NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING. by John Broome and Christian Piller. II Christian Piller

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1 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING by John Broome and Christian Piller II Christian Piller ABSTRACT In the first part I discuss the thesis, advanced by John Broome, that intentions are normatively required by all-things-considered judgments about what one ought to do. I endorse this thesis, but remain sceptical about Broome s programme of grounding the correctness of reasoning in formal relations between contents of mental states. After discussing objections to the thesis, I concentrate in the second part on the relation between rational action and rational intention. I distinguish between content-related and attitude-related reasons for propositional attitudes like believing, wanting, and intending something. The former appeal to features of the content of the propositional attitude they are reasons for, the latter would be reasons for a propositional attitude because of features of the propositional attitude as a whole, for example the feature of its being beneficial to believe or to want that p. I try to show that the common philosophical reaction to attitude-related reasons, namely to claim that they are merely content-related reasons in disguise, is mistaken. In its most extreme form such a reaction would fail to respect the first-person character of reasoning which manifests itself in, among other things, the fact that a Mooresentence and its analogue for intentions cannot be a conclusion of reasoning. In the third part I argue that there are attitude-related reasons for intentions, and, in showing how they influence practical deliberation, I find that their existence can be rendered compatible with the thesis that it is rational to intend to do what one thinks one ought to do. I The Structure of a Theory of Practical Reason. A theory of practical reason has several parts. First, and most fundamentally, it tells us which things are practical reasons. One dispute at this first level is about the question whether nonpsychological facts, e.g. that it is raining, can be reasons or whether only psychological states, e.g. an agent s belief that it is raining, can play such a role. Facts one is not aware of couldn t figure in one s deliberation, and whether we call a fact a reason and add that awareness of it is a condition for it to be a reason, or whether we call the awareness itself or, more liberally, belief in it a reason, might well be a purely terminological matter. In agreement with John Broome, I will adopt the second, the psychological way of talking about reasons. Some psychological

2 196 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER states are reasons. 1 The central dispute at this first level is about whether beliefs on their own can be reasons or whether beliefs, as the Humean thinks, only transfer the normative force that ultimately comes from an agent s desires, interests or ends. The second part of a theory of practical reason deals with relations between reasons and aims at an aggregation of reasons. Reasons may conflict, one reason may outweigh another, it may defeat or undercut or support or enforce other reasons. There might be reasons not to take certain reasons into consideration. Relations between reasons are a varied affair. Decision theory seeks an easy solution to the problem of aggregating reasons. If we impose numerical functions on the psychological states that are reasons, weighing reasons becomes a matter of applying a simple algorithm. Accordingly, all relations between reasons would be reducible to strength, thus understood. Decision theory is just one example of an attempt to accomplish the general aim that guides this second level of a theory of practical reason, which is to determine where the balance of reasons lies. Once we know this, we know what to do, and what is left, it seems, is simply to do it. Normatiûe Practical Reasoning. A theory about reasons and their relations also provides a theory of correct reasoning. The relation is simple enough: a person reasons correctly if she follows the path of reasons (in the right way). In his contribution John Broome focuses on practical reasoning that starts from normative premises or, rather, on a special case thereof. Norms might conflict, but the normative statements which Broome takes as a starting point of practical reasoning have left the possibility of conflict behind. Conflicts between norms and conflicts between reasons, we are asked to assume, have been solved. We suppose we already know where the force of reasons lies. The judgements Broome is interested in are all-things-considered judgements about what one ought to do, and his question is how to reason from there. Some will think that Broome s premises are, in fact, conclusions of practical reasoning. But one argument s conclusion is another s premise, and I agree with Broome that a 1. All references to John Broome are, if not mentioned otherwise, to his paper Broome (2001) in this volume. Strictly speaking, Broome doesn t mention reasons, he only talks about normative requirements. I will argue below that this is a terminological and not a philosophical divergence.

