Titles include: Stewart Candlish THE RUSSELL/BRADLEY DISPUTE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY

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2 History of Analytic Philosophy Series Editor: Michael Beaney Titles include: Stewart Candlish THE RUSSELL/BRADLEY DISPUTE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY Annalisa Coliva MOORE AND WITTGENSTEIN Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense Omar W. Nasim BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE EDWARDIAN PHILOSOPHERS Constructing the World Nuno Venturinha (editor) WITTGENSTEIN AFTER HIS NACHLASS Pierre Wagner (editor) CARNAP S LOGICAL SYNTAX OF LANGUAGE Forthcoming: Andrew Arana and Carlos Alvarez (editors) ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS Rosalind Carey RUSSELL ON MEANING The Emergence of Scientific Philosophy from the 1920s to the 1940s Giusseppina D Oro REASONS AND CAUSES Causalism and Non-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action Sébastien Gandon RUSSELL S UNKNOWN LOGICISM A Study in the History and Philosophy of Mathematics Anssi Korhonen LOGIC AS UNIVERSAL SCIENCE Russell s Early Logicism and its Philosophical Context Sandra Lapointe BERNARD BOLZANO S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY An Introduction Douglas Patterson ALFRED TARSKI Philosophy of Language and Logic

3 Erich Reck (editor) THE HISTORIC TURN IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY Graham Stevens THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS

4 Moore and Wittgenstein Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense Annalisa Coliva University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy

5 Annalisa Coliva 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6 10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number , of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave and Macmillan are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Coliva, Annalisa, 1973 Moore and Wittgenstein: scepticism, certainty and common sense/annalisa Coliva. p. cm. (History of analytic philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN Moore, G. E. (George Edward), Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Scepticism. 4. Certainty. 5. Common sense. I. Title. B1647.M74C dc Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

6 Contents Preface to the English Edition Series Editor s Foreword Acknowledgements Abbreviations of cited works vii viii xi xiii Introduction 1 1 G. E. Moore: Scepticism, Certainty and Common sense 13 1 A defence of common sense 14 2 Proof of an external world 25 3 Malcolm: common sense and ordinary language 28 4 Clarke and Stroud: At the origins of contextualism 37 5 Moore and Humean scepticism: Wright s interpretation of the proof 42 6 Moore s comeback: Pryor s dogmatist interpretation 44 7 Having knowledge and being able to prove that one does 47 2 Wittgenstein: Belief, Knowledge and Certainty 55 1 The philosophical use of to know. On the misleading assimilation of to know and to believe 57 2 The language game with to know and I know. A perspicuous description 60 3 The grammatical use of I know 74 4 Wittgenstein and the assertion fallacy 90 5 Coda. Wittgenstein and semantic contextualism Wittgenstein: Doubts and the Nonsense of Scepticism The language game with to doubt : A perspicuous description Some philosophical consequences: Why idealism and scepticism in general are nonsensical Two classical sceptical arguments and Wittgenstein s replies 118 v

7 vi Contents 4 Wittgenstein: Hinges, Certainty, World- Picture and Mythology Only apparently empirical propositions: Examples and preliminary considerations Propositions that characterize a method. The hinges around which all other propositions rotate On the groundlessness of the foundations World-picture Different world- pictures and epistemic relativism? Propositions that might be part of a kind of mythology 203 Conclusion: Moore and Wittgenstein on Epistemology and Language. A Synopsis Truisms, hinges, common sense, world-picture and knowledge Meaning, use and philosophical contexts Scepticism Certainty Epistemic foundationalism and epistemic relativism 210 Notes 211 Bibliography 234 Index 241

8 Preface to the English Edition This book is a revised and much enlarged version of my Italian volume Moore e Wittgenstein: scetticismo, certezza e senso comune, published in 2003 (Padova, Il Poligrafo). In 2004 and 2005 several important works on On Certainty, but also on Moore s epistemology and, in particular, Proof of an external world, appeared. That by itself was reason enough to recommend a revision and extension of the original book. But, meanwhile, I also came to a rather different view about the anti- sceptical potential of Wittgenstein s notes in On Certainty as well as to a much deeper understanding of their bearing on the problem of epistemic relativism. The present book bears testimony to such changes and developments. So, in more detail, the new parts are in Chapter 1, sections 6 and 7; in Chapter 2, sections 3.4 and 5; in Chapter 3, sections 2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.2, 3.2.1, and 3.3; and, finally, in Chapter 4, sections 3.2, 5, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2, 5.2.1, as well as the Introduction and the Conclusion. Some themes, already present in the Italian edition, have received a slightly different treatment throughout the text. In particular, I have insisted more than before on what I take to be Wittgenstein s view(s) on the notion of nonsense, also in consequence of recent therapeutic interpretations of his thought in general, and of On Certainty in particular. I have paid more attention to the issue of Wittgenstein s conception of propositions and rules, as well as to possible connections with Kant s views on synthetic a priori judgements. Finally, I have also enlarged on why I personally think Wittgenstein didn t put forward a new form of epistemic foundationalism. Credits In Chapter 4, the entire section 5 is taken from my paper Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?, Philosophical Investigations 33/1, vii

