The THE GREAT CRISES, VOLUME THREE OCTOBER 22 28, Philip Zelikow and Ernest May Editors, Volume Three

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1 The PRESIDENTIAL RECORDINGS JOHN F. KENNEDY THE GREAT CRISES, VOLUME THREE OCTOBER 22 28, 1962 Philip Zelikow and Ernest May Editors, Volume Three David Coleman George Eliades Francis Gavin Max Holland Erin Mahan Timothy Naftali David Shreve Associate Editors, Volume Three Patricia Dunn Assistant Editor Philip Zelikow and Ernest May General Editors B W. W. NORTON & COMPANY NEW YORK LONDON

2 Copyright 2001 by The Miller Center of Public Affairs Portions of this three-volume set were previously published by Harvard University Press in The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis by Philip D. Zelikow and Ernest R. May. Copyright 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America First Edition For information about permission to reproduce selections from this book, write to Permissions, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY The text of this book is composed in Bell, with the display set in Bell and Bell Semi-Bold Composition by Tom Ernst Manufacturing by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group Book design by Dana Sloan Production manager: Andrew Marasia Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data John F. Kennedy : the great crises. p. cm. (The presidential recordings) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Contents: v. 1. July 30 August 1962 / Timothy Naftali, editor v. 2. September 4 October 20, 1962 / Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, editors v. 3. October 22 28, 1962 / Philip Zelikow and Ernest May, editors. ISBN X 1. United States Politics and government Sources. 2. United States Foreign relations Sources. 3. Crisis management United States History 20th century Sources. 4. Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), Archives. I. Naftali, Timothy J. II. Zelikow, Philip, 1954 III. May, Ernest R. IV. Series. E841.J dc W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT

3 102 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 Tuesday, October 23, 1962 Having lived so long with knowledge of nuclear peril, Americans reacted to Kennedy s speech with alarm but not panic. Everywhere, families stocked up on food, gasoline, and other emergency supplies. Reservists prepared for a call-up. In homes and in bars, television watchers saw footage of airplanes taking off and troop trains moving tanks and soldiers. An atmosphere of tension was pervasive. Kennedy s transition adviser, Richard Neustadt, a professor at Columbia University in New York, wrote Theodore Sorensen: The reaction among students here was qualitatively different from anything I ve ever witnessed.... [T]hese kids were literally scared for their lives. 1 All through the night, lights had burned in Washington. At the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and elsewhere in the intelligence community, analysts anxiously scrutinized every intelligence indicator of any Soviet military activity. While they saw Soviet (and Cuban) forces being brought to a higher state of readiness, they detected no evident deployments of field units for action against Berlin or Turkey. At 9:00 A.M. the representatives of the Organization of American States began meeting to consider the U.S. proposal for endorsement of U.S. goals and U.S. actions against Cuba and the Soviet Union, presented by Dean Rusk. The U.N. Security Council would begin its meeting later in the day. 10:00 11:03 A.M. [O]ne of the answers to this problem that Bobby raised, which you may not want to put on the record, but off the record, is that we re not saying that... this action alone because of the blockade, results in the elimination of these. Because quite obviously, they re already there. On the otherhand there s no action we ever could have taken, unless we d have invaded Cuba a year ago... and the 1. Montague Kern, Patricia Levering, and Ralph B. Levering, The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 126.

4 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis 103 fact of the matter is there wasn t anybody suggesting an invasion of Cuba at a time when they necessarily could have stopped these things coming onto the island.... So that what we are doing is throwing down a card on the table in a game which we don t know the ending of. Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban Missile Crisis 2 At 10:00 A.M. President Kennedy gathered his chosen advisers, now convened for the first time as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. He turned on the tape recorder as the intelligence briefing began. The initial five minutes of the recording were excised as classified information. Declassified summaries indicate that this portion of the briefing presented evidence about Soviet military activity and the exclusive involvement of Soviet personnel in manning missile sites, as well as some discussion of the nationality of the pilots flying the aircraft in Cuba. From what John McCone said on tape to congressmen the next day, McCone may have been reporting to the ExComm that about half of the MiG fighter aircraft were being flown by Russian pilots, one Czech flier had been identified, and the rest were being flown by Cubans. President Kennedy: What do you expect this question to be raised about here? The points which are going to be of concern? John McCone:... I think there is one photograph, I think it s here. See this one? Robert Kennedy: [as a quieter aside] Should I go now? 3 2. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Sheffield Edwards, Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Vice President Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Arthur Lundahl, John McCone, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, Maxwell Taylor, Llewellyn Thompson, and Jerome Wiesner. Tapes 34 and 35.1, John F. Kennedy Library, President s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection. 3. This brief exchange hints that the President and his brother had decided that, on cue, Robert Kennedy would press to hear John McCone s answer to a politically sensitive question about the discovery of the missiles. They knew McCone could be especially helpful in defusing such inquiries, both through his own contacts with journalists and with more credibility, as a Republican member of the administration. Their concern about what McCone might say was bound to have been sharpened by their knowledge that McCone had warned about Soviet mis-

