A NEW SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANT DESCRIPTIONS IN KANT S ETHICS

Transcription

1 A NEW SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANT DESCRIPTIONS IN KANT S ETHICS A Thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University In partial fulfillment of As the requirements for 3 fc the Degree AO i-} PH IL * (L 4" Master of Arts In Philosophy by Stuart Laurence Chapin San Francisco, California May 2017

2 Copyright by Stuart Chapin

3 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL I certify that I have read A NEW SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANT DESCRIPTIONS IN KANT S ETHICS by Stuart Laurence Chapin, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in Philosophy at San Francisco State University. Stephan Nayak-Young, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy

4 A NEW SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANT DESCRIPTIONS IN KANT S ETHICS Stuart Laurence Chapin San Francisco, California 2017 Some argue that for Kant, the moral status of an action is in some sense objective, and the Formula of Universal law (hereafter FUL) is the central feature of a deliberative procedure agents use to track the objective moral status of an action. To determine the objective moral status of an action, agents submit that action s maxim to the FUL deliberative procedure. Depending on what information an agent includes in an action s maxim submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure, the FUL deliberative procedure can track multiple, and possibly conflicting, moral statuses of the same action. Call this the Standard Problem of Relevant Descriptions. The Standard Problem of Relevant Descriptions is further problematized by the fact that agents might not have access to information which if included in an action s maxim would lead the FUL deliberative procedure to track a different moral status of that action. I call this variant the General Skeptic Problem of Relevant Descriptions. While other commenters focus their attention on re-engineering maxims to overcome these problems, I take an alternate route. In this paper I argue, one way to overcome both Problems of Relevant Descriptions is to re-engineer the object of moral appraisal, actions, into action-maxim pairs, what I call Considered Actions. On my view, the only information which can be included in the maxim submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure is the information specified in the description of the Considered Action up for moral appraisal. In doing so we prevent multiple maxims from being related to a single Considered Action thus overcoming the noted PRDs. I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis. njl-* Chair,Hnesis Committee Date yi y fr

5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Leonard Lopez and Ira Richardson for their early and continued support of my life long development as an academic and intellectual. I would like to thank Kevin Toh, Isabelle Peschard, David Landy, Joel Kassiola, Stephan Nayak- Young, and Justin Tiwald for having the largest impact on my growth as a scholar during my time at San Francisco State University. I would like to thank Spencer Baudette, Austin Due, Austin Hunter, and the members of the Contemporary Works on Kantian Ethics Reading Group (Spring 2016) at San Francisco State University for their insightful comments at various stages of this Thesis. Finally, I would like to thank my sister Alex and my mom Dana for ceaselessly supporting my adventures in academic philosophy. V

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction...1 Maxim Construction and The Standard Problem of Relevant Descriptions... 8 Attempted Solutions Onora O Neill s Agent-Relative Solution...14 The General Skeptic Problem of Relevant Descriptions Mark Timmons Alternative Criteria Solution...25 The Essential Reference Principle Against the Charge of Rigorism Possible Criticisms of the Essential Reference Principle...36 Pushing the Problem Up a Level Why my view over others? Not Kant s V iew Conclusion Bibliography...47 VI

7 1 A New Solution to the Problem of Relevant Descriptions in Kant s Ethics Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that my maxim should become a universal law - Formula o f Universal Law1 There is some debate regarding the function the Formula of Universal Law (hereafter FUL) plays in Kant s moral system. Some argue that for Kant, the moral status of an action is in some sense objective, and the FUL is the central feature of a deliberative procedure agents use to identify the objective moral status of some action (Timmons 1998). On this view, actions are right for some reason(s) other than being identified as such by the FUL deliberative procedure. Others argue that the FUL is not just part of a deliberative procedure agents use to identify the objective moral status of an action, but also the moral status of an action is constituted by being identified as such by the FUL deliberative procedure. On this view, actions are morally right in virtue of being identified by FUL deliberative procedure.2 1See Kant, Immanuel, Mary J. Gregor, and Allen W. Wood. (2008). Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2 This is in no way an exhaustive list of the different interpretations of the FUL deliberative procedure. Others argue that the FUL is a deliberative procedure employed to generate a type of ethical duties (Herman 1998, 132). For a more general treatment of the difference between deliberative procedures which track the moral statues of actions and deliberative procedures which constitute the moral statues of actions see Chapter 7 of Miller, Alexander. Contemporary metaethics An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity, 2015.

8 2 I want to draw our attention to a problem facing both interpretations of the FUL deliberative procedure, however I will spend most of my time discussing this problem as it applies to the former interpretation that the moral statuses of actions are in some sense objective and that the FUL is the central feature of a deliberative procedure agents use to identify the objective moral status of actions.3 The problem at hand has to with the FUL deliberative procedure s apparent ability to inconsistently track the objective moral status of an action. This problem becomes clear when we walk through the FUL deliberative procedure. To implement the FUL deliberative procedure, agents first determine the proposed subjective principle of action related to the action up for appraisal, what Kant calls a Maxim (Kant 2008,73). A rough definition of a maxim is an agent s intentional description of the action, which guided that agent s attempted action towards the agent s specified end (Kitcher 2003, 218). The maxim I should take a yoga class because yoga is good for my body might guide an agent attempt the action take a yoga class. Next, agents submit their action s maxim to the FUL, that is to say, they determine whether they, the agent can, at the same time, will that my maxim should become a universal law (Kant 2008, 57). If the action s maxim passes 31 spend most my time on the first interpretation of the FUL deliberative procedure because, as we will see, a solution to the former can also be a solution to the later where the opposite might not be the case. I return to the alternate reading of the FUL deliberative procedure in section IV.

9 3 this universalizability test, the action is identified as morally permissible by the FUL deliberative procedure. Unfortunately, Kant does not provide a method to determine what information must be included in an action s maxim, instead he leaves the agent to decide for herself. Depending on what information an agent includes in an action s maxim, the FUL deliberative procedure can track multiple, and possibly conflicting, moral statuses of one and the same action. Consider again the action of taking a yoga class. Agents might attempt the action of taking a yoga class according to the maxim I should take a yoga class because it will help me cheat on my spouse, or according to the maxim I should take a yoga class because yoga is good for my body. The maxim I should take a yoga class because it will help me cheat on my spouse might fail the FUL deliberative procedure thus identifying the action take a yoga class as a morally impermissible action. The maxim I should take a yoga class because yoga is good for my body might pass the FUL deliberative procedure thus identifying one and the same action, take a yoga class as a morally permissible action. How best to determine what information is to be included in the action s corresponding maxim such that when we submit that maxim to the FUL deliberative procedure, the FUL