9 Series Editor s Foreword During the first half of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy gradually established itself as the dominant tradition in the Englishspeaking world, and over the last few decades it has taken firm root in many other parts of the world. There has been increasing debate over just what analytic philosophy means, as the movement has ramified into the complex tradition that we know today, but the influence of the concerns, ideas, and methods of early analytic philosophy on contemporary thought is indisputable. All this has led to greater self- consciousness among analytic philosophers about the nature and origins of their tradition, and scholarly interest in its historical development and philosophical foundations has blossomed in recent years, with the result that history of analytic philosophy is now recognized as a major field of philosophy in its own right. The main aim of the series in which the present book appears, the first series of its kind, is to create a venue for work on the history of analytic philosophy, consolidating the area as a major field of philosophy and promoting further research and debate. The history of analytic philosophy is understood broadly, as covering the period from the last three decades of the nineteenth century to the start of the twentyfirst century, beginning with the work of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, who are generally regarded as its main founders, and the influences upon them, and going right up to the most recent developments. In allowing the history to extend to the present, the aim is to encourage engagement with contemporary debates in philosophy, for example, in showing how the concerns of early analytic philosophy relate to current concerns. In focusing on analytic philosophy, the aim is not to exclude comparisons with other earlier or contemporary traditions, or consideration of figures or themes that some might regard as marginal to the analytic tradition but which also throw light on analytic philosophy. Indeed, a further aim of the series is to deepen our understanding of the broader context in which analytic philosophy developed, by looking, for example, at the roots of analytic philosophy in neo- Kantianism or British idealism, or the connections between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, or discussing the work of philosophers who were important in the development of analytic philosophy but who are now often forgotten. viii

10 Series Editor s Foreword ix The present book, by Annalisa Coliva, offers an account of remarks that Ludwig Wittgenstein ( ) wrote in the last year and a half of his life, remarks that were edited, translated, and published posthumously as On Certainty in Wittgenstein is arguably the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century, and is undoubtedly a central figure in the analytic tradition. His two major works are the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, which appeared in German in 1921 and in its first English translation in 1922, and the Philosophical Investigations, which was also edited, translated and published posthumously, appearing shortly after Wittgenstein s death, in The Tractatus is one of the canonical texts of analytic philosophy, while the Philosophical Investigations subjected some of its key ideas to criticism. In both works, Wittgenstein also criticizes the views of other philosophers, most notably, Frege and Russell. On Certainty contains further criticisms of all these earlier views, but its target, in particular, are ideas Wittgenstein found in two of Moore s most famous papers, A defence of common sense, published in 1925, and Proof of an external world, published in It is Wittgenstein s response to these two papers that Coliva sets out to elucidate and assess. On Certainty has been influential in analytic epistemology ever since it first appeared in 1969, but its interpretation has been enormously controversial. Part of the reason for this is that Wittgenstein did not live long enough to revise and polish his remarks to the extent that he had done in the case of the Philosophical Investigations. Its interpretation also requires understanding of Moore s own papers, which have generated their own share of dispute. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Wittgenstein s (re)reading of Moore s papers in the last two years of his life was inspired and mediated by discussions with Norman Malcolm, who has made his own contribution to analytic epistemology. There is a complex history here, from Moore s original papers to the most recent interpretations of Moore s and Wittgenstein s views, and it is one to which Coliva is sensitive in the account she offers. Moore had been concerned in his papers to show that scepticism about the external world is misguided. While sympathetic to Moore s goal, Wittgenstein was critical of his approach and the specific claims he made. In his engagement with Moore s views, Wittgenstein raised questions about the notions of knowledge, belief, and certainty involved both in philosophical disputes and in our ordinary discourse, and about the status of key propositions that he called hinge propositions. Coliva brings out the similarities and differences between Moore s and Wittgenstein s approaches and conceptions, locating her account in

11 x Series Editor s Foreword current debates about scepticism and knowledge. Over recent years, there has been a blossoming of interest in Moore s attempt to refute scepticism and in Wittgenstein s On Certainty. Coliva s book provides a fine example of how work in history of analytic philosophy not only sheds light on the historical development of themes in analytic philosophy but also, in doing so, advances the philosophical debates themselves. Michael Beaney April 2010

