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1 Basic Choice and Basic Stance: Explaining the Fundamental Option Author(s): William Cosgrave Source: The Furrow, Vol. 35, No. 8 (Aug., 1984), pp Published by: The Furrow Stable URL: Accessed: 05/01/ :42 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The Furrow is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Furrow.

2 Basic Choice and Basic Stance? Explaining the Fundamental Option William Cosgrave INTRODUCTION We hear frequent reference nowadays to a reality described variously as one's fundamental option, basic choice, basic direction, etc. This is a little puzzling to many and so it will, perhaps, be helpful to discuss it in some detail here. This is a relatively new topic in Catholic moral discussion, coming to prominence largely because of the decline of the legal model of morality and the rise of other more personal ones1, while the improved understanding of the human person now available has also been a factor.2 THE PERSON AND HIS MORAL CHOICES Every free human act is performed by a person and, because it is free, it belongs to him in a unique way. In it he expresses and reveals himself. In addition to this, it is true to say that a person is changed by his free acts; by them he becomes a better or worse person, and so one's actions remain in their effects on the person who performs them. Now, the two points just made (that one's actions express what one is as a person and at the same time change one as a person) indicate that there is in the human person a level that is deeper, more stable and more enduring than that of one's individual actions. This is the level of the person as person. Leaving aside here any philo sophical discussion of the human being as person3, we focus on the person as a moral being, i.e., as one who can and does know and choose freely, not so much to do a particular action, but to be a certain kind of person. At this deep level, which is that of the person 1. See my article 'Models of the Christian Moral Life', The Furrow, Sept. 1983, p , especially at p See Bernard H?ring, Free and Faithful in Christ (Slough 1978), vol. 1, p See Timothy O'Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality (New York 1978), p. 57ff. William Cosgrave is a priest of the diocese of Ferns. Address: The Presbytery, Gorey, Co. Wexford.

3 BASIC CHOICE AND BASIC STANCE 509 as person rather than as agent doing this or that specific free action, one is confronted by the basic choice between good and evil, between deciding to be a good, loving other-and God-centred person or its opposite, an unloving, selfish, other-and God-rejecting person. Here one is not choosing to do A or B as he does in specific actions; rather he is choosing to be a basically good or a basically evil person. That there is such a level of reality as this within the person and that there is a real freedom and choice at this level is not something that is immediately obvious; much less is it something we can readily prove. Rather is it something that we must argue to and then try to understand, if we are to account adequately for our experience of ourselves and others as free persons in our daily living4. Experience would seem to indicate that there are many people who are predominantiy good and others who are or at least seem to be predominantly evil. In the case of the former, goodness seems to characterise their actions, attitudes and very being. They not merely have certain virtues and do certain good actions in a regular way but they are in some deep personal manner basically, if not totally, good. The same holds for the basically evil person at the other end of the scale. Now, to say this is to say that at this deepest level of the person, in the core of his being, he has adopted a fundamental moral stance or direction or orientation to reality, to life itself, to people and to God; he has decided to become a fundamentally good person or a fundamentally evil one. We refer to this stance or condition of the person as fundamental or basic, because it exists at the deepest level of the person and affects and shapes his whole being, outlook, manner of living and individual actions, and also because it is quite different from any ordinary daily choice one might make. We speak of it as moral, because the person chooses to adopt it in true knowledge and freedom and remains free to change it. Now, the two central concepts here are one's basic choice and one's basic stance, and in regard to both some further explanatory comments will be helpful. A basic choice (or fundamental option or critical response) is one made at the centre of the person and with non-reflexive knowledge and transcendental or basic freedom and which brings about the establishment of the person's basic moral stance5. A choice which does not do this is by definition not a basic one, however significant it may be in certain ways and circum stances. A basic choice is, then, the cause of one's basic stance, thus giving one a new overall moral orientation or direction in and to life. The basic stance itself, on the other hand, is that state or condition of the person or self in which one exists as a basically good or evil 4. Ib., p The phrases 'non-reflexive knowledge' and 'transcendental or basic freedom' which are used here will be explained below in section (2) (a) and (b).