5 104 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 President Kennedy: Yeah, you might as well get that over with because I think we ll probably need John McCone, who s got [unclear]. McCone: [Unclear] one of those downstairs. This is one matter that would interest you. This shows, in last night s photographs, three of the missiles at the M[R]-1 site, the most advanced medium-range type, have disappeared. We can t detect where they are, from yesterday s photography. Also, at other sites, there s evidence of extensive camouflage. I d like you to see those pictures, when you get there. Robert Kennedy: The question that I ve heard raised rather extensively is why this was not uncovered sooner, when there were some reports about it, to why we didn t know about it, and therefore why a blockade of some kind was not instituted earlier. And so that this is the second question, [whether] what we are doing now is, in fact, closing the barn door after the horse is gone. And those questions that will be raised.... President Kennedy: Well that ties into Senator Keating s frequent statements. I m having Senator Keating s statements analyzed. Actually they are quite inaccurate. He made a statement two days ago that it was being built there, pads, which would be ready for fire at the United States in six months. So his information was from... He had a piece of it, but it was not precise. But nevertheless that is going to be.... Now it seems to me that somebody in a responsible position ought to take up this question. I don t think that it s realized how quickly these mobile bases can be set up and how quickly they can be moved. So that I m just wondering now what is the judgment the question is getting this point over, in view of the next 24 hours. There will be some spraying all around. Arthur Krock s just beginning to say. 4 Then we ll just have that problem of... Robert McNamara: Mr. President, later today, as you will see, I believe I should have an on-the-record press conference. I had an off-therecord, or brief background, briefing for one hour last night with about siles in Cuba since August and had called repeatedly for more surveillance. The Kennedys also might have noted, the day before, the contrast between the loyal, supportive assurances of the you did all you could variety that they had heard at midday from the State Department intelligence chief, Roger Hilsman, and McCone s more reserved stance ( I wouldn t be too categoric that we had no information.... ) at the NSC meeting in the afternoon. 4. Arthur Krock, long a reporter covering Washington, was then a member of the editorial board of the New York Times. Krock had been a friend of Kennedy s father and a mentor to the young John Kennedy during the 1940s. Like the elder Kennedy, Krock was politically conservative, often sympathetic to the Republican Party, and the relationship between the older columnist and younger president had become wary and ambivalent.

6 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis newsmen and I covered this point at that time; however, I think that we need more than that. I think we need briefings of congressional personnel, more than were here last night. If necessary, we ought to send some people out, particularly to Jerry Ford, 5 for example, and certain other congressional leaders who will be asking this kind of a question. And there are many other individuals in the city that ought to be briefed apart from those that I will see tonight. The Scotty Restons and that. 6 President Kennedy: You ll see them at the press [unclear] McNamara: Well, I will probably not see Scotty Reston. But I think someone should have seen him privately. George Ball: I had a private talk with Scotty and went over this [unclear]. President Kennedy: What about John McCone? Any of these people that John [McCone] ought to see? Vice President Johnson: Yes. He ought to see [Senators Richard] Russell and [J. William] Fulbright as soon as he can today. I saw your speech with them last night, and I think that the attitude was much better than was indicated here. And, particularly, some of the statements that you made that you were going to prevent the use of these missiles against us, and that explains it a little better. That s better. We didn t quite say that in the meeting yesterday. They didn t get everything in the meeting they got from your speech and McCone can give them a good deal more. I tried to give them a little bit myself, later, after the speech. President Kennedy: Well, actually Vice President Johnson: [Congressman Carl] Vinson desired to see Mr. McCone this morning, and I told him that I thought he d clear up... President Kennedy: Well, why don t you see... McCone: Yeah, I ll do that. I ll see them a little later. President Kennedy: Now it seems to me, you may want to set for your committee, I mean the group of people that you deal with, just to get the.... But that s a natural thing, but I think so why don t you people that you know.... I think it should be on a completely off-therecord basis when you talk to them. McCone: Yeah, I ll talk to them. Well, I ll talk with Russell and 5. Gerald Ford, later President of the United States, was then a Republican member of the House of Representatives from Michigan. 6. James Scotty Reston was a prominent reporter and columnist for the New York Times.