12 Acknowledgements This work has been with me, in one form or another, for about fifteen years. Hence, acknowledgements will be rather long. First of all, I would like to thank the late Roberto Dionigi, who taught theoretical philosophy at the University of Bologna, for first getting me interested in Wittgenstein s philosophy and for teaching me how to work with and on a philosophical text. Second, I would like to thank Eva Picardi, who was my supervisor for my tesi di laura on On Certainty, for unfailing support throughout the years. Third, I would like to thank Crispin Wright, who partly supervised that work, when I was an undergraduate student visiting St Andrews with an Erasmus exchange programme; and who, later on, made me appreciate how Wittgenstein s ideas in On Certainty could become relevant also to contemporary epistemology. Fourth, I would like to thank Danièle Moyal- Sharrock, for her lovely friendship and support. If this book is coming out in English, it is essentially due to her encouragement. Also Duncan Pritchard has been a continuous support while writing this book. Both his and Danièle s comments to earlier versions of this work have proved fundamental in improving it towards its final version. I should also like to thank Mike Beaney, not just for having the book in his Palgrave series in the history of analytic philosophy, but also for very stimulating discussions on what it means to do history of analytic philosophy, originally occasioned by our co- participation as invited speakers in the Second SIFA Graduate Conference, held in Bologna (October ). Moreover, I would like to thank all my colleagues at COGITO Research Centre in Philosophy; so, once again, Eva Picardi, Paolo Leonardi, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Elisabetta Lalumera, Giorgio Volpe, Walter Cavini, as well as the PhD and Master students Delia Belleri, Alessia Pasquali, Alessia Marabini, Sara Neva, Fabio Minocchio, Andrea Marino, Iryna Sivertsava, Filippo Ferrari, Eugenio Orlandelli, Michele Palmira, Beatrice Collina and Giovanni Mascaretti for their attendance to a series of seminars on Moore and Wittgenstein held in Fall 2009, which helped me a lot to fix several details of the manuscript. But, most of all, I would like to thank them for their support and enthusiasm for our Research Centre. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Marco Panza, and my son Leonardo. I hope Marco won t get offended if this book is dedicated only to our xi

13 xii Acknowledgements child. I promise that the next one on the shelf will be his, for as our song says, Myself and I seem to agree that the best thing for you would be me. 1 This one, however, is for our frugolo, for the two of them have slowly come to light together.

14 Abbreviations of cited works xiii Moore C Certainty, 1959, reprinted in PP, pp DCS A defence of common sense, 1925, reprinted in PP, pp FFS Four forms of scepticism, 1959, reprinted in PP, pp LM Letter to Malcolm, 1949, reprinted in SW, pp MP Moore s paradox, 1944 (?), reprinted in SW, pp PEW Proof of an external world, 1939, reprinted in PP, pp PP Philosophical Papers, London, George Allen & Unwin, RMC A reply to my critics, in P. A. Schillp (ed.) 1942 The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Evanston and Chicago, Northwestern University. SW Selected Writings, London- New York, Routledge, TF Truth and falsity, , reprinted in SW, pp Wittgenstein CV Culture and Value, Oxford, Blackwell, NF Notes on Frazer s The Golden Bough, Synthese 17, pp , Reprinted in Philosophical Occasions , Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, pp Page reference to the latter. OC On Certainty, Oxford, Blackwell, PI Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell, RFM Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1967/1978. RPP I, II Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Oxford, Blackwell, TLP Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Z Zettel, Oxford, Blackwell, 1967.

15 xiv Abbreviations of cited works A/B AT SA Others Kant, I Kritik der reinen Vernunft, English trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan, Descartes, R Meditationes de prima philosophia, English transl. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1911, vol. I. Page reference to the C. Adam and P. Tannery edition of Œuvres des Descartes, Paris, Vrin/CNRS Searle, J Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

16 Introduction This book focuses predominantly on the notes that Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote, mostly in the last eighteen months of his life, which were edited by the literary executors G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright in 1969 under the title of Über Gewißheit On Certainty. This text is, arguably, Wittgenstein s third and last masterpiece. It has been defined as a gem in the rough. 1 That it is a philosophical gem is clear at first encounter, for it contains a wealth of extraordinarily rich observations on G. E. Moore, idealism and scepticism, the nature of knowledge, belief, doubt, certainty and the role of reasons or justifications with respect to them. Yet it is clear, upon second encounter with it, that it is also in the rough because different threads emerge, often in tension with one another. Let us review some of the main difficulties afforded by On Certainty (OC). Consider the incipit of the work If you do know that here is one hand, we ll grant you all the rest (OC 1). Here Wittgenstein is referring to G. E. Moore s celebrated Proof of an External World, published in The Proof is generally considered a puzzling philosophical performance and it has stirred considerable interest upon different generations of scholars and philosophers, since its first appearance, up to present times. But reference to Moore s work is not confined to his 1939 paper; it extends also to a previous one A Defence of Common Sense published in This earlier paper is clearly different from the later one, as it does not aim to offer a proof of a given metaphysical thesis, but simply to charact erize a series of truisms which collectively make up our common sense picture of the world, according to Moore. It then endeavours to clarify what kind of philosophical implications that might have, against those who have denied or held views incompatible with the metaphysical and epistemological truths allegedly contained in Moore s truisms. 1

