moral positions in order to start the job of criticism. What do you understand by a right, if you accept such a notion? What is the basis of moral obligation in your understanding? By trying to clarify your own position you will better be able to address the claims that Hobbes is making. Answer the following questions with regard to Hobbes s notion of a right of nature:

11 What exactly is the right of nature for Hobbes? Are there any limits to that right? Do people have to respect the rights of others? What considerations do you think lead to this definition of right for Hobbes? The Laws of Nature Natural Law argument had a long tradition in Christian thought prior to Hobbes. In most previous instances the underlying assumption was that God, who ruled the world, gave legislation to people in two ways. One was the way of revelation (ie the Bible) to those fortunate enough to receive it; this was called Divine Positive Law. But what of those who did not receive revelation? The assumption here was that everyone, believer or not, was obliged to act morally and the specific requirements of morality were available through the medium of reason. What reason suggests, God commands. Here in chapter 14 and 15 Hobbes s natural law argument invokes reason by way of devising a rational solution to the problems of the state of nature-war. Some have portrayed the argument as a kind of game theory model: what should a rational actor do if faced with the given situation of conflict that Hobbes describes? Make a [very] brief list of Hobbes s laws of nature. How would you characterize them generally? Do you agree with what Hobbes puts forward as the rational thing to do in the situation he describes? Why or why not? When you examine the specific details of Hobbes s Natural Law argument[s] in chapter 14, work out as well an answer to the following more general questions: What is the basis of our obligation to follow natural law? (see especially Ch. 15, par and 40-41) Should we call the obligation involved in doing what is necessary to conserve and defend ourselves a case of moral obligation? Is belief in God required to make the argument work? (see Ch. 31, and especially par. 5 and 40) Hobbes Justice, Obligation and Contract Reading: Leviathan, Chapters 14, 15 Contracts are important in Hobbes s argument: They are the means whereby people extricate themselves from the danger and misery of the state of nature. They are the procedure by means of which obligations arise to other people. They lead to the principal understanding of justice Commentators have noted the close connection between the concept of contract and that of freedom. Usually, although Hobbes is something of an exception here, a contract is only deemed valid if people freely enter into it. Duress, for example, is commonly understood to render a contract void. If I take a gun to your head and suggest that you might want to trade your BMW for my loonie, most would say that this would not be a free choice and any contract/agreement would be null and void. By making the political order a creature of contract, Hobbes and the other contract theorists seem to imply that the structure of our lives together is open to choice, an opportunity for the exercise of freedom. Notice how this emphasis on freedom differs from Plato and Aristotle where the emphasis was more on discovering the rational solution to politics and less on the issue of human choice. Explain the different kinds of contract in Hobbes s view; what, in particular, is a covenant of mutual trust? Are there, on Hobbes s view, any valid contracts possible in the condition of nature? (Consider

12 especially Ch. 14, par. 27; Ch. 15 par. 1-5) Obligation Note Hobbes s treatment of obligation in Ch.14, par.7. Political obligation for Hobbes and this is a common feature of modern political thought arises from the choices we make. We are not born into our obligations; they do not rest on the assumed inequality of humankind; there is not some natural aristocracy which merits our obligation. If we are obliged to other people, we ve somehow agreed to it. There is an additional treatment of obligation (natural as opposed to artificial obligation) which Hobbes elaborates and which arises only in the relation between God and humankind. See Ch. 31, par. 5. Virtual Seminar Question: Hobbes says that obligations arise from contract; and that we are obliged to enter into contracts with others in order to create a sovereign. If obligations arise from contracts how does he explain our obligation to enter into contracts? Justice Contracts also lead Hobbes to the concept of justice and this too is a peculiarly modern approach and prominent, with various modifications, in many liberal understandings of justice. To get a good sense of the point of Hobbes s position, consider the following question (suggested by Robert Nozick): Is it just that Tiger Woods earns a gazillion dollars a year playing golf when a nurse barely earns a living wage or when there are starving children whose basic needs are unmet? Hobbes would say that justice occurs when valid contracts are honoured. If Tiger got what he contracted to get, there can be no complaint about justice. Your just desserts are those you manage to negotiate. (Ch. 15, par. 14): The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the appetite of the contractors. (Although note what he says immediately following about equity.) Virtual Seminar Question: It is not unjust, it would seem on Hobbes s view, that Tiger is extraordinarily well paid. How might Hobbes approach the obligations we might nevertheless have toward the less fortunate? (Hint: keep in mind our obligations to Natural Law and the logic of Hobbes s Natural Law arguments.) Hobbes Authority and Sovereignty Reading: Leviathan, Chapters 16-31, especially 16-21; [80pgs] In Chapters16 and 17 Hobbes contends that the basis of sovereignty is the voluntary act (rather, the acts of the many people in the yet-to-be community) of authorization which takes place in creating the sovereign. One thing to consider in assessing Hobbes s position is the extent to which voluntary choice is operationalized. Another thing to consider is the extent to which rational people would devise the sort of political structures which Hobbes outlines. As we will see Locke did not think so, nor did Rousseau. It is worth noting that Hobbes lived through a very difficult civil war in England and it may well have been that experience which informed his political preferences. His greatest concern seems to have been anarchy; hence, his desire to curtail the possibilities of civil strife. Explain the details of creating sovereignty by institution ; why does Hobbes say that the Sovereign can do no injury to any of his/her subjects? How does sovereignty by acquisition differ from sovereignty by institution; is Hobbes warranted in saying that both would be voluntarily chosen? Specify the powers over which the sovereign has authority? What limits or restraint applies to the sovereign? Explain the point of Ch.27, par. 28; and Ch. 26, par.24. What bearing do these passages have on Hobbes s understanding of sovereignty?

