Prof. dr. Bart Vandenabeele Vakgroep Wijsbegeerte en Moraalwetenschap

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1 Promotor Prof. dr. Bart Vandenabeele Vakgroep Wijsbegeerte en Moraalwetenschap Decaan Rector Prof. dr. Marc Boone Prof. dr. Anne De Paepe

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3 Willing and Idealising An Investigation into Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's Philosophies of Value and Life Violi Sahaj Proefschrift voorgelegd tot het behalen van de graad van Doctor in de Wijsbegeerte 2017

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5 Acknowledgements I want to express my gratitude to everyone who helped me on this journey starting with my deep gratitude for the invaluable support, understanding, faith and patience that my supervisor, Professor Dr. Bart Vandenabeele, has shown me throughout this journey. I am deeply grateful to him for allowing me to undertake the research project whose foundations he set, but especially for his faith, understanding and patience after I expanded the research beyond those foundations. I would like to express my great appreciation for the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (FWO) who made it possible financially for me to pursue my research and so for entrusting me with the means to complete it. Ghent University was a vibrant and nurturing establishment that made my study an absolute pleasure throughout. I voice my special thanks to the department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences for providing me with a most fruitful and nurturing place, complete with everything that a researcher requires. I wanted to thank Lut Van Kets, Emilie Vanmeerhaeghe and Gitte Callaert for their support and guidance in getting around the department and its systems. Their invaluable contribution are hard to put into words. I am grateful to Professor Eric Schliesser for allowing me to attend his Master s classes and thereby introducing me to his amasing research team. I thankful for being included in the reading groups with Laura Georgescu, Wim Vanrie, Barnaby Hutchins, Iulia Mihai, Inge De Bal and Marij van Strien. The debates, discussions and even casual conversation we had over the years and months have contributed immeasurably to my intellectual and personal maturity. I want to also express my gratitude for Professor Dr. Maarten van Dyck and his support for the initiative of putting together a department mini-football team. I also want to thank the doctoral students and postdoctoral researchers who made that possible: Anton Froeyman, Andries De Smet, Jan De Vos, Wannes Van Hoof, Kasper Raus, Mathieu Beirlaen, Fons Dewulf, among others. The philosophical discussions and debates we had after our sports, precisely because of our diverse philosophical backgrounds and interests greatly challenged and shaped my thoughts. v

6 It was an absolute pleasure to meet and converse with Jan-Willem Wieland, Pieter Bonte, Silvio Senn and Maarten Boudry. The diverse philosophical perspectives and richness of character among us was, for me, a greatly enriching experience, which I continue to admire and seek. To those who shared an office with me Farah Focquaert, Steff Coppieters, Aurélie Van De Peer, Anton Froyeman, Mahdi Shamsi, Jan De Vos and others who did so briefly during my stay I want to say thank you for your grace in handling me at my worst and for your receptivity when I was at my best. I am especially grateful for your guidance throughout my stay at the department and in Belgium; my experience would have been greatly impoverished without you. I am deeply thankful to Sarah Willems, whose immediate and unconditional support upon my arrival to Ghent and then her friendship thereafter enriched my experience and made me feel so welcome. I also would like to thank Professor Dr. Max Martens and Anne Cesteleyn for their kindness in helping me secure an office space so shortly and swiftly after my arrival in Ghent. Judith Wambacq, Annelies Monseré, Boris Demarest and Kris Goffin, I tried over and over again to put into words what your guidance, friendship, discussions, and engagement with me and my work, but also personally, has done to shape me, but each word was unsatisfactory. I can only say from the bottom of my heart that it meant the world to me. I want to also express my gratitude for the friends and acquaintances I met outside of the University of Ghent, whose support, guidance and friendship was a source of boundless inspiration for my work. Thank you all for showing me the rich, cultural and experiential capital, charm and diversity of Ghent and Belgium. I would be remiss to ignore what my undergraduate training at the University of Greenwich did to set me on this journey. I am grateful to Dr. Kath Jones, Dr. Jim Urpeth, Dr. Matt Lee and Dr. Mick Bowles for setting the philosophical foundations of my thoughts. I also want to thank my subsequent post-graduate study at Birkbeck College, University of London, which built upon and refined those foundations. I want to especially express my deep gratitude for my Master s thesis supervisor, Professor Dr. Ken Gemes, whose inspiring lectures on Nietzsche, supervision and subsequent faith in me to proceed onto a PhD were absolutely pivotal to this journey. In closing, please allow me to thank my family for their guidance, support and their many and continued sacrifices, which allowed me to pursue this journey, even against the odds. I am and will always be a reflection of your struggles and successes. I hope to make that reflection something for which you can feel unquestionable pride. Last, but never least, I want to thank my partner, Nadia Raitchev: without her unconditional love, her effortless joy and the way she enriches my life and does so in spite of our difficulties and struggles this whole journey would have been meaningless. vi

