# Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory.

Save this PDF as:

Size: px
Start display at page:

## Transcription

1 Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory. Monika Gruber University of Vienna Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

2 1 Truth and Probability (1926) 2 Facts and Propositions (1927) 3 Decision Theory Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

3 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey s goal in TP is to bring out the connection between the subjective degree of belief we have in a proposition p and the probability we assign it. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

4 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey s goal in TP is to bring out the connection between the subjective degree of belief we have in a proposition p and the probability we assign it. Ramsey considers the notion of partial belief. We have to establish what a partial belief is and how it is to be measured because a degree of belief has no precise meaning, unless we specify exactly how to measure it. Therefore, Ramsey presents his first definition of a degree of a belief. the degree of a belief is a causal property of it, which we can express vaguely as the extent to which we are prepared to act on it. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

5 Truth and Probability (1926) In order to be able to measure the strength of our beliefs, we must assign to any belief a magnitude or degree having a definite position in an order of magnitudes. Hence we must construct an ordered series of degrees and then assign numbers to these degrees in an intelligible manner. We denote: full belief by 1, full belief in the contradictory by 0, equal beliefs in the proposition and its contradictory by 1 2. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

6 Truth and Probability (1926) In order to be able to measure the strength of our beliefs, we must assign to any belief a magnitude or degree having a definite position in an order of magnitudes. Hence we must construct an ordered series of degrees and then assign numbers to these degrees in an intelligible manner. We denote: full belief by 1, full belief in the contradictory by 0, equal beliefs in the proposition and its contradictory by 1 2. It is much more difficult to say what it means that we belief in a proposition to 2 3. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

7 Truth and Probability (1926) In order to be able to measure the strength of our beliefs, we must assign to any belief a magnitude or degree having a definite position in an order of magnitudes. Hence we must construct an ordered series of degrees and then assign numbers to these degrees in an intelligible manner. We denote: full belief by 1, full belief in the contradictory by 0, equal beliefs in the proposition and its contradictory by 1 2. It is much more difficult to say what it means that we belief in a proposition to 2 3. This is the harder part of the task, but it is absolutely necessary; for we do calculate numerical probabilities, and if they are to correspond to degrees of belief we must discover some definite way of attaching numbers to degrees of belief. [TP, 64] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

8 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey considers two ways in which we can deal with this task. The first one is assuming that a belief is perceptible by its owner and accompanied by a feeling of conviction to which a definite number could be ascribed. This method, however, is dismissed on a few very obvious grounds, i.e. the inability to ascribe numbers to feelings, or that we often have no feelings at all about our strongest beliefs. Ramsey suggest another, the only sound method the kind of measurement of belief with which probability is concerned [TP, 67] to assume that the degree of a belief is a casual property of it the extent to which we are prepared to act on this belief. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

9 Truth and Probability (1926) As soon as we regard belief quantitatively, this seems to me the only view we can take of it. It could well be held that the difference between believing and not believing lies in the presence or absence of introspectible feelings. But when we seek to know what is the difference between believing more firmly and believing less firmly, we can no longer regard it as consisting in having more or less of certain observable feelings; at leat I personally cannot recognize any such feeling. The difference seems to me to lie in how far we should act on theses beliefs: this may depend on the degree of some feeling or feelings, but I do not know exactly what feelings and I do not see that it is indispensable that we should know. [TP, 66] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

10 Truth and Probability (1926) Two essential things Ramsey points out are that: the beliefs we are concerned with are dispositional, i.e. they would lead to action if acted on them, in suitable circumstances; e.g. a lump of arsenic; and Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

11 Truth and Probability (1926) Two essential things Ramsey points out are that: the beliefs we are concerned with are dispositional, i.e. they would lead to action if acted on them, in suitable circumstances; e.g. a lump of arsenic; and the degree of a belief is a casual property of it the extent to which we are prepared to act on this belief. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

12 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey persists that when we talk about the strength of our beliefs what we actually mean, is how we should act, according to those beliefs, in possible situations. Therefore, also in regard to measuring partial beliefs, with which probability is concerned, Ramsey argues that the best way is the measurement of belief via basis of action. The old-established method of measuring a person s belief is to propose a bet, and see what are the lowest odds which he will accept. This method I regard as fundamentally sound; but it suffers from being insufficiently general, and from being necessarily inexact. [TP, 68] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

13 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey persists that when we talk about the strength of our beliefs what we actually mean, is how we should act, according to those beliefs, in possible situations. Therefore, also in regard to measuring partial beliefs, with which probability is concerned, Ramsey argues that the best way is the measurement of belief via basis of action. The old-established method of measuring a person s belief is to propose a bet, and see what are the lowest odds which he will accept. This method I regard as fundamentally sound; but it suffers from being insufficiently general, and from being necessarily inexact. [TP, 68] Ramsey proposes to construct a general and more exact theory of quantities of belief. A theory which assumes that we act in the way we think most likely to realise the objects of our desires, so that a person s actions are completely determined by his desires and opinions [TP, 69]. Admittedly, such theory cannot apply adequately to all possible situations, nevertheless, Ramsey decides to use it claiming for the results only approximate truth. He formulates what is now known as a Bayesian principle of the maximisation of expect utility. Distancing himself from the utilitarians, for whom the pleasure had a dominating position, Ramsey holds that agents choose the act which is for them of the greatest utility, given their desires and their degrees of beliefs. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