17 2 Moore and Wittgenstein This immediately poses the problem of understanding Moore s work per se and then of seeing how Wittgenstein was struck by it. Neither of these two tasks is straightforward, though. For generations of interpreters have offered substantially different readings of Moore s 1939 paper and this bears testimony to the extreme difficulty of making sense of it. Yet the earlier paper, too, is by no means easy to understand. Still Wittgenstein clearly thought there was something extremely important to it. Furthermore, he became interested in these two papers mainly as a consequence of his visit to his former pupil and friend, Normal Malcolm, in Ithaca, in Malcolm was working on them at the time and, through conversations with him, Wittgenstein started to ponder on their philosophical significance. This is historically important because it means that Wittgenstein s reception of Moore s two articles was mediated by the reading of them afforded by one of Moore s first commentators, viz. Malcolm. Yet Malcolm s reading of Moore itself was mediated by his earlier attendance of Wittgenstein s lectures (1938/1939) and, as we shall see, by Wittgenstein s treatment of epistemic expressions in connection with first- person avowals of mental states, whether sensations or propositional attitudes, as well as by further exposure to Wittgenstein s influence in This complex entanglement poses a number of historically difficult questions. From a methodological point of view I have therefore decided to devote an entire chapter to Moore s two papers (with occasional incursions also into other epistemological works by him, whose later publication, however, makes them less relevant to the task of understanding Wittgenstein s reception of Moore s work). After a presentation of them, I have then reviewed the main interpretations to which they have given rise, with special attention to Malcolm s reading of Proof of an External World, in particular, as well as to his private correspondence with Moore on the topic. This correspondence clarifies in many respects Moore s own understanding of his later paper, and the differences between him and Malcolm, as well as between him and Wittgenstein, on three interrelated issues: first, the conception of meaning at work in their respective philosophical perspectives; second, their different notions of nonsense either more semantically oriented, in Malcolm and Wittgenstein, or more epistemically oriented in Moore; finally and connectedly, their contrasting conceptions of the legitimacy of philosophical scepticism. However, it soon becomes clear that Malcolm s reading of Moore is indeed very partial and can hardly be considered a faithful and illuminating rendition of the latter s work. Hence, I have also decided to deepen the understanding of Moore s epistemology per se by looking

18 Introduction 3 at a number of influential interpretations of it that have been offered since, up to the present day. Thus, I have focused on Thompson Clarke s and Barry Stroud s first attempts at reading Moore as a somewhat protocontextualist philosopher; as well as on Crispin Wright s influential reading of Proof of an External World as ironically a sceptical argument in disguise, up to a recent, more favourable, appraisal of it proposed by Jim Pryor. For different reasons, I claim that all these readings are somewhat wanting and that they don t do justice to the complexity of Moore s reflections. I therefore close by proposing my own interpretation of Moore s work, which basically sees it as a form of proto- externalism in epistemology. Yet, I must stress, if my reading is on the right track at all, Moore s externalism is really just in nuce. For it depends on the basic move of divorcing the obtainment of knowledge from the possibility of claiming it, and does not contain any analysis of the concept of knowledge which might sustain such a separation; nor does it contain any clear hint of how the sceptical challenge and its ultimate legitimacy can be dealt with from such a perspective. This passage from the mere reconstruction of the historiography around Moore s work to a new interpretation of it marks the passage from a simply historiographical to a properly historical work, conceived as a form of rational reconstruction, whose validity, however, can only be tested against textual evidence. That is to say, it is my firm conviction that when engaged in doing history of philosophy analytic or otherwise as opposed to doing philosophy as such, we are all first and foremost involved in a process of interpretation of more or less remote texts. However, such interpretations can t be assessed merely on the basis of their own specific philosophical interest and merits, if they are meant as exegeses. Rather, they must always be evaluated with respect to the text of which they are purported interpretations, as well as to other historical evidence pertaining to what we may generically call the context in which the work was created. I believe there is a strong tendency, especially in analytic philosophy, to forget such a methodological requirement and thus to present more how such and such a text struck one, as it were, rather than what that text itself tried to say, in light of its author s intentions and working context. However, rational reconstructions without textual evidence, or else supported by very little textual evidence, seem to me to be empty to use a piece of Kantian terminology. I have therefore endeavoured to avoid falling prey to such a tendency as much as possible. Whether I have succeeded or not is for the reader to decide. Yet, as an analytic philosopher, I myself am sensitive to what I think are, upon close examination, just rational reconstructions. Let me offer