7 List of Abbreviations Unless otherwise stated, I have used the following translations of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche s texts. Schopenhauer FR Schopenhauer, A. (1903). On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In K. Hillebrand (Trans.), On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reasons and on the Will in Nature; Two Essays (pp ). London: George Bell and Sons. FW Schopenhauer, A. (2009): Prise Essay on the Freedom of the Will. In C. Janaway (Trans. & Ed.), The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics (pp ). NY: Cambridge University Press. OBM Schopenhauer, A. (2009) Prise Essay on the Basis of Morals. In Janaway, C. (Trans & Ed.), The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics (pp ). NY: Cambridge University Press. WR Schopenhauer, A. (2010). The World as Will and Representation: Volume 1. Norman, J., Welchman, A. & Janaway, C. (Trans. & Eds.). NY: Cambridge University Press. WRII Schopenhauer, A. (1958). The World as Will and Representation: Volume 2. Payne, E.F.J. (Trans.). NY: Dover Publications. Nietzsche A Nietzsche, F. (2005). Antichrist. In A. Ridley (Ed.) & J. Norman (Ed. and Trans.). The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (pp. 1-68). Cambridge University Press. BGE Nietzsche, F. (2002). Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. R.P. Hortsmann (Ed.) & J. Norman (Trans. & Ed.). NY: Cambridge University Press. vii

8 BT Nietzsche, F. (1999). The Birth of Tragedy. In R. Guess (Ed.) & R. Speirs (Trans. & Ed.). The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (pp ). Cambridge University Press. CW Nietzsche, F. (2005). Case of Wagner: A Musician s Problem. In A. Ridley (Ed.) & J. Norman (Ed. and Trans.). The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (pp ). Cambridge University Press. D Nietzsche, F. (1997). Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. M. Clark & B. Leiter (Eds.), R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.). Cambridge University Press. EH Nietzsche, F. (2005). Ecce Homo. In A. Ridley (Ed.) & J. Norman (Ed. and Trans.). The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (pp ). Cambridge University Press. GM Nietzsche, F. (1997). On the Genealogy of Morality. K. Ansell-Pearson (Ed.) & C. Diethe (Trans.). Cambridge University Press. GS Nietzsche, F. (2001). The Gay Science. B. Williams (Ed.), J. Nauckhoff (Trans.) & A. Del Caro (Trans.). Cambridge University Press. HHI Nietzsche, F. (1996). Human, All Too Human: Volume I. In R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.), R. Schacht (Intro.), Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits (pp ). Cambridge University Press. HHII Nietzsche, F. (1996). Human, All Too Human: Volume II. In R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.), R. Schacht (Intro.), Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits (pp ). Cambridge University Press. UM Nietzsche, F. (1997). Untimely Meditations. D. Breazeale (Ed.) & R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.). Cambridge University Press NCW Nietzsche, F. (2005). Nietzsche Contra Wagner. In A. Ridley (Ed.) & J. Norman (Ed. & Trans.). The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (pp ). Cambridge University Press. TI Nietzsche, F. (2005). Twilight of the Idols; or How to Philosophise with a Hammer. In A. Ridley (Ed.) & J. Norman (Ed. and Trans.). The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (pp ). Cambridge University Press. WLN Nietzsche, F. (2003). Writings from the Late Notebooks. R. Bittner (Ed.) & K. Sturge (Trans.). Cambridge University Press. WP Nietzsche, F. (1967). The Will to Power. W. Kauffman (Ed. & Trans) & R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.). NY: Vintage Books. viii

9 Z Nietzsche, F. (2006). Thus Spoke Zarathustra. R. Pippin (Ed.) & A. Del Caro (Ed. & Trans.). NY: Cambridge University Press. ix

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11 Table of Contents Acknowledgements... v List of Abbreviations... vii Table of Contents... xi Introduction Schopenhauer on Self-Cognition, Disinterestedness and Compassion The Will, the Intellect and the Meaningful World-View Self-Cognition and the Correlation Theory of Cognition Aesthetic Contemplation and the Projection of Willing The Objective Picture and the Schopenhauerian Ideas The Willing Stance and the Disinterested Individual Aesthetic Contemplation from the Viewpoint of the Artist and the Spectator The Beautiful, the Sublime and the Felt Consciousness Motives and Mainsprings Wellbeing, Woe and the Pleasure in Willing Something The Mainsprings of our Actions The Will to Life The Difference between Selflessness and Compassion (Mitleid) The Metaphysical Egoism Objection Compassion and Egoism: A Response to the Metaphysical Egoism Objection The Conscience and Self-knowledge Schopenhauer s Objection to Kant on the Conscience and the Impasse of Self-knowledge The Paradox of Ascetic Resignation and Schopenhauer s Error Nietzsche on Agency, Morality and the Ascetic Ideal Nietzschean Agency: Conscious Thought and the Drives The Lack of Fit and the Two Commitments The Nuanced Solutions to the Lack of Fit Towards an Alternative Solution to the Lack of Fit xi

12 2.5 Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and the Will-Body Identity Nietzsche on Individuality and Generality following the Will-Body Identity Nietzsche s Reversal: Individuality, Deliberation and our Self-image Nietzsche s Method, the Conceptual Link and the Origin of Selfconscious Agency Self-conscious Agency and the Origin of Morality Nietzsche s Evaluation of Morality: Egoism and the Sovereign Individual The Bridge: An Alternative Solution to the Lack of Fit Nietzsche on Objectivity and Aesthetic Contemplation The Morality of Mitleid and the Ascetic Ideal Conclusion English Summary Nederlandse Samenvatting Bibliography xii