10 4 deliberative procedure identifies the correct objective moral status of that action, is known as the Problem of Relevant Descriptions (hereafter Standard PRD).4 Some recent attempts to overcome the Standard PRD generate and apply constraints on the information agents include in an action s maxim. Onora O Neill argues that agents should include only the information that guided the agent to attempt that action, in that action s maxim (O Neill 1974), while Mark Timmons argues that agents should include only and all the available information regarding autonomy and that which is necessary for autonomous action in their maxims (Timmons 1998). Even if these attempts do provide a method to determine what of the information available to an agent should be included in an action s maxim such that it eliminates the ability of the FUL deliberative procedure to track multiple, possibly conflicting, moral statuses of one and the same action, a more troubling type of PRD persists. Agents can never definitively know whether bits of information applicable to the moral appraisal of an action exist outside the information available to the agent. By applicable information I mean information which, if included in that action s 4 For a general articulation of the Problem of Relevant Descriptions see Anscombe, Elizabeth. (2000). Intention (reprint), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

11 5 maxim submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure, would result in the FUL deliberative procedure would track a different moral status of that action. Consider the action of smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s. Those who smoked tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s had no way of knowing that smoking tobacco cigarettes causes cancer. In fact at that time it was commonplace for doctors to give their patients cigarettes to help with certain illnesses. If an agent included information like cancer causing in the maxim to determine the moral status of the action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s, it assuredly would not pass the FUL deliberative procedure. Unfortunately, agents in the 1920s couldn't include unknowable facts like cancer causing in their maxims. Failing to include this information allows agents to formulate a maxim that, when submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure, would allow the agent to incorrectly identify the action of smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s as a morally permissible action.51 call the inability to include applicable information which exists outside of the information available to the agent, the General Skeptic PRD. While commenters might be able to guide an agent s maxim construction such that they prevent the Standard PRD, further philosophy is required to ensure that the information which exists outside of the information available to the agent is rendered inapplicable to the moral appraisal 51 am assuming here that everything else about the maxim remains consistent between the two cases.

12 6 of an agent s action. Commenters must generate on Kant s behalf a method to render facts like cancer causing inapplicable to the moral appraisal of the action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s. In this paper, I argue that one way to render unknowable information inapplicable to the moral appraisal of an action, is by re-conceptualizing the object up for moral appraisal by the FUL deliberative procedure. On my view, we shift the object up for moral appraisal from the objective moral status of actions to the objective moral status of action-maxim pairs, what I call Considered Actions. We shift the FUL deliberative procedure from tracking the objective moral status of the action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s to tracking the objective moral status of the action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to the maxim smoking is healthy. By requiring that actions reference their corresponding maxim, the only information that is permitted to be in the maxim of the Considered Action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to the maxim smoking is healthy is smoking in healthy. If any other information were to be included in that Considered Action s maxim, it would evolve that Considered Action into a second distinct Considered Action. By including the smoking causes cancer into the maxim of the Considered Action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to the maxim smoking is healthy it would evolve into the Considered Action smoking tobacco

13 7 cigarettes in the 1920s according to the maxim smoking causes cancer. It would become a second distinct Considered Action up for moral appraisal. It is in this way that the information unknowable to the agent, smoking causes cancer, is rendered inapplicable to the Considered Action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to the maxim smoking is healthy. Furthermore, The Essential Reference Principle prevents smoking Instead of the Considered Action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to the maxim smoking is healthy from receiving multiple, sometimes conflicting moral statuses because each Considered Action, smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to the maxim smoking is healthy and smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to the maxim smoking causes cancer, can, by definition, only be related to a single maxim description. This paper unfolds as follows: first, I will spend some time clarifying maxims, the FUL deliberative procedure, and the Standard PRD. Then, I will investigate two recent attempts to solve the Standard PRD, highlighting their inability to overcome the General Skeptic PRD. Next, I will explicate the Essential Reference Principle, emphasizing its ability to render information not included in a Considered Action s maxim inapplicable to the moral status of that Considered Action thus overcoming the noted PRDs. Following that, I will explore one possible upshot of adopting the Essential Reference Principle, its ability to help resist another

14 8 criticism pressed against Kant, his alleged rigorism (Schapiro 2006). Finally, I will entertain four possible criticisms of the Essential Reference Principle. Let us now spend some time getting clearer on what constitutes a maxim, the role maxims play in the FUL deliberative procedure, and how the FUL deliberative procedure suffers from the problem of Relevant Descriptions.6 I. In the Introduction, I presented a rough definition of a maxim - a maxim is an agent s intentional description of an action which guided that agent s attempted action towards a specified end (Kitcher 2003). A standard way to sharpen this rough and ready definition of maxims is by highlighting the component parts of maxims - Doing X in circumstance C for the sake of an end E (Herman 1993, 134). Consider the maxim dropping off the kids at school this morning because attending school is valuable. In this maxim, the doing is dropping off the kids as school, the circumstance is this morning, and the end is attending school. Maxims do not always explicitly state their component parts. At times maxims merely imply one or more of their component parts. Consider again the maxim taking a yoga class because it is good for my body. In this case, the doing 6 Space does not allow me to weigh in on the details of the universalizability process, how if at all the FUL deliberative procedure generates positive obligations, or how, if at all, maxims can cause an agent to act.

15 9 is taking a yoga class, the end is having a good body, and the implied circumstance is whenever the yoga class is available. If the component parts exposition of maxims is a correct interpretation of Kant s own view, then it would be uncharitable to say that Kant, strictly speaking, does not provide guidance as to what information we should include in an action s maxim. The component parts definition does give us minimal constraints as to what information must be included in an action s maxim. Agents must include in their maxims the end the action is working towards, some description of the action, and the circumstances in which the agent attempts that action. Despite these minimal constrains it remains possible to generate the Standard PRD. Consider this example advanced by Richard Galvin: Imagine a case where you want to determine whether the action Cutting a car s brake lines is a moral action. In this case, someone offered you a lot of money to murder a colleague by cutting his car s brake lines. If you only included facts like cutting the brakes will end X s life in the description of the maxim, it will fail the FUL deliberative procedure, however, if you only included facts like Cutting the brake lines will get me lots of cash in the description of the maxim, it would pass the FUL deliberative procedure (Galvin 2011, 408). Considering that both maxims meet the minimum component constraints, how are agents supposed to choose between the two descriptions? Being that both maxims apply to one and the same action, it seems that the FUL deliberative