3 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING 197 further step might be necessary to make reasoning truly practical. Broome says that reasoning relates mental states and that the state closest to action is the intention to act. If there is a gap between the all-things-considered judgement that one ought to ϕ and the intention to ϕ, then this gap can be closed by correct practical reasoning. A person who believes that all things considered she ought to ϕ will, if rational or if reasoning correctly, intend to ϕ. This is not quite Broome s thesis: his is a more cautious variation on the above. But, as I will argue below, his way of being cautious can be replaced by another. Reasons and Normatiûe Requirements. Something is a reason if it stands in the being-a-reason-for relation to something else. If we think about reasons for belief, simple logical relations between what is believed are good candidates for making it the case that the corresponding beliefs are such that one stands in the beinga-reason-for relation to another. Facts about rationality and justification, in turn, depend on facts about reasons, but here an important qualification needs to be introduced. Suppose one of my beliefs is crazy and completely unjustified. It will still stand in the being-a-reason-for relation to whatever is entailed by its content. But we wouldn t want to say that it can justify or contribute to the justification of the belief it is a reason for. Craziness is not a proper basis for justification. Such a belief can t justify another, because it itself fails to meet standards of rationality. Standing in the relation of being-a-reason-for to another belief is not sufficient for contributing to justification. Even if you have enough cement of reason, you can only build a house if the bricks you use are solid. This is a general fact about the relation between reasons and justification or rationality and so it also applies in the practical domain. In particular it applies to the thesis of which I have said it is not quite Broome s. If the judgement about what one ought to do fails to meet standards of rationality, then, although it stands in the right relation to the intention to do what one judged one ought to do, it cannot justify it. Broome introduces a special notion, the notion of a normative requirement, to make room for this fact. I don t object to this notion; I only think that we don t need to replace the more familiar concept of reason. There are two differences between something s normatively requiring something else and something s

4 198 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER being a reason for something else. 2 In one sense the notion of requirement is stronger. The connection between reasons and rationality is loose: having a reason for something doesn t make it rational. Why not? Because one might have a stronger reasons against it. The notion of a conclusive reason takes care of this difference. In another sense the notion of a normative requirement is weaker. If some psychological state S normatively requires another state R, then, according to Broome s understanding of requirements, it doesn t follow that even if S obtains, the agent is under a normative obligation to be in R. Normative requirements, conceived as operators on sentences govern whole conditionals, not just their consequents. Thus, they are not detachable by modus ponens. If, on the other hand, S is a conclusive reason for R, then it seems that, if S obtains, the agent is under an obligation to be in R. But, Broome correctly insists, if the agent is in state S for the wrong reasons, then the agent is under no obligation to be in R despite the fact that the normative requirement that binds S and R together holds. When Broome speaks of normative requirements, I speak of reasons that are able to justify. As explained above, a reason can only justify if it doesn t itself violate standards of rationality. We don t need to ban detachable normative terms: the added clause that assures a necessary caution in making such detachments should be enough. 3 If I am right, we can state Broome s thesis, using traditional vocabulary, in a number of ways. In terms of rationality: a rational person will intend to do what she reasonably judges she ought to do. In terms of reasons: a rational person will take her reasonable judgement that all things considered she ought to do something to be a conclusive reason for intending to do it. In terms of justification: an agent s all-things-considered normative belief, insofar as it is rational, will justify the formation of the corresponding intention. All these formulations are variations in emphasis only; they all express the same idea. Broome s Programme of Formal Justification and an Alternatiûe. To me Broome s thesis sounds completely convincing. The gap between an all-things-considered ought judgement and the 2. See Broome (1999) for details. 3. In subsequent sections, I will usually assume that the conditions that we have to impose on detachment are met.

5 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING 199 intention seems very small. If, for example, we slightly adapt Davidson s account of intention, where he argues that intentions are unconditional or all-out evaluative judgments (see Davidson 1978), it even looks as if there is no gap left any more to be bridged. If, on the other hand, there is a gap, Broome s thesis seems to build exactly the right bridge of rationality between judgements and intentions. I don t mean to suggest that Broome s thesis is true, but trivially so. To see its virtues let me compare it with one of von Wright s attempts to explain practical reasoning: I intend to make it true that E Unless I do A, I shall not achieve this. Is there a conclusion which can be said to follow logically from the two premisses? I think there is one for which this claim can be made. It is the conclusion: I will do A. This is what we call a declaration of intention. An inference is normally thought to be between true and false propositions. But it is doubtful whether a declaration of intention could qualify as a proposition. The logical nature of the argument therefore is obscure. In order to see things in a clearer light, let us shift the argument from the first person to the third person. What we then get is in the first place: X intends to make it true that E. Unless he does A, he will not achieve this. Therefore X will do A. It is quite clear, however, that this argument is not logically valid (von Wright 1972: 42). The third-person example is not a valid inference, von Wright thinks, because the agent might well be unaware of the truth of the second premise. He might not know that doing A is a necessary means to achieve his end. The situation is confusing for von Wright in two respects. An apparently valid inference in the first person has a non-propositional statement as its conclusion, and this kind of apparent validity is perspective dependent, i.e. it can t be transferred to the third person. There are two things we should learn from von Wright s struggle. First, logic has to be