13 Introduction 1 The broad objective of this thesis is to restore the significance of Schopenhauer s philosophy to the evolution of Nietzsche s thoughts. The philosophical commentary on Nietzsche focuses mostly on his objections to Schopenhauer s metaphysics and pessimism, but generally ignores the fundamental philosophical agreements between them. With the notable exception of Janaway s (2007) influential analysis of Nietzsche s GM, which offers a brief commentary. I aim to show that there are significant philosophical agreements between them that are crucial for our understanding of Nietzsche s philosophical interests and focus on certain topics. I will argue that they agree on fundamental concepts and distinctions, e.g., the will-body identity, but disagree over the explanatory and evaluative framework we should derive from these concepts and distinctions. This is because both have different criteria for explaining phenomena like agency, morality, aesthetic contemplation and ascetic resignation. Furthermore, they disagree on the philosophical method that sets the limits of their respective explanatory and evaluative frameworks. For Schopenhauer, the method that is apposite for explaining phenomena is transcendental idealism and the limits it sets through our first-person experience. Nietzsche prefers an alternative method, namely, what he calls historical philosophising in combination with his so-called drive psychology. I aim to demonstrate that both philosophical methods are rooted in the so-called will-body identity, which we find in Schopenhauer. The narrower objective of the thesis focuses on their philosophy of value, specifically, their ethics and aesthetics: their views on selflessness and compassion, but also disinterestedness and objectivity. I decided to extend the thesis to other topics such as their respective analysis of agency and ascetic resignation ( ascetic ideal, in Nietzsche s case). My reason for doing so is that they are core areas of both contention and agreement between them, which inform not only their ethical and aesthetic views, but also shed light on their distinct philosophical methods. Analysing the previous allows us to recognise what underpins Nietzsche s interest in agency or selfhood, morality, the arts and the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche substantially deviates from Schopenhauer s views on agency following his critique of the concept of the will as apposite for comprehending the insights inherent to the will-body identity, but his interest and focus on agency and its explanatory value is 1

14 actually rooted in Schopenhauer s philosophy of the will. Nietzsche accepts the insight of the will-body identity, but he derives a different explanatory and evaluative framework from that insight, which is premised on his use of the concept of the drive as a replacement of the will. By offering an extensive analysis of the two thinkers in a broader selection of topics, I aim to provide readers with a picture that demonstrates the ways in which their reasons, distinctions and evaluations intertwine and diverge. To achieve this and where appropriate, I introduce terminology and-or translations for disambiguating concepts or ironing out inconsistencies. Each concept I introduce is based on their propositions and distinctions. Likewise, I aim to challenge common assumptions or doxies about Schopenhauer and Nietzsche s philosophy, e.g., the touted claim that Schopenhauer s philosophy is pessimistic, which Atwell aptly summarises as follows: The double-sided world [i.e., the world as will and as representation] is the striving of the will to become conscious of itself so that, recoiling in horror at its inner, selfdivisive nature, it may annul itself and thereby its self-affirmation, and then reach salvation. (Atwell 1995, 28; my emphasis) Though Atwell is rightly cautious to state that it may annul itself, many commentators throw such caution to the wind and argue that self-cognition of the will s efficacy leads to salvation or ascetic resignation. To challenge this doxy, I utilise the so-called doublecognition of the body as will and representation (or as object ) and the will-body identity to propose the correlation theory of cognition. The correlation theory of cognition constitutes the foundations of Schopenhauer s philosophy and epistemology. It sets a clear boundary around what we can know and how we can (re)act. Using the correlation theory of cognition and key textual evidence, I will argue that we have good grounds for resisting the conclusion that self-cognition of the will leads to or causes ascetic resignation such that we can claim that his philosophy is pessimistic. The correlation theory of cognition also changes how we make sense of key concepts such as disinterestedness, compassion, selflessness and objectivity. These concepts do not link to ascetic resignation in the way we initially assume when we construe his philosophy as pessimistic. To aid readers in recognising the previous, I suggest that we distinguish Schopenhauer the individual, who may be a pessimist, from the proposition that his philosophy is pessimistic. His philosophy can resist the charge of pessimism in subtle, but fundamental ways. It can show that pessimism is an aspect of individuals and so their will, which, in turn, can explain why the world itself appears as not worth much, albeit to them. In short, pessimism is the subjective correlate of the world that appears to us in a pessimistic light. It compels us to focus on those features of it such as the suffering of others or our own and, in turn, to conflate that suffering with the character of the world itself. It also engenders actions in us that further entrench the previous character. Our pessimism colours our experience of the whole world and, in turn, limits on our actions. Accordingly, it is not our cognition of the world as it is in itself that leads to pessimism. It is the projection 2

