Some Iterations on The Subject s Perspective Objection to Externalism By Hunter Gentry
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1 Gentry 1 Some Iterations on The Subject s Perspective Objection to Externalism By Hunter Gentry The subject s perspective objection to externalism is one of the most widely discussed objections in the contemporary analytic epistemology literature. Let s take a look at the case that started it all: Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of a such a cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the president is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in 1 which it is completely reliable. Famous Norman appears in Laurence BonJour s article entitled Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge (1980) and was meant to be a counterexample to reliabilism. BonJour asks if Norman is epistemically justified in believing that the president is in New York. On reliabilist accounts that stipulate that a belief that P is justified for S if it is the result of a reliable cognitive process, it seems so. But BonJour asks further, is it not the case that Norman is subjectively irrational and thereby not epistemically justified? Indeed, the case of Norman, according to BonJour, suggests three things: (1) Justification requires evidence, (2) Reliability is not sufficient for justification, (3) And evidence makes it the case that P s truth (if it is true), is not an accident from S s subjective perspective. 1 BonJour in Kornblith p.21
2 Gentry 2 All this being said, it is clear that at least evidential justifiers are required for a belief s being justified. BonJour ultimately uses Norman to defend coherentism, thus he thinks that only beliefs can serve as evidential justifiers i.e. coherence is internally accessible. (1990): Let s take a look at another case from Keith Lehrer in his book: Theory of Knowledge Suppose a person, whom we shall name Mr. Truetemp, undergoes brain surgery by an experimental surgeon who invents a small device which is both a very accurate thermometer and a computational device capable of generating thoughts. The device, call it a tempucomp, is implanted in Truetmp s head so that the very tip of the device, no larger than the head of a pin, sits unnoticed on his scalp and acts as a sensor to transmit information about the temperature to the computational system in his brain. This device, in turn, sends a message to his brain causing him to think of the temperature recorded by the external sensor. Assume that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so his thoughts are correct temperature thoughts. All told, this is a reliable belief forming process. Now imagine, finally, that he has no idea that the tempucomp has been inserted in his brain, is only slightly puzzled about why he thinks so obsessively about the temperature, but never checks a thermometer to determine whether these thoughts about the temperature are correct. He accepts them unreflectively, another effect of the tempucomp. Thus, he 2 thinks and accepts that the temperature is 104 degrees. Lehrer thinks that Truetemp is certainly not justified in believing that the temperature is 104. Why? Because he has no idea whether he or his thoughts are reliable indicators of the temperature. Moreover, he accepts blindly the belief that it is 104 degrees, that is, he has no evidence for that claim. This sounds eerily familiar to Norman. Neither Norman nor Truetemp 2 Lehrer pg.163 4
3 Gentry 3 have evidence for their beliefs. That being said, although the belief is correct, they do not 3 believe or have some evidence to indicate that it is correct. This suggest that it would be an accident from their perspective that their beliefs are true. Thus, they are not justified. There are a multiplicity of cases to be made here that parallel the suggestions by BonJour and Lehrer, but the motivator for thinking these cases have weight is the intuition that we need evidence to be justified, something internally accessible to the subject such that it is not an accident from her perspective that the belief be true (if it s true). I want to take pause here to make a short stipulation between externalism and internalism. One thing the subject s perspective objection is not doing is giving a knock down objection to externalism as a whole. Alvin Goldman said recently in a commentary on Jack Lyons (2008): [I]t s a plain mistake to suppose that reliabilism rejects all internal justifiers. Here is the correct way to view the matter. According to the canonical way of distinguishing internalist from externalist theories, what makes a theory internalist is it s claim (explicit or implicit) that all justifiers (justifying factors) are internal. What makes a theory externalist is its denial of internalism. In other words, and externalist theory is one that implies that not all justifiers are internal, i.e., that some justifiers (or justifying factors) are 4 external. This is an important point because in order for the subject s perspective objection to be successful at objecting to an externalist theory, the externalist theory in question, must deny all internal justifiers or (depending on the way the subject s perspective objection is used) deny the requirement of evidential justifiers. It s clear that some externalist theories do not refute all 3 In the contemporary literature, this condition is expressed in many ways, i.e., believe, believe with justification, identify, indicate, etc. 4 Goldman pg.462
