Jessica Tizzard Department of Philosophy 1115 E 58 th Street Chicago, IL

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1 EDUCATION Jessica Tizzard Department of Philosophy 1115 E 58 th Street Chicago, IL jtizzard@uchicago.edu Ph.D. Chicago, IL Department of Philosophy, 2017 M.A. Chicago, IL Department of Philosophy, 2012 B.A. University of Toronto Toronto, ON Specialist in Philosophy, 2009 (With High Distinction) AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Kant, Kantian Ethics, Moral Psychology AREAS OF COMPETENCE Early Modern Philosophy, German Idealism, Ethics ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT Post-Doctoral Humanities Teaching Fellow, PUBLICATIONS 2017 Kant on Space, Time, and Respect for the Moral Law as Analogous Formal Elements of Sensibility, European Journal of Philosophy, 2017: 1-17, (Forthcoming in Print). DISSERTATION Sense-Dependent Rationalism: Finding Unity in Kant s Practical Philosophy Committee: Robert Pippin (chair); Stephen Engstrom (University of Pittsburgh); Candace Vogler; Dan Brudney No issue has more wide-ranging implications for Kant s practical philosophy than that of how our active rational and receptive sensible capacities of mind relate to one another. How we interpret this relationship fixes our understanding of Kant s relation to his predecessors; his view of human nature; his account of the will, motivation, and virtue; and his conception of moral faith. I argue that the vast majority of commentators adopt an untenably dualistic reading of the relationship between reason and sensibility that cannot be representative of Kant s actual view. Instead, I suggest a unified account of these capacities that takes reason and sensibility to stand to one another as form to matter. The result can be described as a cognitivist reading of Kant s practical philosophy, one which emphasizes that the objective representational content of our reasoning and the subjective motivation felt by 1

2 the subject must be understood as inseparable from one another. This novel view of practical reasoning has important implications for established interpretive issues that I develop throughout, touching upon debates concerning the concept of respect for the moral law, moral motivation, the possibility of evil, the concept of the highest good, and the role of religion in Kant s philosophical system. REFEREED CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 2017 Making Sense of the Postulate of Freedom, North American Kant Society Southern Study Group, Tulane University, November Practical Reason and the Call to Faith: Kant on the Postulates of Immortality and God, North American Kant Society Midwest Study Group, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, October 6-7* ** 2015 The Possibility of Kantian Frailty, North American Kant Society Midwest Study Group, Northwestern University, October Historical Faith and the Role of Sensible Dependency in Kant s Religion, UK Kant Society and North American Kant Society Annual Conference, Keele University, September 3-6 *Nominated for the Marcus Herz award for best graduate student submission to any NAKS Study Group in 2017 **Received travel stipend for best graduate student submission CONFERENCE COMMENTARIES 2015 Response to Maria Acosta Lopez, On the Poetical Nature of Philosophical Writing: Schiller s Response to Fichte, Chicago-area Consortium on German Idealism, DePaul University, March 20 (Invited) AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS Post-Doctoral Humanities Teaching Fellowship Mellon Foundation - Dissertation Completion Fellowship Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Dissertation Fellowship Doctoral Fellowship LANGUAGES German (Reading) 2

3 TEACHING EXPERIENCE (Ongoing) Lecturer, served as instructor of record; designed syllabus and all course assignments; graded all assignments and exams 2018 PHIL 21515/ Ethics of the Enlightenment (Spring Quarter) MAPH (Course offered to both undergraduate and master s students) 2018 PHIL Kant s Critique of Practical Reason (Winter Quarter) 2018 HUMA Human Being and Citizen II (Winter Quarter) 2017 HUMA Human Being and Citizen I (Autumn Quarter) 2015 PHIL 29200/29300 Form and Matter in Kant s Practical Philosophy (Winter Quarter) BA Preceptor, served as instructor of record; provided guidance for senior undergraduate students writing BA theses; organized and ran group meetings for the discussion of worksin-progress; provided ongoing written feedback on draft work 2016 PHIL Senior Seminar I (Autumn and Winter Quarters) 2017 PHIL Senior Seminar II (Winter and Spring Quarters) Teaching Assistant, responsible for leading discussion sections (6-15 students per section, two sections); collaborating with faculty on the design of course materials; creating writing assignments and evaluations; providing substantive critical feedback; and grading 2017 PHIL Kant: Critique of Pure Reason (Spring Quarter) 2017 PHIL Racial Injustice (Winter Quarter) 2016 PHIL History of Philosophy I: Ancient Philosophy (Autumn Quarter) 2014 PHIL History of Aesthetics (Winter Quarter) 2013 PHIL Kant s Moral Theory (Autumn Quarter) 2013 PHIL History of Philosophy II: Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (Winter Quarter) University of Toronto PHL 100Y1 Introduction to Philosophy (Two semester course) PHL 100Y1 Introduction to Philosophy (Two semester course) 3