6 200 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER separated from reasoning, and second, reasoning is done from a first-person perspective. Logical relations hold between the contents of attitudes, relations of rationality hold between attitudes. Von Wright is misled by the idea that an action or an intention should be entailed by some premises and this, in turn, supports his feeling that the premises, especially in the third-person case, have to mention the agent s attitudes. Broome, in contrast, separates things as they ought to be separated. Logic is only indirectly relevant for theories of reasoning, be they epistemological or practical. For example: no one is looking for so-called epistemological syllogisms in which beliefs would be the conclusions of valid inferences. Such inferences wouldn t be of any special interest. But logical relations are relevant because they can explain why some beliefs are reasons for others. Broome tries to extend the relevance of logical relations to the practical domain. Reasoning from intending an end to intending what one takes to be a necessary means to that end, is founded, he argues, on the validity of modus ponens. And, one could add, reasoning from intending an end to intending the avoidance of what one takes to be a sufficient hindrance of the achievement of the end is founded on modus tollens. So far so good. Can we generalize and pursue the general project of founding theories of correct reasoning on logical relations? The first and immediate worry is that logical relations won t prove to be sufficient for a complete theory of reasoning. Broome shares this worry; it directly applies to his thesis. The step from believing that one ought to do something to intending to do it, Broome tells us, cannot be justified by logic, or rather, by logic alone. Nevertheless Broome insists that a correct process of reasoning is made correct by the formal relations that hold between the mental states contents (Broome 2001: 182). What is meant here by formal relations? The semantics of ought could be invoked to justify Broome s thesis. If asked why one ought to intend to do what one believes one ought to do, one can point to what ought means. The content of the belief I ought to ϕ seems itself to claim that moving from this belief to the corresponding action or intention is justified. Thus, although Broome s thesis can t be justified by appeal to logical relations, it might well be justified by formal relations between the contents of attitudes.

7 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING 201 The prospects of this general programme, though, strike me as rather dim. Rules of practical reasoning and logical relations are in more tension than might appear at first sight. Here are two examples. First, some forms of practical reasoning not only fail to find support in logic, they find logic s condemnation. Reasoning from intending an end to intending what one takes to be a sufficient means for that end looks very much like the fallacy of affirming the consequent. 4 Secondly, to follow the paths of logical entailment doesn t always make for proper reasoning. Alf Ross s (1941) paradox comes to mind: I ought to do something; thus, I ought to do it or something else. If that were correct reasoning, anything I could do would fulfil a normative requirement I am under. But if I am under an all-things-considered obligation to mail a letter, I won t fulfil an all-things-considered obligation by burning it. To avoid implausible results like this, we have to restrict logic s influence on proper reasoning. What else could be appealed to in justifying rules of reasoning? I think that some principles of practical reasoning are just what they seem to be: basic principles of practical reasoning. They sound plausible, yet we can try to challenge them, but if no challenge succeeds their initial plausibility is good enough for us to accept them. The attempt to justify Broome s thesis I mentioned above seems in the end not to go beyond this position. If the semantics of ought reveals that the reasoning in question is correct, the belief that one ought to φ contains both the premise of the reasoning process and the claim to its own correctness. But why this latter claim to correctness should itself be correct is left unanswered. Surviving reflective scrutiny might well be all that can be put forward in its support. Reasoning and the First-Person Perspectiûe. Above I mentioned two lessons to be learnt from von Wright s struggle. The first was to separate logic from reasoning, the second is that reasoning has a first-person character. I will use first-person character as a convenient label for a variety of features. Von Wright worried about the asymmetry he saw between practical syllogisms conducted in the first and the third person. Once we separate logic from reasoning, the person s attitude towards a content will not 4. This has been pointed out by Kenny (1975: 70).

8 202 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER figure in the premises of this person s reasoning. This should appease von Wright s worry, and it also illustrates the first-person character of reasoning. The attitudes can stay outside the reasoning process because reasoning is done from a first-person perspective. A related point is the following: I can engage in practical reasoning about what I will do, but I can t engage in practical reasoning about what you will do. When I reason about what you will do, I engage in theoretical reasoning that concludes in a belief, and it will need a premise about your rationality, or about the fact that you reason correctly, in order to come to any conclusion. The same holds in respect to theoretical reasoning: From p and If p then q, I reason towards q. But from You believe that p and You believe that if p then q, I can only reason towards You believe that q if I add You reason correctly (and, arguably, some premise about what correct reasoning is). A different aspect of the first-person character of practical reasoning is that the use of I in practical reasoning is ineliminable. Broome assumes the opposite. He says that, if I am Leslie, I can reason from my belief that Leslie ought to ϕ to the intention that Leslie will ϕ. But this claim is at odds with his view that correct reasoning is made correct by formal relations that hold between the contents of these attitudes. If that were so, everyone who is related to the contents Leslie ought to ϕ and Leslie will ϕ by the appropriate attitudes ought to intend that Leslie will ϕ if he believes that Leslie ought to ϕ. Concerns about my ability to influence Leslie aside, my belief that Leslie ought to ϕ might give me no reason to intend that he ϕ. For example, I might, for good reasons, want Leslie to be unreasonable. A further aspect of the first-person character of reasoning will become relevant later on. Looking Back. A theory of practical reasoning has two central parts. It has to tell us which things can play the role of reasons, and it has to tell us how to aggregate reasons. We may well conceive of the results of this process in Broome s way: the results are judgments about what one ought to do. Broome s thesis concerns a third part of a theory of practical reasoning, the part in which it becomes practical. He claims, most plausibly, that one s intention should follow one s judgment about what one ought to do. Or, more precisely, that this judgement normatively requires the corresponding intention. Agreeing with Broome on the need