14 Truth and Probability (1926) The theory I propose to adopt is that we seek things we want, which may be our own or other people s pleasure, or anything else whatever, and our actions are such as we think most likely to realise those goods. [TP, 69] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

15 Truth and Probability (1926) The focus remains on measuring the beliefs via basis of action. Ideally, our subject, having no doubts and only certain opinions about everything will always act in a way, which in her opinion, will lead to the greatest sum of good maximum expected utility. Our agent, however, being human, is not always certain to what degree she holds at least some of her beliefs. Therefore, Ramsey suggests another definition of a degree of belief, which takes account of varying degrees of certainty in the agent s beliefs. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

16 Truth and Probability (1926) I suggest that we introduce as a law of psychology that his behaviour is governed by what is called the mathematical expectation; that is to say that, if p is a proposition about which he is doubtful, any goods or bads for whose realization p is in his view a necessary and sufficient condition enter into his calculations multiplied by the same fraction, which is called the degree of his belief in p. We thus define degree of belief in a way which presupposed the use of the mathematical expectation. [TP, 70] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

17 Truth and Probability (1926) Supposing an agent s degree of belief in a proposition p is m n, then we define it thus Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

18 Truth and Probability (1926) Supposing an agent s degree of belief in a proposition p is m n, then we define it thus Def. degree of belief in p = m n ; which means that an agent s action is such as she would choose it to be if she had to repeat it exactly n times, in m of which p was true, and in the others false [in each of the n times he has no memory of the previous ones]. [cf. TP, 70] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

19 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey proves these laws to be necessarily true of any consistent set of degrees of belief. Hence he shows how Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

20 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey proves these laws to be necessarily true of any consistent set of degrees of belief. Hence he shows how we can measure the degree of belief an agent as in p, and Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

21 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey proves these laws to be necessarily true of any consistent set of degrees of belief. Hence he shows how we can measure the degree of belief an agent as in p, and provided an agent is reasonable, his degree of belief will have a measure that satisfies the mathematical laws of probability. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

22 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey proves these laws to be necessarily true of any consistent set of degrees of belief. Hence he shows how we can measure the degree of belief an agent as in p, and provided an agent is reasonable, his degree of belief will have a measure that satisfies the mathematical laws of probability. He has shown that the measure representing the degree of belief that an agent has in p satisfies the axioms of probability theory. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

23 Truth and Probability (1926) We find, therefore, that a precise account of the nature of partial belief reveals that the laws of probability are laws of consistency. They do not depend for their meaning on any degree of belief in a proposition being uniquely determined as a rational one; they merely distinguish those sets of beliefs which obey them as consistent ones. Having any definite degree of belief implies a certain measure of consistency, namely willingness to bet on a given proposition at the same odds for any stake, the stakes being measured in terms of ultimate values. Having degrees of belief obeying the laws of probability implies a further measure of consistency, namely such a consistency between the odds acceptable on different propositions as shall prevent a book being made against you. [TP, 78-9] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

24 Truth and Probability (1926) Ramsey s aim was to show that we are able to measure the degree of belief an agent has in a proposition, and that provided the agent follows some principles of rationality, the measure by which we can represent this degree of belief is a probability measure. Moreover, Ramsey in fact has shown that the obtained measure of degree of belief is a probability measure. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

25 Truth and Probability (1926) In Truth and Probability (1926), Ramsey laid the foundations of the modern theory of subjective probability and of modern decision theory. Seen like this, it is important to understand TP as a theory of rule-following: we can describe a person s actions in terms of rule-following. If our distribution of degrees of belief follows the rules of probability, a book cannot be made against us. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

26 Facts and Propositions (1927) For Ramsey the problem of truth is not separate from the problem of the analysis of judgement or the content of belief, hence the problem of truth is transferred to the problem of the truth conditions of beliefs, that is why Ramsey says that if we have analysed judgement, we have also solved the problem of truth. [FP, 39] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

27 Facts and Propositions (1927) For Ramsey the problem of truth is not separate from the problem of the analysis of judgement or the content of belief, hence the problem of truth is transferred to the problem of the truth conditions of beliefs, that is why Ramsey says that if we have analysed judgement, we have also solved the problem of truth. [FP, 39] In "Facts and Propositions" Ramsey deals with full beliefs, which he defines as a set of actions for whose utility p is a necessary and sufficient condition. Moreover, Ramsey connects his theory of belief to a theory of truth, adding that the given belief is true if p, i.e. if these actions are useful. Thus any belief used as a basis for action is true, if and only if, the agent having the belief is successful acting on it. That is Ramsey s Principle. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

28 Facts and Propositions (1927) Before dealing with the more complex concepts judgement and belief, Ramsey turns to the issues of truth and falsehood in order to show that there is really no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle. [FP, 38] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

29 Facts and Propositions (1927) Before dealing with the more complex concepts judgement and belief, Ramsey turns to the issues of truth and falsehood in order to show that there is really no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle. [FP, 38] Truth and falsity are ascribed primarily to propositions, which may be either explicitly given or described. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