15 of our own pessimism onto the world that limits our actions in it and, in turn, leads us to perceive the world as not worth much. The world s character is a mirror of our will. The difference between Schopenhauer the individual and his philosophy likewise shows the intimate relationship between the two thinkers that informs Nietzsche s philosophical interest, focus and method. It shows why Nietzsche focuses on agency, morality, the ascetic ideal and the arts, but also his general approach to philosophical problems as well as his skepticism with respect to the so-called thing in itself and the purity of truth. I will argue we can characterise Nietzsche s approach to philosophical problems as stemming from the perspective of an individual or individuality, i.e., our personal needs, drives and so on. Even his analysis of communities, morality and the so-called herd shows the stamp and seal of individuality, as I will aim to demonstrate. Nietzsche acquires his approach from objections to Schopenhauer s philosophy, but equally from fundamental philosophical agreement, which we rarely notice. We are can appreciate this agreement more easily if we note the intimate relationship between them as from Nietzsche s point of view. In his early writings, Nietzsche describes Schopenhauer as his educator, which he defines in the following way: Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you that the true, original meaning and basic stuff of your nature is something completely incapable of being educated or formed and is in any case something difficult of access, bound and paralysed; your educators can be only your liberators. (UM, Schopenhauer, 1; my emphasis) Notice that the above indirectly refers to Schopenhauer s claims about willing and instruction: What someone truly wills, the striving from his innermost essence and the goal he pursues accordingly this is something we could never alter with external influences such as instruction: otherwise we could recreate him. Seneca makes the apposite remark: velle non discitur [willing cannot be taught]; which shows that he preferred the truth over his fellow Stoics, who said that virtue can be taught. (WR, ) Nietzsche, then, employs Schopenhauer s passage to inform his definition of a true educator. Note how the above definition compares with Nietzsche s subsequent description of his encounter with Schopenhauer and, specifically, the role Schopenhauer played in his life: It was in this condition of need, distress and desire that I came to know Schopenhauer. I am one of those readers of Schopenhauer who when they have read one page of him know for certain they will go on to read all the pages and will pay heed to every word he ever said. I trusted him at once and my trust is the same now as it was nine years ago. (UM, Schopenhauer, 2 my emphasis) This early description of Schopenhauer s influence, which is markedly more intimate and personal than we would expect from a philosophical opponent, substantially informs and 3

16 guides my analysis. It guides my approach to their philosophical relationship, but also to them as individual thinkers in their own right and with their own philosophies. I aim to show that Nietzsche construes philosophical problems, inquiries and interests as stemming from something personal or individual, similar to the above description of his reasons for coming to know and trusting Schopenhauer. This interest in the individual is not unique to Nietzsche, but stems from Schopenhauer s philosophy of the will. In sum, the thesis aims to assess the philosophical agreements and disagreements between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche s views on ethics and aesthetics; specifically, on how they define and evaluate concepts like disinterestedness and objectivity, likewise selflessness and compassion. After recognising that focusing solely on their ethical and aesthetic propositions detracts attention from the fundamental agreements between them, I extend the scope of my assessment. This extension aims to provide a clearer framework for identifying the subtle, but fundamental agreements between them, which, in turn, gives us a clearer view of their ethical and aesthetic differences. However, the drawback of this approach is that it substantially broadens the thesis in content and focus. Below, I offer an overview of my journey into each philosopher and a brief summary of the various chapters, starting with Schopenhauer. 2 While reading into Schopenhauer s ethics and aesthetics, I came across a disharmony between his various accounts of the pure subject of cognition, which led me to inquire into what he means by the objectivity of a cognition. On the one hand, the pure subject of cognition perceives things (including her body ) as a representation and thus as foreign to her (cf. WR, 124). On the other hand and during aesthetic contemplation, the pure subject of cognition collapses the distinction between herself and the object when she perceives its Idea. She no longer perceives it as foreign (cf. WR, 201-2). Accordingly, the pure subject of cognition sometimes perceives things as foreign, but likewise as similar to her will and so as familiar to her as is her own willing, striving and so on. I sought to resolve this disharmony because of its implications for Schopenhauer s aesthetics, which is invaluable for laying out clearly what he means by aesthetic contemplation. The above disharmony in his account of the pure subject of cognition encouraged me to take a step back and re-read Schopenhauer s WR. I followed his suggestion that we should read it as the unfolding of a single thought [ein einzige Gedanke] (WR, 312). Accordingly, I read each book as though it was a part of the unfolding of a single thought. What was important for my research into his ethics was the single thought s ability to explain Schopenhauer s proposition that from the same source that gives rise to all goodness, love, virtue and nobility there ultimately emerges also what I call the negation of the will to life (WR, 405). While reading closely and searching for the single thought, I noticed that the pure subject of cognition in books one and two of WR differ substantially from the pure subject of cognition in books three and four. I realised that their difference was due to the introduction of the concept of the will and its role in Schopenhauer s epistemology. 4