4 Gentry 4 internal justifiers and there is at least one that does not refute evidential justifiers (I think Comesaña s evidential reliabilism might qualify). Bergmann s Dilemma for Internalism Bergmann s dilemma is aimed at Access Internalisms (AI), that is, justification theories that require awareness of some justification contributors. Bergmann sketches out the awareness as follows: AR: S s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something X that contributes to the justification of B e.g., evidence for B, or a truth indicator for B, or the satisfaction of some necessary condition of B s justification and (ii) S is aware (or potentially aware) of 5 X. 6 There can be two types of awareness required of S: strong or weak. Strong awareness entails the following: Actual doxastic strong awareness requirement (ADSAR): S s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something X that contributes to the justification of B and (ii) S is actually aware of X in such a way that S justifiably believes that X is in some way relevant to the 7 appropriateness of holding B. And weak awareness does not require of S that he conceive of the justification contributor (the object of awareness) as in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B. Given these terms, we can construct the dilemma: Dilemma for Internalism: 5 Bergmann Pg. 9 6 Strong and weak can be explicated further in terms of actual versus potential and non doxastic versus doxastic, but for our purposes, we will take actual doxastic strong awareness as representative of the general view. 7 pg.17
5 Gentry 5 (1) An essential feature of internalism is that it makes a subject s actual or potential awareness of some justification contributor a necessary condition for the justification of any belief held by that subject. (2) The awareness required by internalism is either strong or weak. (3) If the awareness is strong, then internalism has vicious regress problems leading to radical skepticism. (4) If the awareness is weak, then internalism is vulnerable to the SPO, in which case internalism loses its main motivation for imposing the awareness requirement. (5) If internalism either leads to radical skepticism or loses its main motivation for imposing awareness, then we should not endorse internalism. 8 (6) Therefore, we should not endorse internalism. How is it that strong awareness leads to vicious regress? Imagine S s belief B is justified for her. Under ADSAR, S must hold a meta belief B1 such that S believes that her justification contributor X is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B. But if that s true, then B1 must be justified by another meta belief B2 such that S believes her justification contributor X1 is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B1. And the regress is on! What about this SPO business for internalism? I thought SPO was an objection to externalism. It is, remember, to avoid the SPO, a theory of justification must make it the case that whenever S is justified in believing B, it must not be an accident from S s perspective that it be true (if it is true). But under weak awareness, according to Bergmann, merely having evidence is not sufficient to prevent accidentality about the truth from S s perspective about belief B. Bergmann describes the SPO as follows: 8 Bergmann Pg. 13 4
6 Gentry 6 SPO: If the subject holding a belief is not aware of what that belief has going for it, then she is not aware of how its status is any different from a stray hunch or arbitrary conviction. From that, we may conclude that from her perspective it is an accident that 9 her belief is true. And that implies that it is not a justified belief. Bergmann thinks that the difference between it being an accident from S s perspective and it not being an accident, makes a difference to the justification. So insofar as it is not an accident, S is justified. One might object: Bergmann, you're an externalist though, so if the SPO is a problem for the internalist, it s definitely a problem for you. I have sympathy for this objection and although I can t address it here, I will say that Bergmann ultimately thinks that the intuitions behind the SPO are too demanding and thus should be rejected. I disagree with him, but that discussion will take place elsewhere. Greco on the SPO John Greco, in his book Putting Skeptics in Their Place (2000), develops a view called agent reliabilism. As I understand it, Greco is walking a tightrope between externalism and internalism to appeal to the intuitions of both. Here, we will focus on his treatment of, what he calls, subjective justification because he develops this account following considerations from good ol Norman the clairvoyant. Let s get Greco s agent reliabilism out on paper before discussing subjective justification. Agent Reliabilism: S knows P only if: (i) P is true, (ii) S s believing P is the result of dispositions that S manifests when S is thinking conscientiously and (iii) such 10 dispositions make S reliable in the present conditions, with respect to P. 9 Bergmann Pg Greco pg.218 Italics mine.