30 Facts and Propositions (1927) Before dealing with the more complex concepts judgement and belief, Ramsey turns to the issues of truth and falsehood in order to show that there is really no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle. [FP, 38] Truth and falsity are ascribed primarily to propositions, which may be either explicitly given or described. explicitly given it is evident that It is true that Caesar was murdered means simply that Caesar was murdered, and it is false that Caesar was murdered means that he was not murdered. We add is true and is false for emphasis or stylistic reasons. We also say it is a fact that which means the same. In the case of explicitly given propositions, if we substitute p for Caesar was murdered we do not have to add is true to p, for it is true that Caesar was murdered means simply that Caesar was murdered, hence the use of the variable p is substitutional. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

31 Facts and Propositions (1927) described here, we get statements from which we cannot in ordinary language eliminate the words true and false, e.g. He is always right means that the propositions he asserts are alway true, The matter seems more complicated in the case of described propositions, although Ramsey is determined to hold that that it is just as simple. For as soon as we present our propositions in a clear logical notation, For all p if he asserts p, then p (is true) the predicate is true can easily be eliminated, since the propositional function p is true is the same as p, like the value of Caesar was murdered is true is the same as Caesar was murdered. It could, however, be argued that the quantification here, is one over the objects, and not sentences, as in the case of explicitly given propositions. For Ramsey it was not, but he suggests yet another interpretation, i.e. to express it as a relation of the form arb ; then He is always right could be expressed by For all a, R, b, if he asserts arb, then arb (is true) the elimination of the predicate is true does not present any difficulties. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

32 Facts and Propositions (1927) For all p iff p then p which amounts to simply stating p itself. To sum it up, on Ramsey s redundancy account of truth to say that p is a fact, or that it is a fact that p means the same as to say that p is true, which in turn amounts to simply stating p. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

33 Facts and Propositions (1927) This short statement has, however, been misinterpreted by the deflationists. Ramsey s redundancy conception of truth only makes sense together with his theory of belief which, in turn, is dependent on his complete theory of truth. Hence, his theories of belief and of truth are interdependent. Ramsey s goal in FP is to present a logical analysis of judgement and belief, and he is determined to account for the truth conditions of beliefs and judgements. He wants to establish the factor that makes the truth predication of these notions possible, or more precisely, what these mental states have in common that enables us to state their truth or falsity. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

34 Facts and Propositions (1927) As Michael Dummett notices, it is not possible that Ramsey held a redundancy conception of truth which amounted to the given equivalence, and at the same, using this equivalence wanted to determine the truth conditions of our beliefs, or generally, of all our mental states. Moreover, Ramsey was definitely aware that if one holds that it is true that p amounts simply to p one needs to know the content or the meaning of p. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

35 Facts and Propositions (1927) The following quote makes it clear that for Ramsey any discussion of truth is strictly connected to his theory of belief. It is, perhaps, also immediately obvious that if we have analysed judgement we have solved the problem of truth; for taking the mental factor in a judgement (which is often itself called a judgement), the truth or falsity of this depends only on what proposition it is that is judged, and what we have to explain is the meaning of saying that the judgement is a judgement that a has R to b, i.e. is true if arb, false if not. We can, if we like, say that it is true if there exists a corresponding fact that a has R to b, but this is essentially not an analysis but a periphrasis, for The fact that a has R tob exists is no different from a has R to b. [FP, 39] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

36 Facts and Propositions (1927) On Ramsey s account given in FP, a belief is a disposition to act if certain preferable circumstances were present and a disposition to act as if believed proposition was true. He considers the mental factors in a belief and holds that Their nature will depend on the sense in which we are using the ambiguous term belief: it is, for instance, possible to say that a chicken believes a certain sort of caterpillar to be poisonous, and mean by that merely that it abstains from eating such caterpillars on account of unpleasant experiences connected with them. The mental factors in such a belief would be parts of the chicken s behaviour, which are somehow related to the objective factors, viz. the kind of caterpillar and poisonousness. An exact analysis of this relation would be very difficulty, but it might well be held that in regard to this kind of belief the pragmatist view was correct, i.e. that the relation between the chicken s behaviour and the objective factors was that the actions were such as to be useful if, and only if, the caterpillars were actually poisonous.[fp, 40] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

37 Facts and Propositions (1927) Poisonous Edible Eat Upset stomach Excellent dinner Refrain Avoids upset stomach Missed dinner 1 1 Sahlin, 1990, 72. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

38 Facts and Propositions (1927) Thus any set of actions for whose utility p is a necessary and sufficient condition might be called a belief that p, and so would be true if p, i.e. if they were useful. 1 and he adds in a footnote that It is useful to believe arb would mean that it is useful to do things which are useful if, and only if, arb; which is evidently equivalent to arb. [FP, 40] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

39 Facts and Propositions (1927) This brings us back to the problem of the truth conditions of beliefs, hence a combined theory of truth and belief, understood as the basis of our actions, which leads us to yet another formulation of what has been called Ramsey s Principle a belief that p is true, if and only if it is useful to do the things of which the truth of p is a necessary and sufficient condition. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