16 10 procedure is tracking two conflicting moral statuses of one and the same action. It will be helpful to have a general schema of the Standard PRD up and running. (1) FUL acts as the central feature of a deliberative procedure which tracks the objective moral status of an action by submitting that action's maxim to a particular type o f universalizability test. (2) Multiple maxims can be related to a single action. Thus, (3) By allowing multiple maxims to be related to a single action, we allow the different maxims to render different, and possibly conflicting, moral statuses of a single action.7 Considering Galvin s example, some might think that the Standard PRD is a problem of self-deception. The only way an agent would not include cutting the 7 While some take (1) as the hallmark of Kant s ethics explicitly stated throughout his works, (2) is an abstraction of what commenters take as philosophically obvious, that any action can be related to any one of many possible maxims. Commenters who argue that (3) is an unsurmountable problem for Kant, spend little time formally arguing for (2), nor do they spend much time formally arguing that (2) is a necessary feature of Kant s ethics. Instead, commenters submit intuitive examples of (2) which seem to necessarily lead to the problematic form of (3), where maxims render conflicting moral statuses of the same action. Here are three examples of (2) that lead to the problematic form of (3). For some alternate examples of the Standard PRD see Parfit, Derek On What Matters, vol. 1. Edited by Samuel Scheffler. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

17 11 brakes will end X s life in their maxim is if the agent is purposely deceiving themselves about this information to achieve some mischievous aim. While Kant definitely discusses wicked agents deceiving themselves regarding the content of their maxims, it is important to notice that the thrust of the Standard PRD identifies a more fundamental problem with the FUL deliberative procedure then merely that it is possible for the wicked among us to re-describe their maxims to avoid failing the FUL deliberative procedure.8 The thrust of the Standard PRD is that maxims and actions stand in a nonnecessary relationship, which allows different maxims to track different, possible conflicting, moral statuses of one and the same action.9 This is made clear when we consider a case of the Standard PRD where no self-deception is involved. Consider the previous case again only this time let us assume the agent did not know her colleague would die from her action of cutting a car s brake lines. Due to her ignorance, she would only be able to submit the maxim Cutting the brake lines will get me lots of cash to the FUL deliberative procedure. Here the agent would track a different moral status of the action cutting For more on this see Kant, Immanuel, and Allen W. Wood. Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings. New York: Cambridge University Press, If the relationship between maxims and action constitute agency for Kant, then denying that agents have the power to attach whatever maxim to whatever action might amount to denying our own agency. This may be a disastrous consequence.

18 12 the brake lines then if she included facts unknowable to her, murdering her colleague in the content of that action s maxim. Here the Standard PRD arises when agents simply lack some piece of information applicable to the appraisal of an action. While we might not fault the agent for her ignorance, what is troubling about this case is that while she correctly employed the FUL deliberative procedure, she was able to track the wrong objective moral status of the action cutting the brake lines. This seems to cut against the claim that the FUL deliberative procedure tracks the objective moral status of actions. Or does it? This last claim depends on the sense of objective being employed in this paper. Let me take a moment and say something about the type o f objectivity I have in mind in this paper. The interpretation o f the FUL deliberative procedure under consideration in this paper is something close to Mark Timmons (Timmons 1998) view of the FUL deliberative procedure. Regarding objectivity Timmons says the following: Talk of the objectivate rightness of action, as opposed to its subjective rightness, can perhaps be best understood in terms of perspective. As I am using the notion, the objective rightness (and in general, the deontic status of an action, objectively considered) is independent of anyone s beliefs about the morality of the action; an action is objectively right if it really is right. And presumably, whether or not an action really is right depends upon objective features of the action and not on the beliefs or attitudes of individuals or groups. Here, the perspective Is an appropriately idolized one. The subjective rightness of an action, by contrast, has to do with the firstperson perspective of agents. And here it is useful to draw a distinction. Let us say that an action is weakly subjectively right just in case the agent honestly believes that the action in question is objectively right and let us say that an action is strongly subjectively right just in case the agent s belief

19 13 that the action is objectively right is a belief that is rationally held (Timmons 1998, 397). For Timmons, an action is objectively right if we would determine that it is right from a gods eye view or from the view from the universe. I am hesitant to adopt this conception of objectivity. It is not clear to me from Timmons discussion how a moral theory can meet this type of objectivity requirement. Does it require that agents must adjudicate the moral status of actions from God s perspective? Lacking clarification on this point from Timmons, I use an alternative sense of objectivity in this paper which might be better characterized as subjective universality. By subjective universality I mean that if any competent agent applied the FUL deliberative procedure to one and the same action they would track the identical moral status of that action.10 Consider the cutting the brake lines case again. According to the subjective universality conception of objectivity, to track the correct objective moral status of the action cutting the brake lines, it must be the case that any agent, despite their background beliefs or limited information sets, would track the same moral status of the action cutting the brake lines. In the previous case, we saw an agent lacking information about the action up for moral appraisal which, if included in her maxim, 10 Unfortunately, space does not permit me to explain what I mean by competent agent.

20 14 would change the moral status of the action cutting the brake lines. Considering this we can say she fails to meet the subjective universality requirement. Keeping this understanding of objectivity and the PRD general schema in mind, we can now turn towards some recent attempts to solve the PRD. These attempts argue that by placing constraints on maxim descriptions the contingent relationship between maxim descriptions and actions is upgraded to some type of necessary relationship; thus, preventing the FUL deliberative procedure from tracking multiple moral statuses of one and the same action (Standard PRD). II. One attempt to overcome the Standard PRD argues that the proper maxim to be included in FUL deliberative procedure is just the maxim which guided the agent to attempt that action. This has become known as the agent-relative solution. This view was first explicitly formulated by Onora O Neill in her impressive work Acting on Principle (O Neill 1975). For O Neill, when deliberating about the moral status of an action we need not test every maxim that is related to that action - just the maxim that is guiding the agent to attempt that action. Or, in the terms we have been using, we need not submit every possible maxim description to the FUL deliberative procedure, only the maxim description that is guiding the agent to attempt that

21 15 action.11 If an agent is honestly only interested in taking a yoga class to help them cheat on their spouse, then, according to O Neill, they should submit only the maxim Taking a yoga class to help me cheat on my spouse to the FUL deliberative procedure to determine the objective moral status of the action taking a yoga class. Submitting only the maxim the agent acted on to the FUL deliberative procedure short circuits the Standard PRD by rendering the infinite number of possible ways a deliberative agent might describe an action s maxim inapplicable to tracking the moral status of that action. Agents would already know the correct maxim description because it is the description of the maxim which guided the agent to attempt that action. I want to take a moment to motivate O Neill s agent-relative interpretation of the FUL deliberative procedure. O Neill s system requires us to submit only the maxim the agent was acting on to the FUL deliberative procedure. Considering that maxims contain information about the end the agent was striving towards by attempting that action, the circumstances the action is couched in, and the action itself, O Neill s view forces the FUL deliberative procedure to be directly sensitive to those applicable facts when tracking the moral statuses of actions. 11In this paper, I assume that a shift in the information contained in a maxim constitutes a shift in maxim, it becomes a new distinct maxim.

