Realism and Anti-Realism about Science A Pyrrhonian Stance

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Realism and Anti-Realism about Science A Pyrrhonian Stance"

Transcription

1 international journal for the study of skepticism 5 (2015) brill.com/skep Realism and Anti-Realism about Science A Pyrrhonian Stance Otávio Bueno University of Miami otaviobueno@mac.com Abstract Pyrrhonists provide a way of investigating the world in which conflicting views about a given topic are critically compared, assessed, and juxtaposed. Since Pyrrhonists are ultimately unable to decide between these views, they end up suspending judgment about the issues under examination. In this paper, I consider the question of whether Pyrrhonists can be realists or anti-realists about science, focusing, in particular, on contemporary philosophical discussions about it. Although prima facie the answer seems to be negative, I argue that if realism and anti-realism are understood as philosophical stances rather than particular doctrines that is, if they are conceptualized in terms of a mode of engagement, a style of reasoning, and some propositional attitudes the apparent tension between Pyrrhonism, realism, and anti-realism vanishes. The result is a first step in the direction of bringing Pyrrhonism to bear on contemporary debates in the philosophy of science. Keywords realism anti-realism Pyrrhonism stance voluntarism 1 Introduction: Pyrrhonism and Pyrrhonists It is well known that Pyrrhonism is not a philosophical doctrine, and the Pyrrhonist is not someone who defends philosophical views. Rather, Pyrrhonism is a particular strategy of investigation. It can be thought of as an ability to manage opinion and information. In his description of this philosophy in the influential Outlines of Pyrrhonism (ph), Sextus Empiricus (2000) notes: koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 doi /

2 146 Bueno Skepticism [that is, Pyrrhonism] is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgment and afterwards to tranquility. ph I 8; italics added Sextus here makes it clear that Pyrrhonism is an ability of investigation, and the exercise of that ability is a way of implementing inquiry. The Pyrrhonists strategy of investigation consists primarily in the examination of arguments for and against a certain conclusion. Since for them these arguments seem to be equally persuasive, Pyrrhonists are unable to decide between the considerations provided, and as a result suspension of judgment emerges. It is also well known that Pyrrhonism does not involve beliefs; at least beliefs about the ultimate nature of things. On some interpretations, Pyrrhonism allows for beliefs about the appearances, as long as these beliefs are not thought of as involving dogmatic claims about what is really going on.1 Pyrrhonists tell us that they are not committed to establish the way things are (they are not dogmatists). They also tell us that they have no commitment to establish the way things are not (they are not negative dogmatists). Rather, they continue the investigation and, being genuinely unable to decide the issues under consideration, end up suspending judgment. Sextus himself highlights this point. Discussing the different kinds of philosophy, he notes: [I]n the case of philosophical investigations some have said that they have discovered the truth, some have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still investigating. Those who are called Dogmatists in the proper sense of the word think that they have discovered the truth for example, the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics, and some others. The schools of Academics have asserted that things cannot be apprehended. And the Skeptics are still investigating. Hence the most fundamental kinds of philosophy are reasonably thought to be three: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Skeptical. ph I 2 4 A distinctive trait of Pyrrhonism is the fact that it involves continuing the investigation rather than claiming that the truth has been established 1 For different interpretations of this issue within ancient Pyrrhonism, see the papers collected in Burnyeat and Frede (1997).

3 Realism and Anti-Realism about Science 147 (as dogmatic philosophers do) or asserting that the truth cannot be settled (as academic philosophers insist on). Pyrrhonists do not stop their inquiry for to do so would amount to either a form of dogmatism or simply giving up on investigating. After all, if Pyrrhonists stopped because they have found the truth, they would become dogmatists; if they stopped because they concluded that the truth couldn t be found, they would become negative dogmatists (which is what Academic philosophers amount to in Sextus classification of philosophical investigations above). What if they stopped because they got tired, sick or decided to do something else with their lives? In this case, the Pyrrhonist would simply abandon investigating and would also abandon being a Pyrrhonist. Even a temporary commitment to claiming that things are really a certain way (or that one cannot ever decide how they are) would take Pyrrhonists beyond Pyrrhonism. Suspension of judgment is, thus, an integral part of the Pyrrhonian investigation. But can the Pyrrhonist simply voluntarily decide to suspend judgment? Can one voluntarily decide to withhold belief? To the extent that deciding to believe in something is a puzzling phenomenon, the same seems to go for deciding not to believe and for deciding neither to believe in something nor to believe in its negation hence to suspend belief on the topic under consideration. This raises the issue of the connection between voluntarism and Pyrrhonism. Which degree (if any) of voluntary control over one s beliefs and opinions is possible, including the management of opinion involved in suspending judgment? And once voluntarism is on the table, how far does it extend? Does the Pyrrhonist suspend judgment about everything, or is such suspension somehow restricted? As is well known, Pyrrhonists follow the appearances, and the issue regarding the suspension of judgment about them doesn t emerge, since appearances are not claims about the way things are. Considerations as to whether to suspend one s judgment or not arise only once particular claims are made. These claims may be about a range of issues, including ordinary situations, scientific matters, or philosophical doctrines (among other possibilities). Whenever a claim is made (particularly about the nature of things), Pyrrhonian investigation strategies apply. To make the discussion concrete, in this paper I will examine claims involved in making sense of science, focusing on realist and on anti-realist views about it. In particular, is there a form of realism underlying Pyrrhonism? That is, do Pyrrhonists assume that scientific theories properly describe the world? Or, alternatively, does Pyrrhonism presuppose some form of antirealism? That is, do Pyrrhonists assume that scientific theories need not (or cannot) be true?

