INCIDENT NEAR GAUCIEL August 24, 1944.

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1 INCIDENT NEAR GAUCIEL August 24, The incident to which I refer is recorded in the mimeographed History of the Thirtieth Division Artillery on page 40. It is covered in the one line which I quote: "On another occasion a pocket was discovered and one battery of the 230th F. A. Bn. near Gauciel had to turn directly around to fire in support of the infantry that was dispatched to mop it up." What really happened near Gauciel on that occasion? Granting that 'History' must needs distill most of the warmth and vitality out of 'minor' events to keep them in proper perspective, is it possible to bring this cold and lifeless statement nearer to the reality of the incident by recounting my warm, and vivid memories of 'inconsequential' details? I shall try. And in trying I must admit that these memories are more vivid to me than what was said at a faculty meeting last week, or what I had for dinner last night. It happened on the afternoon of August 24th, 1944, in our C P (command post) located some five miles east of Gauciel which is a little community about five miles east of Evreux. It was a damp day, with low hanging clouds, and a slight drizzle from time to time. I was seated at the table on which was pinned the artillery operations map, and to which was hanging a field telephone. The table was located near a window on the first floor of the large manor house in which we had located the C P. Several others of the staff were sitting around the large rook which was evidently a dining room, smoking, drinking coffee, or writing letters. Our battalions were attached to their Combat Teams and were advancing rapidly north towards Louviers, our immediate objective. There was little opposition, and so we had little to do. It was a dull afternoon on a dull day. It was about twelve days after we had broken through the German lines at Mortain. We had chased them for several days until we contacted the British near Ferrieres-aux-Etampes about August 18th. Then we entrucked and rode some 115 miles to the Arve River, detrucking there between Dreux and Nonancourt. On August 20th we had started a drive north along the Siene River to clear out all Germans west of the river to Louviers. We had advanced rapidly against spotty opposition by small groups trying to get across the Seine. In this rapid advance we had by-passed some Germans who had holed up in woods or places off the main routes, knowing that we could clear up these small pockets later. We had advanced some 25 miles towards Louviers, and had moved our C P to its present location on the morning of the 23rd August. We hoped we wouldn t have to move it again as it was large enough and had sufficient grounds enclosed with a high brick wall to accommodate all of our men. It was a nice place; opposition was slight and we were living easy. I set at the window that afternoon looking out to the yard and to the roofs of the small community of Gauciel a few miles away. I was in a sort of daydream, seeing everything and being conscious of nothing. My attention was caught by the sound of a large motor vehicle laboring up the steep, winding, hedge bordered, gravel road from the gate into the yard. It didn't sound familiar and I wondered if it was a large communications truck from Corps Headquarters. Before it came into sight I was interrupted by Lt. Col. Ball, the Division G-2 (intelligence officer) who came in, walked over to my table, handed me a piece of paper, and asked if we had a battery that could reach those coordinates. I pulled my attention from the approaching truck, turned around to check the coordinates on the map, and noted that the point was some 6000 yards directly behind us - in our own area. I told him that I didn't know as the batteries were leap-frogging forward rapidly to keep up with the infantry, and most of them were ahead of us; however, the 230th F A Bn had a C P at Gauciel and maybe one of the batteries was far enough behind to reach it.