7 106 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 [Congressman Carl] Vinson. They are the fellows that run the two committees that I deal with. President Kennedy: You might want to get Ford in. Doesn t mean you ll get him. McCone: Yes, that s a that brings in [Congressman Clarence] Cannon. McNamara: I can take care of Ford very McCone: I had a very long, long meeting with Cannon and Ford and [Congressman John] Taber, and [Congressman George] Mahon the day they left [after Congress recessed in mid-september]. Now, this was before we had the evidence. But there were enough shreds of things coming through so this will not... that I predicted that this is what we were going to bump into. But I told them we had no positive evidence. I think we ve handled Ford all right. McNamara: You ought to pick up Mahon too on that. McCone: Yeah. President Kennedy: What about now, now what problem is the... do you have an on-the-record [press conference]? McNamara: I think I should later today, particularly assuming we get this [presidential quarantine] proclamation out today, as soon as possible. President Kennedy: Now John, it seems to me you ought to talk to the people the Vice President suggested, and any others in the Congress. I don t think we ought to bring in too many. They just feed on each other. But I don t know whether there is any members of the press who are of particular significance who John McCone ought to talk to. McNamara: I think someone ought to catch [columnist Stewart] Alsop and Reston. Ball: I saw Reston. I saw Alsop with Reston and I had about an hour with them. McNamara: On this particular point, George? Ball: Well, we went over this point among others. And I think they were pretty well set. President Kennedy: Well, why doesn t John McCone use his judgment on how to respond and [unclear]. Why don t you [do] Alsop and McGeorge Bundy: Arthur Krock. President Kennedy: Well, Arthur. [Chuckles, unclear] come down on him. Bundy, didn t say Arthur, but maybe you re a friend of his, maybe... You use your judgment on that. McCone: Yeah.

8 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis 107 Ball: The three I saw yesterday were President Kennedy: He s [Krock s] suggesting this is part of the political campaign. Ball: were Alsop, Reston, [Washington Post editor] Al Friendly. And Walter Lippmann is coming in to see me this morning. President Kennedy: Yeah, I think [Hearst newspapers columnist] Bill White. Who wants to talk to Bill White? Ball: The Vice President would like [unclear]. President Kennedy: Him and... Llewellyn Thompson: [Publisher of the Washington Post] Phil Graham called me last night. And he was all right with that. Bill [Tyler] and I talked to him. President Kennedy:... [Reporter] Ben McKelway. What about Ben McKelway? Well, I ll tell you what, right after this meeting I ll have some suggestions to you and to the State [Department] about some of these special people that we think ought to get some special time today. McCone: I think I ll call up Eisenhower and get permission from him to use his name in talking with these congressional people. [Unclear] his view of this thing as a soldier. I wanted to bring it up last night [in the meeting with the congressional leadership], but I was afraid that it would be a violation of confidence. President Kennedy: I think on background too, because it s better to have it come from him than have it.... I think, they ll be in touch with him. I think the point is, this mobile [missile] business isn t quite clear. And everybody thinks that a military base takes a long time to construct, and I think that that s the [follow-up story] Bundy: The man that s very important from that point of view is [New York Times military affairs reporter] Hanson Baldwin. His article this morning is perfectly right on this. McNamara: We can get him [unclear]. Bundy: Can you can get past him? [Laughter.] McNamara: I guess, to him through the Navy. 7 Get to him all right. President Kennedy: [Unclear.] All right. Well, anyway, we ll get that. Robert Kennedy: What about the answer to the question of what we re going to do about them [the missiles already in Cuba]? President Kennedy: I don t think we probably ought to answer that. You d just better wait for the extra hour. 7. A graduate of Annapolis, Baldwin had long been a major conduit for Navy press leaks.

9 108 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 Robert Kennedy: All right, I would think that maybe they re going to ask Bob about this at the press conference, at the State Department. President Kennedy: Whether we re going to go invade rather than Robert Kennedy: Well, no. I suppose you d say we re going to try to make efforts through diplomatic McNamara: No, I would suggest not saying that. Last night they asked me that five times and I repeated every time in the words the President used: We will take such further action as is required to accomplish our objective. 8 Ball: That s exactly what we ve stuck to. McNamara: And they said: Well, does this mean military action? Bundy: It is of great importance that, unless we get a clear-cut decision around this table to change, we stay right with the President s speech. We re just getting, [U.S. ambassador to Moscow Foy] Kohler has reported that he was handed two documents, the Soviet statement which is just coming over the ticker and we have only an incomplete version and another thing, which he s sending telegraphically and he didn t say what it was. President Kennedy: Did we ever put out my letter to Khrushchev? He ll probably Bundy: No, sir. We told Khrushchev that we would not do so. President Kennedy: All right. Thompson: We told [Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly] Dobrynin. Bundy: What? President Kennedy: Now, the.... Thompson: The first Soviet reaction was cautious, including on Cuba. In both the TASS statement and Dobrynin s reaction, and the fact that it was the Cubans that raised this in the Security Council. Bundy: The first two pages of this [just-released TASS statement] are a rehash of stuff we ve heard before. I think Tommy [unclear]. President Kennedy: What s your second point, Bobby? Robert Kennedy: Just this. On the second, the fact that they re doing this. We ve taken this action after they ve got their missiles already there, unopposed. I think probably we get by with this answer for about 24 hours. But we re going to have difficulty after that. 8. President Kennedy s exact words were: Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities.