4 PEDAGOGICAL TRAINING Pedagogy Program for Humanities Teaching Fellows, with the Center for Teaching and Learning, Forums on Course Design, Learning Objectives, Teaching by Discussion, the First- Year Transition into College Pedagogy Program, Department of Philosophy, Syllabus workshops, round-table discussions on teaching with faculty and alumni 2013 Pedagogies of Writing (HUMA 50000), Writing Center, Quarter-long course on teaching effective writing in humanities core classes 2013 Seminar on Course Design, Center for Teaching and Learning, Workshop on the fundamentals of teaching and learning as applied to course design DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE 2016 Graduate student coordinator for the German Philosophy Workshop at the Organized schedule of presentations, arranged travel and accommodation for visiting speakers, promoted workshop events, maintained workshop website, balanced budget, and other organizational duties 2013 Organizer for prospective graduate students week Arranged meetings, events, accommodations and other welcome-activities for students admitted to the graduate program in philosophy PROFESSIONAL SERVICE Referee for The Kantian Review (2017) GRADUATE COURSEWORK (* Indicates Audit) Kant, Early Modern Philosophy, German Idealism 2016 Hobbes, Locke, and Kant: Legal and Political Philosophy (Helga Varden) * 2014 Practical Reason (Stephen Engstrom) 2012 Kant s Critique of Pure Reason (Jim Conant) 2012 Hegel s Science of Logic (Robert Pippin) 2010 Kant s Ethics (Candace Vogler) Ethics and Action Theory 2013 Thomistic Moral Philosophy (Candace Vogler) * 2012 Psychoanalysis and Ethics (Candace Vogler and Jonathan Lear) 4

5 2011 Deliberation and Self-Knowledge (Jason Bridges and David Finkelstein) 2011 Topics in Anscombe (Anselm Mueller) 2011 Aristotle s Theory of Action (Agnes Callard) Philosophy of Mind, Perception, Self-Knowledge 2012 Self-Consciousness and the Psychoanalytic Unconscious (Matthew Boyle and Jonathan Lear) 2011 Stanley Cavell s The Claim of Reason (James Conant) 2011 Varieties of Scepticism (James Conant) 20 th Century Analytic Philosophy 2011 Frege (Michael Kremer) 2011 Wittgenstein s Later Philosophy (David Finkelstein) * 2010 From Sellars to McDowell (David Finkelstein) 2010 First year seminar in 20 th Century Analytic Philosophy: From Carnap to McDowell (Michael Kremer) REFERENCES Robert Pippin Evelyn Stefansson Nef Distinguished Service Professor of Social Thought and Philosophy at the r-pippin@uchicago.edu Stephen Engstrom Professor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh engstrom@pitt.edu Candace Vogler David B. and Clara E. Stern Professor of Philosophy at the vogue@uchicago.edu Daniel Brudney Professor of Philosophy dbrudney@uchicago.edu Christel Fricke (Teaching Reference) Research Director at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas University of Oslo christel.fricke@csmn.uio.no 5