17 Schopenhauer uses the will to render meaningful the thing in itself, which he derives from Kant who sometimes argues that it is merely a limiting concept and so not substantial, and, at other times, that it is substantial, but unknowable. Schopenhauer s construes the thing in itself not solely as a limiting concept, but as substantial. He aims to render it meaningful without overstepping Kant s limits of possible cognition, however. In short, he sought to access it without arguing that we can cognise something as it is in itself. I read him as offering as close an approximation of what something is in itself as is possible in accordance with the limits of cognition set out by Kant s transcendental idealism. He attempts to do so by using our relationship to ourselves, i.e., our first-person experience, as the basis for this approximation. We can access the thing in itself from within without thereby claiming that we can cognise it as an object among other objects in the world, according to Schopenhauer. The will-body identity and the so-called double cognition demonstrate his unique and novel philosophical approach to the problems raised and left unanswered by Kant s transcendental idealism. The previous led me to develop what I called the correlation theory of cognition, which, I will argue, is fundamental to his philosophy. I found that we can construe the single thought variously, but settled for two variations: the will-body identity and correlation theory of cognition. Using the correlation theory of cognition, we can resolve the above ambiguity between the two accounts of the pure subject of cognition starting with distinguishing between three cognitions of something: cognition of an object, of a motive and an Idea. Noting Schopenhauer s irregular uses of Objekt and Gegestand, I coined the generic term of the target of a cognition rather than the object or representation. I chose target for brevity and clarity, but also to emphasise the directionality of a cognition parallel to the directionality of the will or willing. To understand what he means by cognition of an object, a motive or an Idea, I argue, we should assess their respective targets, but also their subjective correlates. When we do so, we recognise that something appears as an object only when we assume a particular subjective stance in relation to it; the same applies with respect to when it appears as a motive or an Idea. Each one have their distinct subjective correlates. A core assumption of the correlation theory of cognition, then, is that the same target of cognition can, at different times and based on the subjective stance we take in relation to it, appear as an object, a motive or an Idea. We perceive the same thing in each instance, but the nature of our perception and thus how it appears changes in relation to changes in us, i.e., our subjectivity or the subjective correlate. The previous changes have implications with respect to the actions we can take in relation to something. In other words, how something appears places or removes a limit on our possible actions in relation to it. Finally, I found that the source of goodness, love etc. is disinterestedness and its cognitive modus, namely, aesthetic contemplation. The previous stems from our projecting the will on the target of our cognition and, in turn, on the world itself. I then focused on explaining how it can be possible for someone to be disinterested and still (re)act in relation to something. In sum, the concept of the will plays a pervasive role in Schopenhauer s philosophy, but we have to first construe it as derivable from the first-person experience of 5

18 willing something. The previous experience is difficult to conceptualise without, at the same time, losing sight of the fact that it is a first-person experience. I construe it as the event that shows the will-body identity and thus the bridge between the (first-person) subjective world of thoughts (wishes, desires etc.) and the (third-person) objective world of actions (objects, events etc.). The philosophical commentary generally reflects the previous, but it often misses the nuanced and distinct roles that the will plays in his explanation of certain phenomena, which inform us about his concepts and resolve apparently contradictory propositions such as the intellect s effect on the will. Consequently, I used the ill-body identity, the correlation theory of cognition and the different uses of the will as the conceptual framework that resolves Schopenhauer s apparently contradictory or inconsistent propositions. I would summarise my reading of Schopenhauer s philosophy as an attempt to unfold the essential role that the previous conceptual framework plays in his philosophy and how it disambiguates his ethical and aesthetic propositions. Below, I give a slightly more detailed overview of the various chapters in Schopenhauer s section and their arguments, which could be useful as an outline for how I derived the conceptual framework and used it to resolve various inconsistencies and disambiguate certain core concepts. 1. The will, the Intellect and the Meaningful World-View. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the foundations of Schopenhauer s epistemology. I assess why and how he introduces the concept of the will using the so-called double cognition and I analyse what Atwell aptly calls the will-body identity thesis. I also introduce the correlation theory of cognition and argue that the pure subject of cognition still assumes the willing stance on things. Accordingly, the so-called pure subject s purity here is dubious, especially, if it yields cognition of an object. 2. Self-cognition and the Correlation Theory of Cognition. In this chapter, I lay out in detail what I call the correlation theory of cognition and develop the distinctions and propositions from the previous chapter. I define it as the theory that there is a by-fit relationship between the subject and the object of a cognition. I also suggest a distinction between the object and the target of a cognition to clarify how Schopenhauer conceives the difference between the cognition of an object, a motive or an Idea. These types of cognition have their own corresponding subjective correlate, which are, respectively, the impure subject of cognition (or what I call the willing stance ), the willing subject (or the individual ) and the genuinely pure subject of cognition (or the disinterested stance ). 3. Aesthetic Contemplation and the Projection of Willing. I argue that the correlation theory of cognition permits a novel understanding of aesthetic contemplation that distinguishes it from ordinary cognition and reflection of an object or a motive. Aesthetic contemplation is a type of cognition, which we can comprehend as the by-fit relationship between assuming a disinterested stance on something and cognising it as an Idea, or, more clearly, cognising its Idea. 6