10 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis 109 McCone: [aside to Arthur Lundahl] Could I just share Just show these two or three pictures tomorrow [unclear]. Bundy: In a broader sense, I don t think the country s reaction is that we ve done too little. Robert Kennedy: The people are going to start thinking today about the fact that they re there, and what we President Kennedy: Well, what I was going to say that s what I was going to say I think we ought to get an analysis from CIA or from someone as to what the effects of a blockade of everything but food and medicine would be on Cuba, given their known supplies and what it would do to the country s economy, and what the political effects would be, in Cuba as well as outside. Because we should certainly have to have that as one of our possible courses of action. Robert Kennedy: Do we want that on Berlin too? President Kennedy: Yeah, I think probably, what the effect would be of a blockade in Berlin by them. Robert Kennedy: The same kind [of blockade]. Unidentified: Yes, there s much work that has already been done. Arthur Lundahl prepares to show a few additional items of photographic intelligence. Arthur Lundahl: Missiles up there, the MRBMs. You ll recall four of them. There s three of them here. The coverage of yesterday. President Kennedy: This was photographed yesterday, or the day before? Lundahl: Yesterday, sir. So the four of them were back there; there s only one of them at the forward position, so two of them have gone. President Kennedy: I see. Lundahl: And where they might have gone, we don t know at the present time. They could have been right back there in the trees. They could have been [unclear] to another locale. President Kennedy: I think that you, Bob, ought to have this point of this, emphasizing the mobility of these and the way they could have flown them in or taken them in by submarine and nobody would have known President Kennedy is concerned again that his administration might be accused of dilatory discovery of the Soviet missiles. In fact, the MRBMs were much too large to have been carried in a Soviet airplane or inside a Soviet submarine. Only cargo ships with specially designed holds or deck layouts (such as those used in the lumber trade) could carry the nearly 75-footlong missiles.

11 110 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 McNamara: Mr. President, I used this particular picture last night with the press. I showed it to them. I pointed out the mobility. I told them of the convoys coming in here, our watch of those. And that between Sunday and Monday, in one 24-hour period, I didn t identify the days, I stated the number of buildings that had been added, and the changes in the site situation. And to emphasize, I showed them also a picture of an IRBM site and emphasized the difference between MRBMs and IRBMs. And the MRBMs are mobile and that we estimated that they could be set up, torn down, moved, and set up again in a six-day period. And this was why it was only this week that this information became available. President Kennedy: Let s get that on the record, [unclear]. McNamara: And I have a transcript of that on tape. May I also say that those pictures were in the hands of the Tactical Air Command, as a basis for target folders, at 10:00 P.M. last night. We sent down how many is this 25 sets of them. So that we were taking U-2 photographs one day and targeting them the next. Based on them. President Kennedy: OK. Do you mind if I have these? McCone: This shows our coverage now. Everything in the island is covered except the [unclear] at this time. Lundahl: Ninety-seven percent. McCone: We have covered 97 percent. So that s rather [unclear]. We ll have three [low-level reconnaissance] missions out today. McNamara: Mr. President, the critical action we need to take is a determination of when the proclamation will be effective, the proclamation of the quarantine, the time it will be issued, the time it will become effective, and the time for the first intercept of a ship under the terms of that proclamation. We would propose that it be issued as soon as possible today following OAS action. We had hoped that that would be before six tonight. If it is issued before six tonight, we propose that the quarantine be effective at dawn tomorrow. This is a lesser grace period of approximately 12-hour grace period instead of the 24 hours that we have discussed previously. Eleven seconds excised as classified information. Furthermore, it ll be to our advantage to make the quarantine effective at dawn, because this will allow a day of naval activity, tomorrow, which would not be possible were the quarantine to be effective 24 hours after this evening. We would have to wait until the following day. We d like the day of naval activity tomorrow because there is one particular ship we re interested in.

12 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis 111 President Kennedy: The Poltava? McNamara: No, the Poltava is [Unclear interjection by President Kennedy]. Well I m not either. The Poltava is way out here on the 22nd and tomorrow morning it will be someplace in this area, which is still on the order of, perhaps 1,200 miles from Cuba, and we can t get a cruiser out there with any certainty by tomorrow morning with the necessary antisubmarine escort. So we would propose to go after this ship, which we believe has 70- foot hatches which are large enough to take the missiles, by which time that ship will be moving into this area. And we think that we can intercept it quite effectively. Unidentified: Which is that? The name? McNamara: The Kimovsk. President Kennedy: Wouldn t you guess anything that has a missile on it would be turned around last night? McNamara: Well, I think so. And we would like to have the first ship either turned around or stopped and found to have offensive weapons, one or the other. President Kennedy: We d like to grab this anyway, but of course if they turned around last night, they re back McNamara: Well, I doubt that they ve turned around yet. We have no indication they have, which will be checked today. But it would seem to me it s likely they ll turn around when they re halted or requested to halt in which case our first intercept has been successful. If they don t turn around, and we search and find offensive weapons on board, it s successful. What we wish to avoid is intercepting one of the other ships that may not have offensive weapons on it. President Kennedy: It was my argument, we just have to assume that any Russian ship, in view of our statement, that has offensive weapons will be turned around now. Unidentified: That s acceptance of the quarantine. President Kennedy: That s right. I mean they ll turn them around before they get within the range so that [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.] McNamara: I think our plan ought to be designed to try to catch an offensive-weapons ship. That s the objective, and to do it as promptly as possible after the effective time of the quarantine. And for that purpose, we d like the quarantine made effective tomorrow and go after that ship. Alexis Johnson: Do you put in a zone, Bob, where you intercept? You will declare a zone? McNamara: No, we don t propose to declare a zone.