9 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING 203 for caution in making such a claim, I tried to show that standard talk of reasons and rationality can do the trick. 5 Broome subscribes to the programme of justifying rules of practical reasoning by appeal to formal relations between the contents of the attitudes that are the elements of the reasoning process. I indicated why I am sceptical about this programme and recommended a trivial and more minimal standard of justification which simply is that such principles have to survive reflective scrutiny. II Broome s objections to Broome s thesis. In his paper Broome has raised three challenges to his thesis, and I won t add to this list. Two of these challenges, in my view, can be dismissed quickly, but one needs more work. A Humean, Broome thinks, might worry about his thesis. After all it says that a normative judgement is by itself a conclusive reason for an intention. If what I said about the structure of a theory of practical reasoning is correct, the Humean will be illadvised to raise a challenge here. His concern should be the first and not the last part of a theory of practical reasoning. Everyone, even the Humean, should agree that our intentions should follow our justified beliefs about what we have most reason to do. So, can beliefs on their own after all guide us in our actions? True beliefs about what we have reason to do will, if the Humean view of reasons is correct, involve reference to an agent s desires. Given Humeanism, a true belief about what one ought to do is only possible on the basis of an agent s desires and interests. What if a person wrongly but not unreasonably believes that she ought to do something? What, for example, if a being without any desire wrongly takes itself to have desires? Wouldn t Broome thesis have anti-humean consequences in such a case? The issue here is whether a rational person will, as a matter of conceptual truth, be guided by her reasons or whether she will be guided by what she takes to be her reasons. I don t think that this should 5. There is matter of dispute remaining. Sometimes Broome seems to think that the normative belief has to be true, whereas I would say it has to be justified, in order to justify or normatively require the corresponding intention. I won t pursue this discrepancy here.

10 204 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER primarily be seen as a dispute over the Humean picture of rational agency. The Humean certainly has no reason to reject the first alternative to be rational is to be guided by one s (Humean) reasons and the second alternative might at best lead toarefinement of Humeanism but not to its rejection. 6 Regarding Broome s inability objection, I have even less to say. Is the existence of a normative requirement challenged by the fact that one is unable to fulfil it? Sometimes it is, and sometimes it isn t. If one was unable to fulfil a requirement but one is responsible for being unable to do so, the inability won t be an excusing condition, but in other cases it will be. I don t worry about the fact that general restrictions on normative claims having to do with abilities will also hold in case of Broome s thesis. Broome worries because the absence of excusing conditions doesn t fit neatly with his view that formal relations between contents have to justify reasoning processes. Having abandoned this programme, we can simply add whatever ability-restriction is appropriate to Broome s thesis. Attitude-Related and Content-Related Reasons. There is a serious objection to Broome s thesis. It is related to what he calls the objection from misdirection, but I want to pursue it in more general terms. Broome s thesis provides the framework of the following discussion, but I hope that the points raised will be of independent interest. In the end it will turn out that the views about reasons developed here can also be used in defence of Broome s thesis. Let me start by introducing two concepts of reasons. The concepts, I hope, will be clear enough, but the claim that I am going to defend, namely that there are things that satisfy these concepts, is of course not meant to be settled by introducing these concepts. Take some propositional attitude for which there could be reasons, like wanting that p, intending that p, or believing that p. Something is a content-related reason for a propositional attitude if it refers to some appropriate feature of p. For example, believing that p is useful would be a content-related reason for wanting that p. In other words, p s usefulness is a consideration that speaks in favour of wanting that p. Believing that pisthe 6. For a more detailed discussion of this point and its consequences see Piller (2000).