19 4. The Objective Picture and the Schopenhauerian Idea. This chapter aims to give a detailed analysis of the objective side of aesthetic contemplation. I assess what he means by cognition of an Idea by juxtaposing it to cognition of an object and motive. I attempt to give a novel view of what he means by perceiving the target independent from its relations to other targets of cognition. I argue that, after he introduces of the concept of the will, what he means by an Idea rests on our perceiving the target as the representation of willing, striving and so on. In short, it rests on what I call the projection of willing whose basis is the double cognition of the body as will and as an object among objects. Likewise, I critically evaluate the status of the Schopenhauerian Idea in light of alternative readings. I argue against the Platonic and Kantian readings of the Ideas. 5. The Willing Stance and the Disinterested Individual. Following from the previous, this chapter assesses the subjective side of aesthetic contemplation by juxtaposing the willing stance which is the subjective correlate of ordinary cognition (i.e., of an object or a motive) to disinterestedness or the disinterested stance. After Schopenhauer introduces the will, the pure subject of cognition changes its meaning to reflect disinterestedness or our assuming a disinterested stance on the target of our cognition. I construe the latter as the genuinely pure subject of cognition to emphasise that projection of willing onto the world offers us a more veracious cognition of its target, than cognition of an object or a motive. The same occurs with cognition of the world itself, which, after introducing the will, he construes as a representation of willing, striving and so on. Finally, I evaluate my proposed reading of disinterestedness in light of other readings. 6. Aesthetic Contemplation from the Viewpoint of the Artist and the Spectator. I assess whether or not Schopenhauer s account of aesthetic contemplation supports a distinction between the arts and aesthetics. I propose an insight into Schopenhauer s philosophy of art by distinguishing artists based on their respective aims. I distinguish artists tout court from aesthetic artists. Aesthetic artists aim to incite aesthetic contemplation and therefore cognition of an Idea in their spectators, whereas nonaesthetic artists have different aims or prioritise different aspects of the arts. Finally, I suggest Schopenhauer s philosophy of art leaves us with two conflicting demands of aesthetic artists, which may be irreconcilable. 7. The Beautiful, the Sublime and the Felt Consciousness. In this chapter, I argue that we should comprehend beauty and sublimity as properties or features of objects that incite aesthetic contemplation. I object to the proposition that beauty and sublimity are features of something on which we aesthetic contemplate, i.e., features of Ideas. According to Schopenhauer, beauty and sublimity are prerequisites of aesthetic contemplation and not consequences of aesthetically contemplating on something. I derive the previous from an analysis of his conflicting remarks on aesthetic pleasure. I argue that an account of aesthetic pleasure is derivable from his views on our pleasure in beauty. This account has the benefit of being consistent with his general account of pleasure. Thus, I argue that aesthetic pleasure is still alleviation of pain or suffering; it 7

20 works against the back drop of a thwarted will and so it presupposes the will. The difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic pleasure is that the former alleviates pain or suffering by redirecting our attention from our suffering and the (personal) will underpinning it to something else, not by our actions or by attaining the object of our will. We derive aesthetic pleasure from projecting the will onto something, but projection is pleasing to us because it distracts us from our own woe. Finally, I consider how this theory applies to sublimity and discuss the intimate relationship between sublimity, aesthetic contemplation and what he calls the felt consciousness. The felt consciousness, I suggest, is a bridge between his aesthetics and ethics. 8. Motives and Mainsprings. This chapter aims to make smoother the transition from aesthetics to ethics by arguing that there is a distinction between a motive (Motiv) and a mainspring (Triebfeder) of action. Common translations of Triebfeder as incentive can be misleading by not taking into account the distinction between the will and the intellect in Schopenhauer s philosophy based on his correlation theory of cognition. We have epistemic access to our mainsprings only in reflection over an action and its corresponding motive, because, while we act, we identify with our mainsprings and so merely experience their reflection in the motive. Thus, we only have indirect cognition of a mainspring, but we directly cognise our motives, since they are the objects impelling us to act. 9. Wellbeing, Woe and the Pleasure in Willing Something. In this chapter, I clarify and nuance the distinction between wellbeing and woe by assessing his claim that wellbeing and woe mean respectively in accordance and discordance with a will. I use this chapter to prepare the ground for a subsequent overview and definition of the various mainsprings of action by arguing that willing is directional and thus positive in the sense that it aims for something. I utilise a distinction between one s state and one s aim to argue that his various mainsprings suggest that we can conceive of a pleasure in willing itself as distinct from a pleasure in accordance with a specific aim of the will (or a specific mainspring). Consequently, we can construe pleasure in willing itself as underpinning the differences in mainsprings. 10. The Mainsprings of our Actions. This chapter aims to nuance and further refine the definition of the concept of a mainspring of action. Likewise, it breakdown the various mainsprings that Schopenhauer discusses in his works. I assess some possible objections to the definitions I offer and defend the proposition that the will is always positive. I also argue that we can derive his negative conception of willing, i.e., all willing springs from need, and thus from lack, and thus from suffering (WR, 219), from the positive conception of what the will aims for. We can distinguish between the bodily state which urging us to act and the action s aim ; the aim characterises the act of will proper, which is always positive in that it aims for something rather than against it. I construe the act of will as the movement of reaching for something, which explains or underpins our reacting to or against something that blocks this reaching. 11. The Will to Life. The analysis of the concept of the will to life and its epistemological limits is, in my view, the most important part of Schopenhauer s metaphysics. I argue 8