13 Hobbes Freedom and Other Things Reading: Ch. 6 [review]; Ch.21; Ch.24 Freedom In chapter 6 we saw that Hobbes explains the voluntary motion of human beings as motion which involves the imagination. What we call endeavour is the interior beginning of the motion within us, but no motion is self-caused and so, in effect, to endeavour is to be moved by something. Since the imagination is itself a motion caused by other motions outside the body, this means that humans have no free will. Hobbes nevertheless has much to say about freedom. What is his definition of freedom? Given his definition of freedom, in what sense are people free in the state of nature? Explain the point of Chapter 21, paragraphs 4-6. What liberties do subjects have against the sovereign? Explain the point of Ch. 21, par19. Property Locke has much to say about property and in order to appreciate what is distinctive to his view it is worth examining Hobbes s position. See Chapter 24 Virtual Seminar Question: Explain Hobbes s understanding of property. Why and in what sense is there no property in the state of nature? John Locke State of Nature Reading: Macpherson s Introduction to the Hackett edition of the Second Treatise of Government Second Treatise, Ch. 1-6 Locke s argument is structured in a very similar way to that of Hobbes in Leviathan. Both men invoke a state of nature prior to or independent of formal government, invest it with certain assumptions and then specify a set of political institutions which would solve the problems to be found there. For Hobbes, as we saw, the principal problem of the natural condition was anarchy; the solution was a virtually absolute sovereign. We might say that Hobbes s solution is Locke s problem. His concern is with tyranny and his solution is to limit government according to the views of the majority of the community. We want to examine and asses the arguments which bring him to that conclusion. Chapter 1, summarizes Locke s argument in the First Treatise of Government against Robert Filmer s position in a book called Patriarcha. Filmer had argued that political authority came by direct gift from God to Adam and through Adam s successors to current monarchs; and, that the nature of political authority was modeled on the kind of absolute and unquestionable rule that a [obviously very patriarchal] father has within a family. Locke would contest both claims and the Second Treatise is his essay concerning the true original, extent and end of civil government. He begins by clarifying the details of what he takes to be the state of nature. Explain what Locke means by freedom and equality [in addition to ch. 2, see paragraphs 54 and 57-63]. How does Locke s position here compare with Hobbes? Explain the argument contained in the quotation from Richard Hooker which Locke cites in paragraph 5 as an example of a natural law argument. Explain the basis of his own natural law argument in par. 6. How does Locke distinguish the State of Nature from the State of War? (note as well par. 123: does this suggest a kinder gentler view of human nature?)

14 Locke Property Reading: Second Treatise, ch. 5 One particular aspect of Locke s natural law argument is his treatment of property. Unlike Hobbes, he will contend that property rules and rights are present in the state of nature. When governments are created they will have the duty to protect and regulate those rights and Locke wants to emphasize the point that governments neither create property rights nor are they entitled to deprive citizens of those rights arbitrarily. Explain Locke s treatment of property in ch. 5. What is the basis of the right to property and how is it limited? Explain the significance of money to his argument. Is Locke justified in saying that the turfs my servant has cut become my property? [par.28] Does Locke s natural law argument necessitate private property and a capitalist market economy? [consider his core natural law argument in par. 6] Explain the point of par. 120 and 134: do individual property rights take precedence over the interests of the majority of the community? Locke Paternal/Parental vs Political Power Reading: Chapters 6-11 Robert Filmer had explained political authority through the model of the paternal authority of the (obviously very patriarchal) family. Politics was like a family and the patriarch ruled unchallenged. Locke as we ve seen wants to undermine that position. If it were to prevail there would be no basis for removing a tyrannical ruler and no sense in which government would be accountable to the people. But Locke has a problem; he is aware that, historically, the father of the family [did frequently become, as well] the prince [par.74]; hence, the importance to his argument of clarifying the distinction between paternal and political power. Do you think he is successful in establishing this distinction through his arguments? Are historical facts pertinent to his argument? Explain Locke s distinction between paternal and political power. Should we construe Locke as a feminist for treating paternal power as parental power? Explain the point of paragraphs How does Locke differ from Hobbes here? What does Locke understand by a community aka commonwealth aka political society? Why do people form political societies? Compare Locke to Hobbes on this point. What does Locke mean by absolute, arbitrary government and what is wrong with it? What limits ought to apply to any government entrusted with political power? Locke Political Institutions Reading: Ch. 10, From what Locke says in chapter 10 it would seem that there is more than one correct form of political order and the majority of a community can specify a variety of legitimate forms of government. There is in effect a two stage process to the formation of political institutions; something noticeably lacking in Hobbes s formulation. Hobbes had said that there was no community prior to the creation of a sovereign; hence, there was no community which could reconsider its choice of government. This is precisely what Locke wants to amend; he wants to insist that government is a fiduciary trust and if the trust is abused by a given ruler, it can be reassigned. In effect, Locke wants to establish a principle of popular accountability which Hobbes thought would make political life impossible.