6AANA016 Indian Philosophy: The Orthodox Schools Syllabus Academic year 2012/3

Transcription

1 School of Arts & Humanities Department of Philosophy 6AANA016 Indian Philosophy: The Orthodox Schools Syllabus Academic year 2012/3 Basic information Credits: 15 Module Tutor: Dr Will Rasmussen Office: PB/A702 Consultation time: Wednesdays, 12:00-13:00 Semester: First Lecture time and venue*: Thursdays, 10:00 12:00 *Please note that tutorial times and venues will be organised independently with your teaching tutor Module description (plus aims and objectives) This module (along with 6AANB017 Indian Philosophy: The Heterodox Schools) is intended for students who wish to gain an introduction to Indian philosophy that looks carefully at the high standard of logic, epistemology, metaphysics and linguistics that grounded the various philosophical systems. The schools most fully examined are Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, however the positions and arguments of other schools are often adduced to enhance this study. The examination of these schools makes use of translations of the key primary texts and focuses upon the vigorous debate over conceptual analysis and argumentative strategies by which the schools presented their philosophical positions, defended them against attacks by other schools, and mounted in turn their own attacks. Studying Indian philosophy in this way demonstrates both the similarities and the philosophically important differences in the way the main issues of philosophy have been addressed in India and in the West. Assessment methods and deadlines 1

2 Formative assessment: 1 x 2,000 word essay, due on the last day of term Summative assessment: 1 x 4,000 word essay, due at on Friday 17 May 2013 NB Please note that for semester I- only Study Abroad students, assessment requirements may vary. In particular, the summative essay may be required to be submitted by the end of term (date TBC). Outline of lecture topics (plus suggested readings) Page 2

3 For an excellent survey of Indian Philosophy prior to (and during) the course, see Hiriyanna, M. (2000) Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass. The course book is Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, referred to below as SB*. Week One<DATE>: << Sāṅkhya. Dualism and the Inherence of the Effect in its Cause>> Sāṇkhyakārikā 1-16 in SB*: & Bhagavadgītā II & XIII in SB*: & Padārthadharmasaṃgraha 88 in SB*: Week Two<DATE>: << Sāṅkhya. Process Materialism and the Existence of the Self >> Sāṃkhyakārikā (SK) in SB*: & Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (SDS) in SB*: Ślokavārtika: Ātmavāda (pp. 383 ff) at Week Three <DATE>: << Sāṅkhya. The Law of Karma and the Soteriology of Nature without God >> Sāṃkhyakārikā in SB*: & Nyāyakusumāñjalī in I.3-v.14 in SB*: Padārthadharmasaṃgraha in SB*: Week Four<DATE>: << Mīmāṃsā. Word and Object >> Mīmāṃsāsūtra I.i.1-VI.i.26 in SB*: Nyāyasūtra II.ii in SB*: Week Five<DATE>: << Mīmāṃsā. World without Beginning and Heaven without God >> Ślokavārtika in SB*: Nyāyakusumāñjalī in SB*: Padārthadharmasaṃgraha 40 & in SB*: & Week Six<DATE>: << Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Metaphysics of Properties and Property-bearers >> Tarkasaṃgraha 1-5 & in the online pdf course handout or at Padārthadharmasaṃgraha 1-25, & 138 in SB , & 419 Nyāyasūtra II.i in SB*: Week Seven<DATE>: << Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Ontology of Universals, Relations and Non-existence >> Tarkasaṃgraha 6-9 & (See Week Six for the bibliographical reference.) Padārthadharmasaṃgraha 110 & in SB*: & Outline of lecture topics (plus suggested readings) continued if necessary Page 3

4 Week Eight<DATE>: << Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Means of Knowledge, Causation and Perception >> Tarkasaṃgraha (See Week Six for the bibliographical reference.) Nyāyasūtra I.i.3-7 (for the pramāṇas) & II.i (for perception) in SB*: Week Nine<DATE>: << Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Inference and Hypothetical Reasoning >> Tarkasaṃgraha (See Week Six for the bibliographical reference.) Nyāyasūtra I.i.5 & 32-41, I.ii.1-9 & II.i in SB*: 359, & 367 Tattvopaplavasiṃha in SB*: (for a Materialist refutation of inference) Week Ten <DATE>: << Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Analogy, Testimony and Certainty >> Tarkasaṃgraha (See Week Six for the bibliographical reference.) Nyāyasūtra II.i & II.ii in SB*: NB The single Formative Essay is due on the Friday of Week Ten. Page 4

5 Suggested essay questions This course is designed to encourage you to pursue what really interests you in the light of your study of primary sources in Indian philosophy, and to think for yourself. So try to focus upon the primary texts and commentaries, and exhibit your own critical assessment of the issue, stimulated by your wider reading of secondary sources. Also, feel free to augment your examination of the topic by drawing upon any relevant Western philosophy that you have studied. Here are some suggestions, but the instructor welcomes you to meet or him to discuss your own choice of title and essay structure. How cogent is the Sāṅkhyan dualism of puruṣa (self) and prakṛti (nature)? Assess Sāṅkhya s causal theory of the the existence of the effect (satkārya) in its cause, especially against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika s objections (Lectures I & VII). Assess Sāṅkhya s arguments for the existence and nature of the self. Is Sāṅkhya s soteriology for the liberation of the self consistent with its dualistic ontology? How coherent is the Sāṅkhyan doctrine of the teleological evolution of an insensate universe, without God, for the liberation of the self? (Lectures III & V) Assess Sāṅkhya s and Mīmāṃsā s arguments for the law of karma, and discuss whether the law implies or refutes the existence of God. (Lectures III & V) Assess Mīmāṃsā s and Nyāya s arguments for their theories about the semantic relation between words and their objects. (Lectures IV & X) What exactly is Mīmāṃsā s theory of the intrinsic validity (svataḥ pramāṇya) of cognitions claiming to prove, and does it prove this? Assess Mīmāṃsā s arguments for the eternality of the word and the authority of the Vedas. How convincing is Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika s analysis of reality as an ontology of seven categories of things that exist (padārthas)? Does Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika succeed in proving that wholes exist as new entities distinct from their parts? Assess arguments for and against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika s theory of the reality of universals (sāmānya). Is Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika s theory of the relation of inherence (samavāya), viz. identity-in-difference, sufficient to vindicate Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika s pluralistic ontology? Does Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika s account of perception as a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) succeed in establishing its direct realism? Assess the philosophically important similarities and differences between the Aristotelian syllogism and Nyāya s inference for another (parārthānumāna). Does Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika s theory of valid inference (anumāna) and the invariable concomitance/pervasion of properties solve the problem of induction? Are the Materialist (Carvāka) School correct in maintaining that perception is the only valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa)? Does Nyāya succeed in satisfactorily establishing how we ascertain epistemic certainty, i.e. the knowledge that we know? Page 5

6 Suggested additional readings Page 6

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