40 Facts and Propositions (1927) The essence of pragmatism I take to be this, that the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or more vaguely still, by its possible causes and effects. Of this I feel certain, but of nothing more definite.[fp, 51] Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

41 Decision Theory Two main types of factors influence our decisions: Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

42 Decision Theory Two main types of factors influence our decisions: our wants or desires, which determine the utilities of the possible outcomes of our decisions, Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

43 Decision Theory Two main types of factors influence our decisions: our wants or desires, which determine the utilities of the possible outcomes of our decisions, and our beliefs about the world, which determine the probabilities of the possible outcomes. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

44 Decision Theory Two main types of factors influence our decisions: our wants or desires, which determine the utilities of the possible outcomes of our decisions, and our beliefs about the world, which determine the probabilities of the possible outcomes. A decision theory tells us how to handle our desires and beliefs and provides an account of how to combine these into a rational decision. We can describe a person s actions in terms of rule-following. If the chicken doesn t know whether the caterpillar is poisonous or not, it should act in a way that maximizes his expected utility. If, on the other hand, the chicken has a full belief that the caterpillar is poisonous, it will refrain from eating it an action that is useful iff the caterpillar is, in fact, poisonous. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

45 Decision Theory Two main types of factors influence our decisions: our wants or desires, which determine the utilities of the possible outcomes of our decisions, and our beliefs about the world, which determine the probabilities of the possible outcomes. A decision theory tells us how to handle our desires and beliefs and provides an account of how to combine these into a rational decision. We can describe a person s actions in terms of rule-following. If the chicken doesn t know whether the caterpillar is poisonous or not, it should act in a way that maximizes his expected utility. If, on the other hand, the chicken has a full belief that the caterpillar is poisonous, it will refrain from eating it an action that is useful iff the caterpillar is, in fact, poisonous. It is perspicuous how Ramsey s ideas on truth presented in FP (1927) are dependent on the ideas on probability presented in TP (1926). Moreover, the same ideas are clearly visible in Ramsey s latest unpublished and far from completed manuscript On Truth. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

46 Decision Theory Thank you. Monika Gruber (University of Vienna) Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory / 30

### Wright on response-dependence and self-knowledge

Wright on response-dependence and self-knowledge March 23, 2004 1 Response-dependent and response-independent concepts........... 1 1.1 The intuitive distinction......................... 1 1.2 Basic equations

### This is a longer version of the review that appeared in Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 47 (1997)

This is a longer version of the review that appeared in Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 47 (1997) Frege by Anthony Kenny (Penguin, 1995. Pp. xi + 223) Frege s Theory of Sense and Reference by Wolfgang Carl

### Based on the translation by E. M. Edghill, with minor emendations by Daniel Kolak.

On Interpretation By Aristotle Based on the translation by E. M. Edghill, with minor emendations by Daniel Kolak. First we must define the terms 'noun' and 'verb', then the terms 'denial' and 'affirmation',

### On Interpretation. Section 1. Aristotle Translated by E. M. Edghill. Part 1

On Interpretation Aristotle Translated by E. M. Edghill Section 1 Part 1 First we must define the terms noun and verb, then the terms denial and affirmation, then proposition and sentence. Spoken words

### International Phenomenological Society

International Phenomenological Society The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics Author(s): Alfred Tarski Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Mar.,

### A CRITIQUE OF THE FREE WILL DEFENSE. A Paper. Presented to. Dr. Douglas Blount. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. In Partial Fulfillment

A CRITIQUE OF THE FREE WILL DEFENSE A Paper Presented to Dr. Douglas Blount Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for PHREL 4313 by Billy Marsh October 20,

### Russell on Denoting. G. J. Mattey. Fall, 2005 / Philosophy 156. The concept any finite number is not odd, nor is it even.

Russell on Denoting G. J. Mattey Fall, 2005 / Philosophy 156 Denoting in The Principles of Mathematics This notion [denoting] lies at the bottom (I think) of all theories of substance, of the subject-predicate

### Logic: Deductive and Inductive by Carveth Read M.A. CHAPTER IX CHAPTER IX FORMAL CONDITIONS OF MEDIATE INFERENCE

CHAPTER IX CHAPTER IX FORMAL CONDITIONS OF MEDIATE INFERENCE Section 1. A Mediate Inference is a proposition that depends for proof upon two or more other propositions, so connected together by one or

### Zimmerman, Michael J. Subsidiary Obligation, Philosophical Studies, 50 (1986):

SUBSIDIARY OBLIGATION By: MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN Zimmerman, Michael J. Subsidiary Obligation, Philosophical Studies, 50 (1986): 65-75. Made available courtesy of Springer Verlag. The original publication

### Philosophy of Mathematics Kant

Philosophy of Mathematics Kant Owen Griffiths oeg21@cam.ac.uk St John s College, Cambridge 20/10/15 Immanuel Kant Born in 1724 in Königsberg, Prussia. Enrolled at the University of Königsberg in 1740 and

### The Nature of Truth. by Robert James Boyles, Mark Anthony Dacela, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin and Victorino Raymundo Lualhati

The Nature of Truth by Robert James Boyles, Mark Anthony Dacela, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin and Victorino Raymundo Lualhati Objectives After reading this chapter, students should be able to: 1. Explain the