19 4 Moore and Wittgenstein but one example. Take for instance Saul Kripke s work on Wittgenstein s remarks on rule- following and the so- called private language argument. 2 Needless to say, its exegetical accuracy is extremely debatable indeed, as a historian, I would rank myself among those who think that Kripkenstein is clearly not Wittgenstein. Yet, there is no denying that that reading is intellectually engaging and philosophically fruitful. How to resolve the tension then, between, as it were, rational reconstructions that are historically empty and historical reconstructions that might end up being philosophically blind to pursue our Kantian comparison? That is to say, how can one resolve the pressure between, on the one hand, offering interpretations that may be accurate from a textual point of view, yet not philosophically germane to future investigation and, on the other, presenting rational reconstructions that may end up having little to do with the text they aim to be exegeses of? I have, as a rule, divorced my activity as a historian from my work as a philosopher. So, if you happen to be interested in Colivenstein, as it were, you will not find it here. Not that I have ever been tidy and disciplined enough to pursue these two activities seriatim. My initial interests in Moore and Wittgenstein were as a historian, since my first approach to philosophy in the late 1990s. Then I have abandoned the issue for a number of years, by working essentially on the self and self- knowledge and on my own attempt at retaining as much of Wittgenstein s anti- realist epistemological outlook as possible, without embracing his view that the basic propositions that form the framework of our epistemic practice are rules. Meanwhile, I have occasionally gone back to my activity as a historian, especially to complete the Italian edition of this book, which came out in As I became interested in the issue of relativism and wrote a book on the topic in Italian, I also worked on Wittgenstein s alleged relativism, and the final sections of this book bear testimony to that. Yet I think I have been fortunate to have become interested in two major philosophical contributions: Moore s epistemological works, on the one hand, and Wittgenstein s On Certainty, on the other. To try and bring out their own respective philosophically rich insights, without superimposing my own attempt to develop them in directions which may seem fruitful, when engaging in purely theoretical work, is I think both historically and philosophically interesting. For it helps better to see why and in which possible directions they may then be expanded, without themselves already containing these later developments, but only their buds, as it were. In other words, I have been lucky enough always to be interested in philosophical classics, which do indeed deserve that name

20 Introduction 5 because they remain the best and richest examples of philosophy in the making, and have been inspirational to generations of philosophers. It is indeed with this ideal in mind namely, the ideal to let these texts talk for themselves, while signalling if and when they elicit points that are relevant to contemporary debates in epistemology as well as to a rising way of doing philosophy of language, which pays close attention to the role played by context in determining the proposition expressed by a given sentence that I have written this book. I hope that this way of proceeding will have another important effect, especially with respect to the perception of Wittgenstein s work. For, although in recent years there has been something of a Moorean renaissance, mostly fostered by new and detailed reconstructions of his celebrated proof, it is clear that Wittgenstein s work both in philosophy of language and in epistemology is often considered of interest only to Wittgensteinians nowadays. That is to say, to a varying number of scholars who, while mostly engaged in exegesis, tend to think that Wittgenstein had the last word on pretty much everything. On the contrary, I hope this book will succeed in showing the opposite, viz., that Wittgenstein (and indeed Moore, when it comes to epistemological externalism) had, if anything, often the first word; that his philosophical genius consisted frequently in sensing, and sometimes in developing, philosophical problems and broad outlooks which, before him, were either ignored or not as pressingly and deeply felt as he perceived them, or else, were simply unavailable. If so, then, reading Wittgenstein (as well as Moore), keeping him, as it were, on our philosophical bedside tables, will remain a source of inspiration and will often lead us to think for ourselves. It will then be a powerful propellant for starting doing philosophy, rather than ending it. This, I think, is the basic lesson I have learned from Crispin Wright, although, being more historically minded than him, I tend to sharply distinguish between a sort of ars inveniendi the activity of tracking down certain themes and problems in Wittgenstein s (and Moore s) texts and a sort of ars inventionis, which consists in further developing those themes and in proposing solutions to those problems, in turn often devised either by analogy or by contrast with suggestions that may be found in the texts. Another advantage of keeping the two activities separate becomes apparent when one considers Wittgenstein s conception of his own way of doing philosophy as essentially therapeutic rather than constructive. No doubt there may well have been elements of self- deception in this sort of self- appraisal. Yet, one can t simply dismiss this quite explicit attitude of Wittgenstein. Still, the real question is this: why should one want to do so? Well, essentially for two reasons, I take it. First,