4 510 THE FURROW person, as predominantly oriented towards goodness or evil. It is brought into existence by and only by a basic choice and conse quently, we may say that this stance has a greater importance than the basic choice, since the latter is only the means to the end of establishing it.6 This basic choice is distinct also from the specific (or categorical) choices we make every day, even if these latter are important and serious. In fact, the basic choice, precisely because it is basic, is not merely not a specific choice, but differs from this not just in degree but in kind. It is of its nature quite distinct from the daily choice we make in choosing, e.g., to go for a walk this evening, to give alms to a poor man now, to change one's job tomorrow, etc. These latter specific choices are made with explicit awareness and knowledge and involve some exercise of the person's freedom of choice; he is quite clear in his mind what he is doing and freely decides to do it. The agent has reflex knowledge and categorical freedom in making such choices, choices which involve selecting between different categories or kinds of options or possibilities that present themselves to the person choosing. These choices are made at a relatively superficial or peripheral level of the person and do not engage him at the deepest level of his being. They focus on a specific object distinct from the person and involve him in a commitment to or a rejection of that object or value. In such choices there is always an object over against the moral subject and in choosing it he must leave aside other possible objects of choice and here and now limit himself to this particular one. Thus, he selects and confines himself in and by his selecting. One's basic choice, on the other hand, is not so limited or focused on a specific object or value and neither is it superficial or peripheral. In making it the person does not have reflex knowledge of it nor does he exercise his categorical freedom of choice. Rather one's basic choice takes place at the core of the person, at his deepest level of being, and it concerns a choice to be and become as a person, rather than to do anything or choose a specific object or value. At this deep level of personal being one's knowledge is and can only be non-reflexive (i.e., not reflected on and, so, obscure) and one's freedom is basic or transcendental (i.e., going beyond all specific objects and categories and choosing to be rather than to do). Hence, in making a basic choice I commit myself as a person, I dispose of myself, as it were, and make myself good or ev? as a person at my deepest level, in my 'heart'.7 6. O'Connell, op. cit., p. 64. See Enda McDonagh, Gift and Call (Dublin 1975), p Ib., p. 61-2; Josef Fuchs, Human Values and Christian Morality (Dublin 1970), p

5 BASIC CHOICE AND BASIC STANCE 511 It will be clear from this discussion that one's basic choice and one's specific choice are very different realities, despite their being both moral choices. Enough has been said to establish the distinction between them and the importance of taking account of both in our moral thinking and living. But it is also important here to advert to two significant links between these two kinds of moral choice. Firstly, once one has made a basic choice and so has established a basic stance, then clearly his subsequent free actions will be profoundly influenced by this and will in large measure spring from that stance. The person's basic stance will express itself in what he does in particular situations, so that his specific choices will be realisations and concr?tisations of his fundamental direction as a person. And conversely, these particular actions will strengthen and deepen the person's basic choice and stance and make them more dominant in and over his life as a moral subject.8 Secondly, we must not think that the basic choice is one that a person makes in addition to his specific non-basic choices. We should not add, as it were, one's specific choices on any particular day, say five, to one's basic choice and so arrive at a total of six moral choices for that day. That would be to put the two kinds of choices on the same level and so reduce the basic choice to a non-basic one. Rather, the situation is that one's basic choice is made in and through one's specific choices and only in this way; but yet they remain distinct kinds of choices. A basic choice does not and cannot exist all by itself; it is not possible for a person to make a basic choice without making any specific choices, as if he could choose to be a particular kind of person morally without doing any specific moral actions at all. On the contrary, a person can make a basic choice, thus choosing to be a particular kind of person, only in and through choosing specific objects and values, i.e., in and through making some non-basic choices. So it is that over a period of time, while one chooses A, B, C, etc., one is also and thereby furthering the process in and by which he makes his basic choice. The two kinds of choice are going on together but are different levels of the person.9 To explain more fully the nature and implications of this basic choice it is necessary to reflect a little more on some of its more significant aspects. ASPECTS OF THE BASIC CHOICE (a) Conscious but not reflexive: Contemporary moralists and theologians generally say that the person is and must be conscious of his basic choice and stance, since, otherwise, they could not be said 8. Eugene J. Cooper, 'The Fundamental Option', Irish Theological Quarterly, October 1972, p. 389 ff. 9. O'Connell, op. cit., p. 64 ff; Fuchs, op. cit., p. 96,