### On Truth Thomas Aquinas

On Truth Thomas Aquinas Art 1: Whether truth resides only in the intellect? Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5)

### Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions

Facta Philosophica 4, 2002: 231-238 Peter Lang, Switzerland Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions Ari Maunu 1 Thoughts as truth conditions Michael Dummett has put forward the view, amounting to orthodoxy,

### Penultimate Draft: Final Revisions not Included. Published in Philosophical Studies, December1998. DEFLATIONISM AND THE NORMATIVITY OF TRUTH

Penultimate Draft: Final Revisions not Included. Published in Philosophical Studies, December1998. DEFLATIONISM AND THE NORMATIVITY OF TRUTH Deflationist theories of truth, some critics have argued, fail

### Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori

Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori PHIL 83104 November 2, 2011 Both Boghossian and Harman address themselves to the question of whether our a priori knowledge can be explained in

### 8 Internal and external reasons

ioo Rawls and Pascal's wager out how under-powered the supposed rational choice under ignorance is. Rawls' theory tries, in effect, to link politics with morality, and morality (or at least the relevant

### Truth and Simplicity F. P. Ramsey

Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 58 (2007), 379 386 Truth and Simplicity F. P. Ramsey 1 Preamble Truth and Simplicity is the title we have supplied for a very remarkable nine page typescript of a talk that Ramsey gave

### Russellianism and Explanation. David Braun. University of Rochester

Forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001) Russellianism and Explanation David Braun University of Rochester Russellianism is a semantic theory that entails that sentences (1) and (2) express

### Primitive Concepts. David J. Chalmers

Primitive Concepts David J. Chalmers Conceptual Analysis: A Traditional View A traditional view: Most ordinary concepts (or expressions) can be defined in terms of other more basic concepts (or expressions)

### Russell: On Denoting

Russell: On Denoting DENOTING PHRASES Russell includes all kinds of quantified subject phrases ( a man, every man, some man etc.) but his main interest is in definite descriptions: the present King of

### Wittgenstein s Logical Atomism. Seminar 8 PHIL2120 Topics in Analytic Philosophy 16 November 2012

Wittgenstein s Logical Atomism Seminar 8 PHIL2120 Topics in Analytic Philosophy 16 November 2012 1 Admin Required reading for this seminar: Soames, Ch 9+10 New Schedule: 23 November: The Tractarian Test

### TWO CONCEPTIONS OF THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI. Marian David Notre Dame University

TWO CONCEPTIONS OF THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI Marian David Notre Dame University Roderick Chisholm appears to agree with Kant on the question of the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge. But Chisholm

### What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames

What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames The Frege-Russell analysis of quantification was a fundamental advance in semantics and philosophical logic. Abstracting away from details

### Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality

Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder, and Franz Huber Formal Epistemology Research Group Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy University of Konstanz

### Analyticity and reference determiners

Analyticity and reference determiners Jeff Speaks November 9, 2011 1. The language myth... 1 2. The definition of analyticity... 3 3. Defining containment... 4 4. Some remaining questions... 6 4.1. Reference

### Russell on Descriptions

Russell on Descriptions Bertrand Russell s analysis of descriptions is certainly one of the most famous (perhaps the most famous) theories in philosophy not just philosophy of language over the last century.

### Selections from Aristotle s Prior Analytics 41a21 41b5

Lesson Seventeen The Conditional Syllogism Selections from Aristotle s Prior Analytics 41a21 41b5 It is clear then that the ostensive syllogisms are effected by means of the aforesaid figures; these considerations

### Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935)

Rudolf Carnap: Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935) Chap. "The Rejection of Metaphysics" 1.Verifiability The problems of philosophy as usually dealt with are of very different kinds. From the point of

### Todays programme. Background of the TLP. Some problems in TLP. Frege Russell. Saying and showing. Sense and nonsense Logic The limits of language

Todays programme Background of the TLP Frege Russell Some problems in TLP Saying and showing Sense and nonsense Logic The limits of language 1 TLP, preface How far my efforts agree with those of other

### Logic: Deductive and Inductive by Carveth Read M.A. CHAPTER VI CONDITIONS OF IMMEDIATE INFERENCE

CHAPTER VI CONDITIONS OF IMMEDIATE INFERENCE Section 1. The word Inference is used in two different senses, which are often confused but should be carefully distinguished. In the first sense, it means

### Generic truth and mixed conjunctions: some alternatives

Analysis Advance Access published June 15, 2009 Generic truth and mixed conjunctions: some alternatives AARON J. COTNOIR Christine Tappolet (2000) posed a problem for alethic pluralism: either deny the

### The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth

The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons Deflationists share a core negative claim, that truth is not a genuine, substantive property. Deflationism can

### RUSSELL, NEGATIVE FACTS, AND ONTOLOGY* L. NATHAN OAKLANDERt SILVANO MIRACCHI

RUSSELL, NEGATIVE FACTS, AND ONTOLOGY* L. NATHAN OAKLANDERt University of Michigan-Flint SILVANO MIRACCHI Beverly Hills, California Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of

### Quine on the analytic/synthetic distinction

Quine on the analytic/synthetic distinction Jeff Speaks March 14, 2005 1 Analyticity and synonymy.............................. 1 2 Synonymy and definition ( 2)............................ 2 3 Synonymy

### Wittgenstein and Moore s Paradox

Wittgenstein and Moore s Paradox Marie McGinn, Norwich Introduction In Part II, Section x, of the Philosophical Investigations (PI ), Wittgenstein discusses what is known as Moore s Paradox. Wittgenstein

### In general, the simplest of argument maps will take the form of something like this:

#6 Model Argument Maps 1 Argument Mapping 6: Model Argument Maps Most of the following discussion provides model or prototype argument maps that can be applied to any argument that takes a similar form.