22 16 I take this to be a virtue of O Neill s position. In everyday moral discourse, there is a moral difference between taking a yoga class with the end of having a good body and taking a yoga class with the end of helping me cheat on my spouse. Shouldn t our moral system track that difference? While this may be a virtue of O Neill s position, later in this paper we will see that it comes at too high a theoretical cost.12 Let us now consider one criticism of O Neill s position. Recent work in moral psychology suggests that agents rarely appeal to structured reasoning systems when making most of their moral judgments. Instead, most moral judgments are a product of emotional responses to relevant features of a given moral situation.13 O Neill, along with Kant, can sidestep this concern by conceding that although people normally do not use structured reasoning systems when making moral judgments, they should, and when they do, they should use O Neill s agent-relative constraints on maxim descriptions. Moreover, when agents use structured reasoning systems it is often the case that agents do not know exactly why they act; that is to say, agents often do not know what information is actually included in the maxim guiding their action. If agents are to use their own maxims as 12 As I show below, the account I am developing here inherits this virtue while avoiding its theoretical costs. 13 For groundbreaking work in this area see Greene, J.D. (2007). The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul. Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development (ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong). MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. For a critical response of that work see Chapin, Stuart, (forthcoming). The Emotive Foundations of What? A Critique of Greene s Psychological Explanation of Consequentialist Judgments.

23 17 a basis for a decision-procedure, they will be denied the crucial bit of information that makes that decision possible. This concern forces O Neill to develop an additional self-reflection procedure to help agents determine the information they included in their action s maxim. O Neill suggests a kind of variable isolation and manipulation method. Roughly, the deliberative agent would reflect on each aspect of the maxim in question, then she would systematically isolate and manipulate aspects of that maxim to see if she would still act on that maxim. If she isolates and manipulates aspect X of her maxim and she would continue to act on that maxim, then aspect X of her maxim is not a necessary part of the maxim. If she isolates and manipulates aspect Y of her maxim and she would not still act on that maxim, then aspect Y of her maxim is a necessary part of the maxim. Deliberative agents would apply this isolation and manipulation procedure to all aspects of a maxim until they arrive at just the parts of their maxim required to guide the agent to attempt the action. O Neill s isolation and manipulation procedure seems like a reasonable addition to Kant's ethical system. However, recently Richard Galvin (Galvin 2011) forwarded an example of a Standard PRD which seems to be immune to O'Neill's isolation and manipulation procedure. Galvin s example features an agent attempting to decipher the maxim she is acting on using O'Neill's isolation and manipulation

24 18 system yet she still leaves out morally applicable information that should be included in the description of her maxim. Imagine a student offered an agent some cash to kill a colleague. According to O Neill s method, she should reflect on her maxim and then manipulate each aspect of that maxim to determine if that aspect must be included in the maxim description. Galvin says: According to O Neill's isolation test I should ask whether I would still have performed the action if some description were not true of it to determine the relevant maxim. In this case, I would not have performed the action were it not a case of making money, but I would have acted differently if it were not a case of killing my colleague perhaps if offered the money for simple letting the air out of his car's tires, I would have done that instead. Since my intention was to get the money, this would be part of the relevant maxim to test, but "killing Prof. X" would not be. But what is morally inapplicable about my behavior is that I killed my colleague, not that I made money (Galvin 2011,408) Galvin notices that if you manipulate the "killing Prof. X" aspect of the maxim, she would likely behave differently. On O Neill s picture, because she would behave differently if she manipulated the "killing Prof. X" aspect of her maxim, killing Prof. X is disqualified from being part of the description of the maxim she uses when apprising the action of killing my colleague. Unsurprisingly, "killing Prof. X" seems to be morally relevant information we should include in our maxims. This seems to be a serious problem for O Neill s isolation and manipulation procedure. A pathway for O Neill to possibly overcome Galvin s concern becomes evident once we remind ourselves of the component parts of a maxim. Maxims are

25 19 comprised of doing X in circumstance C for the sake of an end E (Herman 1993, 134). Considering that in this example the action the agent is apprising is "kill my colleague," it seems like the agent must include the information "killing Prof. X" in the maxim submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure. So, what went wrong is Galvin s example? Galvin has offered an example where an agent, using O Neill s isolation and manipulation procedure, included a description of her action in her maxim which left out information applicable to the moral appraisal of the action. O Neill s system allowed this agent to describe their action as Cutting the brake lines to make money instead of describing their action as cutting the brake lines to kill my colleague. O Neill s system seems to permit agents to describe the action, to be included in their maxims, as they see fit. By allowing agents to determine how they describe their actions to be included in their maxims up to be submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure, a type of PRD arises at the level of action description much like how the Standard PRD arises at the level maxim descriptions. Allow me to sum this concern up by stating it formally: (1) FUL acts as the central feature of a deliberative procedure which tracks the objective moral status of an action by submitting that action's maxim to a particular type of universalizability test.

26 20 (2) An action s maxim must include a description of the action (3) An action can be described in multiple ways Thus, (4) By requiring an action s maxim must include an action description, and an action can be described in multiple ways, we allow the different maxims to render different, and possibly conflicting, moral statuses of a single one and the same action. Some might argue that a quick solution to Galvin s problem with O Neill s isolation and manipulation procedure is to insist that an agent s maxim must contain a general description of the action up for moral appraisal. Instead of describing their action as Taking a yoga class because it is good for my body or taking a yoga class because it will help me cheat on my spouse, we describe our action generally such that both action descriptions fall under that general description taking a yoga class. The hope is that describing actions generally forces agents to include morally relevant information like "taking a yoga class because it will help me cheat on my spouse" in the general action description taking a yoga class. This addendum, all maxims must contain a general action description of the corresponding action, can fit right into O'Neill's agent-relative solution.