11 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING 205 best explanation of q, where q is something believed to be true, is a content-related reason for believing that p. Believing that p is entailed by the eûidence is another content-related reason for believing that p. Something is an attitude-related reason for a propositional attitude if it refers to some appropriate feature of the attitude as a whole and not only to a feature of the content of the attitude. Take wanting that p. One of the features of the attitude as a whole would be that wanting that p is useful. Believing that wanting that p is useful would then be an attitude-related reason for wanting that p. Similarly, believing that an intention is useful or believing that belieûing that p would be beneficial or believing that belieûing that p would be an expression of trust would all be attitude-related reasons for that intention or belief. 7 The Objection. Believing that one ought to ϕ is a content-related reason for the intention to ϕ. The belief mentions something about ϕ-ing it is what one ought to it doesn t mention anything about the intention to ϕ. Suppose there are attitude-related reasons. Then there could be attitude-related reasons against intending to ϕ, and it seems as if only a weighing process could determine where the force of reason lies. It would be premature to announce that one ought to intend to ϕ as soon as one believes one ought to ϕ. About half the reasons relevant to intending to ϕ have not yet been taken into account. To use one of Broome s examples: I know I ought to sleep, but I also know that if I intend to sleep I won t sleep. Should I intend to sleep? The answer seems clear: I should not intend to sleep. I have content-related reasons for having this intention but it seems that my attitude-related reasons against the intention outweigh them. Broome s reaction to the problem of finding sleep is, roughly, the following: Bad Luck! Your reasoning process is correct. But some people are unfortunate. Correct reasoning has unwanted 7. I only want to explain these two concepts of reasons; my aim is not to give a precise definition of them. I understand that in mentioning, for example, some feature of the attitude of believing that p one also mentions some feature of p, namely that it is that the believing of which has the appropriate feature. One could invoke the distinction between being referred to in modo recto and in modo obliquo to make the distinction more precise. But I am confident that the distinction makes good sense as it stands. Note that a reason is always a reason for something. If we change what something is a reason for, what was an attitude-related reason might well become a content-related reason. This is a feature and not a criticism of the distinction as I ve drawn it above.

12 206 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER effects on them. True, correct reasoning doesn t guarantee success in action. If a rational person, despite careful and correct reflections, still fails, we could invoke bad luck. But in the example at hand the agent knows that bad luck is going to strike, and isn t that something that should influence this person s reasoning? Here is one piece of reasoning: I ought to sleep; thus, I ll go to bed now. Here is another: I ought to sleep; I won t sleep if I make any effort to sleep; thus, I won t go to bed now. Correct reasoning seems to lead to opposed intentions. This is a serious problem for the proposed account of normative practical reasoning. The attitude-related reason against intending to sleep conflicts with the content-related reason for the intention to sleep. A Common Way to Answer the Objection. A common philosophical reaction is to deny the assumption on which this problem is built, i.e. to deny that there are attitude-related reasons. The intuitive force of such an approach is strongest in the case of alleged attitude-related reasons for believing something. Suppose that on the basis of your memory you believe that p. Believing that not-p, however, would be very useful. Nevertheless, one s awareness of its usefulness doesn t seem to be a reason for believing that not-p. We have to find a different place in order to capture the normative force of a belief s usefulness. Distinguish: there are reasons for believing something, and there are reasons for bringing it about that one is in a particular belief state. The alleged attitude-related reason for believing that not-p is, in fact, a content-related reason for bringing it about that one believes that not-p or, alternatively, for intending to believe that not-p, or for intending to bring it about that one believes that not-p. The content of the belief was not-p, but the content of the intention is the belief that not-p. Now we realize, according to this common reaction, that there are no attitude-related reasons. Candidates for such reasons are content-related reasons for something else. Attitude-related reasons can be denied once we clearly separated the domains to which the two reasons in our example apply Broome says several times (e.g., Broome, 2001: xx) that the correctness of reasoning solely depends on the relations that hold between the contents of the elements that make up the reasoning process. This puts him firmly on the side of those who deny that there are attitude-related reasons.

13 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING 207 In the case of reasons for beliefs this strategy certainly has intuitive appeal. I will try to undermine it as a general strategy for dealing with attitude-related reasons. Starting cautiously, let me point to a residual problem of this strategy, which is to capture adequately the normative force of content-related reasons for believing something. Available evidence gives you reason to believe that p. What if the awareness of the evidence has to overcome some resistance, what if, for some reason, it is hard to follow where the evidence leads? We face the following alternatives. Either your awareness of a normative requirement to believe that p tells you to make an attempt to believe that p, for example by running through the evidence again, or it has no such force. If the latter, the normative force of reasons looks somewhat empty. At least, it s not a force that really applies to you. It only applies to the belief-state: it ought to exist. But it is, according to this alternative, a completely different matter whether a person has, in virtue of this requirement, any reason to bring about what ought to be. If we take the first option of the alternative above and claim that the fact that this belief-state ought to exist does provide you with a reason to bring its existence about, then there is common ground for content-related and attitude-related reasons. Content-related reasons for believing that p are, on this alternative, by their very nature of being reasons for believing also reasons for bringing it about that one believes that p. Then they would have to be weighed against alleged attitude-related reasons for believing that not-p, which, according to the position under consideration, simply are content-related reasons for bringing it about that one believes that not-p. It seems as if only the ground on which there is conflict has shifted, not that the conflict has been avoided altogether. Structural parallels between theoretical and practical reason make the above strategy of denying attitude-related reasons an attractive option for the domain of practical reason. But we should not forget that there are also disanalogies between theoretical and practical reason. One such disanalogy is the following: if there are attitude-related and content-related reasons in the theoretical domain they would be incomparable; but if there are attitude-related and content-related reasons in the practical domain they would be comparable. When you have to decide what to believe in a case where the evidence makes it likely that