### Revelation, Humility, and the Structure of the World. David J. Chalmers

Revelation, Humility, and the Structure of the World David J. Chalmers Revelation and Humility Revelation holds for a property P iff Possessing the concept of P enables us to know what property P is Humility

### Moral Obligation. by Charles G. Finney

Moral Obligation by Charles G. Finney The idea of obligation, or of oughtness, is an idea of the pure reason. It is a simple, rational conception, and, strictly speaking, does not admit of a definition,

### Theories of propositions

Theories of propositions phil 93515 Jeff Speaks January 16, 2007 1 Commitment to propositions.......................... 1 2 A Fregean theory of reference.......................... 2 3 Three theories of

### On the Aristotelian Square of Opposition

On the Aristotelian Square of Opposition Dag Westerståhl Göteborg University Abstract A common misunderstanding is that there is something logically amiss with the classical square of opposition, and that

### IS GOD "SIGNIFICANTLY FREE?''

IS GOD "SIGNIFICANTLY FREE?'' Wesley Morriston In an impressive series of books and articles, Alvin Plantinga has developed challenging new versions of two much discussed pieces of philosophical theology:

### Faults and Mathematical Disagreement

45 Faults and Mathematical Disagreement María Ponte ILCLI. University of the Basque Country mariaponteazca@gmail.com Abstract: My aim in this paper is to analyse the notion of mathematical disagreements

### Who Has the Burden of Proof? Must the Christian Provide Adequate Reasons for Christian Beliefs?

Who Has the Burden of Proof? Must the Christian Provide Adequate Reasons for Christian Beliefs? Issue: Who has the burden of proof the Christian believer or the atheist? Whose position requires supporting

### Saying too Little and Saying too Much. Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul

Saying too Little and Saying too Much. Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul Umeå University BIBLID [0873-626X (2013) 35; pp. 81-91] 1 Introduction You are going to Paul

### 5: Preliminaries to the Argument

5: Preliminaries to the Argument In this chapter, we set forth the logical structure of the argument we will use in chapter six in our attempt to show that Nfc is self-refuting. Thus, our main topics in

### 15. Russell on definite descriptions

15. Russell on definite descriptions Martín Abreu Zavaleta July 30, 2015 Russell was another top logician and philosopher of his time. Like Frege, Russell got interested in denotational expressions as

### Saying too Little and Saying too Much Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul

Saying too Little and Saying too Much Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul Andreas Stokke andreas.stokke@gmail.com - published in Disputatio, V(35), 2013, 81-91 - 1

### [3.] Bertrand Russell. 1

[3.] Bertrand Russell. 1 [3.1.] Biographical Background. 1872: born in the city of Trellech, in the county of Monmouthshire, now part of Wales 2 One of his grandfathers was Lord John Russell, who twice

### In this section you will learn three basic aspects of logic. When you are done, you will understand the following:

Basic Principles of Deductive Logic Part One: In this section you will learn three basic aspects of logic. When you are done, you will understand the following: Mental Act Simple Apprehension Judgment

### A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC FOR METAPHYSICIANS

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC FOR METAPHYSICIANS 0. Logic, Probability, and Formal Structure Logic is often divided into two distinct areas, inductive logic and deductive logic. Inductive logic is concerned

### TRUTH VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1. Tr u t h MICHAEL DUMMETT

TRUTH VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 Tr u t h MICHAEL DUMMETT PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY THE VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. I 2013 Featuring classic papers from the archive & commentaries by contemporary philosophers

### Let us begin by first locating our fields in relation to other fields that study ethics. Consider the following taxonomy: Kinds of ethical inquiries

ON NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORIES: SOME BASICS From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the

### Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. i-ix, 379. ISBN \$35.00.

Appeared in Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (2003), pp. 367-379. Scott Soames. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. i-ix, 379.