21 6 Moore and Wittgenstein because as remarked, Wittgenstein wasn t always consistent with his metaphilosophical pronouncement and at least at places he seems to be engaged in some kind of constructive philosophical activity after all. Second, because if one is interested in Wittgenstein mostly as an inspirational source for one s own way of thinking, then one will have the more or less conscious tendency to play down those remarks, as taking them at face value would presumably prevent or deter one from developing his and/or one s own ideas in a constructive manner. But if one feels free to give Wittgenstein his due, while divorcing one s own thinking from the idea of thereby bringing to light something which was already present in Wittgenstein, as opposed to merely inspired by him, one will also feel free to acknowledge, on the one hand, the therapeutic elements in Wittgenstein s own thought, while, on the other, ignoring them in one s own philosophical activity, if one sees that fit. So much for an explanation of the methodology employed in this work. Let me now go back to a description of its content. I said before that On Certainty is a difficult text. We have been reviewing one reason for such an assessment, namely the difficulty of seeing clearly the relationship with its official opponent, viz. G. E. Moore. But this is just one reason. There are at least three more that are somehow interconnected. The first one is that On Certainty revolves around the idea that Moore s truisms and first premise of his proof Here is my hand as well as propositions similar to them, are like hinges that must stay put in order for our language and epistemic practices to be possible. Yet as soon as we look at them, the truth of this claim is far from obvious. For instance, it is perfectly conceivable that, on occasion, Here is my hand be a genuinely empirical proposition, subject to verification and control; and indeed, one of Wittgenstein s favourite examples, Nobody has ever been on the Moon, simply appears false to us. By contrast, things look much better when one considers The Earth has existed for a very long time, which obviously must stand fast if we are to pursue our usual epistemic practices, such as history or geology; or else, There are physical objects, which, pace some interpreters, is a hinge for Wittgenstein. For, if we gave that up, how could we keep having a conceptual scheme of mindindependent objects and how could we possibly take testimonies and perceptual experiences to bear upon them? Yet, it remains to be clarified in what sense, if any, hinges are hinges. From a structural point of view, Wittgenstein repeatedly claims that hinges are (i) neither true nor false; (ii) neither justified nor unjustified;

22 Introduction 7 (iii) therefore, they are neither known nor unknown; (iv) hence, they cannot sensibly be called into doubt; (v) furthermore, they aren t either rational or not rational; (vi) thus, finally, for these very reasons, they aren t empirical propositions but rules. This set of claims poses a series of difficulties, both because they don t seem unequivocal, if one goes through On Certainty, and because, even supposing they constituted the backbone of Wittgenstein s official view known, in the literature, as the framework reading of On Certainty they would seem problematical. For instance, it is extremely weird to say that Here is my hand is neither true nor false, when I am holding my hand up in front of my face in what appear to be perceptually and cognitively optimal conditions. Similarly, we take ourselves to have an overwhelming body of evidence in favour of the fact that, for instance, the Earth has existed for a very long time, up to the point that, if we know anything at all, we know at least that much and, surely, to believe such a thing is at any rate entirely justified and therefore rational. Moreover, among hinges, as we have seen, there is Nobody has ever been on the Moon, which simply appears false to us, let alone dubitable. Furthermore, if they are rules, supposing one could make sense of this claim, what would they be rules of? The Philosophical Investigations, as well as Wittgenstein s middle- period writings, made us familiar with the idea of rules of grammar; roughly, with the idea of meaning constitutive rules, albeit rules determined by linguistic use itself and therefore dependent on it. But The Earth has existed for a very long time could only be regarded as meaning constitutive on a rather holistic picture of linguistic meaning, which is neither clearly Wittgenstein s official view, nor obviously correct as such. So, in what sense, if any, could it be a rule of grammar? Moreover, if hinges are rules because they are neither true nor false, as well as neither epistemically assessable, in what sense, if any, could they still be regarded as propositions? That is, if bipolarity is the mark of propositionality, how could Wittgenstein claim that they are hinge-propositions? Wouldn t it be more correct to say that they are strings of sounds or graphemes that don t express any proposition at all? And, if so, wouldn t that explain one of Wittgenstein s further claims tentative as it might be that with respect to them, all of our propositional attitude verbs for example, to assume, to believe, to know, to be certain, etc. seem to be inappropriate? Yet, if so, what on earth could the certainty we have with respect to them whence the title of the book be? Finally, if hinges are rules, isn t there a danger of embracing

23 8 Moore and Wittgenstein epistemic relativism, or at least of making it intelligible? After all, we are familiar with the idea of different, even formal games, defined by different sets of rules or axioms. Or else, was Wittgenstein somehow proposing a new and sui generis form of epistemic foundationalism, where at the foundations lie rules, rather than immediately verified propositions? A further reason why understanding On Certainty is difficult depends on the complexity of its anti- sceptical strategy. For, if Moore is clearly one opponent, On Certainty is by no means a sceptical treatise. Yet, when one tries to pin it down as far as its anti- sceptical potential is concerned, one will run into several exegetical troubles. Just to give the reader a sense of the difficulty of making sense of the anti- sceptical strategy contained in that book, consider that, to the best of my knowledge, at least four different families of interpretations of this issue have been proposed. They can be graded according to whether they attribute to Wittgenstein a view of scepticism as nonsensical, in two senses to be further elucidated; or whether they allow that, even for Wittgenstein, scepticism did indeed make sense; and, furthermore, that it could actually be answered. So, to clarify, the therapeutic interpretation, due essentially to James Conant, has it that, in On Certainty, scepticism is deemed utterly and radically nonsensical, as sceptical doubts are expressed outside any context of use and, given the connection between use and meaning, can t be endowed with sense. Sceptical doubts are therefore meaningless much like the combination of signs Ab sur um. The framework reading, in contrast, has it that hinges are rules which, as such, can t be subject to epistemic appraisal. Hence, scepticism, which doubts them, raises a doubt where it cannot rationally be sustained. Therefore, sceptical doubts are nonsensical not because they are meaningless but because they are irrational. The naturalist reading, mainly proposed by Peter Strawson, holds that, for Wittgenstein, sceptical doubts are neither meaningless nor irrational, just unnatural, since they are raised with respect to propositions that we find natural to take for granted, given our upbringing within a community that collectively holds them fast. Finally, the epistemic reading, championed by Crispin Wright and Michael Williams, but somehow connected to earlier work by Thomas Morawetz, claims that, for Wittgenstein, hinges are really not rules but propositions that, at least in context, cannot be evidentially justified. Yet, if we broaden our conception of warrants so as to include also non- evidential ones call them entitlements we can actually see how, even for Wittgenstein, hinges can in point of fact be justified, contrary to what sceptics maintain. Furthermore, if we recognize that Wittgenstein didn t tie either truth to evidential justification,