6 Long Dissertation Abstract: Sense-Dependent Rationalism: Finding Unity in Kant s Practical Philosophy Saying something worthwhile about Kant s practical philosophy requires sensitivity to both historical and contemporary concerns. First, from the historical perspective, one must understand Kant s project as one that brings together two conflicting threads from the history of early modern philosophy. This has long been appreciated by his interpreters, who trace the influence of both the rationalist training that shaped Kant s initial viewpoint, and the empiricists who later stirred his mature thinking into consciousness. The result is a practical philosophy that is as concerned to emphasize reason s autonomy as it is to recognize the importance of its relation to the senses. Second, to represent Kant s project as possessing enduring philosophical merit, one must avoid the appearance of an untenable dualism that holds between the realm of reason and the world of sense. Critics have long dismissed the dominant reading of Kant s philosophy, which understands the moral subject to be fundamentally divided between an inaccessible atemporal realm that somehow safeguards our freedom, and a world determined by necessary laws of nature that seems to rule it out. To put Kant s practical philosophy in meaningful dialogue with contemporary positions in the fields of ethics, metaethics, and moral psychology, one must not just revise or reconstruct the historical Kant, but show that he actually avoids the dualistic perspective so often attributed to him. In my dissertation, I show that Kant s reader can be responsive to both concerns. That is, we can frame his project as a great unification of the rationalist and empiricist views that interested him, and defend against the claim that his position relies upon an untenably dualistic vision of our rational and sensible capacities. The central claims of my reading allow us to rethink the nature of practical reasoning and motivation, breaking out of the framework that characterizes the interpretive literature on these topics. This field is typically split between those who emphasize Kant s rationalist influences (e.g., Henry Allison, Andrews Reath, and Allen Wood), and those who seek to bring out his empiricist sympathies (e.g., Paul Guyer and Richard McCarty). Accordingly, the literature is often framed as a debate between intellectualist and affectivist readings of Kant s position on various issues. I argue that both of these positions misrepresent Kant s views by explicitly or implicitly adopting the dualist picture we must avoid. In defense of my position, I argue against a number of common misconceptions taken up by both sides. Primarily, I discount the claims, 1) that reason and sensibility stand opposed to one another as completely independent capacities; 2) that because of 1), moral motivation in general, and the feeling of respect for the moral law in particular, must be interpreted on either intellectualist or affectivist lines; and 3), that the tendency towards immorality which spurs this dualism makes the practical use of reason fundamentally different in structure from the theoretical use. Against these views, I argue for a reading that maintains a unified conception of our agency, claiming that we must think of reason and sensibility as metaphysically interdependent capacities. Reason s activity does not merely provide a formula that must be imposed upon independently intelligible, resistant sensible content; it completely transforms our capacity to sense and feel. Our sensible nature thus does not stand opposed to reason, its fundamental character is determined by reason s activity. In this respect, I argue, the practical use of reason is just like its theoretical counterpart; Kant s unified vision permeates his entire 6

7 system. Accordingly, we can draw on certain structural features of the theoretical philosophy to better understand the practical. Building on these central claims, which I establish in the first and second chapters, my view distinguishes itself through a number of additional features. As I argue in my third chapter, which has recently been published by the European Journal of Philosophy, the feeling of respect for the moral law, the focus of Kant s account of moral motivation, is the lynchpin for this unified account. It should be understood analogously to Kant s doctrine of space and time in the Critique of Pure Reason, as the formal element of sensibility that represents the extent to which the entire capacity has been determined by reason. The concept of respect thus need not be interpreted according to the dichotomy set up by the literature: as indicative of sensibility s rationally determined nature, respect is neither primarily intellectual or affective in character. In addition, because the interdependency of reason and sensibility has been secured in the unique way I propose, I am able to advance a new theory of motivation which holds that the objective representational content of our reasoning and the subjective motivation felt by the subject must be understood as inseparable from one another. Insofar as sensibility is transformed by reason through the feeling of respect, we must understand sensible motivation to be tied to representations of reason. In chapters four and five, I draw out the implications this view has for thinking about the possibility of immoral action, and the role of moral faith and the practical postulates. In the former, I show how my view leads us to the desirable conclusion that acts of reason, not sensibility, are the source of immoral action. In the latter, I claim that the practical postulates motivate the moral disposition through their cognitive standing, that is, by rendering our representations of morality s final end, the highest good, more conceptually determinate. My sixth and final chapter turns directly to the secondary literature, providing a more detailed critical account of the various kinds of dualism that pervade contemporary Kant scholarship, and setting my own view against this long-standing trend. The result of these arguments is a reading that respects Kant s diverse historical influences without thinking that they lead to a fundamentally Janus-faced account of human nature. This view is not only sound from a historical perspective, it shows promise on the contemporary scene. For on the reading I propose, Kant is able to ground morality in reason, and thereby give a strong, cognitivist defense of its objectivity, without facing typical objections about the impossibility of rational motivation that spur non-cognitivist positions. His project thus enjoys the relative merits of both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of morality, and continues to offer philosophical insight beyond its merely historical context. 7