7 Gentry 7 Notice first that this is a theory of knowledge, not justification; but no worries, because we ll see that the only condition that makes a difference as to whether S is justified or knows is clause (i). So Greco thinks that BonJour s Norman case has some real force behind it. He wants a theory of justification that accounts for the intuitions behind the case. He states: [e]vidential grounds in general, seem capable of generating knowledge only if the believer has some insight into the reliability of those grounds. The novice mathematician who does not see that her axioms entail her theorem does not 11 know the theorem on that account. It s clear that Greco is concerned about sensitivity to reliability and evidence here. And it seems that he takes the internalist intuition seriously, let s see how he accounts for it. convenience: Greco begins by laying out BonJour s Norman case. Let s have it in front of us again for Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of a such a cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the president is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in 12 which it is completely reliable. 11 Greco Pg BonJour in Kornblith p.21
8 Gentry 8 Greco looks at three different ways of interpreting Norman. All three interpretations involve the notion of transparent knowledge, that is, no one knows unless he knows that he knows, or at 13 least can know that he knows. Let s look at each interpretation in some detail. (1) S knows P only if S knows that she knows P. Greco thinks this interpretation is completely misguided. Firstly, why think agent reliabilism precludes one from knowing that he knows? Presumably, he says, one can come to know that he knows in the same way that he comes to know anything else via reliable cognitive faculties. Secondly, this principle leads to vicious regress. If S, to know P, must know that he knows P, then he must know that he knows that he knows P, and so on. Why stop at second order knowledge? It seems that a view like (1) requires more besides. (2) S knows P only if S knows that P was reliably formed. Similar to Bergmann s dilemma, Greco thinks that this also leads to vicious regress. Imagine S knows P. Well for that to be true, S must also know that P was reliably formed, call this knowledge P1. But for S to know P1, he must know that P1 was reliably formed, call this P2. And the show goes on. (3) Transparency Principle (TP): for S to know P, S must know that the conditions of knowledge have been met. Greco shows that this principle is false and incoherent. Imagine S knows P. For that to be true, S must know that she has been met the sufficient conditions for knowledge: X,Y, and Z. But if TP is endorsed, then X, Y, and Z are not sufficient. Indeed, X, Y, Z, and TP would be sufficient. But then to know X, Y, Z and TP are met, S would have to know that X, Y, Z, and TP are met again and again, and again. This principle reeks of vicious regress. So what is right about Norman, according to Greco? He thinks that BonJour got right that we need sensitivity to our 13 Greco Pg.182
9 Gentry 9 own reliability. This is something that is lurking behind the three interpretations above as it is a weaker claim. Sensitivity to reliability is weaker than knowledge of one s reliability. Greco considers Sosa s view on Norman next. Ernest Sosa makes a distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge requires that S have a true grasp of the fact that one s belief is grounded in a reliable cognitive faculty. Ultimately, Sosa concedes that Norman has animal knowledge, but lacks reflective knowledge because he does not see himself as believing from a reliable faculty of clairvoyance. I think it is easy to see that what Sosa is getting at here is that a lack of sensitivity to reliability makes it the case that from S s own perspective, it is accident that the belief be true. But Sosa is not talking about internalist awareness requirements like we saw above. Indeed, it is unclear exactly what he has in mind, but Greco thinks it has something to do with perspectives as dispositional beliefs. However, in responding to an objection, Greco notices that Sosa switches from talking about dispositional beliefs to dispositions to believe. This is where Greco latches on. He thinks that we should think about sensitivity to reliability in terms of dispositions to believe. Greco thinks that it is psychologically implausible that we have the kind of perspectives Sosa has in mind (dispositional beliefs, especially those concerning the reliability of our faculties). Finally, we have come to Greco s conception of subjective justification: SJ: A belief P is subjectively justified for S iff S s believing P is grounded in the cognitive 14 dispositions that S manifests when thinking conscientiously. When Greco uses conscientiously, he means when S is trying to believe what is true, that is the kind of default mode humans are normally in. In this sense, his SJ is very similar to proper 15 functionalism. 14 Greco Pg Proper functionalism, at least in some cases, is the idea that properly functioning faculties are generally reliable. Likewise, thinking conscientiously, is supposed to imply reliability.