24 Introduction 9 or knowledge to a subject s ability to provide warrants for one s claims, and actually held a somewhat externalist conception of know ledge, we can go so far as to argue that he himself maintained the view that hinges are known. Either way, on this interpretation, Wittgenstein would actually recognize the full intelligibility and appropriateness of the sceptical challenge, and in fact devise a rather sophisticated line of response to it. Finally, going from one extreme to the other of this taxonomy, the overall appraisal of On Certainty would change, as it would go from taking it as a merely therapeutic to a robustly theoretically committed text. One final reason why making sense of On Certainty is difficult has to do with the issue which, provocatively, one could put like this: why that title? Now, it is a well- known fact that it was chosen by the editors, yet was their choice utterly misguided or deeply motivated? Again, given the number of interpretations of On Certainty available nowadays, answers to these questions vary considerably. For, on the one hand, if one holds the therapeutic reading, according to which Wittgenstein didn t put forward any substantive view of hinges but merely aimed to cure ourselves of the temptation of either doubting them or of insisting that we knew them, it is simply not clear whether certainty would have a definite object, and what kind of attitude it would be. On the other hand, if one held a naturalist reading of hinges, they would be certain because, given our practices, they are actually exempt from doubt. Moreover, our attitude with respect to them would be of a somewhat instinctive kind; that is to say, we would take them for granted because we have been brought up within a community that behaves that way with respect to certain propositions. If, in contrast, one maintained an epistemic reading, the category of certainty as a propositional attitude would simply be inappropriate, though there would be certainties, viz. propositions for which doubts would be ungrounded and for which entitlements could be provided. For, to put it succinctly, we would either have non- evidential warrant for them, hence justified belief in them, or actually knowledge of them. Certainty as a propositional attitude would thus drop out of consideration on this view. Finally, on the framework reading, hinges are certain because of their normative role that exempts them from doubt. Moreover, as to our attitude with respect to them, if we held the ineffabilist conception of hinges, whereby, failing to be propositions, they could neither be said, nor made the object of any propositional attitude, our certainty with respect to them would have to be thought of as non- propositional, non- conceptual and therefore of a merely animal kind. Or else, if we maintained that hinges, while being rules, are still propositions on a fairly relaxed notion of proposition we

25 10 Moore and Wittgenstein could claim that, as such, they can be the object of a propositional attitude of certainty which parallels the kind of attitude we bear to our most wellentrenched, yet fully explicit rules. That is to say, we do accept them and hold them fast, we behave in accord with them, or else accept criticism for not doing so, and, finally, pass them on to our children. As will become apparent, I personally maintain one specific version of the framework reading, whose elements of novelty with respect to other ones are mainly as follows. First, in my view, hinges are not just meaning constitutive rules, but also, and in fact in most cases, rules of evidential significance. Hence, I side with those interpreters of Wittgenstein who actually hold that after the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein came to broaden both the notion of rule such as Wright and Moyal- Sharrock and that of grammar, so as to include this kind of epistemic rules. However, I don t know whether this would justify the claim that there actually is a third Wittgenstein, after the one of the Tractatus and of the Philosophical Investigations. Ultimately, I don t think the counting is that important; all that matters is to be clear about the basic notions at play here and the developments to which they were subject. Second, I don t embrace the ineffabilist claim that since hinges aren t bipolar, they can t be propositions and that, therefore, they remain, as certainties, always beyond the possibility of being said. On the contrary, I hold the view that while failing at bipolarity, they are still propositions, albeit with a normative function, rather than a descriptive one, and that we do indeed express them on various occasions: either to teach them to someone who ignored them or to remind someone of them were they to violate them, as philosophers such as Moore and a sceptic do. Contrary to other framework interpreters, most notably Moyal- Sharrock, I do think that at least the former context in which hinges are actually said is a genuine language game, by Wittgensteinian lights. Hence, hinges do indeed figure as such within language games, yet not as part of epistemic ones, where empirical propositions are put forward and assessed. Third, I do think that the anti- sceptical strategy presented in On Certainty actually depends on an entailment between the irrationality of raising doubts with respect to rules which, as such, cannot be subject to epistemic evaluation, and the meaninglessness of those doubts. Hence, to my mind, there is something important to learn from the therapeutic reading. What supporters of the therapeutic reading are mistaken about, I think, is to hold that the primacy of use prevents us from attributing Wittgenstein the view of hinges as rules. For, granted that primacy, I actually think that rules are what we can recognize ex post as held fixed by our actual practices. Fourth, I hold that

