Francisco Peinado on Truthmakers for Negative Truths NEH Seminar, July 2015 Brian Embry

Transcription

1 Francisco Peinado on Truthmakers for Negative Truths NEH Seminar, July 2015 Brian Embry I T1 Truthmakers [Verificativa] in Seventeenth-Century Scholasticism The idea of a truthmaker for a particular truth, then, is just some existent, some portion of reality, in virtue of which that truth is true. (Armstrong 2004, 5) Verificativum : veri- from verum (true) + -ficativum from facere (make) T2 T3 T4 Some seventeenth-century scholastics on truthmaking: The immediate and formal truthmaker of a proposition is that by which a proposition is immediately and formally rendered true. (Francisco Peinado, ) 1 You have to say what it is for a proposition to be true and what is required in reality on the part of the object for the proposition to be true. The latter I call a truthmaker. (Giovannbattista Giattini, 1651) 2 In all propositions some existence, or the ultimate actual truthmaker of the proposition, is affirmed. (Silvestro Mauro, ) 3 II The Problem of Negative Truths Peinado s Position (roughly): Negative truths do not have truthmakers. T5 T6 [ ] the only reason to scale back Truthmaker to exempt negative existentials is that there do not seem to be truthmakers for negative existentials. Truthmaker theorists who proceed in this way have no principled objection to the cheater who, when confronted with her own apparently truthmakerless truths, scales back Truthmaker accordingly. For this cheater is simply adopting the strategy of the timid truthmaker theorist, concluding that since there do not seem to be any truthmakers for a certain kind of truth, none are required. (Merricks 2007, 40) Either there s something wrong with accepting truths that don t have an ontological grounding or there isn t: if there is, then every truth requires a grounding; if there isn t, then no truth requires a grounding. Truthmaker theory is a theory about what it is for a proposition to be true; it s not the kind of theory that can apply only in a restricted domain. What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn t apply to all propositions? Why should it be okay for negative truths to go ungrounded and not okay for positive truths to go ungrounded? (Cameron 2008, ) The objection: Peinado s Position is ad hoc. 1 Peinado, Phys., : Verificativum immediatum & formale propositionis, est id a quo propositio immediate & formaliter redditur vera. 2 Giattini, Logica, 292: Debet assignari quid sit, propositionem esse veram, & quid requirat ex parte objecti realiter ad hoc ut sit vera, quod appello verificativum. 3 Mauro, Quaestionum philosophicarum liber secundus, 170 (ad 5): In omnibus propositionibus affirmatur aliqua existentia, sive ultima actualitas verificativa propositionis

2 III Background: A Prevalent Seventeenth-Century Theory of Truth Truth bearers as token mental sentences (= propositions ) Truth as a mereological sum: T7 The first conclusion is that the object is not an intrinsic part composing formal truth and falsity. This is against Arriaga [ ] Oviedo [ ] and other contemporaries who think that truth is composed of two intrinsic parts, one of which is intrinsic to the proposition indeed, it is the proposition itself insofar as it affirms, e.g., Peter s running, and the other part is extrinsic to the proposition but intrinsic to the truth, and it is the object existing in the way in which it is affirmed by the proposition. 4 T8 The common opinion in our School is that truth consists in a complex of an act and an object. 5 The Composite Theory of Truth: The truth of a proposition p = the mereological sum of p and the intentional object of p. Standard Analysis of Truth: p is true =df p exists and the intentional object of p exists. T9 For a proposition to be true is nothing other than for it to affirm Peter s running, and for this to exist in reality. But this implies two things: the proposition and the existence of the object. 6 IV Peinado on Negative Truths How do contradictory propositions differ? The object view: p and p differ because they have different intentional objects. T10 In conditional acts, copulative acts, and disjunctive or vague acts, the particles if, and, and or do not represent some conditionality, copulation, or disjunction or vagueness on the part of the object; they merely indicate a certain mode of representing. The same thing must be said about the particle not in negative acts. 7 4 Polizzi, Siculi platiensis tomus tertius, : Prima conclusio: Objectum non est pars intrinsece componens veritatem & falsitatem formalem. Est contra Arriagam loco citato subsect. 5, Oviedum ibi s. 3, & alios Recentiores existimantes veritatem ex duplici parte sibi intrinseca componi, quarum una est intrinseca propositioni, immo est ipsa propositio, quatenus affirmat V.G. cursum Petri; altera vero extrinseca propositioni, licet intrinseca veritati & est ipsum objectum eo modo existens, quo per propositionem affirmatur. 5 Losada, Cursus philosophici prima pars, 231.2: Sententia in Schola nostra communis Veritatem stare dicit in complexo actus & objecti. 6 Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus, : Propositionem esse veram, nihil aliud est, quam ipsam affirmare cursum Petri, & hunc dari a parte rei: sed hoc dicit duo, & propositionem & existentiam objecti. 7 Losada, Cursus philosophici tertia pars, Metaphysics, d. 4, ch. 3, s. 29: Sicut in actibus conditionatis, copulativis, & disjunctivis, aut vagis, particulae si, &, vel, non repraesentant ex parte objecti conditionalitatem, copulationem, disjunctionem, aut vaguitatem aliquam, sed indicant solum peculiarem repraesentandi modum; ita sententiendum de particula non in negativis. Brian Embry 2