27 21 Unfortunately, including a general description of our actions in our maxims has a problem of its own. Barbara Herman highlights this problem in her insightful paper Moral Deliberation and the Derivation o f Duties (Herman 1993,142). Herman says: The problem cannot be solved by restricting the Cl procedure to maxims with general action descriptions. It is not just that the consequences of such a more are rigoristic moral requirements that vitiate any hope that the Cl procedure can be morally supple. The deeper difficulty is in the arbitrariness of general descriptions. How would we determine the correct level of description except as the one that produces the desired moral result? O Neill s solution requires that maxims refer to a general action description of the corresponding action, but Kant does not provide a method to generate proper descriptions of actions, general or otherwise. How is an agent to know whether they should describe their action as taking a yoga class because it will help me cheat on my spouse or more generally as taking a yoga class or even more generally as being physical? All three are plausible descriptions the agents action. If we include the first description, taking a yoga class because it will help me cheat on my spouse, into our maxim for that action, everything else being equal, it will fail the FUL deliberative procedure. If we include either of the latter descriptions of the action in our maxim, all else being equal, they will pass the FUL deliberative procedure. The two latter descriptions seem to hide the immoral information cheat on my spouse inside the general action descriptions taking a yoga class or being

28 22 physical. 14 By changing the scope of the description included in the maxim submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure we hide information applicable to the moral appraisal of that act. While Herman s comments are aimed to bring out a PRD which arises when agents vary the scope of actions descriptions, Herman s concern applies any time agents attempt to describe their actions which are to be included in their maxims submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure. Anytime an action can be described in multiple ways, we run the risk of leaving out information applicable to the moral appraisal of actions - not just when agents change the level of generality. In light of this it seems O Neill s view cannot be saved by placing constraints on how we describe our actions to be included in our maxim we submit to the FUL deliberative procedure. O Neill s positon faces a subsequent criticism. O Neill s solution requires that to determine the objective moral status of an action, agents only submit to FUL deliberative procedure the maxim that was guiding their action. Earlier in this paper I suggests that this was a virtue of O Neill s position because it forces the FUL deliberative procedure to be sensitive to the ends the agent was striving towards when attempting that action. I suggested that in everyday moral discourse there is a moral 14 Galvin notices a similar problem which arises when we vary the generality of our maxim descriptions (Galvin 2011,41 Off).

29 23 difference between taking a yoga class with the end of having a good body, and taking a yoga class with the end of helping me cheat on my spouse. O Neill s system provides an interpretation of Kant which tracks those differences when adjudicating the moral status of an action. We will now see why it comes at too high a theoretical cost. Limiting the information included in a maxim to only the information the agent acted on, seems intuitive if the FUL deliberative procedure was trying to track the moral culpability of the agent. An agent s maxim tells us why they committed that action. Those who think the FUL is a deliberative procedure employed to track the objective moral status of actions might just say that O Neill s solution misses the mark altogether in that her system aptly tracks the moral culpability of agents rather than the objective moral status of actions. The interpretation of Kant ethics I am considering in this paper suggests that the FUL deliberative procedure tracks the objective moral status of actions, not the moral culpability of agents. If the FUL deliberative procedure tracks the objective moral status of actions, then further justification is required to show that a particular agent s maxim construction correctly tracks the objective moral status of actions. For the FUL deliberative procedure to track the objective moral status of actions it would need to identify the status of an action that, if any agent applied the FUL deliberative procedure to that one and the same action, they would arrive at the same moral status

30 24 of that action.15 If O Neill s system is sensitive to the particular ends the agents were striving towards, and we are looking for the objective status of actions, then for the FUL deliberative procedure to track the objective status of actions everyone would have to have identical ends they are striving towards when they act. This type of uniformity seems very unrealistic. Agents attempt actions for all sorts of reasons. What we previously saw as a virtue of O Neill s position cuts against the aim of the FUL deliberative procedure, to identify the objective moral status of an action not the moral culpability o f agents. This last point seems even more problematic once we recognize that the agent might not have access to all the information applicable to the moral appraisal of the action up for consideration. Consider an agent living in the 1920s who wants to determine whether the action smoking tobacco cigarettes is a moral action. As O Neill s agent-relative view of the FUL deliberative procedure demands, she would submit the maxim guiding the agent to attempt that action to the FUL deliberative procedure. Unfortunately, those alive in the 1920 s didn t know smoking tobacco cigarettes causes cancer. Information like cancer causing assuredly would not pass the FUL deliberative procedure. However, agents in the 1920s couldn't include facts 15 The relationship between the moral status of actions and the moral status of agents for Kant I leave as an open question. My aim here was just to highlight that it seems intuitive that they may not stand in a 1 to 1 correlation. The general argument of this paper does not hinge on this point.

31 25 like cancer causing in the content of their maxims thus they could formulate maxims that, when submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure, would wrongly identify the action of smoking as a moral action. I call this the General Skeptic PRD. The inability to ensure that an agent has available to them all the information applicable to the moral appraisal of an action, undermines the claim that the FUL is a central feature of a deliberative procedure which tracks the objective moral status of actions. How can the FUL deliberative procedure track the objective moral status of actions when agents do not have access to all the information applicable to the moral appraisal of an action? One possible way to overcome the General Skeptic PRD is by a brute demand for omniscience. Agents must know all the information about an action when deliberating about the moral status of that action (maybe this is what is meant by Gods eye view? ). The agent deliberating about the moral status of the action of smoking tobacco cigarettes must know everything about that action including facts like cancer causing. This seems implausible, if not impossible. While it seems implausible to require agents to know all the information about a given action before they render moral judgment, it may be more plausible to demand that agents know all information applicable to the moral appraisal of an action before submitting its maxim the FUL deliberative procedure. What agents

32 26 need is a moral education.16 Recent commenters have explored whether Kant s ethical system provides a method for agents to know what counts as information applicable to the moral appraisal of an action prior to attempting the FUL deliberative procedure. One proponent of this view is Mark Timmons (Timmons 1998). On Timmons s view, Kant overcomes the General Skeptic PRD by requiring agents include all and only the information applicable to the moral appraisal of an action in its maxim, and Timmons derives this information from other moments in Kant s ethical system. Timmons appeals the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Humanity (hereafter FOH), to constrain the description of the maxims we feed into the FUL deliberative procedure. The Formula of Humanity states Action in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end (Kant 1998, 78). According to Timmons, FOH expresses the right making feature of actions while the FUL is part of a deliberative procedure which tracks those right-making features. According to Timmons, Kant s FOH expresses our moral commitment to humanity s innate worth, to treating humans as ends in themselves and never as a means alone. Timmons writes: 16 For an interesting treatment about the role moral communities play in the moral education of agents, see Herman, Barbara. (1993). The Practice of Moral Judgment Chapter 4. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

33 27 Consider for instance the lying promise example. Presumably the lying promise maxim fails the contradiction in conception test because the possibility of making a lying promise depends on the stability of the proactive of promising which would be completely undermined were one's maxim to become universal law. When the agent reflects on this fact about her maxim, she must see the act of making a lying promise as a case of taking advantage of other agents be being a free rider. This sort of deception, because of its manipulative nature, constitutes a violation of humanity as an end in its self, since it interferes with an agent s autonomy, and so is morally wrong (at least presumptively). What makes the action wrong concerns those facts about it - its manner of manipulation - that constitutes violation of humanity as an end (Timmons 1998, ). Per Timmons s view, Kant thinks that autonomous willing along with what is necessary for autonomous willing, constitutes humanity s innate worth thus they are the right making features of actions. Unfortunately, textual support for this reading seems inconclusive. Kant also says:...but the question now is whether it is right. I therefore turn the demand of self-love (self-love in the general category lying promises falls under) into a universal law and put the question as follows: how would it be if my maxim became a universal law? I then see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself, but must necessarily contradict itself. For, the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the end one might have in it itself impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses, (my emphasis) (Kant 2008, 72). This excerpt suggests that the right-making features of actions are their ability to pass the FUL deliberative procedure, not facts about the innate worth of man nor man s autonomous willing.17 Nevertheless, let us assume Timmons s reading of Kant is 171 consider this view in the next section.