14 208 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER p but believing that not-p would be advantageous, the degree of likelihood of p doesn t make a difference to you as long as it hasn t any effect on the costs of your effort to come to the desired state of believing that not-p. A strengthening of content-related evidential reasons would not alter your decision-problem to any extent. With what sort of probability you believe p to be true doesn t in itself bear on the rationality of the project of trying to believe that not-p. This is what I mean by saying that contentrelated and attitude-related reasons are incomparable in case of beliefs. When we switch to cases in which only issues of practical rationality arise things are different. Take the Toxin Case, in which you are rewarded for intending now to do something later that will be bad for you, namely to drink a vial of toxin. You don t have to do it in order to be rewarded; you just have to intend to do it. 9 In this example you have a content-related reason for intending not to drink the toxin: it will make you sick. And you have an attitude-related reasons for having the intention to drink it: having the intention will make you rich. If we alter the content-related reasons, for example by stipulating that the toxin not only makes you sick but that only a very expensive anti-toxin will cure you from this sickness, the strengthened content-related reason will play an important role in your deliberation. In the case of intentions, content-related and attituderelated reasons seem to be perfectly comparable. Incomparability of reasons lends support to the separation of domains to which these reasons apply; in contrast, comparability suggests a common ground for these reasons. Before I pursue this idea further, let us see in more detail how the separation strategy might work in case of reasons for intentions. The general idea is to separate the domains to which alleged attitude-related reasons and content-related reasons apply, and to claim that the proper domain for alleged attituderelated reasons shows that they simply are content-related reasons. The most simple way of separating the domains which is not Broome s way of doing things is the following: there are reasons for actions, e.g. knowing that an action promotes one s ends, and there are reasons for intentions, e.g. knowing that intending to do something promotes one s ends. According to a 9. Footnote 9. See Kavka (1983) for details.

15 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING 209 defender of this kind of separation, the Toxin Case shows something interesting: reasons for actions and reasons for intentions can come apart. One ought not to do what one ought to intend to do. 10 Why The Common Answer Fails. The Coherence Principle. The obvious difficulty in the Toxin Case is to follow such advice. Knowing that as a rational person you won t drink the toxin stands in the way of forming the intention to drink it. Acting and intending, it seems, are too closely connected for the separation to succeed. How can I intend to drink it if I know that after the money has been paid all reasons speak against drinking it? 11 The impossibility of simply intending what I know I have conclusive reason not to do is very similar to the impossibility of simply adopting an advantageous belief that I take to be false. Both impossibilities, I want to suggest, are related to what above I have called the first-person character of reasoning. I can t tell myself, It is the case that p, I clearly remember it, but I believe that not-p, doing so makes me feel much better. Similarly, I can t tell myself I won t drink the toxin, it would make me sick, but I intend to drink it, and so I ll get rich. 12 Believe what is false as well as Intend to do what you won t do are forms of advice that could not be implemented. Recommendations like those could not be the conclusion of an agent s reasoning process. I intend to ϕ, but I won t is a Moore-sentence about intentions. Here we encounter another aspect of the first-person character 10. Kavka (1978: 288) and Lewis (1984: 204) take this point of view in cases of deterrence which are structurally similar to the Toxin case. Retaliation wouldn t serve any purpose: it would only increase destruction. But intending to retaliate does serve a purpose: it prevents the opponent from attacking. 11. The point made here does not rely on the general claim that believing that one won t do something makes it impossible to intend to do it. Doubts about one s ability, for example, might disprove such claim. Not only the favourites might intend to win a race. The exceptions we find to the general claim, though, won t apply to the Toxin case. For example, there is no doubt about one s ability to drink the toxin. For a development of this point see Robins (1997: 195), who is also the source of the term coherence principle for what I introduce under this name below. 12. I treat I will won t ϕ as an expression of an intention. Arguably, I will won t ϕ could also be understood as a prediction. If we allow for such a use, then I won t ϕ, but I intend to ϕ would be predicting that one s attempt to ϕ will fail. But the fact that in the above sentence the predictive use is forced on us, just illustrates my point, namely that one cannot meaningfully express one s intention and, at the same time, claim not to have it.