### From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence

Prequel for Section 4.2 of Defending the Correspondence Theory Published by PJP VII, 1 From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence Abstract I introduce new details in an argument for necessarily existing

### The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism

The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism What is a great mistake? Nietzsche once said that a great error is worth more than a multitude of trivial truths. A truly great mistake

### HORWICH S MINIMALIST CONCEPTION OF TRUTH: Some Logical Difficulties

Logic and Logical Philosophy Volume 9 (2001), 161 181 Sten Lindström HORWICH S MINIMALIST CONCEPTION OF TRUTH: Some Logical Difficulties Aristotle s words in the Metaphysics: to say of what is that it

### Contradictory Information Can Be Better than Nothing The Example of the Two Firemen

Contradictory Information Can Be Better than Nothing The Example of the Two Firemen J. Michael Dunn School of Informatics and Computing, and Department of Philosophy Indiana University-Bloomington Workshop

### Exercise Sets. KS Philosophical Logic: Modality, Conditionals Vagueness. Dirk Kindermann University of Graz July 2014

Exercise Sets KS Philosophical Logic: Modality, Conditionals Vagueness Dirk Kindermann University of Graz July 2014 1 Exercise Set 1 Propositional and Predicate Logic 1. Use Definition 1.1 (Handout I Propositional

### Ayer and Quine on the a priori

Ayer and Quine on the a priori November 23, 2004 1 The problem of a priori knowledge Ayer s book is a defense of a thoroughgoing empiricism, not only about what is required for a belief to be justified

### The Ontological Argument for the existence of God. Pedro M. Guimarães Ferreira S.J. PUC-Rio Boston College, July 13th. 2011

The Ontological Argument for the existence of God Pedro M. Guimarães Ferreira S.J. PUC-Rio Boston College, July 13th. 2011 The ontological argument (henceforth, O.A.) for the existence of God has a long

### Truth in Constructive Empiricism. Jamin Asay. Chapel Hill Approved by: John Roberts. Marc Lange. Keith Simmons

Truth in Constructive Empiricism Jamin Asay A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

### Rationalism. A. He, like others at the time, was obsessed with questions of truth and doubt

Rationalism I. Descartes (1596-1650) A. He, like others at the time, was obsessed with questions of truth and doubt 1. How could one be certain in the absence of religious guidance and trustworthy senses

### Think by Simon Blackburn. Chapter 5d God

Think by Simon Blackburn Chapter 5d God No clickers today. 2 quizzes Wednesday. Don t be late or you will miss the first one! Turn in your Nammour summaries today. No credit for late ones. According to

### Mathematics in and behind Russell s logicism, and its

The Cambridge companion to Bertrand Russell, edited by Nicholas Griffin, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, US, xvii + 550 pp. therein: Ivor Grattan-Guinness. reception. Pp. 51 83.

### PLANTINGA ON THE FREE WILL DEFENSE. Hugh LAFoLLETTE East Tennessee State University

PLANTINGA ON THE FREE WILL DEFENSE Hugh LAFoLLETTE East Tennessee State University I In his recent book God, Freedom, and Evil, Alvin Plantinga formulates an updated version of the Free Will Defense which,

### HAVE WE REASON TO DO AS RATIONALITY REQUIRES? A COMMENT ON RAZ

HAVE WE REASON TO DO AS RATIONALITY REQUIRES? A COMMENT ON RAZ BY JOHN BROOME JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY SYMPOSIUM I DECEMBER 2005 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JOHN BROOME 2005 HAVE WE REASON

### Emotivism. Meta-ethical approaches

Meta-ethical approaches Theory that believes objective moral laws do not exist; a non-cognitivist theory; moral terms express personal emotional attitudes and not propositions; ethical terms are just expressions

### THE REFUTATION OF PHENOMENALISM

The Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library THE REFUTATION OF PHENOMENALISM A draft of section I of Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements 1 The rights and wrongs of phenomenalism are perhaps more frequently

### Truth and the Aim of Belief

Truth and the Aim of Belief PASCAL ENGEL 1 Introduction It is often said that belief aims at truth. This is presented sometimes as a truism, sometimes as capturing an essential and constitutive feature

### WHY WE REALLY CANNOT BELIEVE THE ERROR THEORY

WHY WE REALLY CANNOT BELIEVE THE ERROR THEORY Bart Streumer b.streumer@rug.nl 29 June 2017 Forthcoming in Diego Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays 1. Introduction According to the error theory,

### 10.3 Universal and Existential Quantifiers

M10_COPI1396_13_SE_C10.QXD 10/22/07 8:42 AM Page 441 10.3 Universal and Existential Quantifiers 441 and Wx, and so on. We call these propositional functions simple predicates, to distinguish them from

### ON QUINE, ANALYTICITY, AND MEANING Wylie Breckenridge

ON QUINE, ANALYTICITY, AND MEANING Wylie Breckenridge In sections 5 and 6 of "Two Dogmas" Quine uses holism to argue against there being an analytic-synthetic distinction (ASD). McDermott (2000) claims

### Understanding Deflationism

1 Understanding Deflationism by Scott Soames Philosophical Perspectives Volume 17, 2003 2 Understanding Deflationism Scott Soames A Deflationary Conception of Deflationism. My aim here will be to say what

### Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion Volume 1 Issue 1 Volume 1, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) Article 4 April 2015 Infinity and Beyond James M. Derflinger II Liberty University,

### There are various different versions of Newcomb s problem; but an intuitive presentation of the problem is very easy to give.