3 The intentional mode view: p and p have the same object and different intentional modes. T11 Peinado endorses the intentional mode view: The affirmative and a negative judgments mentioned above [ Peter exists, and Peter does not exist ] do not differ according to object, but both have for their object the existence of Peter. But they differ according to their intentional modes. 8 T12 For a negative act to be true now is for the act to exist now and for its object not to exist, since the act says that its object does not exist. 9 Peinado s analyses of truth Positive Truth: A positive proposition p is true =df p exists and the object of p exists. Negative Truth: A negative proposition p is true =df p exists and the object of p does not exist. T13 Peinado on the Aboutness Constraint on Truthmaking: It seems well known that no internal or external speech and no act of the intellect is rendered true by something that it does not say, by an object that it does not represent. For who would say that this act, Peter runs, is formally made true by the existence of God or by any other entity distinct from the running of Peter, which the act represents? 10 Aboutness Constraint: If T makes ϕ true, then ϕ is about T. A Peinadian argument for the claim that negative truths do not have truthmakers: (1) p is true and has a truthmaker, T. (Assumption for reductio) (2) T exists. (1) (3) p is about T. (1, Aboutness Constraint). (4) p is about T. (3, Intentional Mode View) (5) p exists. (Assumption) (6) p is true. (2, 4, 5, Positive Truth) (7) (1, 6) But T14 T15 The truthmaker for the negative act, Peter does not exist, is Peter negatively represented by that act. Say the same thing about any other negative act. 11 The formal truthmaker of an affirmative proposition is the existence affirmed. Therefore, the formal truthmaker of a negative proposition is nothing other than the existence denied Peinado, De anima, : Judicium affirmativum & negativum supra posita [Petrus existit, Petrus non existit] non differre ex objecto, sed utrumque habere pro objecto existentiam Petri. Differre autem ex modo tendendi. 9 Peinado, De generatione et corruptione, : Est dicere, esse verum nunc actum negativum est esse actum nunc, & objectum nunc non esse: quia actus enuntiat objectum suum nunc non dari. 10 Peinado, De anima, : Nam ex terminis ipsis videtur notum quod nulla loquutio interna aut externa nullusque actus intellectus redditur verus ab eo quod ipse non dicit, & ab objecto quod non repraesentat. Nam quis dicat hunc actum: Petrus currit verificari formaliter ab existentia Dei, aut ab alia entitate distincta a cursu Petri, quem repraesentat actus? 11 Peinado, De anima, : Verificativum huius actus negativi Petrus non existit (idem dicito de quovis alio) esse Petrum negative repraesentatum per hunc actum. 12 Peinado, De anima, : Verificativum formale propositionis affirmativae est existentia affirmata: ergo nihil aliud est verificativum formale propositionis negativae, nisi existentia negata. Brian Embry 3