34 28 correct. If Timmons is correct, then Kant would need to justify the claim that autonomy and that which is necessary for autonomous action is the right-making feature of actions without appealing to the FUL deliberative procedure. Unfortunately Investigating Kant s or Timmons s thoughts on this point falls outside the scope of this paper. Beyond this, Timmons would also need to show that the FUL deliberative procedure, supplemented by the requirement that maxims must include facts about autonomy and that which is necessary for autonomous action, can overcome the noted PRDs. I will now investigate this claim. Again, let us assume Timmons s reading of Kant is correct, that FUL is primarily meant to be part of a deliberative procedure to track the right making features of objects, and FOH expresses those right-making features. Timmons simply does not show how including facts about treating persons as ends in themselves, or facts about autonomy and that which is necessary for autonomous action, in the descriptions of our maxims would prevent the General Skeptic PRD. Consider again the paradigm example of the General Skeptic PRD, someone deciding whether smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s is a moral action. While this person might limit her tobacco use to ensure that she is respecting autonomy and that which is necessary for autonomous action, she simply can t include facts like smoking causes cancer in her maxim. If this is correct then despite including facts about treating persons as ends in themselves and autonomy and that which is

35 29 necessary for autonomous action, it remains possible for actions to carry multiple, sometimes conflicting, moral statuses. Timmons s solution does not overcome the General Skeptic PRD. The General Skeptic PRD requires a different type of response then we have seen from O Neill and Timmons. To overcome the General Skeptic PRD, we need a solution which renders unknowable information like cancer causing inapplicable to the appraisal of the action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the I want to now turn to my positive picture, overcoming the General Skeptic PRD by re-engineering the object up for moral appraisal, actions, in Kant s ethics. III. In this section I would like to shift our discussion away from action descriptions, maxim descriptions, and the role they both play in the FUL deliberative procedure, to a discussion around re-engineering the objects of moral appraisal - actions. I submit the Essential Reference Principle to overcome the above noted forms of PRD. Essential Reference Principle - All action descriptions which are the object o f the FUL deliberative procedure must make essential reference to their corresponding maxim. According to the Essential Reference Principle, to correctly describe the action theft we must include the maxim the agent was acting on when performing the action theft in the description of the action theft. Theft is properly

36 30 described as theft according to maxim X where maxim x was whatever the maxim the agent was acting on when performing that action. If we include the description of an action s maxim within the description of the action being appraised, then actions, as objects up for moral appraisal, can be individuated along the lines of the content of their respective maxims.18 I call actions which are paired with, and individuated by, their maxims, Considered Actions. 19 To better understand how referring to maxims can help us distinguish between what appears to be one and the same action, consider the following analogues method for distinguishing different legal actions along the lines of an agent s intent. Imagine two cases where both cases seem to feature one and the same action: Agent X killing Agent Y with her car. In the eyes of the law, merely because the actions appear to be one and the same action, it does not mean they are one and the same action. One could be the action of manslaughter where the other was could be an action of murder. The legal system considers the intentions of the person driving the car to when determining whether a given case should be considered an action of murder or an action of manslaughter. If the agent intended to kill someone 18 For a more general treatment regarding the proper object of moral appraisal of the FUL deliberative see Korsgaard, Christine M From duty and for the sake of the noble: Kant and Aristotle on morally good action. In The Constitution of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics, eds. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting. New York: Cambridge University Press, Barbara Herman holds a similar view in (Herman 1998, ).

37 31 with her car, then that action might be viewed as an action of murder, whereas if the agent killed someone unintentionally, then that action might be viewed as manslaughter. This example is not meant to suggest that maxims are the kind of intention that the legal system considers when adjudicating cases of manslaughter and murder, it is not a legal theory.20 Instead, this example is meant to model the function the Essential Reference Principle plays in action descriptions, serving as a method to discriminate between Considered Actions which are seemingly one one and the same action. Just as the intentions of agents can help the law distinguish between the actions manslaughter and murder, we, on behalf of Kant, can discriminate between different types of actions in Kant s ethical system by including the content of the maxim the agent was acting on when performing that action in the description of the action. The aim of the Essential Reference Principle is rather straightforward. For either PRD to arise it must be possible for multiple maxims to be related to an apparent single action. It must be possible for both the maxim taking a yoga class because it is good for my body and the maxim taking a yoga class to because it will help me cheat on my spouse to be related to the one and the same action taking 20 Maxims might very well turn out to be a type of intention properly discussed in legal theory, however in this paper I want to remain agnostic to this area of Kantian Ethics.

38 32 a yoga class. The Essential Reference Principle prohibits the possibility of multiple maxims to be related to a single action, thus neither PRD may arise. If we apply the Essential Reference Principle to the Standard PRD Schema its ability to prevent the Standard PRD becomes apparent: (1*) FUL acts as the central feature of a deliberative procedure which tracks the right making features of Considered Actions by submitting that Considered Action s maxim to a particular type of universalizability test. (2*) A single considered action can only be related to a single maxim. And finally (3*) If a considered action can only be related to a single maxim then, it is only possible for a considered action to carry a single moral status. Consider again the action of smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s. In the 1920s agents simply didn t know that smoking tobacco cigarettes causes cancer. When deciding whether to smoke tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s, our maxim could never include facts about the cancer causing. The Essential Reference Principle renders information existing outside the realm of information available to the agent regarding the Considered Action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to maxim X, inapplicable to the moral status of the Considered Action smoking

39 33 tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to maxim X because if that information were included in the maxim related to that action, it would change the description of that Considered Action, to smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s according to maxim Y. The object of moral appraisal would change, it would become a different Considered Action. The Considered Action of smoking tobacco cigarettes when you don t know they were cancer causing is a different Considered Action then smoking tobacco cigarettes when you do know they were cancer causing. Thus, two maxims cannot be related to the one and the same Considered Action, instead each Considered Action would need to have its maxim separately submitted to the FUL deliberative procedure to independently determine the moral status of those Considered Action. While prior to adopting the Essential Reference Principle we might say that due to their ignorance regarding the negative side effects of smoking, people smoking in the 1920s were tracking the wrong objective moral status of their action smoking tobacco cigarettes in the 1920s. This frustrates the claim that the FUL deliberative procedure tracks the objective moral status of actions. Per my view, people smoking in the 1920s were tracking the correct objective moral status of their Considered Action smoking in the 1920s according to the maxim smoking is healthy, but, as it turned out, their action description contained false information.