6 512 THE FURROW to be truly free. In other words, the person is aware of and knows about his basic choice and stance. The point is, however, that this awareness and knowledge are different from the awareness and knowledge with which one makes an ordinary specific (or categorical) choice; one's consciousness of them is not the explicit kind which one can reflect on and think about. When a person decides to do a specific action at a particular time and place, he is explicitly aware of this, can stand back from it, as it were, and make it an object of his reflection. He has, as the current phrase puts it, reflexive consciousness of his choice and action. But in the case of a basic choice this is not so. Here one does not and cannot put one's choice under one's mental microscope, as it were, and reflect on what is going on within him. The reason is that such choice and the person's consequent basic stance are too personal; they are too much part of himself as a person, too closely identified with what he is as a person for him to be able to view them as objects. In other words, the person's awareness of his basic choice and stance is not explicit and is not reflected on. They always are and must remain non-reflexive, not objects the person choosing can reflect upon or analyse as he makes his choice. As a result of this, one's basic choice and stance are by their nature somewhat obscure, elusive and difficult to identify. This accounts for the lack of 'proof of their existence, and means that we have to argue to their presence, nature and importance indirectly, i.e., from their consequences and the consequences of denying or over looking them and other elements of our experience. This obscurity and elusiveness also account, in part at least, for the tendency in the past and sometimes at present to neglect giving due attention and significance to one's basic choice and stance as well as to the sort of knowledge and freedom at work in them.10 (b) Engaging one's basic freedom: We have stated that the making of a basic choice involves the exercise of an act of basic freedom as distinct from freedom of choice, the latter being called into play whenever we make a specific or categorical decision or choice. Clearly, then, this distinction between these two types of freedom corresponds to the distinction between the two types of choices involved. Freedom of choice is quite familiar and is the freedom involved in making our ordinary daily free decisions and actions. It is often referred to today as categorical freedom, because it is always concerned with and involved in our choices between different categories or classes of objects and values, e.g., money, health, truth, rights, etc. One's basic freedom, on the other hand, is exercised in the basic choice by and in which one decides to make oneself a good or a bad person. This freedom is also referred to as transcendental freedom, because it transcends or goes beyond all particular

7 BASIC CHOICE AND BASIC STANCE 513 categories or classes or objects or values and is concerned with the person as person.10 (c) A process not an act: The basic choice would seem to be most accurately described as a process rather than an act, a process that over a period of time unfolds and reaches its climax in and through a whole series of individual or specific choices that the person makes. Experience would seem to indicate that the basic choice does not usually take place at a specific moment in a specific choice, but seems rather to evolve, gather force and come to its completion over quite a lengthy space of time. A person does not become fundamentally good or bad either easily or quickly; it takes time and effort and in fact it may be only later that the subject adverts to it and recognises that he has in fact made a basic choice. (d) Predominant but not total: When a person makes a basic choice, he thereby becomes basically or predominantly good or evil as a person. We do not and cannot say, however, that he is totally so. Experience is again our guide in asserting that no-one is completely or irreversibly good or evil. Even the very best people can do some deliberate evil, however insignificant or infrequent and even the very worst can occasionally 'lapse' into goodness by some good deed. Because of this lack of totality in one's basic choice, it remains always possible that a person will reverse his basic choice and stance. Such a reversal, though possible, is, however, unlikely, and the longer the choice and stance remain in existence in the person's life, the more improbable their reversal becomes. Hence, one who has all his life been basically and sincerely good need not be anxious lest he fall into mortal sin at the last minute, while the fundamentally bad sinner need not expect a death-bed conversion, though such is always possible. In short, once a person commits himself with his whole heart to good or evil, he tends to remain so committed and to continue to be what he had earlier decided to make himself. (d) A rare thing: It would seem to follow from the foregoing that the making or reversal of a basic choice is so significant and so trans formative of the person that it will be a rather rare event in one's life. Experience would seem to confirm that morally mature people tend to be stable and firmly established in their overall outlook on and commitment to moral living and do not change fundamentally either quickly or often, if at all. Thus, once one has made a basic choice and established a basic stance as a moral person, one tends to maintain these and only with difficulty, time and effort can or does one alter them. The reason for this is again to be found in the nature of the person and his basic choice and stance? their profoundly personal character makes them this sort of relatively unchanging reality. Basic choices are, thus, unusual and infrequent high points or critical moments in a person's life. 10. See O'Connell, op. cit., p. 60 ff. and Fuchs, op. cit., ch. 4.