4 T16 T17 When we say, A non-existent object makes-true a negative proposition, by this act we take the object negatively, since it is the same as to say, The object does not exist, and the proposition says that and nothing else. 13 The object of p makes p true by failing to exist. An objection to Peinado s view of negative truths: When this act [ The Antichrist does not exist ] is true, its truthmaker exists, for it is denominated true from its truthmaker. But when this true act exists, the Antichrist does not exist. Therefore something else exists, which is its truthmaker. 14 (1) The Antichrist does not exist is true. (2) When a proposition is true, its truthmaker exists. (3) The Antichrist does not exist. (4) Therefore, the Antichrist is not the truthmaker for The Antichrist does not exist. T12 T18 Peinado rejects (2): That is to say, for a negative act to be true now is for the act to exist now and for its object not to exist, since the act says that its object does not exist. 15 Negative truths have non-existent truthmakers. Juan de Ulloa Madritano on truthmakers in the positive and negative sense: The truthmaker of any act in the positive sense is that which the act is about [attingitur per actum], and additionally is such that when it exists, in proportion to the intentional mode, the act is true, and when it is absent, the act is false. 16 T is a truthmaker in the positive sense for p =df p is about T, and p is true if and only if T exists. T19 A truthmaker in the negative sense I call that which the act is about and is such that the act is true if it does not exist. Notice the difference here with truthmaker in the positive sense. 17 T is a truthmaker in the negative sense for p =df p is about T, and p is true (if and) only if T does not exist. Peinado s Position*: Positive truths have truthmakers in the positive sense but not in the negative sense. Negative truths have truthmakers in the negative sense but not in the positive sense. 13 Peinado, De anima, : Quando dicimus: Objectum non existens verificat propositionem negativam, hoc ipso actu summimus negative objectum, quia idem est ac dicere: Objectum non existit & propositio id & non aliud dicit. 14 Peinado, De generatione et corruptione, : Quando hic actus [Anti-christus non existit] est verus, datur eius verificativum. Nam a verificativo denominatur verus; sed quando datur hic actus verus non datur Anti Christus. Ergo aliquid aliud, quod sit eius verificativum. 15 Peinado, De generatione et corruptione, : Est dicere, esse verum nunc actum negativum est esse actum nunc, & objectum nunc non esse: quia actus enuntiat objectum suum nunc non dari. 16 Madritano, Prodromus, : Verificativum cuiusvis actus, quod tale sit in sensu positivo, est illud quod attingitur per actum, & insuper est tale ut ipso existente, proportionate ad modum tenendi, actus hic est verus, & ipso absente, est falsus. 17 Madritano, Prodromus, : Verificativum in sensu negativo voco illud quod attingitur per actum, & est tale ut ipso non existente (ecce distinctionem a verificativo in sensu positivo) actus sit verus. Brian Embry 4

5 T20 You will say, so what is required for a negative proposition to be true? I respond that nothing is required in the positive sense, since negative propositions are not of the sort that strictly and properly require anything in order to be true; rather, they are of the sort whose truth is precisely prevented by something namely, by the existence of their object. 18 Selected Bibliography Armstrong, David. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, Arriaga, Rodrigo de. Cursus Philosophicus. Lyon: Cameron, Ross. How to be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42, no. 3 (2008): Giattini Sr., Giovannbattista. Logica. Rome, Losada, Luis de. Cursus Philosophici Prima Pars. Salamanca: Madritano, Juan de Ulloa. Prodromus Seu Prolegomena Ad Scholasticas Disciplinas. Rome: Mauro, Silvestro. Quaestionum Philosophicarum Liber Secundus. Rome: Merricks, Trenton. Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Peinado, Francisco. Disputationes in Duos Libros De Generatione Et Corruptione, Opus Posthumum. Alcalá: Peinado, Francisco. Disputationes in Octos Libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Alcalá: Peinado, Francisco. Disputationes in Tres Libros Aristotelis De Anima, Opus Posthumum. Alcalá: Polizzi, Giuseppe. Siculi Platiensis Tomus Primus. Palermo, Madritano, Prodromus, : Dices. Quid ergo requiritur ut propositio negativa sit vera? Respondeo nihil requiritur in sensu positivo, quia propositiones negativae non sunt ex eis qae stricte ac proprie requirunt aliquid, ut verae sint; sed ex eis quarum veritati officit praecise aliquid, nimirum existentia sui objecti. Brian Embry 5