40 34 This allows Kant retain his claim that the FUL deliberative procedure tracks the objective moral status of actions. Beyond its ability to overcome the noted PRDs, there is at least one further reason to adopt the Essential Reference Principle. If we construe the FUL deliberative procedure as not just a method to track the objective moral status of actions, but also as a method agents employ to determine their moral duties, then reengineering actions into Considered Actions can soften the blow of Kant s alleged rigorism (Herman 1993, ). In his piece On the Supposed Right to Lie for Philanthropy, Kant underscores a cornerstone of his moral philosophy - his demand for rigorous adherence to moral duties (Kant 2008, 611). Kant draws this conclusion after examining a case which most might agree that an agent should lie - when a murderer, standing at her doorway, is asking for the location of their next intended victim. According to Kant, even when a murderer is at your door inquiring about the location of some soon to be victim, it is your moral duty to not lie to the murderer See Herman Korsgaard, Christine. Two Arguments against Lying and The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York: Cambridge University Press, Barbara Herman, Moral Deliberation and the Derivation of Duties and Obligation and Performance, both in her The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), and Schapiro T. Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances. Ethics [serial online]. October 2006; 117 (1):

41 35 If the Essential Reference Principle is correct then Kant s rigorism only applies to the action of lying where the definition of the lying is in part constituted by the maxim that the agent applied when determining the moral status of the action lying. Lying is properly described as lying according to maxim X. The strength of the Essential Reference Principle lies in its ability to bifurcate an action into separate Considered Actions according to the maxim that guided that agent s action. This same bifurcation would take place when agents generate the duty do not lie. An agent s duty to never lie would only apply to the maxim-action pair lying according to maxim X, and not any other action-maxim pair which resembles this action lying according to maxim X. The moral status of all other actions some might call lying, perhaps lying according to maxim Y would be determined by their corresponding maxim s ability to pass the FUL deliverable procedure. This allows for the possibility that lying according to maxim Y could pass the FUL deliberative procedure.22 This allows for the possibility that any number of other actions which resemble lying could be morally permissible. By limiting the scope of actions descriptions which count as the action lying to lying according to maxim X, we reduce the scope of actions which are constrained by the duty to not lie. 22 Perhaps we would call these "white lies."

42 36 While I am treating this as merely a positive upshot of my own position, resisting the charge of rigorism on Kant s behalf might outweighs any other theoretical costs of adopting the Essential Reference Principle. In the next section of this paper, I will defend the Essential Reference Principle from three possible criticisms. IV. For some, the Essential Reference Principle might not be satisfying in a certain respect. Instead of rising to the challenge re-engineering maxims so that they properly track the objective moral status of actions, I have lowered the demands placed on the FUL deliberative procedure to merely tracking the objective moral status of agent-relative actions. While intuitions might suggest this, it is up to my detractors to show that the theoretical costs of re-engineering the object of moral appraisal outweighs its ability to overcome the noted PRDs. In this section, I entertain three possible criticisms of my view. If I am successful in defending myself from these criticisms then, ceteris paribus, we have reason to adopt the Essential Reference Principle. Some might argue that my solution is susceptible to the same action description PRD that applied to O Neill s view. Allow me to restate the action description PRD as it applies to O Neill s view:

43 37 (1) FUL acts as the central feature of a deliberative procedure which tracks the objective moral status of an action by submitting that action's maxim to a particular type of universalizability test. (2) An action s maxim must include a description of the action (3) An action can be described in multiple ways Thus, (4) By requiring an action s maxim must include an action description, and an action can be described in multiple ways, we allow the different maxims to render different, and possibly conflicting, moral statuses of one and the same action. For a PRD to arise at the level of action description, action descriptions must be a part of the FUL deliberative procedure. As my Thesis makes no claim as to how an agent should describe their actions within their maxims which are part of the FUL deliberative procedure, it does not suffer from the PRD that we saw with the O Neill s picture.23 My Thesis does not guide maxim construction. My solution eliminates the contingent relationship between maxims and actions by making actions, as the object of moral appraisal, by definition, relative to a single maxim. 231 am quite partial to O Neill s agent-relative maxim construction system.

44 38 This prevents the noted PRD by disallowing multiple maxims from being related to one and the same action while sidestepping questions about how one should describe their maxims. Never the less some might push back and say, my thesis does make use of action descriptions, how is an agent supposed to know how to describe their actions which are up for moral appraisal? This is a question about how agents should describe the actions up for moral appraisal not a question about how an agent should describe the maxims they submit to the FUL deliberative procedure. My response to this concern is straightforward. In most cases the action identified by agents as a candidate for moral appraisal is the action the agent views as an immediately attemptable action in some given circumstance. In The Groundwork on the Metaphysics o f Morals Kant makes sure to forward examples which highlight the circumstances the agent faced when describing an action up for moral appraisal. Here is one example: Another finds himself urged by need to borrow money. He well knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be lent him unless he promises firmly to repay it within a determinate time. He would like to make such a promise, but he still has enough conscience to ask himself: is it not forbidden and contrary to duty to help oneself out of need in such a way?...is maxim of action would go as follows: when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen. (Kant 2008, 74)

45 39 In this example, the agent is confronted with a frustrating situation which guide the construction of the action up for moral appraisal. The frustrating situation facing the agent is that the agent needs to borrow money, however the agent knows they cannot pay the money back. Considering this situation, the agent describes the attemptable action up for moral appraisal as something like borrowing money when you know you cannot pay it back. How an agent properly describes actions up for moral appraisal is a matter of the relationship between how the agent describes the possible actions and the truth of the matter at hand. This is not a moral question, but an empirical one. Agents can of course misread situations and we can, and should, hold them responsible for doing so. However, my thesis is aimed at providing a method to track the objective moral status of actions as described by agents, not to help agents aptly describe the actions they may attempt in a given situation. How agents can ensure their action descriptions are veridical to the phenomena at hand falls outside the preview of this paper. Let s now look at a second possible criticism of the Essential Reference Principle. So far, I have focused on the noted PRDs as they apply to those who interpret Kant as saying that the moral status of an action is in some sense objective, and the FUL is the central feature of a deliberative procedure agents use to identify the objective moral status of an action (Timmons 1998). Some might argue that I have adopted the wrong reading of Kant. In the Introduction, I mentioned an alternative