21 the concept rests wholly on epistemic foundations and its purpose is to provide a meaningful view of the will in the metaphysical sense. However, there is also an ambiguity and potential impasse between the fact that the will to life is a cognition, but nothing in particular corresponds to it, which would legitimate extending the concept as his does, i.e., to make sense of motivation, stimulation and causation. I despair over not being able to further disambiguate the concept, but I utilise it throughout to reveal an overlooked distinction between the will to life and the will. The distinction is crucial for resolving some conceptual knots around the relationship between his views on ethics, asceticism and metaphysics. 12. The Difference between Selflessness and Compassion (Mitleid). In this chapter, I suggest a possible reading of Schopenhauer s proposition in OBM that compassion [Mitleid] is the basis of morally worthy actions. I assess how moral actions are possible in the first place by utilising a distinction between sympathy and empathy, which shows that compassion stems from the change in our cognition stemming from aesthetic contemplation. Our assuming the disinterested stance in relation to someone allows us to empathise with her without this necessarily leading to compassionate action, but we could not possibly act compassionately or feel it for her without empathising with her. Disinterestedness enables compassion, but it does not guarantee it, since it also enables malice and asceticism, both of which require perceiving something or someone as willing, striving etc., which is the minimal condition of identifying with her and her situation. Likewise, I critically assess a misreading of Schopenhauer s proposition that compassion rests on identifying with the recipient and her woe, which I find in Cartwright s objection and his alternative suggestion to Schopenhauer s claim that we feel someone s pain in their body. 13. The Metaphysical Egoism Objection. This chapter demonstrates the so-called metaphysical egoism objection as described by various commentators; I opt for Julian Young s reading as an example. I suggest that there are two possible interpretations of it, which I call the categorical and the motivational interpretation. The categorical interpretation suggests that Schopenhauer fails to demonstrate how compassion genuinely differs from egoism considered metaphysically, which means we can construe compassion as a kind of egoism. The motivational interpretation suggests that the metaphysical identity between agent and the recipient does not guarantee compassion, because she can likewise act egoistically based on this identity. After rejecting the motivational interpretation based on what I discussed previously about the limited role of disinterestedness in compassion, I argue that the categorical interpretation requires assessment and a response. I conclude the categorical interpretation makes two errors. Firstly, it misapplies Schopenhauer s two uses of will, because it fails to recognise these uses. One use refers to the individual, whereas the other refers to the will to life ; one use is individuated or individual whereas the other is metaphysical. The second error is a misunderstanding of the distinction between the will to life as the urge to do something and the mainspring of an action. 9

22 14. Compassion and Egoism: A Response to the Metaphysical Egoism Objection. In this chapter, I suggest a response to the categorical interpretation by arguing we cannot, in principle, conflate compassion with egoism. We can distinguish the will to life from a mainspring that stems from it. Instead, we should read his claim about seeing through the principium individuationis (PI) as representing our overcoming egoism without implying what follows from this overcoming, whether morality follows through compassion, or immorality through malice or even ascetic resignation through the asceticism (the mainspring). Though he often suggests that morality and ascetic resignation follow from seeing through the PI, we cannot overlook how malice is also rooted in the same cognition. I argue that seeing through the PI is our assuming a disinterested stance on something such that we can perceive it as willing, striving and so on. 15. The Conscience and Self-Knowledge. Here, I argue that Schopenhauer views the conscience as inextricably linked to self-knowledge, but they are not synonyms. The former stems from how we respond to the latter. We can distinguish various responses to our self-knowledge and thus treat self-knowledge as the cognition of something, i.e., cognition of an object. In responding to our self-knowledge, we assume the willing stance and thus perceive ourselves as an object first and then a motive. We construct this object from our various actions and their motives using the faculty of reason based on the will-body identity. I call the object of self-knowledge our self-image, for brevity. Our response to our self-image and so how the previous motivates us, determines whether we have a conscience or not. We can have various responses to our self-image, however, some of which are not conscientious. Our conscience is thus one response to our self-image among others. I substantiate the previous propositions by a detailed analysis of how he distinguishes remorse from guilt, but likewise direct from indirect (dis)approval of conscience. 16. Schopenhauer s Objection to Kant on the Conscience and the Impasse of Self-knowledge. I argue that we can find a basis for Schopenhauer s distinction between the conscience and self-knowledge in his objections to Kant s account of the conscience. Schopenhauer argues that Kant failed to distinguish our deliberation about any course of action from our conscience. For Schopenhauer, our conscience reflects the voice of morality, whose source is the mainspring of compassion; it is our compassion reacting to our self-image based on an action we undertook or based on an action we resolve to undertake. The latter uses our memory of a previous similar action(s) as its criterion for evaluating the impending action. Finally, I suggest that there is an impasse in Schopenhauer s views on self-knowledge, which we recognise in the following two conflicting proposition. First, the intellect cannot possibly change the will and, second, self-knowledge of the will can lead to the negation of the will to life, i.e., ascetic resignation. 17. The Paradox of Ascetic Resignation and Schopenhauer s Error. In this last chapter of the Schopenhauer section, I analyse the impasse in self-knowledge and argue that negation of the will to life reveals a paradox in Schopenhauer s philosophy of the will. I start by defining ascetic resignation using a distinction between negation of the will to life and 10