13 112 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 Alexis Johnson: You intercept anyplace? McNamara: We ll intercept any place where it appears that the ship is moving towards Cuba. President Kennedy: What about the other ships? McNamara: We ll wait until we get the first one before we choose the second one. President Kennedy: Shouldn t we have stopped these though? McNamara: I don t believe so, Mr. President, until we have this first intercept. I think that it is extremely important to try to pick a ship that has offensive weapons on it. It would be wait a minute be an unfortunate incident if we hailed a ship that refused to stop; we then disable it and found it didn t have offensive weapons on it. That would be a poor way to start. Robert Kennedy: Poor way to start. McNamara: So what we re trying to do is find one that has offensive weapons. Hail it. And either have it turn around, in which case we ve had a success; or, alternatively, disable it and find the offensive weapons. President Kennedy: Well, what I think we ought to do is try to keep this on track. My guess is that anything that has offensive weapons in it, particularly missiles or missile support, will be turned around by them so that we don t grab it. And therefore, we ought to be able to announce in a day or two [unclear] which ships were turned around and which came out. McCone: You ve got them all under surveillance, haven t you? McNamara: Yes. McCone: You ll know if they ve turned them around. That Kimovsk is a good prospect. However, it s the type of ship that s used for the transportation of heavy construction equipment. This might be the purpose of that voyage. President Kennedy: May I just say that one of the answers to this problem that Bobby raised, which you may not want to put on the record, but off the record, is that we re not saying that there s any action that actually we re taking necessarily, that this action alone because of the blockade, results in the elimination of these. Because quite obviously, they re already there. On the other hand there s no action we ever could have taken, unless we d have invaded Cuba a year ago, to prevent them being there, because they could have come in, the missiles themselves could have come in by submarines and personnel in separately; particularly the mobile kind that they could set up in the week. And there s just no way, unless you were going to invade Cuba six months ago, really. You might say, no, we

14 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis 113 could have perhaps found them two weeks before, but you still wouldn t have found any until they were there. So there s no answer to this unless you were going to invade Cuba six months ago, or a year ago, or two years ago, or three years ago. That s the and the fact of the matter is there wasn t anybody suggesting an invasion of Cuba at a time when they necessarily could have stopped these things coming onto the island. It s possible they could have come on in July on the first ship, before the other technicians came on particularly the mobile kind. So that what we are doing is throwing down a card on the table in a game which we don t know the ending of. But it s not, at least, at the beginning. We recognize that the missiles are already there. But we also recognize there s not a damn thing anybody could do about the missiles being there unless we had invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs or a previous Cuban invasion the year before. That s part of your problem. Some of that you can t put on the record, but it s a very legitimate point. There was no way we could have stopped this happening. We could have stopped this four months ago, what with the SAM sites and all the rest, by an invasion last July. But you see they re going to put up mobile missiles, without an, unless we could have invaded some months ago you couldn t have stopped it. [Unclear.] Bundy: In my opinion one should add all the consequences of invasion at that time. Yes, I saw these. President Kennedy: And even the British [press] today are saying our action is too... The Manchester [Guardian] and all the lousy British press. They re not even with us today. Six months ago, when we would have had everything going... Bundy: The day we get the Manchester Guardian, Mr. President, we re wrong. [Laughs.] President Kennedy: OK. McNamara: Mr. President, based on the assumption the proclamation would be issued this evening, we would also like to issue the notice this evening that we are extending the tours of duty of all Navy personnel now on active duty and all Marine personnel on active duty, the reason being that we are entering a period of high activity for the Navy and we are utilizing the Marines to reinforce Guantánamo. This will require, or I think can best be done by, an executive order signed by you. I have such an executive order here. I will leave it with Ted Sorensen to bring to your attention today. We should have it signed today and we will issue that. Bundy: May I take you back one second? President Kennedy: Yes.

