Vienna, February 10, 1937

Transcription

1 Vienna, February 10, 1937 ""Bear Gelst: Buddie was planning to be in Berlin about this time, and I wonder whether he has arrived. He will have a difficult and a long task ahead of him there, and I am sure you will help him in every possible way. I would be very frank with him, and he is a fine fellow of good sound judgment. X have not heard from him for the last few weeks. We have a courier leaving for Paris the end of the week. Major Riley, who has been doing courier work, is to be attached to Vienna and Budapest as Military Attache when my present Attache t Colonel Shallenberger, goes home in June or July, I think he is a good man and will be quite acceptable. I will use this courier to send you just a brief word. Unfortunately X cannot send you any copies of recent letters to Judge Moore or to the Secretary, as I have none. Judge Moore was unusually appreciative of my letters during the Secretary's absence, and I am glad to know that some of the more important ones recently have had the President's personal attention. I think this is particularly important, as some major decisions with respect to policy are being made, and I am strong in my conviction that this is the decisive year. M^ojron by any chance seen Hamilton Fish Armstrong's book "We or They"? If not, you must by all means get it, as you can read it in an hour or two and it is one of the best things that has been written during the last few years. The situation here remains satisfactory. The Chancellor was said to have planned marrying a Countess Fugger, and there is no reason why a man Raymond Gelst, Esquire, American Consul, Berlin.

2 2. of forty should not marry after two years widowhood, but f»r various reasons it would have been politically unwise for him to do so, and I am in a position to inform you that while the Chancellor may have very much wished to consummate such a marriage, he has definitely put it out of his mind. He is really a patriot and lis one idea is to maintain Austrian independence. The situation in Austria remains comparatively quiet, although the pot is boiling more than usual, Neurath is coming here, as you know, on February 22 and 23, but I do not think it will mean anything more than a return of Schmidt*s visit* He may come with certain directions, but he w^ll not be able to accomplish anything, because as things are now Vienna is looking much more towards the South and towards the West than towards North. The sterile results of the recent Berlin-Vienna trade negotiations should be sufficient to show how that position stands. The Austrians want good relations with everyone, but they are not going to givsl way anywhere for the present. I think it is very important to bear in mind that although the parallelism of actloa^hetv/een Berlin and Rome continues, it is not me^rly so strong, and actions count more than worcis. ueustadter- StGrmer, the Minister of Public Security here, who used to be loud aga: t the Nazis, putcjxlmsolf at the head of some of the new organizations which,, are really pro-llazi and as a result will havfejto "got out of the Government, but his going wjllivbevdelayed until after the Neurath visit. It is interesting that the Italians here are quite in favor*of letting Meust^dter-Stftmer go. During the recent trade negotiations the Italians gave the Austrians full backing in not giving way to the German demands*,, I which were so heavy. The Italians are building up their fences throughout Southeastern.Europe and have bettered their relations with Hungary, Yugoslavia and Turkey. This does not mean that Italian influence is necessarily greater in the long run, but it does weal:en the German influence and strengthens all these countries individually, which is 4\

3 -2", 5 the most important feature. The Italians do not want war under any circumstances, and the parallelism.between Berlin and Rome was carrying then much too far in that direction. These facts nean much more than words and protestations ia Berlin and Rome. The legitimist movement here is coming to the fore, not because anyone particularly wants restoration, but because it may be the solution. The Chancellor is concerned, for he sees no one to take his place with safety when and if he may be for some.reason forced out. To him restoration is the solution, and for this reason the legitimist movement is being groomed and moulded into one which can be acceptable. There is a lot of careful publicity here now to the effect that restoration will moan only restoration in Austria and in no sense revisionism, etc; that it will mean a monarchy adapted to modern times with, all old pretensions and panoply gone. It is being very carefully and adroitly done. Internally I believe monarchy could be brought back tomorrow without a ripple and perhaps with a certain relief even to those who have many reserves regarding monarchy. Externally, Hungary still would prefer not to see restoration, but would not oppose It. Czechoslovakia would not oppose it. Rumania would still prefer not to see it, but French and Italian influence are being exerted there, and Rumania would certainly not take any hostile action* Yugoslavia Is still strongly against, but certainly would no longer "march", as it used to say it would. Italian and English influence are exercising a restraining effect there, Italy considers restoration purely an internal matter in Austria, and if it can be carried through without external difficulties, Mussolini is in favor of it. England and France prefer to remain neutral, but in fact see in restoration a solution and greater stability, Germany remains the principal obstacle, but I doubt whether she would march, as Goring said to Schmidt In Berlin recently that she would In case of restoration. My own feeling is that there will not be Reiehswehr support of a march againa% Austria on account of restoration, just as there was none for the direct sending of troops to Spain

4 ai«in December* I am merely telling you about this restoration business not because it is in the offing, but because it is certainly more in the fore than it has been for several years, and it is an eventuality that has to be definitely reckoned with. The speech of Hitler in my opinion did not change anything nor give up anything and indicated that Germany holds to every single item of her program, even though she tries to soft-pedal it* The assurance that there are to be no more surprises is no assurance to me. It simply means in fact that Germany knows she cannot take any action outside of her frontiers now without disaster, and it is up to the rest of the world to see that she will be increasingly less able to give us surprises. It is no time for any change of policy by England or France or by us. I have done my best to see that this is understood at home. I think we understand, for you will notice that the talk of neutrality legislation has gone down and other things are being pushed to the fore. We must not tie our hand3 for an uncertain future and we must not discourage the democracies in Europe by saying that we will starve them against an autocratic oppressor* I think the speech which Colonel Thomas recently made in Berlin warning Europe of what the next war will be like was a fitting climax to Hitler's January'30 speech. I wonder whether someone in Berlin in adequately reporting on the significance and all the implications of the establishment of the Auslandsdeutsche Bureau in the Foreign Office. It is one of the most brazen pieces of effrontery that I have ever heard of, and it is too bad that too many people fail to understand Just whah these things mean* It means, in fact, the establishment of direct control of Nazi cells by the German Government and Foreign Offioe in every country in the v/orld in a systematic and more dangerous manner than anything which Sommunistic Russia ever attempted through the Komintern, and yet Mr* Goebbels shrieks in Hamburg and probably will again on the 12th that Germany is saving Europe and the world from Communism. How long, oh how long must be put up with thlst

5 It all depends, I think, on how ::^^ ^t-ws^ this cold offensive which Germany willfiiajsathis year. She is putting on a bold front to the v/orld as though all were well and blooming In Germany, when they know how bad it is. They are after limited agreements and bilateral pacts that will give then a free hand. I do not believe they will succeed. Friends of mine in London told me that Hitler would have a last chance to come across is this last speech and that if he did not, there would be no more wavering la British policy. As he did not come across, I think in spite of surface appearances we are going to see England firm and fixed and concentrated on armament. This talk about Eden, I think, is all rot, for as you know, he is not a well man and has to take a reat from time to ti in order to keep going* Ribbentrop will get cold comfort from Halifax, and the only thing Ribbentrop will accomplish will be to show the English Just how right Eden and the Foreign Office are. I have no personal news from home. Did I send you a copy of the editorial of Yillard on "The Sale of Ambassadorships"? If not, let me know and I will send you one. It Is strange that one hears nothing concerning the probable changes in our representation abroad, although it must be something which must be very actively discussed. I hope you have recovered from all inconvenience from your accident and that your sister is getting on well. I shall be glad to hear from you at a convenient opportunity. Cordially yours, George S. Kessersmith GSK/LGW