10 Gentry 10 So how does this account for Norman s case? Agent reliabilism states that: Agent Reliabilism: S knows P only if: (i) P is true, (ii) S s believing P is the result of dispositions that S manifests when S is thinking conscientiously and (iii) such 16 dispositions make S reliable in the present conditions, with respect to P. Is Norman justified? It s not clear. I take it Greco maintains that Norman is not thinking conscientiously. Or that Norman hasn t developed the sort of dispositions, Greco has in mind, while using his clairvoyance. But I m not sure that point matters; remember that the case stipulates that Norman is a completely reliable clairvoyant. And furthermore, that his belief was reliably formed. So it must be the case that, on Greco s view, Norman is not thinking conscientiously. While it s not clear whether that is true or not, I don t have the room to pursue it here. Steup on Bergmann s Weak Awareness Horn of the Internalist Dilemma Mattias Steup, in his essay Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism s Dilemma?, takes on Bergmann s weak awareness horn of the dilemma by developing a weak internalism that he thinks will overcome the dilemma. Steup define s internalism as a constraint on the kinds of items that qualify as sources of justification. He thinks of constraints as reasons and thus comes to the following account of justification, we ll call it reasons internalism (RI): RI: believing P while having undefeated reason(s) for P is necessary and sufficient for being justified in believing P. Reasons can be a great many things, but Steup gives us a nice list of what he has in mind, namely, beliefs, rational intuitions, memory impressions, introspective states, and perceptual experiences. Steup is very explicit that these reasons are internalist notions. Hence, a belief s having its origin in an external condition e.g., reliable process, is not sufficient for justification. 16 Greco pg.218
11 Gentry 11 Let s turn back to Bergmann s construal of the weak awareness horn. Remember that Bergmann thinks of weak awareness as not requiring that S have a justified meta belief B1 to the extent that some source of justification X for belief B is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B. Given this, he thinks that weak awareness falls victim to the SPO, which is the main motivator for requiring awareness, and by extension, the main motivator for internalism. Thus, we should not endorse internalism. Bergmann thinks of the SPO as follows: SPO: If the subject holding a belief is not aware of what that belief has going for it, then she is not aware of how its status is any different from a stray hunch or arbitrary conviction. From that, we may conclude that from her perspective it is an accident that 17 her belief is true. And that implies that it is not a justified belief. It is also important to remember that a theory that avoids the SPO is a theory that does not allow for accidentally true beliefs from the subject s own perspective. Thus, the condition that Steup s weak internalism places on a belief s justification S s having a reason for the belief is not sufficient to protect against the SPO. That is to say that S s true belief, regardless of S s reasons, is not enough to rule out non accidentality from S s subjective perspective. But Steup thinks that he can add some bells and whistles to his theory to account for this, without falling victim to either horn of the dilemma. Before I unpackage Steup s response, let s consider phenomenal conservatism briefly, as Steup uses the notion of seemings in his theory. It s important to get clear about what he means by this. Many philosophers who invoke seemings use the term in varying technical ways, but Steup is using it fairly generally. Phenomenal conservatism (PC) states that if it seems to S that P, then S is therby prima facie justified in believing that P. But seems here is really just appearances or looks. Steup thinks that whatever support a subject has for her beliefs arises 17 Bergmann Pg.12
12 Gentry from her seemings a subject s reasons = a subject s seemings. So this account varies minimally from RI. The only difference is the utilization of seemings instead of reasons, but as we just noted, under PC, a subject s seemings are the subject s reasons. It is also the case that PC does not require a justified meta belief of the sort: my seeming that P is a reason for believing P. So PC is a weak internalist theory. Indeed, PC stipulates that seemings are innocent until proven guilty, that is, we take their reliability for granted. Given this, Steup rejects PC and thinks it does happen to fall victim to Bergmann s dilemma. So what is Steup s position? Steup adds a memory condition to PC. He thinks that memory plays an important role to guard