15 114 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 Bundy: There is no question of international law with respect to the amount of notice on a blockade? McNamara: No, we believe not. Our lawyers have examined that, Mac, and tell us we can if the proclamation is made effective tonight, we can make the quarantine effective tomorrow. Bundy: You should have this approved, Mr. President. President Kennedy: Yes, yes. McNamara: Then I will leave this executive order with you, Mr. President, and Mac... today. [Bundy agrees.] Now, you asked me yesterday to consider the reaction to a U-2 accident and we would recommend this: That SAC [Strategic Air Command] be instructed to immediately inform the Joint Chiefs, as far as myself and yourself, upon any deviation from course of a U-2 aircraft that is unexplained. 10 They maintain a minute-by-minute check on the U-2s as they proceed through their flight pattern. They will be able to tell us when the U-2 moves off course and, we believe, why, particularly if it s shot down. That information can be in here in a matter of minutes, literally 15 minutes after the incident. We are maintaining aircraft on alert that have the capability, if you decide to instruct it to do so, to go in and shoot the SAM site that shot down the U-2. There would be approximately eight aircraft required to destroy the SAM site. We would recommend the information on the U-2 accident to come in here and that we present recommendations to you at the time as to action required. I believe we would recommend that we send the eight aircraft out to destroy the SAM site. If that is your decision, those aircraft can move out, destroy the SAM site, and have it destroyed within two hours of the time the U-2 itself was struck, so that we could announce almost simultaneously the loss of the U-2 and the destruction of the SAM site that allegedly destroyed it. President Kennedy: Well, there are two questions. First, is it possible to send so that we assure the cause of the accident, is it possible to send an accompanying plane just outside the 3-mile limit [on Cuba s national airspace] or is that too burdensome and expensive? McNamara: Well, it s not so much that it s burdensome as it is uncertain. And we think that the best way to handle it is through the SAC report. 10. At that time the Strategic Air Command (in cooperation with the then-secret National Reconnaissance Office of the U.S. Air Force), not the CIA, was operating the U-2s flying over Cuba. Later SAC would draw on CIA pilots in support of its effort.

16 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis 115 President Kennedy: We ve got the.... Now is there somebody flying along? Is there some way, that if they do get hit, they can get into the ocean and you can get them picked up? McNamara: Yes, yes. We do have air-sea rescue aircraft associated with them. President Kennedy: Now, there are two things. First, do we want to indicate that in advance, number one? Or, number two, if we lose one of our officers in a plane, then the next fellow we send up... I suppose what we do is, when we take out that SAM site, we announce that if any U-2 is shot down, we ll take out every SAM site. McNamara: Exactly. Bundy: Is surveillance being reaffirmed in the OAS, George? Ball: No, it is not. Bundy: We think we have enough? We think we have enough? Ball: We have enough. Bundy: It s very clear [unclear]. President Kennedy: Then I would think what we would do is, if the first one [is shot down], we have to take it out [the offending SAM site], and then announce what s happened. And then we would announce that any further reconnaissance planes which are authorized by the OAS are done, then all these SAM sites are... [Bundy and Ball agree.] We would have to do a SAM site and a U-2 a day. Maxwell Taylor: One point I might make, Mr. President, I think it s highly unlikely we can really identify the guilty SAM site. President Kennedy: I understand. Taylor: It doesn t really matter, I don t think, however. And secondly, the Secretary mentions eight planes. I would like to reserve judgment on the total... approval on the total, because I think if we go in we send in... President Kennedy: Good. OK. Anybody have any question about this? McCone: A question that we do... Would you launch an attack on information received from the plane? Or would you wait until it has returned, so you ve got verification on it? McNamara: We would launch it on information received from the airplane. Bundy: Wouldn t it depend, how much information? President Kennedy: Well, I think we can make the... We re going to have the chance to... Bundy: Well, Mr. President, I think the next question I was going to ask is, if you are unavailable, which with a 15-minute thing of this kind we can t ever be certain of, in terms of the detail of the information...

17 116 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 Do you want to delegate that authority now to the Secretary of Defense or do you want to, or what s your...? President Kennedy: Well, what we want to do is, I will delegate to the Secretary of Defense on the understanding that the information would be very clear, that the accident that happened was not malfunction. Bundy: That it was in fact a matter of military action. President Kennedy: Action against us. McNamara: Only if you re unavailable and only if it s clear. President Kennedy: Now, the only other question is whether we ought to at some point, in the day after the OAS acts, I don t know whether we can reaffirm just unilaterally the OAS implementing the decision of October 6th on surveillance so that there is some warning. McNamara: I have told the press. I read the statement before my press conference last night and it s very clear. And I told the press on background that that was what we re going to do. And I think tonight I can say it after the OAS meeting, whether it reaffirms or doesn t reaffirm. President Kennedy: We won t say what our action will be. McNamara: No, we will simply say that we are continuing surveillance as, in effect, directed by the OAS. Alexis Johnson: Let me say, the OAS resolution as presently drafted is very broad. It, while not specifically mentioning surveillance as such, surveillance would be accompanied, encompassed [unclear], including use of armed... The resolution, proposed resolution is, recommends, that member states, in accordance with Article 6 in the Rio Treaty, take all measures, individually and collectively, including... use of armed force well, this certainly includes reconnaissance which they may deem necessary to ensure that the government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from a Sino-Soviet power military material. President Kennedy: Does that resolution... [It] would not give us the authority for an invasion, would it? Cause it just says, continue to receive [military material]? Alexis Johnson: Yes, it... I wouldn t... I d like to have the Secretary answer that, but I should think that President Kennedy: Has this been submitted to them [the OAS member countries]? Alexis Johnson: This is being submitted this morning. Ball: Well, no. But it s further than that... it says that [reading again from the draft OAS resolution] to ensure the government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent missiles and bases in Cuba with offensive capability from