2 I asked him what he wanted to shoot at and he said that about a battalion of Krauts had holed up in a small woods in that area and would not talk about surrendering to the lieutenant in command of a Reconnaissance Platoon that was challenging them. The lieutenant thought that if he had a little artillery fire on the woods the Germans would realize that they had no chance and would listen to reason. I told him we'd need some observation on the fire as we wouldn't want to hit any of our troops. He said that he was in radio communication with the lieutenant and he would tell us where our rounds were falling. I told him to wait a minute, and asked Sgt. Fountain to get the S-3 (operations officer) of the 230th, Major Evans, on the telephone. In a few seconds the voice on the phone said, "This is Creek 3 speaking", Creek being the code-name of the 230th and the 131 being the designation of the operations officer. This is Cracker 3 speaking, that being my code-designation, Can you reach these coordinates, and I gave him the location. Almost immediately he came back with, "Yes sir. We have a battery that can reach there, but we have no observation. What is the target?" He didn't seem at all surprised that the target was directly in the rear so I questioned him: "Have you checked these coordinates closely? Are you sure you can hit it? We want to shoot at some Krauts holed up in a woods who need persuading. We will furnish observation. Check those coordinates again." "We can hit them with one battery. It is just a few hundred yards from our C P and I can see them from the window. However, it will take some time to turn the battery around." I told him to hold on, and told Lt. Col. Hall to get his radio truck around under my window and then we could have communications from Evans to me then to him and to the radio operator and on to the commander of the Recon Platoon. We'd need a little time to instruct the recon commander how to report his observations and so I called back to Major Evans who was on the open phone line: How long will it take you to get out the first round?", and he replied immediately, "About 10 minutes". Then I knew that he was confused in some way as he could not turn a battery around and get it laid to the rear in that short a time so I inquired rather impatiently, "Evans, you know that you can't get ready in ten minutes. Give me a reasonable time. He replied in amused manner, "Yes I can, Colonel. This morning we found a battery of the 743 rd Armored Bn sitting around, and they attached themselves to us. All they have to do is crank up their motors and swing around. Our batteries are too far forward, but these chaps will take fire missions from us - and glad to do so". I told him that was all right, to go ahead and get ready to fire, but not to fire until he cleared with me and then fire "At my command". He said he d report when the battery was ready to fire. While I was waiting for Lt. Col. Hall to get his radio truck around to my window and Major Evans to get his battery laid, I sat down and glanced out of the window. A small crowd of 10 to 20 men had assembled in the yard where the big truck had backed around and parked with the tailgate facing my window. The tailgate had been lowered and an extension of some three feet had been let out and braced with two V-shaped legs to make a platform. Over the platform a canvas covering extended from the body of the truck to the end of the platform on two arms. A record player was just inside the truck body. The driver, another man in fatigue uniform, and a young lady in a raincoat were working around the truck, evidently preparing for some sort of show. I looked around to ask some of the men in the C P what was going on and there was no one there except Sgt. Fountain, and he knew no more about it than I did. They had joined the audience in the yard. The slight drizzle of rain did not dampen their interest. Lt. Col. Hall came back just as his radio truck pulled up under my window. He sat nearest the window so that the radio speaker could be convenient, and Sgt. Fountain stood at the operations map to plot the rounds as closely as possible when the sensings came back. Hall got the Recon Troop commander by radio and

3 we spent a few minutes telling him the location of the battery and the approximate line of fire on the ground and how he would report his sensings back to us as to whether they were over or 'short' or 'right' or 'left' of the line of fire and by how many 100 s of yards in each case. In short, we were giving him a lesson in observed artillery firing! We told him that we would tell him when the round fired and count down to when it should burst so that he would not mistake another explosion in his area as the landing of the shell. Major Evans reported 'ready to fire' in about the time he had promised, but I told him to hold up until we were sure the Recon Troop commander was properly instructed. He was to fire at my command. I also asked him to give me the time of flight and to count down the last ten seconds of the flight. We finally got things cleared with the Recon Troop commander and told him to stay on the line and we'd tell him when to expect the first round. Then I gave Major Evans the command to Fire, which I heard him repeat to the battery. We were looking out of the window and saw the smoke as the battery fired one round, and told the Recon Troop commander, Round on the way. I got Evans to count off Ten, Nine, on down to 'Burst' and listened to see how far off we were. It was close enough as it sounded a few seconds after we announced it, but we figured it took that long for the sound to travel back to us. At any rate it was close enough to be seen by the Recon commander, and he sent in a sensing of, "400 over left", which we sent back to Evans. It took about three rounds to place the center of burst close to the target, so we told the Recon Commander we would fire 'One Volley' (four) rounds the next time, and he could make a general sensing of the center of the four rounds. We would not fire any more unless he thought it necessary. We'd wait for him to see if this was enough persuasion. So I gave Major Evans the sensings, 'Range correct, deflection correct. One round', but told him to leave the battery laid until further orders. We watched the smoke of the four rounds, got the sensing that it 'was about in the right place' and that he (the Recon Troop commander) would try to parley further with the Krauts. While we were waiting we watched the performance in the yard. A young lady was singing some song, which I cannot remember, accompanied on a small piano in the truck. There was a loud speaker and we heard it quite clearly, but were more intrigued by the beautiful young lady in a low necked evening dress performing on the tail-gate of the truck. This was the first time that we had had such entertainment, and it was exceptionally well received by the men. After she had finished a man, evidently a comic, was doing some juggling and making remarks to provide some relief to the young lady. No one was interested in him or his actions. The rain had stopped and the crowd was growing larger as the word spread. About fifteen minutes later the radio operator called that the Recon Troop commander was on the phone. Lt. Col. Hall answered and found out that the Krauts were still not ready to play ball with us, that they seemed to think the artillery were stray shells and he could not surrender his command honorably under the circumstances. He cussed the Kraut's abnormal sense of honor, and said we'd better make medicine strong enough to cure him of it. We agreed and told him we would fire 'Three volleys', or 12 rounds, in quick succession to show him that we could put in as much as necessary if he wouldn't listen to reason. I called Evans to fire "Three rounds, same range, same deflection" as fast as practicable. We turned to look at the young lady again, and she was in the midst of a song when the battery boomed away three rounds. The battery was about 5000 yards from us and the boom was muffled by the distance, but she never missed a note. After the battery had finished firing, we called to the Recon Troop commander that "Rounds completed. Will fire no more until you report back to us." We then returned our attention back to the young lady to await the final report of the Recon Troop commander.