16 210 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER of reasoning: Moore-sentences, whether regarding beliefs or intentions, cannot be the conclusions of reasoning. The first-person character of reasoning supports a principle of coherence that demands that reasons for intentions and reasons for actions cannot come apart. Such a principle secures the independently plausible claim that Moore-sentences cannot conclude a process of reasoning. Separating reasons for actions from reasons for intentions violates this principle of coherence which is a constraint on practical reasoning founded in its first-person character. A Variation on the Common Answer. Broome s proposal is slightly different. What I called reasons for actions are, in his case, reasons for intentions. What I called reasons for intentions are, in his case, reasons for intentions to intend. The question What should I do? is answered by the formation of an intention. The question What should I intend to do? is answered by the formation of an intention to intend. Broome thinks that these things can come apart, and that they do in the Toxin Case. Both the intention not to drink the toxin and the intention to intend to drink it are rationally required. Could we appeal to a higherorder principle of coherence demanding that first-order and second-order intentions can t conflict? Second-order intentions are an unusual kind of thing. Suppose you decide to stand up. Thereby, you have formed an intention to stand up. What could possibly be involved in intending to have this very intention? Let me try to focus on cases in which talk of second-order intentions has more plausibility. Second-order intentions might play a role if the first-order intention is left unspecified. For example, one can intend to settle some issue later. Arguably this decision is the formation of an intention to form an intention later on. Furthermore, if acting and intending to act in certain ways meets resistance one can even intend to form a specific intention later on. Being too shy to ask her to dance and being too shy to even intend to do so, an agent might intend to form the intention to ask her to dance after he had a drink. In general, second-order intentions seem to make sense if they are directed towards the formation of future intentions. Thus understood, Broome s handling of the Toxin Case doesn t involve a violation of a principle of coherence. It is the case that p, but tomorrow I will believe that not-p is not a Moore-sentence

17 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING 211 and neither is its analogue for intentions. This doesn t render Broome s stance satisfactory, though. The belief that one ought not to drink the toxin still justifies the intention not to drink it. And the belief that one ought to intend to drink it justifies the intention to intend to drink it. But how can one believe that allthings-considered one ought to intend to drink it, and at the same time realize that one s opposed intention not to drink it satisfies an all-things-considered normative requirement? The separation strategy, in the way Broome uses it, separates what the logic of practical reasoning binds together. I think that a discussion of attitude-related reasons for intentions should not exclusively be guided by the Toxin Case. The Toxin Case, I feel, brings together two different issues, only one of which is how to account for what seem to be attitude-related reasons. The other issue is related to discussions of prudence. How can I have reasons now for doing something in the future if I know that in the future I won t have any reasons for doing it? (Although I have reasons now to intend to drink the toxin, I know that, when the time of drinking comes, I will have no reason for intending to drink it, nor will I then have reasons for drinking it.) In order to deal with the first issue we should try to separate it from the second. We should look for other examples where attitude-related reasons seem to occur. III There are Attitude-Related Reasons. Above it has been argued that my attitude towards a belief, for example, wanting to have it, doesn t carry any weight in regard to the belief s rationality. But if I want to raise my arm, for example, my attitude towards the raising of my arm may well make my raising of the arm rational. Sure, to raise one s arm is not a propositional attitude, but we can change the example easily. If I want to assume that p (or imagine that p), my attitude towards assuming that p may well make my assuming of p rational. In contrast to the beliefcase, we are not eager to distinguish between assuming that p and bringing it about that one assumes that p. If there really is a difference, wanting to assume that p seems to be a reason for both. In this first group of examples there are no clear contentrelated reasons for the attitudes in question. Being fruitful, for

18 212 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER example, is a property not of p but of assuming that p. Certainly it is true that assuming that p is making a fruitful assumption because p is related in interesting ways to other propositions. Properties of the content of the propositional attitude are relevant in this case only insofar as they ground properties of having the propositional attitude. We assume that p, because we realize that assuming that p would be fruitful. Our reason for assuming that p does not refer to a property of p but to a property of assuming that p, thus it is an attitude-related reason. 13 In all cases in which there are no clear content-related reasons, the acceptance of attitude-related reasons finds little resistance. Take a case of indifference. Two goods A and B are offered to you, both are attractive, but you have no preference between them. In such a case content-related reasons don t settle what to do. Taking A is as good as taking B. What prevents you from missing out on a good opportunity, I want to suggest, is what we could call an unspecific attitude-related reason. You want to decide. You want that you either intend to take A or that you intend to take B. Intending to take something is useful; thus you intend to take something and so you take one of the goods. If content-related reasons don t decide, an unspecific attituderelated reason explains not how but that you make a decision. Let me move into areas of conflict between attitude-related and content-related reasons. I want to smoke because smoking relaxes me. This is a content-related reason for wanting to smoke. I also want not to smoke, because wanting to smoke is part of an addict s personality, something I want not to have. This, it seems, is an attitude-related reason against wanting to smoke. If conflicts between second-order and first-order desires make an agent s life difficult, and I suppose they do, the difficulty is well captured as a conflict of attitude-related and contentrelated reasons. Separating the domains to which these reasons apply would misrepresent the situation a thus conflicted agent is in, because it would wrongly appease what actually is in conflict. Finally, there are cases in which attitude-related and contentrelated reasons conflict at the same level. Here is an example that 13. A pragmatist, we might want to say, treats beliefs as I treat assumptions here. What seem to be content-related reasons for believing that p, are in fact attituderelated reason. They are only relevant because believing truly is usually the most useful thing to do.