18 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis 117 ever becoming active threats to the peace and security of the Continent. Which is practically everything that you could possibly ask for. President Kennedy: OK, all right. Can you continue, Mr. Secretary? McNamara: The next contingency is an air intercept. We don t know, and we re not prepared to recommend to you action relating to air intercept. We will maintain, with the help of CIA and our own resources, the careful watch on the movement of Soviet aircraft to Cuba. We ll inform you immediately upon receiving any information indicating such aircraft is moving in there. The Navy and the Joint Chiefs are considering how we might intercept and what the rules of engagement will be, and we will be prepared to talk about that later. You asked about the aircraft on alert against the nine missile sites. They are on alert. They will be prepared to move against those sites. We do believe we should have warning the night before, in preparation for a dawn strike, however. In an emergency, it could be done with less warning, but we would recommend against it, except in an emergency. Taylor: This is a part of the overall strike plan. We d have to pull out that portion and execute it. McNamara: The next subject: invasion preparations and the action we re taking to be prepared for an invasion. The most important single action we need to take, and the one with the longest lead time, is the chartering of merchant vessels, cargo vessels in particular. We need about 134 ships. Of the 134, about 20 are military vessels, we are diverting those from their other activities and assembling them now. Of the remaining 114 we started yesterday to charter, we chartered four yesterday. There are nine others we could have chartered that we turned down because they were either unsuitable or the price was too high. We propose to continue today to charter under forced draft. We may pick up another 10 to 20 ships today. That will leave us short perhaps 90 to 100 ships. We ll have to obtain those by requisitioning them. The 100-odd ships we need to requisition [unclear correction from someone]. The number of ships we ll requisition would be on the order of 60 to 70 percent of all ships in U.S. East Coast ports. So this is a tremendous dislocation of shipping. We re not prepared to recommend such requisitioning to you this morning. We do believe we should proceed to charter today and the Chiefs are working out a very careful analysis of when these additional ships are required in relation to the early days of an invasion. We think that the action we re proposing is satisfactory for today. We do not propose to call up today the transport aircraft, 21 squadrons 16 aircraft apiece, some 300 transport aircraft, that would come from the Air Reserve and [Air National] Guard that are essential

19 118 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 for the invasion forces. This can be done at the start of the preparations for the invasion, either simultaneous with the air strike or shortly before, giving a lead time of something on the order of five to seven days for those air squadrons. So we don t believe that today we need to take that action. McCone: I d like to bring up the shipping again. This concerns me because you not only preempt the large percentage of the ships, but you also affect industry in a great many areas. For instance, the lumber industry in the entire Northwest is dependent upon American-flag ships coming around. And these come from Japan, Honolulu, and elsewhere, and pick up cargoes and come around. What you do by preempting these ships is you turn off, you turn the entire East Coast lumber business over to Canada. Now practically all industry that ships by water is affected, either they ship coastwise or intercoastal. I wonder if we shouldn t consider using flags of the ships of friendly nations. There s great numbers of ships laying around and your entire requirement could be served by a fraction of the cost. If this could be done, and I raise this just as a matter of policy, whether there is legal restriction or whether it would be impossible to arrange diplomatically... But I would think the Germans, for instance, might go along. There are a hell of a lot of German ships around, British ships. Taylor: I would think the risk involved, Mr. President, would preclude any offering of foreign bottoms if they get involved in an invasion of Cuba, which they soon will. McCone: Well, you might man them. [Unclear.] Taylor: Underwriting [unclear]. McNamara: The question of what to do on shipping is a very complicated one. All I m prepared to recommend now is that we go ahead with chartering on a commercial basis, voluntary basis. And tomorrow we ll be prepared to raise it again. We have Admiral [John] Sylvester of the Navy in charge of this. He s examining all alternatives and we just don t know what course we should follow. McCone: I think, in addition to the problem of the ships themselves, you ought to look at the effect on the economy. McNamara: We are, exactly. McCone: This could be very, very serious. McNamara: Yes. This is the primary reason why we re not recommending requisitioning. It will disturb the whole export flow of goods. McCone: Well, it won t disturb the export because most of your export, or a great part of your export, goes in foreign bottoms. McNamara: Well, a lot of it goes in American bottoms. And it will disturb the trade in any case, we agree.