4 148 Bueno In this paper, I will address these topics by examining three issues within Pyrrhonism: (a) (b) (c) Are Pyrrhonists voluntarists? Are Pyrrhonists realists (in particular, about science)? Are Pyrrhonists anti-realists (in particular, about science)? The question (a), about voluntarism within Pyrrhonism, can be raised, of course, quite independently of questions (b) and (c), about the Pyrrhonian attitude toward realism and anti-realism. But I address the voluntarism issue in the context of the realism debate since this issue will pave the way to the discussion, central to my argument, of philosophical stances (van Fraassen 2002). As I use this concept, a stance is a practice of investigation composed of a mode of engagement, a style of reasoning, and some propositional attitudes (see Rowbottom and Bueno 2011). (I ll discuss each of these components in detail below.) And by understanding realism and anti-realism as philosophical stances, I will argue that there is no incompatibility between Pyrrhonism, realism and anti-realism. Thus, in the end, my answers to the three questions above are the same: no and yes (as long as we properly understand what is being asked). But there is no inconsistency in the Pyrrhonian attitude, since these answers, as so much else within Pyrrhonism, are not committing, given a proper use of stances. Before proceeding: a word of warning. In the discussion of Pyrrhonism, I will sometimes raise issues that ancient Pyrrhonists, such as Sextus, have not explicitly discussed. For instance, our contemporary conceptions and theories in science are significantly different from those found in Ancient Greece, although there are important similarities between them. But the hope is that what I have to say about Pyrrhonism captures, or at least is compatible with, the central features of the Pyrrhonian attitude. If not, consider the attitude I discuss as a form of neo-pyrrhonism.2 2 The term neo-pyrrhonism has been used, in different ways, by Robert Fogelin (1994) and Oswaldo Porchat Pereira (2007). Fogelin explores the implications of Pyrrhonism to contemporary debates in epistemology (particularly in accounts of knowledge and justification). Porchat tries to identify, more broadly, positive contributions of Pyrrhonism beyond the usual strategies of suspension of judgment. I am examining here the implications of Pyrrhonism to the framing of the realism/anti-realism debate in general philosophy of science, within broadly Porchatian lines. (I owe to Porchat much of my understanding of ancient Pyrrhonism.)

5 Realism and Anti-Realism about Science Pyrrhonism and Voluntarism Voluntarism is the view according to which one can have some level of voluntary control over one s beliefs. It is common to distinguish the scope of voluntarism relative to the kinds of beliefs that are involved. (i) Basic perceptual beliefs are typically not included in the scope of voluntarism. We cannot simply decide to believe, given a table and our normal perceptual modalities, that there is no such table in front of us. We would normally need to have some defeaters in order to rule out the belief that the table is there (such as that we are hallucinating it). And even then, typically, the table will still seem to be in front of us if we have the corresponding visual experience. (ii) Inferred, theoretical beliefs are the usual candidates for beliefs under voluntary control. Suppose someone asks you: How many empty sets exist? Perhaps someone (say, a nominalist) answers: sets don t exist; therefore, there are no empty sets. But someone else (say, a platonist) may think that the proper answer may require stronger ontological commitments (which, it is thought, the question presupposes). A different answer is then provided: sets do exist, and there is only one empty set (the one referred to in the correct set theory). Alternatively, someone else (say, a more thoroughgoing platonist) may give yet another answer: sets exist, and there are several, in fact, infinitely many, empty sets (one for each rank in type theory; one for each possible set theory etc.). Which of these answers should you give? After examining the available arguments, it s by no means obvious that any one of them is ultimately telling none of them forces you to believe in a particular answer. It is not as though a single answer is the only viable alternative and needs to be adopted. As a result, you may then decide to believe one way or the other.3 Thus, there is an important difference between perceptual and theoretical beliefs. The former seem involuntary given your visual experiences whereas the latter seem to be within the scope of our voluntary control. I can t avoid forming the belief that I m typing on a laptop computer at this moment, just as presumably you can t avoid forming the belief that you are reading these words. In contrast, theoretical beliefs provide significantly more room for adjustment and control. 3 This seems to be a typical situation in philosophical debates. Usually there are several arguments in support of a certain philosophical view, and several arguments against it. But nothing forces one to believe that particular position. As a consequence, one can decide to believe one way or the other. Needless to say, this is precisely the kind of scenario explored by the Pyrrhonist.