19 NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING 213 is well-known in a different context. 14 Consider the following three choice situations. Your host offers you a large apple and an orange, asking you to pick one while he takes the other. Both fruits are appealing to you, but overall you prefer the large apple and pick it. Suppose your host had offered you an orange and a small apple to choose from, and in this case you would have picked the orange. So you prefer the large apple to the orange and the orange to the small apple. But now think about the choice between a large apple and a small apple. Here other considerations come in. It would be impolite to go for the bigger of two fruits of the same kind. Thus, in that case you choose the small apple. Taking only content-related reasons into account we seem to be faced with intransitive preferences. But your behaviour seems perfectly reasonable. Considering the choice between a large and a small apple, the content-related reasons favour taking the large apple. But actually choosing the large apple has other effects. You might appear to be impolite. You have an attitude-related reason not to choose what your content-related reasons favour. There is a case of conflict, and, what is remarkable, the conflict is resolved very easily: the attitude-related reason wins. You choose what is worse because choosing the worse is still better than choosing the better. In making a choice you not only reflect on what it is that you choose but also on what you are in so choosing. These examples should convince us that there are attituderelated reasons, at least in the practical realm. Not only the qualities of what is chosen but also the qualities of choosing inform rational choice. Considering such qualities of choosing, an agent may have reason to choose in a way that is contrary to the qualities of what is chosen. The attitude-related reasons are reasons for choosing something. No one would defend the strategy of separating the domains of attitude-related and content-related reasons in this case. It would result in too implausible a view, namely that one ought to choose the big apple and also ought to bring it about that one chooses the small one. If politeness is more important than the size of an apple, then it is true that I ought to bring it about that I choose the small apple, but it is 14. I don t know the origin of this example. Pettit, who uses it in Pettit (1991: 163) confesses the same. See Broome (1991: 100 ff.) for a structurally identical example. He puts it to a very different use, though.

20 214 JOHN BROOME AND CHRISTIAN PILLER also true that I do so by simply choosing it. These are all claims about choices, but what holds for choices also holds for intentions. I have a content-related reason to intend to take the big apple: it is a nicer fruit. But intending to do so is a sign of being impolite, something I don t want to be. Thus, I have an attituderelated reason against intending to take the big apple. Once we realize the importance of attitude-related reasons in the above case, we see that the example about the apples is no isolated curiosity but manifests a very general point. Intentions and choices tell others and ourselves what sort of persons we are. Intentions are of moral significance. Anyone who lives in a social world, and wants to be brave or kind or just, or simply polite, will recognize the importance of attitude-related reasons and their potential to outweigh content-related reasons. Above I said that the Toxin Case, on which much of the discussion of attitude-related reasons has focussed, clouds these points because it brings in separate considerations that relate to our attitudes towards our future selves. The following variation of the Toxin Case leaves these other issues aside and should help to strengthen my point. In this simplified Toxin Case it is still true that you are rewarded solely for the intention to drink the toxin and not for actually drinking it; the only difference is that you have to intend to drink it now. This should avoid the temporal split between the intention and the action that makes the original case so intriguing. Even if there is no temporal split, we can distinguish between action and intention. Having the intention to drink it, if one really drinks it, will be a way of drinking it, namely drinking it intentionally. And there are other ways of drinking it. If, for example, the toxin is forced down your throat against your resistance you will have drunk it, but not intentionally. Unsuccessful actions show another way in which intention and action can come apart. You take the glass, the liquid flows in your mouth, but a sudden spasm makes you choke, you cannot swallow, and you fail to drink the toxin. The money should still be yours because you had the intention to drink it. The simplified Toxin Case doesn t seem to raise any deep problems. If for you the money more than compensates for a day of being sick, you will intend to drink it, and if things go as planned you will drink it. What are your reasons? The reward gives you a reason for intending to drink it, and your reason for intending to drink it

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