20 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis 119 McCone: What s got to be affected is your coastal lines and intercoastal operations, which can t go on foreign bottoms. It s against the law. This is what s going to be affected. President Kennedy: Well, now can we there s no way I know what the law says but is there any power we ve got that can exempt them from that law during this period? We shouldn t be that hamstrung. Is there anything that national emergency powers, anything? McCone: I don t know whether there is or not. Robert Kennedy and Bundy: You can look it up. President Kennedy: You could ship by foreign bottoms, that would... Bundy: Who will do that? Unidentified: The Attorney General. President Kennedy: Who s working with you on the shipping over in your shop? Roswell Gilpatric: I m working with Admiral Sylvester of the Navy. President Kennedy: OK. McNamara: Next point is to confirm again, Mr. President, we propose to exclude petroleum, oil, and lubricants from the initial list of prohibited goods. The final point relates to low-level reconnaissance. I believe it s John McCone s recommendation, as it is that of the Chiefs, that we undertake a series of low-level flights today to establish details of these missiles and to obtain the evidence to prove to a layman the existence of missiles in Cuba. Ball: May I raise the question please, sir, on the matter of exempting POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants]. One of these things which we might think about as an action to be taken on the loss of a U-2, would be a tightening of the embargo. And the next obvious step is to POL. Now we may not want to take it to that point. But I think this is something we should at least give consideration to. Gilpatric: You can look at it every day, George, and see [unclear]. President Kennedy: Well now, it seems to me, I think the films, unless we need them for tactical reasons, I think we ve proved it to the laymen. The only question is if you need the... you don t want to do the low-level flights Bundy: Mr. President, may I comment on that? Because the question of evidence is becoming of great importance in the international debate. Now, it s too soon to be sure what the reaction will be in the United Nations but we ve had a number of calls, both from Mr. Stevenson and from Mr. [John] McCloy, emphasizing the importance of proof at the U.N. Taylor: Has the President seen that [unclear]?

21 120 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 Unidentified: That s SAC with the low level [photography], Mr. President. President Kennedy: That s what? Unidentified: That s SAC at low level. President Kennedy: Where exactly? McNamara: In from Florida. It starts here and moves across the entire area. This is [at an altitude of] approximately 200 feet, we believe. President Kennedy: So, in other words, then, we d do that today? McNamara: That would be our recommendation. President Kennedy: There is a question about whether these things really exist? Bundy: Oh, Mr. President, we have an immediate question as to what to say about what we now know. For example, our position currently has been that we will show pictures without leaving them in people s hands and not making them available for publication. We showed them to friends and to newspaper men, but not in the [U.N.] Security Council. I, myself, think we are now ready to take the view that the pictures can be shown in the Security Council, if I understood the directive this morning. The second question is whether locations can be mentioned. There is some feeling in New York that if we say we ought to go and look at the town of Umpty-ump, that this will carry conviction. The question that I would put is, which towns, whether to do this and, if so, which towns? We obviously must not do it in a way which indicates that we only know thus, because that will show what, if anything, we re missing. But it may be that the best thing to do is to defer that question for 24 hours. President Kennedy: Well, I don t think we ought to give them the towns until we ve gotten some agreement [in the U.N.] that they re really going to go there. Because they could be moving these [missiles] anyhow. We d give away quite a lot. I don t know whether we get a hell of a lot until we Bundy: Fixed sites are the ones that one might suggest. [Unclear exchange in which McNamara, Bundy, and McCone chime in that the photos of fixed sites (which have no missiles yet) are the least persuasive.] President Kennedy: Well then, why don t we do this filming thing then anyway, because... You re going to start moving people.... Robert Kennedy: If could raise a question. When we were over at the laboratory the other day the indication was that the low Robert Kennedy s visit, with McNamara, to the National Photographic Interpretation Center on Saturday morning, 20 October.

22 ExComm Meeting of the NSC on the Missile Crisis 121 McNamara: I think they were wrong, Bobby. This is a strip [of film] taken to show the benefits of low level. Ten seconds excised as classified information. McCone: This is new film, a new camera, and it s very, very much better. The reason I feel this, Mr. President, is there s been some comment in the European press that s been skeptical both Britain and the French. Most particularly, [Mexican president López] Mateos made a statement in the Philippines that, if the evidence was conclusive, the attitude of Mexico toward Castro and Cuba would change. 12 And I think we ought to get the conclusive evidence, and I think this is the way to do it. Unidentified: I think this is a way of proving [unclear]. President Kennedy: OK. [Unclear.] Bundy: Do you want to put [unclear]? Unidentified: Right now? McCone: Yes. McNamara: Yes. They re on alert now. Taylor: We would take [unclear]. President Kennedy: Well now, General, they go in under the radar, do they? This does not give away... If we re going to have to do that technique again [for an air strike], this doesn t give away our abilities too much? Taylor: No, sir, we don t think so. We don t think there s any real danger, but there s always a certain amount in doing it. If we start a milk run [an easy mission] in the same place, we would [unclear]. President Kennedy: OK. Fine. Robert Kennedy: Will that give away exactly where we know that the Bundy: Are you going through everything? [speaking over others] Do you want to leave one out, or put some others in? McNamara: No, I think we ought to do all nine [missile sites]. Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but do you think it would be worthwhile? Bundy: How about the suspected tenth [missile site] that was in the papers this morning? McNamara: Well, we don t know where the tenth is. We looked very carefully last night for it. 12. Mexico s president Adolfo López Mateos was visiting Manila when the crisis broke, and his plane was met by Americans bearing evidence about the missile deployment when it refueled in Honolulu en route back home.