8 514 THE FURROW (0 An adult reality: Our description of the basic choice so far would seem to make it necessary to say that only a moral adult can make it. It would seem to be beyond the capacity of children and moral adolescents. In fact, the mark that distinguishes a moral adult from one who is not such is precisely the ability to make a basic moral choice. One who can make such a choice is a moral adult; one who cannot, isn't. However, to answer the question 'who is in fact a moral adult?' is generally impossible or at least very difficult. One could perhaps say that as a general rule it is hard to imagine that anyone under the age of puberty could be classed as or reach the level of a moral adult. And while an adolescent may be morally mature for his age, it will be unlikely, even if not impossible, that he will be morally mature in an adult way. Hence, as a general rule, basic choices will not be a feature of chronological adolescence, though there may be some exceptions and some choices by adolescents might be termed basic at least at an adolescent level.11 (g) Its religious dimension: So far we have spoken only in secular and moral terms. For the Christian, however, the religious dimension of his choices, specific and basic, needs to be adverted to and explained. Assuming a general understanding of the relationship of religion and faith to the moral life,12 we may say that the person's moral choices are not only moral but also and at the same time religious. The Christian by the light of his religious faith recognises that in making each and every choice, he is not merely choosing a particular moral value or disvalue, not merely choosing to love or reject a particular human person or group; he is also and thereby choosing or rejecting God. This is true also of his basic choice. This choice too is by its nature religious and Christian, and so, to choose to be basically for good is to choose to be basically for God, and to choose to be basically evil is to choose to be basically against God. In short, then, in deciding to be a loving person is one's basic choice, one chooses and loves God; in deciding to be a selfish and sinful person, one chooses not to love God.13 Thus, adverting to this religious and explicitly Christian dimension of our moral choices, specific and basic, lends deeper meaning and significance to them, highlighting their full nature and their consequences for this present life and also for that in eternity. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE BASIC CHOICE (a) Basic stance? a state not a process: It is important that, while 11. See George Regan, New Trends in Moral Theology (New York 1971), ch See Enda McDonagh, Gift and Call, ch. 4; Josef Fuchs, Human Values and Christian Morality, ch. 5; Vincent McNamara, The Furrow, Oct. 1977, p ; and Jan. 1984, p ; Charles Curran & Richard McCormick, Readings in Moral Theology (New York 1980), vol See Fuchs, op. cit., ch. 4.