against non accidentality and moreover, attain sensitivity to reliability. Steup is thinking of memory of a subject s seemings in a kind of track record form. If S reflects, in the past, almost all my beliefs based on seemings of the relevant kind have been true, so probably, my current seeming that P of the corresponding kind is true. So Steup concludes that this reflective process supplies S with additional seemings (higher order) that justify the attribution of reliability to S s lower level seemings. It is hard to see how this is not a variant on strong awareness though. Steup thinks of the higher order seemings as memory data that do the justifying of the lower level seemings. But this just sounds like a round a bout way of talking about justified meta beliefs. It also leaves open the question of: does the memory data need to be justified? Afterall, the memory data are seemings of a higher order, so don t they need the justified attribution of reliability? I digress, for this is nearly what Steup anticipates. He imagines that Bergmann objects in the following way: either require that S conceive of the memory data as a justification contributor or don t, either way, the dilemma can be reapplied. Steup then replies by denying the second horn when the dilemma is reapplied. He claims that merely pointing to the track record memory 18 Steup in Tucker Pg.140
13 Gentry 13 data is sufficient to avoid non accidentality, and that is all that he needed to show. I find this answer very unsatisfying. It seems ad hoc first of all, but secondly, if the dilemma can be reapplied and when it is, Steup just denies the second horn of the dilemma, I wonder why he didn't just deny it from the get go. It seems to me that the memory data business did nothing more to countenance the intuitions behind the SPO than does PC by itself. If seemings, under PC, are innocent until proven guilty, and Steup rejects this, why think that higher order seemings (memory data) are innocent? Lyons and Basicality I will conclude this article with Jack Lyons dealings with Norman and Truetemp from his book, Perception and Basic Beliefs. Lyons conceives of the Norman and Truetemp cases to be suggesting a very different problem. He calls this problem the delineation problem and it thus: which beliefs are basic? That is, which beliefs do not depend upon other beliefs for their justification? In other words, what counts as a non inferential belief? So Lyons wants to argue that Norman type cases do not imply problems of grounds, but rather the delineation problem. To be sure, Norman type cases do not establish, what Lyons calls, the grounds principle (GP). 19 GP: all justified beliefs have grounds, that is, evidential justifiers. He wants to put forward a theory of justification that clearly defines which beliefs are basic and which are not and how each are justified. So Lyons endorses, what he calls, inferentialism reliabilism (IR). IR: (i) a basic belief is prima facie justified iff it is the result of a reliable cognitive process and (ii) a non basic belief is prima facie justified iff it is the result of a 19 Lyons Pg. 29
14 Gentry 14 reliable inferential process, the inputs of which are themselves (prima facie) 20 justified. Lyons takes Norman and Truetemp cases to be suggesting that they have basic beliefs, but the intuition is that neither of them are justified because they do not have evidence for their beliefs. Or, on some interpretations (Bergmann), they don t satisfy the awareness requirement. Lyons eschews these suggestions. He says, [i]t does not serve the more ambitious aims of 21 establishing the grounds principle and certainly not a general meta belief requirement. So Lyons IR overcomes the Norman and Truetemp cases by denying that their beliefs are basic. How? It seems that Lyons is just side stepping the issue here. And furthermore, how is it that they are not basic? Lyons endorses a perceptual system theory of perceptual belief (PST); that is, a belief is a perceptual belief iff it is the output of a perceptual system. But how is this supposed to help us? Norman has the cognitive power of clairvoyance and moreover, it is reliable. Clairvoyance, according to Lyons, has to be interpreted as perceptual. It certainly is not an intuition or memorial faculty. But what is a perceptual system? And if clairvoyance is supposed to be interpreted as perceptual, does it meet the conditions? Lyons gives four conditions for a perceptual, what he calls, primal system. Perceptual Primal System (PPS): (a) Its lowest level representational inputs are the results of energy transduction across sense organs, (b) None of the inputs to any of its subsystems are under the voluntary control of the larger organism, (c) It s inferentially opaque (i.e., its doxastic outputs are cognitively spontaneous in BonJour s [1985] sense), and 20 Pg Lyons Pg.114