6 150 Bueno There are those who deny that this is the case. Some theoretical beliefs force themselves upon us just as perceptual beliefs do. When Kurt Gödel writes that we have something like a perception of the objects of set theory (1964: 485), he is ultimately noting that, on his view, we are able to perceive these objects as having certain properties and lacking others, just as we perceive physical objects in our environment: this process also involves recognizing the objects in question as having or lacking certain properties. Gödel emphasizes that the perception of set-theoretic objects can be seen from the fact that the axioms [of set theory] force themselves upon us as being true (1964: 485). On his view, we have direct intuition of the truth of basic mathematical axioms, including those axioms of set theory (and arithmetic). As a result, if the relevant axioms force themselves upon us as being true, it seems that the resulting theoretical beliefs are not open to our voluntary control, just as perceptual beliefs are not. Since Gödel s account highlights a putative similarity between mathematical intuition and perception, it putatively supports an important analogy between perceptual and (at least some) theoretical beliefs. One could then use such a Gödelian account to resist voluntarism about some theoretical beliefs.4 How about Pyrrhonists, do they adopt voluntarism? There is one sense in which the answer is clearly No. Suppose that voluntarism is thought of as a particular philosophical view about the nature of belief formation. The view insists that, at least for a range of theoretical, inferred beliefs, it is under our voluntary control whether we are going to form or not a particular belief of this kind. Understood in this way, this is precisely the sort of view about which Pyrrhonists suspend judgment. They will point out that there is disagreement about the truth of voluntarism: some defend it; others reject it. On the one hand, a voluntarist epistemology is an important feature of Bas van Fraassen s empiricist account of science, including, in particular, theoretical beliefs (van Fraassen 1989; 2002). On the other hand, we saw that even regarding theoretical beliefs a Gödelian view could be invoked to resist voluntarism about them. Pyrrhonists, however, are unable to decide the issue. There are good arguments to resist voluntarism about theoretical beliefs, given the similarities between intuition and perception, but there are also good arguments to adopt voluntarism about such beliefs, given that they generally allow for adjustments under our control. It is genuinely unclear for Pyrrhonists how to decide 4 For further discussion of Gödel s view on this issue, see Maddy (1990) and Parsons (2008). Eli Chudnoff (2013) develops a fascinating account of intuition according to which, similarly to perceptions, intuitions have presentational phenomenology. On his account, just as in Gödel s, it is less clear whether there is room for voluntarism about at least some theoretical beliefs.

7 Realism and Anti-Realism about Science 151 between the two opposing views. This leads them to suspend judgment about the issue, and as a result, it cannot be said that they embrace voluntarism. There is, however, a sense in which a Pyrrhonist seem to be a voluntarist. Perhaps the best way to understand the Pyrrhonian attitude regarding voluntarism is to consider it as a form of voluntary agnosticism: voluntarism regarding suspension of judgment. It is under one s voluntary control whether one suspends judgment or not about a given issue. But this point needs to be understood carefully. The Pyrrhonist is genuinely unable to decide between rival accounts of a given issue. In this respect, suspension of judgment simply emerges from the inability to decide, and is not a voluntary action. However, Pyrrhonists can voluntarily produce the conditions under which they will be led to such suspension. In this way, they systematically explore a form of voluntarism as part of their investigation: they actively look for counterarguments to balance the weight of evidence offered by the particular view under examination. The active process of search for counterarguments creates a situation in which Pyrrhonists end up being struck by the equal force of arguments, pro and con, regarding the issue at hand the opposing evidence that is generated from this search. The result is then suspension of judgment.5 But it is important to note that voluntary agnosticism is not a philosophical view. Pyrrhonists would suspend judgment about any such proposal. Rather, the idea is simply that Pyrrhonists seem to exhibit some voluntary control over their suspension of judgment. To insist on this point: Pyrrhonists voluntarily engage with the process of continually examining the evidence for and against a certain claim until their ability to suspend judgment is manifest being unable to decide the issue (given the evidence), they suspend judgment and then recurrently repeat this process, again and again. This suspension of judgment may be thought of as a form of voluntarism; it does not lead to the commitment to a particular belief, but rather to the lack of commitment, since no belief is acquired. What we have here is the suspension of judgment typical of the agnostic who holds no view about the nature of the matter under consideration. However, there may be a problem for Pyrrhonism if it is conceptualized in terms of voluntary agnosticism. It may be objected that, if voluntary agnosticism is invoked, one does not obtain a serious form of skepticism (Lammenranta 2008: 15). In order to obtain suspension of judgment, Pyrrhonists may need to choose the evidence selectively. After all, it is only on extremely rare occasions that the evidence will point equally strongly in opposite directions. If the 5 See Alston (1988) for an examination of different kinds of control of belief (and other propositional attitudes).