9 BASIC CHOICE AND BASIC STANCE 515 specific free choices are individual acts and the basic choice is a process, the result of this basic choice, namely, one's basic stance or orientation, is neither an act nor a process. It is rather a state or condition of the person into which one comes and in which one remains perhaps for a long time and in many cases for life. This is the state of basic goodness or of basic evil; in traditional language, the state of grace or the state of mortal sinfulness. It is one's basic choice for good and for God which brings one into the state of grace and one's basic choice for evil and against God, i.e., a mortal sin, which establishes one in the state of moral sinfulness. As we said earlier, neither of these states is easily or quickly attained to nor easily or quickly abandoned. It is only the deeply personal and often lengthy process involved in a basic choice which does or can do this. Thus, if one has become established in either of these states, it will be rare and difficult to change this condition of the person, though it always remains possible as long as life lasts. As a consequence mortal sin and mortal sinfulness will be as rare in a person's life as a basic choice and a basic stance for good, and the change from one to the other will be even more rare. (b) What is mortal sin?: One of the points in which the thinking we are expounding differs from the tradition is in its understanding of the nature of mortal sin and what it takes to cause such a sin to come into existence. To elaborate somewhat on what has already been stated, we may describe a mortal sin as a basic choice or fundamental option for evil. This much is generally agreed, but where disagreement tends to appear is when one asks, are individual specific actions sufficient to constitute mortal sin, e.g., is murder or adultery a mortal sin, or at least can they be? The traditional answer is, of course, yes. But in this newer view the matter is not so easily resolved and is in fact quite complex. The first point is that no particular individual or specific choice or action can be identified with a basic choice (for good or evil), since these two choices differ in kind, occur at different levels of the person and hence are essentially different realities. Therefore, no specific immoral choice or action, however serious, can be said to be in itself a mortal sin in our meaning of the term. Having said this, however, another point must be added immediately. While an individual specific choice or act cannot be said to be a mortal sin in itself, it can happen that the person may, on the occasion of performing such a specific act and in and through the choice it involves, commit a mortal sin (in our sense of the phrase). In other words, a mortal sin may accompany or be evoked by a specific or non-basic choice14 but they cannot be identified with each other This seems to be the central point in the Vatican's discussion of this topic in its Declaration on Sexual Ethics (1915), n. 10. However, in asserting that 'it is scarcely correct to say that individual actions are not sufficient to constitute mortal sin' (emphasis added), it seems to go too far and to state the matter inaccurately. 15. See O'Connell, op. cit., p. 71 ff.

10 516 THE FURROW Note that the tradition itself at its best only claimed that acts such murder and adultery could be mortal sins (in the traditional meaning of that term) but sometimes might not be. It was clearly understood that the matter of any specific human act is not identical with the act itself; it is only one element of such an act. Hence one could not conclude that, because the matter is grave, as in these cases, the sin itself is necessarily mortal; it might not be, depending on the agent's understanding, freedom and intention. The really difficult question now is: how often in practice are basic moral choices for evil (that is, mortal sins) made in and through or evoked by particular non-basic choices or acts? For example, if a person commits an act of adultery or murder, will that cause the agent to make or will it evoke from him a basic choice for evil on every occasion he does it?, or frequently?, or only rarely? How about a serious lie or serious theft?, or deliberately missing Mass, etc.?, and whatever one's answer here, how does one know what the answer is or might be? It would seem that there are different views on this question, a fact that, perhaps, reflects the great difficulty there is in giving any convincing answer to it. With experience as our.guide we may venture to say very tentatively that: (a) A lot would seem to depend on the particular matter involved, since there are clearly degrees of seriousness (or gravity) within the category of serious sin; (b) Since the basic choice is normally a process rather than an act, such a choice may sometimes not accompany a particular specific choice or act; and (c) given the deep significance and the consequent infrequency of the basic choice, it may be that these choices do not often accompany our non-basic choices.16 (c) Serious sin: Because of the above understanding of mortal sin, it seems necessary to introduce another category of sin in order to give an adequate account of our experience of sin and sinfulness. This category we designate as serious or grave sin and it refers to specific important or significant choices for evil or acts of sin which a person may make or commit at a particular time and place, e.g., knowingly to steal a large sum of money, deliberately doing someone a grave personal injury,'an act of adultery, etc. (To be fully accurate here we should speak of these acts, not as serious or grave sins but rather as instances of serious or grave matter, which may or may not be serious sins, depending on the agent's understanding, freedom and intention.17) These acts used to be referred to as mortal sins in the tradition, but, as is now clear, this name should be reserved for a basic choice for evil and that only. The label 'serious sin' seems, 16. Ib., p. 71 f?.; p. 80 ff. 17. Ib., p. 80.