Newcomb s problem Today we begin our discussion of paradoxes of rationality. Often, we are interested in figuring out what it is rational to do, or to believe, in a certain sort of situation. Philosophers

### CLASSIC INVARIANTISM, RELEVANCE, AND WARRANTED ASSERTABILITY MANŒUVERS

CLASSIC INVARIANTISM, RELEVANCE, AND WARRANTED ASSERTABILITY MANŒUVERS TIM BLACK The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 328-336 Jessica Brown effectively contends that Keith DeRose s latest argument for

### Philosophy Epistemology Topic 5 The Justification of Induction 1. Hume s Skeptical Challenge to Induction

Philosophy 5340 - Epistemology Topic 5 The Justification of Induction 1. Hume s Skeptical Challenge to Induction In the section entitled Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding

### Negative Facts. Negative Facts Kyle Spoor

54 Kyle Spoor Logical Atomism was a view held by many philosophers; Bertrand Russell among them. This theory held that language consists of logical parts which are simplifiable until they can no longer

### 2 in which a; is a constituent, where x, the variable, is. 1 I have discussed this subject in Principles of Mathematics, chapter

II. ON DENOTING. B Y BERTRAND BUSSELL. B Y a " denoting phrase " I mean a phrase such as an}- one of the following : a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present

### Russell s Problems of Philosophy

Russell s Problems of Philosophy IT S (NOT) ALL IN YOUR HEAD J a n u a r y 1 9 Today : 1. Review Existence & Nature of Matter 2. Russell s case against Idealism 3. Next Lecture 2.0 Review Existence & Nature

### CHAPTER TWO AN EXPLANATORY ROLE BORIS RÄHME FOR THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH. 1. Introduction

CHAPTER TWO AN EXPLANATORY ROLE FOR THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH BORIS RÄHME 1. Introduction Deflationism about truth (henceforth, deflationism) comes in a variety of versions 1 Variety notwithstanding, there

### Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas

1 Copyright Jonathan Bennett [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small dots enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional bullets,

### Vagueness. Bertrand Russell

Vagueness Bertrand Russell 1923 Reflection on philosophical problems has convinced me that a much larger number than I used to think, or than is generally thought, are connected with the principles of

### Intersubstitutivity Principles and the Generalization Function of Truth. Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh. Shawn Standefer University of Melbourne

Intersubstitutivity Principles and the Generalization Function of Truth Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh Shawn Standefer University of Melbourne Abstract We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich

### McDougal Littell High School Math Program. correlated to. Oregon Mathematics Grade-Level Standards

Math Program correlated to Grade-Level ( in regular (non-capitalized) font are eligible for inclusion on Oregon Statewide Assessment) CCG: NUMBERS - Understand numbers, ways of representing numbers, relationships

### Section 31 Revisited: Frege s Elucidations

Section 31 Revisited: Frege s Elucidations Joan Weiner University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Section 31 of Frege's Basic Laws is titled "our simple names denote something (bedeuten etwas)". 1 Any sophisticated

### A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions

A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions Agustín Rayo February 22, 2010 I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are only well-defined relative to suitably constrained

### Being and Substance Aristotle

Being and Substance Aristotle 1. There are several senses in which a thing may be said to be, as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words; for in one sense the being meant is

### MILL. The principle of utility determines the rightness of acts (or rules of action?) by their effect on the total happiness.

MILL The principle of utility determines the rightness of acts (or rules of action?) by their effect on the total happiness. Mill s principle of utility [A]ctions are right in proportion as they tend to

### Foundations of Non-Monotonic Reasoning

Foundations of Non-Monotonic Reasoning Notation S A - from a set of premisses S we can derive a conclusion A. Example S: All men are mortal Socrates is a man. A: Socrates is mortal. x.man(x) mortal(x)

### Reply to Florio and Shapiro

Reply to Florio and Shapiro Abstract Florio and Shapiro take issue with an argument in Hierarchies for the conclusion that the set theoretic hierarchy is open-ended. Here we clarify and reinforce the argument

### Equality of Capacity AMARTYA SEN

Equality of Capacity AMARTYA SEN WHY EQUALITY? WHAT EQUALITY? Two central issues for ethical analysis of equality are: (1) Why equality? (2) Equality of what? The two questions are distinct but thoroughly

### Thomas Reid on personal identity

Thomas Reid on personal identity phil 20208 Jeff Speaks October 5, 2006 1 Identity and personal identity............................ 1 1.1 The conviction of personal identity..................... 1 1.2

### Definite Descriptions and the Argument from Inference

Philosophia (2014) 42:1099 1109 DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9519-9 Definite Descriptions and the Argument from Inference Wojciech Rostworowski Received: 20 November 2013 / Revised: 29 January 2014 / Accepted:

Kripke s skeptical paradox phil 93914 Jeff Speaks March 13, 2008 1 The paradox.................................... 1 2 Proposed solutions to the paradox....................... 3 2.1 Meaning as determined

### 9 Knowledge-Based Systems

9 Knowledge-Based Systems Throughout this book, we have insisted that intelligent behavior in people is often conditioned by knowledge. A person will say a certain something about the movie 2001 because

### The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons

Forthcoming in Mind The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons DOUGLAS W. PORTMORE ABSTRACT: It is through our actions that we affect the way the world goes. Whenever we face a choice of what to

### A PRIORI PRINCIPLES OF REASON

A PRIORI PRINCIPLES OF REASON Wolfgang Spohn Department of Philosophy University of Konstanz D - 78457 Konstanz Germany 1. Introduction As my title indicates, I would like to present various a priori principles