23 self-negation. I support this distinction by arguing that guilt and negation of the will to life are different responses with correspondingly different targets and mainsprings. I also critically assess Reginster s reading of ascetic resignation, which suggests that ascetic resignation is indifference with respect to our desires engendered by an expectation about the nature of desiring itself, which we derive from aesthetic contemplation. The expectation is that we never fulfill our desiring itself, because it will always lead to suffering. The intellect s activity explains ascetic resignation: it focuses us on features that are inhospitable to our will. I argue that Reginster overlooks a passage in Schopenhauer, which shows that the previous expectation and its corresponding indifference can also produce affirmation of the will to life. Likewise, he overlooks the role of the will in the intellect s focusing on a particular feature of the world, because he conflates ordinary reflection with aesthetic contemplation. When we reflect on something, the will distinguishes and selects the features we focus on. The previous is different from the free play of the intellect in aesthetic contemplation, which allows us to identify with and focus wholly on a target of our cognition at the expense of our will and the self-consciousness underpinning its activity. Accordingly, we can reflect on our aesthetic contemplation and infer something about our will from it, but we must not conflate the previous reflection and its inferences with aesthetic contemplation itself. Correspondingly, I argue that we should distinguish the reflective objectivity of ordinary cognition from the aesthetic objectivity of aesthetic contemplation. Given the previous, I argue that ascetic resignation itself is paradoxical, because it reflects an activity of the will, namely, one of its mainspring, but not the activity of the intellect on the will. I defend the previous by arguing that there is a difference between satisfaction and complete satisfaction. Our aiming for complete satisfaction is not inherent to the will to life itself, but is, paradoxically, one way in which the will to life expresses itself, i.e., it is a mainspring of action. Thus, aiming for complete satisfaction results from ascetic resignation or represents one of its early stages; it does not cause it. The intellect reflects the will, it does not change it. It offers self-knowledge, but it cannot possibly respond to this knowledge independent from the will and thus its mainsprings. 1 Lastly, I conclude by demonstrating a crucial error Schopenhauer makes in linking the artistic genre of tragedy to negation of the will to life. 3 The affirmation of passing away and destruction that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, becoming along with a radical rejection 1 I leave open the conditions under which the intellect provides us with self-knowledge, that is, what impels our intellect to make an object of our will in the first place, because it did not concern Schopenhauer directly, but he addresses it mostly indirectly through his conception of aesthetic pleasure. Nietzsche did consider these conditions, however. They arguably inform his philosophical method of addressing hard cases and phenomena by assessing the conditions under which these phenomena and-or concepts emerge. 11

24 of the very concept of being all these are more closely related to me than anything else people have thought so far. (EH, BT, 3) The above passage from Nietzsche s Ecce Homo has been my map into Nietzsche s philosophy and Weltanschauung. There are three key philosophical areas implicit to it, which, I believe, define his philosophical interests. Firstly, his focus on life s value and its construal as a problem, that is, the problem of pessimism, which he argues is addressed by the assessments of philosophers, but also the creative activities of artists. Secondly, his ethical evaluation of willing, egoism and their cognates, which he construed as undermined by the dominant morality of his day. Thirdly, his philosophical method or approach to philosophical problems, which he constructs from his training as a philologist, albeit also from his philosophical interests in German idealism, especially, Schopenhauer s philosophy of the will. The previous areas interested both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but they had diametrically opposed evaluations and approaches to them. As a preliminary to a more detailed discussion in the main body of the text, I offer a broad overview of my reading of Nietzsche that underscores what, I will argue, is his indebtedness to Schopenhauer s philosophy. Nietzsche s affirmation of passing away and destruction accentuates a difference between himself and Schopenhauer, whose views on death oppose this affirmation. Recall that, after quoting a famous passage from Calderon s Life is a Dream 2, Schopenhauer asks, how could it [being born] not be an offence, given that it is followed by death in accordance with an eternal law (WR, 381; my emphasis). Schopenhauer s evaluation of death as an offence conceals the subjective correlate underscoring our construing death as an offence, i.e., as something negative or as a wrong, for which we have to repent. Only the will to life that expresses itself as an individual, i.e., egoistically, could underpin this negative evaluation of the eternal law and lead to a depreciation of life. Likewise, Nietzsche s saying yes to opposition and war evidences a radical departure from his educator, who construes opposition and war as the highest expression of egoism and struggle between individuals (WR, 359; my emphasis). They are both objective correlates of egoism, which Schopenhauer blames for the profoundest suffering of humankind and even the suffering inherent to life itself, when he later construes egoism as following necessarily from the affirmation of the will to life and thus preservation of the body. He champions compassion, which he construes as the natural ground of morality, for its ability to suppress and mitigate the negative consequences of egoism. Furthermore, Nietzsche s views on the family failing of all philosophers (HHI 2) their lack of historical sense is implicit to his saying yes to becoming and radical 2 The quote is from the following a statement by Sigmund in Act I: Oh, what a miserable, unlucky wretch am I! Please explain to me, heavens, given the way you treat me, what crime I committed against you with my birth; although if I was born, my crime is clear, and the severity of your sentence has sufficient cause, for birth itself is man s greatest crime. But I would just like to know, to ease my distress leaving aside, heavens, the crime of birth what else I did to merit further punishment. Weren t others born as well? And if so, what privileges were they granted that I ve never enjoyed? (Calderon 2004, 93). 12