11 BASIC CHOICE AND BASIC STANCE 517 therefore, appropriate and necessary to describe important non-basic choices for evil, and we may add that is is to this kind of sin that the obligation to go to confession, if one commits it, now attaches. Venial sins remain as in the? tradition insignificant or minor choices for evil made in specific situations.18 (d) Basic choice and one's eternal destiny: Traditional teaching states that one who commits a mortal sin and so enters the state of mortal sinfulness deserves thereby to lose heaven and to go to hell; and if one dies in this state, he will in fact enter the condition or state which we refer to as hell. In our newer understanding of the matter all this remains true and so, as we saw, the only difference between the two presentations in this area concerns what constitutes mortal sin. Now, one consequence of this difference is that there is a divergence of view between the two approaches over what one needs to do to gain heaven or lose it. The tradition says that the single act called an important good act, which puts one in the state of grace, suffices to merit heaven, and the single act called mortal sin is enough to lose it. The new thinking, however, holds that such acts in and by themselves are not sufficient for this purpose and that, therefore a serious sin in the newer view (=what the tradition calls mortal sin) does not in and by itself entail the loss of the state of grace and so does not merit hell. Only a basic choice for evil (=a mortal sin in the new approach) does this, while only a basic choice for good merits heaven. From this it follows that in the tradition there are many more acts meriting hell than there are in the new thinking of today, i.e., many more acts that are or could be mortal sins, deserving eternal damnation. As at least a partial result of this the Christian life tended to become for many an anxiety-laden journey with the prospect of mortal sin and hell never far away. Today such fears have significantly decreased and, as we have seen, contemporary theology supplies the thinking that justifies that decrease. Only a basic choice resulting in a basic stance for evil merits hell, as we see it, and this is rare and difficult and is not something that one can stumble or slip into almost by accident, nor is it a reality that can come about overnight, as it were. Consequently, the Christian need not be fearful of such eventualities but can be at peace in the knowledge of what a mortal sin really is, and that, if he is genuinely trying to live? good life, such sin is a rather remote possibility for him. There is no cause for complacency, however, and it will be salutary to remember that, while mortal sin is rare and difficult, it is also very rare and difficult 18. Helpful discussions of the fundamental option, mortal sin, etc., can be found in the following: /. Schoonenberg, Man and Sin (London 1965), p. 25ff.; S. Fagan, Has Sin Changed? (Dublin 1978), p. 78ff.; B. H?ring, Free and Faithful in Christ (Slough 1978), vol. 1, p. 21 Iff.; J. Gaffney, Sin Reconsidered(New York 1983), ch. 8; C. Byrne, 'New Thinking on Sin', Intercom (Dublin), Dec. '83/Jan. 1984, p. 4ff.

12 518 THE FURROW for one who has committed it, and so got into the state of mortal sinfulness, to get out of it again. Hence it is more urgent than ever to avoid it. CONCLUSION The thinking we have been expounding has implications for Christian living generally, a few of which will be mentioned here. Firstly, it views human freedom dynamically, seeing it as a task more than a once-for-all gift. It highlights the fact that the Christian life is essentially a growth process and not a 'patchwork of disengaged acts' and that, consequently, conversion from sin and continual growth in faith and love must be central for all of us. In this context confession tends to be understood as a relatively infrequent high point in the whole process of conversion, where quality is primary and the sacrament is seen as a celebration of the (grave) sinner's reconciliation with the Church and with God. Finally, this kind of thinking, because of its personalist and relational outlook and emphasis, will be unlikely to appeal to those still maintaining the legal view of the Christian moral life. Only those using the more recent non legal models will find it acceptable and illuminating. Accommodation TWO MODERN COTTAGES Sleep twelve. Very private location, two and a half miles from Castletownbere. Registered Irish Tourist Board. Central heating. Fully carpeted. Telephone, television, free fuel. Special terms for Religious and Voluntary Organisations. VACANT: 1 September. Phone , office hours.