46 40 reading of Kant which holds that the FUL is not just part of a deliberative procedure agents use to identify the objective moral status of actions, but also that the moral status of an action is constituted by being identified by the FUL deliberative procedure. Per this view, actions are morally right in virtue of passing the FUL deliberative procedure. Some might argue that our mistake was to adopt the first reading of Kant and we would fare better against the noted PRDs by adopting this second interpretation of Kant. At first glance, the alternate interpretation of the FUL deliberative procedure seems like a tenable solution to the General Skeptic PRD. The alternative reading of the FUL deliberative procedure states that the FUL deliberative procedure tracks the objective moral status of an action, and the moral status of an action is constituted by being identified by the FUL deliberative procedure. On this view, the definition of information applicable to the moral appraisal of actions just is - being included in the maxim we submit to the FUL deliberative procedure. If an agent is unaware of some information about an action, then they cannot include that information in that action s maxim. If that information cannot be included in their maxim, then it cannot be included in the FUL deliberative procedure. If it cannot be included in the FUL deliberative procedure, then it is, by definition, not applicable to the moral appraisal of actions. It is in this way the alterative interpretation overcomes the general skeptic PRD. If the second reading of Kant overcomes the General Skeptic PRD then some

47 41 might then wonder; why should we adopt the Essential Reference Principle over adopting this alternative reading of Kant? Unfortunately, this alternative reading of Kant remains susceptible to the Standard PRD. To see this let s first remind ourselves of the standard PRD schema: (1) FUL acts as the central feature of a deliberative procedure which tracks the right making features of actions by submitting that action s maxim to a particular type of universalizability test. (2) Multiple maxims can be related to a single action. Thus, (3) By allowing multiple maxims to be related to a single action, we allow the different maxims to render different, and possibly conflicting, moral statuses of a single action. The alternative reading of Kant would replace (1) with (lo); an action is moral because that action s maxim passed a particular type of universalizability test which features the FUL. Agents, after all, can know whether some maxim passes the FUL deliberative procedure. While this reading of Kant is, at least, prima facie plausible, and, in fact, may have been Kant s own view, it does not seem to prevent Standard

48 42 PRD. Changing (1) to (lo ) does not affect (2), and (3) still seems to follow from (lo ) and (2). (lo ) An action is moral because that action s maxim passed a particular type of universalizability test which features the FUL. (2) Multiple maxims can be related to a single action. Thus, (3) By allowing multiple maxims to be related to a single action, we allow the different maxim to render different, and possibly conflicting, moral statuses of a single action. When we replace (1) with (lo), (3) still obtains. It seems that little is accomplished by recharacterizing (1) into (lo). The alternative reading of Kant s inability to overcome PRDs becomes clear when we remind ourselves that even on that picture, actions still have objective right making features. According to the alternative interpretation of Kant, the objective right making feature of an action is that the action s maxim passed a particular type of universalizability test. If this is correct, then (lo ) can be restated as (loo). (lo O ) FUL acts as the central feature of a deliberative procedure which tracks the right making features of actions. The right making feature of an action is

49 43 that the action s maxim passed a particular type of universalizability test, and this is determined by submitting that action s maxim to a particular type of universalizability test.24 (2) Multiple maxims can be related to a single action. Thus, (3) By allowing multiple maxims to be related to a single action, we allow the different maxim to render different, and possibly conflicting, moral statuses of a single action. When we replace (lo ) with (loo), (3) still obtains. It seems that little is accomplished by rearticulating (lo ) into (loo). Regardless of its inability to overcome the noted PRDs, we may still have good reasons to adopt the second interpretation of the FUL deliberative procedure. Thankfully the Essential Reference Principle can also help the alternative interoperation overcome the Standard PRD. (lo*) FUL acts as the central feature of a deliberative procedure which tracks the right making features of Considered Actions by submitting that Considered Action s maxim to a particular type of universalizability test. 24 This might be a formal articulation of O Neill s agent-relative solution.

50 44 (2*) A single considered action can only be related to a single maxim. And finally, (3*) If a considered action can only be related to a single maxim then, it is only possible for a considered action to carry a single moral status. It seems the Essential Reference Principle helps either interpretation overcome the noted PRDs. I leave open the question of which interpretation is preferred considering that the Essential Reference Principle can aid both in overcoming the noted PRDs. Beyond these substantive concerns, some might argue that there is no textual bases for thinking that the Essential Reference Principle is Kant s own view. While my aim in this paper is merely supplement Kant s picture, I do think Kant held something close to the Essential Reference principle. To demonstrate this I, want to highlight a moment in The Groundwork o f the Metaphysics o f Morals where Kant seems to employ Considered Actions, action descriptions which reference their maxims. Another finds himself urged by need to borrow money. He well knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be lent him unless he promises firmly to repay it within a determinate time. He would like to make such a promise, but he still has enough conscience to ask himself: is it not forbidden and contrary to duty to help oneself out of need in such a wav?...is maxim of action would go as follows: when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen. (Kant 2008, 74)

51 45 This example needs some unpacking to see how the action Kant is considering references the maxim guiding the agent to take that action. In the middle of this passage we see Kant asking a question out loud, Is it not forbidden and contrary to duty to help oneself out of need in such a way? It seems to me that everything following to in this sentence is supposed to be the description of an action and the underlined portion is referencing part of the action that Kant previously stated. That previously stated information was He well knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises firmly to repay it within a determinate time. Finally, at the end of this quote, we see Kant giving a concise articulation of the maxim, and this maxim is roughly identical to the content Kant referenced while describing the action by saying in such a way. This seems to suggest Kant includes the maxim of his action, He well knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises firmly to repay it within a determinate time, in the description of the action up for moral appraisal. While this is just one example, and my argument is supplementary to Kant s work, this example gives us at least one reason to think that Kant held the Essential Reference Principle In an earlier version of this Thesis I made the stronger claim that all the examples of the FUL deliberative procedure in the Groundwork can be read as evidence

52 46 IV. While other commentators have worked towards guiding maxim construction, the aim of this paper was to render the relationship between maxims and actions non-contingent by making actions, by definition, relative to single maxims. I accomplished this by requiring that the object of moral appraisal, actions, make essential reference to their related maxim. Per my view, actions just are actionsdone-according-to-maxims. Much more work needs to be done to demonstrate that the maxim-action relationship I have defended in this paper can fit into a more general theory o f action. I am optimistic about the success of this larger project. that Kant held the Essential Reference Principle. While I still maintain that this can be shown, I will save this discussion for another time.

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