26 Introduction 11 the title On Certainty is entirely appropriate for two different reasons. First, because this text deals with hinges, that is to say, with propositions whose status of certainties depends on their role of basic rules of our conceptual scheme and epistemic practices. Hence, their certainty is of a grammatical (or even logical ) nature (provided logic and grammar are taken as synonyms), not of a psychological, or animal one. Yet, there is also a sense in which our attitude with respect to them is rightly characterized as certainty, as opposed to knowledge, or (non- evidentially) justified belief or whatever you have. For we do accept them as rules, in a way which knows no doubt we hold them fast and, in view of that, behave in accord with them, accept reproach for not doing so, and transmit them to future generations by teaching them a given language and to take part in our epistemic practices. Hence, I maintain that certainty as an attitude is a form of acceptance not of ungrounded presuppositions but of rules, conceived of, in their turn, as normative propositions. Thus, I contrast, at once, both epistemic readings such as Wright s, whereby we would accept these truth- apt propositions, without any evidential warrant to do so; as well as other framework readings, such as Moyal-Sharrock s, according to which certainty with respect to hinges could never be a propositional attitude, as its objects wouldn t be propositions, and should thus be regarded as some kind of animal certainty. Finally, I conclude by showing why the framework reading need not be committed either to interpreting Wittgenstein as an epistemic foundationalist, or to attributing him some form of epistemic relativism. For, on the one hand, Wittgenstein s hinges are such that we bear no epistemic relation to them and, without that much, it seems to me there really is no room for foundationalism. On the other, rules are entrenched in a practice that, quite clearly, could have been metaphysically different from what it in fact is. Yet, from the inside of such a practice, as we in fact are, we can t really conceive of its alternatives. Apparent examples to the contrary are then defused by appealing also to textual evidence, both in On Certainty and in the Notes on Frazer s The Golden Bough and in Culture and Value. Hence, I conclude, somewhat against generations of interpreters, that also by Wittgenstein s lights epistemic relativism remains a mere metaphysical possibility, but that it is not a description of our actual epistemic situation, nor of an epistemic condition we can really make sense of. So, if epistemic relativism has a grip on us at all, it remains ineffectual, as we could not really conceive of it in detail. This, in broad outline, is the reading of On Certainty I defend. Yet, exactly because I think, in agreement with therapists as well as with many other

27 12 Moore and Wittgenstein commentators, that in the later Wittgenstein the observation of linguistic use and epistemic practices is the starting and fundamental point, my analysis and eventual defence of the view just presented proceed in three stages, corresponding to each of the last three chapters of this book. The first and the second chapters pay close attention to Wittgenstein s observations respectively about the use of I know in everyday contexts, in philosophical ones and in a grammatical sense; and to his remarks about the use of I doubt, both in ordinary contexts and in philosophical ones. Those analyses allow me to clarify, on the one hand, Wittgenstein s view of knowledge, which I regard as firmly internalist, and to defuse appearances to the contrary, as essentially due either to a conflation between propositional and practical knowledge or to the oblivion of the grammatical use of I know. They also allow me to further clarify Wittgenstein s conception of meaning and nonsense, as well as to investigate the complexity of his anti- sceptical strategy and thus to oppose, in particular, naturalist and epistemic readings of it. In the fourth and last chapter, in contrast, I take up the issue of the status of hinges, their many different kinds, their propositional nature, their allegedly foundational role, and the kind of propositional attitude we bear to them, as well as the issue of whether they open the way to epistemic relativism. In passing, I contrast my interpretation with other prominent relatives inside the family of so- called framework readings of On Certainty. Finally, in the Conclusion, I signal the main similarities and differences between Moore and Wittgenstein with respect to epistemology and philosophy of language. Along this lengthy and winding road, I have placed a number of signposts to indicate the various junctions at which both contemporary philosophy of language and epistemology may be seen as having their departure points. As said, both Moore s and Wittgenstein s works are classics, and their being so is, in my view, tantamount to their having had the first word on many issues which, nowadays, we all perceive as philosophically important. That should also make us curious to read them, in order to deepen our self- understanding, by giving us a sense of our place in the context of a philosophical tradition. Still, it is only to be expected that by further reading them, someone will be inspired to develop some of their suggestions in yet unforeseen directions. My wish, in effect, is ultimately this. Yet, if so much happens, I also hope people will give credit to their inspirational sources. This, to my mind, is by no means a sign of lack of originality.