4 We had taken some three quarters of an hour to an hour to do this shoot, and it was about 4:30 and turning dark under the low clouds. The performance was drawing to a close and in spite of the extended cheering of the men the lady had put her coat back on and the truck was preparing to depart. I wondered about the identity of our guests and if they had been sent to our CP in its exposed position by some mistake. Before we got a report back from the Recon Troop commander the truck had gone. Lt. Col. Hall had gone back to the room across the hall where the Div C P was located with the understanding that he would return when the commander called back the results of his latest parley. Some of the men were drifting back into our C P filled with talk about the young singer. I inquired who she was, but could get nothing more than 'Dinah' but I couldn't make out whether this was her name or a song that she had sung. I told Sgt. Boyd to find out as I wanted to remember this occasion and she was a vital part of it. Shooting Krauts to the singing of a young lady in an evening gown wasn't done everyday! About a half an hour later a call came through from the Recon Troop commander and Col. Hall was called. He talked with the Recon commander and reported that the German's honor had been satisfied, he was convinced that he was facing overwhelming odds, and agreed to surrender. The Recon commander said there were about 10 Krauts in the pocket and asked if he should bring them in to the Division Prisoner of War compound or take them to Corps. Hall told him to take them to Corps as quickly as possible as we had more than we could care for. He then said that he thought the 230th had shown unusual flexibility and initiative in what they had done and that I should put them in for a commendation for it. I told him it would look better if he were to put in the recommendation for a Division commendation for the 230th and I would put in a recommendation for a similar commendation for the Recon Troop commander and his unit. We agreed that this action would probably not decide the final outcome of the war, nor even of this campaign, but it was certainly unusual enough to have some record of it. I then called Evans and told him the results of his battery's shoot, and congratulated him on how well it went off. I told him 'Mission accomplished. You can turn your 'attached' battery around now and resume your normal mission.' I also told him that we were going to put in a recommendation for a Division letter of commendation for the battery's work at which he laughed. This sort of irritated me and I asked him if they had so many letters of commendation that they had no use for another. He replied in a contrite voice, No, Colonel! Don t get me wrong! We appreciate your recommendation even if we don't get the citation. I was just thinking that we did this same thing in the Tennessee Maneuvers and we got 'skinned' by the umpires! And here you are talking about a commendation! That's kind of cock-eyed." I asked him what he was talking about, and he started off with, "You remember it. It was in the Tennessee Maneuvers in 42 or 43. We were defending against a river crossing in the vicinity of Murfreesboro by two divisions the 98th Div and one other. They forced the crossing and some tanks and infantry got back near Division Hqrs. We sent an observer to see if he could find them. He did and we turned a battery around and started to fire on them. The umpires had a fit! They said that couldn't be done; we'd kill our own men. We did it anyhow and they made a great 'to-do' about our unmilitary actions in their report. Don't you remember General Yoo-Hoo Ben Lear skinning the 30th Division Artillery by name at the critique? I remembered vividly, as it was one of the most humiliating experiences I had in my military service. We thought we had done a difficult job well, and we were made the laughing stock of the army by none less than the Commanding General of the Second Army! As the operations officer of the Division Artillery I had taken this as a personal affront - a public condemnation by the highest officer in the Second Army. Now we would have our vindication!

5 I hung up the phone and went straight across the hall to where Lt. Col. Hall was located. I told him the story and said that I would help him write-up the recommendation for a Division letter of commendation right away. If we did not get busy it might be delayed and forgotten later. We started and sketched out the details that he said he would fill in and submit to the Division commander. I was sure it would be approved, as we made it sound good with words like "initiative". ingenuity", speed"., "flexibility", "accuracy of fire", and such. When it was our vindication would be complete: we would be commended for an action in combat for which we had been skinned in maneuvers! When I returned to my C P it was dark. The men had drifted back in and were fixing up the black-out curtains so we could turn on the lights. I sat down with a feeling of keen satisfaction. Ben Lear and his umpires! What did they know about combat? Who fought like civilians Ben or us? While I was silently gloating over Lear's discomfiture, about which he would never know, Sgt. Boyd came over to connect up the lights. I asked him if he had found out the name of the young lady who had performed that afternoon. F. C. Shepard February 4, 1965 Yes, sir, he replied, "It was Dinah Shore." I'd never heard of her. I never thought to ask about the young man who accompanied her.