15 Gentry 15 (d) The system has developed as the result of the interplay of learning and innate 22 constraints. Lyons endorses a modular theory of the brain (in the Fodorian sense), that is, specific parts of the brain are modules that perform certain functions independently. So I take it, that Lyons views a perceptual system as a module in the brain. So the first two conditions are supposed to stipulate that the perceptual system takes its inputs from the world and not from the individual organism. Condition (d) is meant to account for a faculty that comes into being overnight or some such case, it would not satisfy the etiological constraint. You can see from this that we need more information about Norman s clairvoyance: when did he come to have this faculty? If he has had it since he was born, then maybe he satisfies (d). It s not clear at all how he can satisfy (a). What kind(s) of energy are we even talking about in reference to clairvoyance? Lyons asks Was Norman born with some funnel shaped organ on his head that 23 collects C waves? Does he have some special brain structure that the rest of us lack?. While I think these are worthwhile questions to ask, the bottom line is that our intuitions become too hazy and filling in the blanks in various ways just seems ad hoc. Lyons wants to say that Norman and Trutemp s faculties do not satisfy the conditions for a perceptual system. So this means that if we are to interpret these cases as genuine cases of basic belief and the conditions that Lyons lays out for a perceptual system are true and finally, that perceptual systems, of the kind he has in mind, produce basic beliefs, then Norman and Truetemp s beliefs are non basic. Here is Lyons explicit account of basicality: 22 Pg Lyons Pg.118
16 Gentry 16 B: A belief B is basic for S at t iff B is the output at t of one of S s cognitive systems that (i) is inferentially opaque, (ii) has resulted from learning and innate constraints, and (ii) 24 does not base B on any doxastic outputs at t. The first two clauses we ve seen before in his conditions of a perceptual primal system. But what about (iii)? Well presumably doxastic grounds would preclude the belief B s being basic. It would preclude non inferential belief. Lyons sums up what I have stated thus far: The clairvoyance type cases that need to be taken most seriously all suppose that the agent has neither defeaters nor independent evidence for the belief in question but that the belief was reliably produced. In such conditions, a belief will be justified if and only if it is basic. I claim that a belief is basic only if it is the non inferential output of a primal system. Norman s clairvoyance belief...is intuitively not the result of a system that satisfies the etiological constraint on primal systems. Truetemp s belief is, ex hypothesi, not the result of such a system. Though the relevant systems are non inferential, they 25 are not primal, and this is why their outputs are non basic. Concluding Remarks This article aimed to compile some (definitely not all) of the iterations on Norman and Truetemp cases. We found many interpretations overlapped and a few that deviated. Bergmann interpreted the cases to suggest an awareness requirement on justification and used that to push one horn of a dilemma against internalist views. We saw that Steup tried to respond to this dilemma and it s not clear that he succeeded. We saw that Greco took the idea of subjective justification and used that to synthesize an externalist and internalist position, agent reliabilism. We also saw the cases that started it all, Norman and Truetemp. And finally, we saw a very different approach to the cases by Lyons who dazzled us with his cognitive scientific 24 Pg Lyons Pg.144
17 Gentry 17 epistemology that allegedly solves the delineation problem, which he thinks is at the heart of Norman and Truetemp. Works Cited Bergmann, Michael. Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism.
18 Gentry 18 Oxford: Clarendon, BonJour, Laurence. "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge." Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. By Hilary Kornblith. Malden, MA: Blackwell, Goldman, Alvin I. "Commentary on Jack Lyons s Perception and Basic Beliefs." Philosophical Studies (2010): Greco, John. Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, Lehrer, Keith. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview, Lyons, Jack C. Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. Oxford: Oxford UP, Steup, Mattias. "Can Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism's Dilemma?" in Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. By Chris Tucker, 2013.
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