8 152 Bueno evidence is collected responsibly, and if it is taken properly into account, the argument goes, suspension of judgment will rarely emerge. As a result, Pyrrhonists do not seem to be serious inquirers interested in the truth, and the corresponding form of skepticism, if it involves choosing selectively the evidence, is not very serious either. As Lammenranta notes: If the skeptic really finds such equally convincing oppositions everywhere, this requires that she attend only to arguments that are equally strong on both sides of the issue, and manage to forget arguments that do not balance in this way. But why should anybody try to do this? If we aim at truth, we should rather take all arguments on both sides of the issue into account, and these arguments typically do not balance. 2008: 15 In response, three points should be made. (a) Pyrrhonists do not require that the evidence point equally strongly in opposite directions. As Lammenranta presumably agrees, no one should require that either. If the total evidence available supported P and if it also supported not-p (thus supporting P and not-p), it would be seriously misleading as evidence. The total evidence is not required to support, equally well, contradictory (or even contrary) claims. Rather, the evidence is such that one is unable to decide whether P or not-p is the case. There may be evidence for P and some other evidence for not-p (not for both!), and it may be unclear how to rule out the evidence in each case. It may be argued that if a part of the evidence supports P and some other part supports not-p, then the evidence as a whole supports P and not-p equally strongly, since it would give both, say, a probability around 0.5. But in this case it seems that one would not be in a position of favoring P over not-p (or vice versa), which is precisely the situation the Pyrrhonian skeptic is in. Of course, Lammenranta is not suggesting that the evidence is contradictory, but that skeptics selectively choose the evidence, and somehow manage to forget arguments that do not balance in this way. But is this really the case? (b) I don t think Pyrrhonists selectively choose the evidence. If they did that, it would be perfectly appropriate to ignore them. But the situation is very different. Suppose that the available evidence supports one party to a dispute. In response, Pyrrhonists will question to what extent the evidence in fact provides the relevant support. However, this is done dialectically. For example, Pyrrhonists may indicate considerations that seem to question, if not completely undermine, the alleged evidence. Or they may suggest considerations that seem to favor the negation of the conclusion supported so far. As a result, they will note, one cannot conclude just yet that the evidence favors one party to the debate.

9 Realism and Anti-Realism about Science 153 But are there always undermining considerations that favor the negation of the conclusion at issue? Lammenranta s point is that often there are not. Pyrrhonists disagree. In fact, their practice of investigation consists in keep searching for such undermining considerations to counterbalance the dogmatists claims. And by uncovering counterarguments, Pyrrhonists can resist the excesses of those who claim to have found the true nature of things. However, what would happen if the undermining considerations couldn t be found, and Pyrrhonists were unable to provide suitable counterarguments to a given claim? If after searching further with no success (perhaps the person who could provide the counterargument hasn t been born yet?), Pyrrhonists might eventually convince themselves that there were no such counterarguments. In that case, they would no longer be Pyrrhonists, and would become dogmatic philosophers. That s a possibility that Pyrrhonists don t rule out, and this fact underscores the seriousness of the Pyrrhonian investigation. (c) In light of these considerations, we can see why Pyrrhonism does not produce an irresponsible form of inquiry. On the contrary, Pyrrhonists are exceedingly careful and systematic in their adjudication of disputes, and refrain from making judgments in the absence of suitable evidence. If, in the end, it turns out that the evidence does not clearly favor either side of the issue under consideration the arguments Pyrrhonists consider seem to be equally persuasive to them suspension of judgment results. 3 Pyrrhonism and Realism In the contemporary literature, there are many forms of realism about science. I will mention three prominent ones: (i) Standard scientific realism (Putnam 1979; Boyd 1990; Psillos 1999): According to the scientific realist, scientific theories are true (or approximately true), and the terms of these theories refer (to relevant objects in the world). Moreover, scientific theories are empirically successful because they provide true (or approximately true) accounts of the objects that compose the world. However, concerns about how to accommodate reference in the context of scientific change have motivated an alternative realist view that does not rely on such reference. On this view, rather than securing reference to particular entities, the realist should be realist about the relevant structures (characterized, in particular, by suitable properties and relations). The resulting view is a structural form of realism. (ii) Structural realism (Worrall 1989, Ladyman 1998; French and Ladyman 2003a, 2003b; French 2006): For the structural realist, scientific theories are

10 154 Bueno true (or approximately true); however, the truth of these theories does not depend on the referential success of their terms, but on their ability to capture the relevant structure of the world. Scientific theories are empirically successful because they provide true (or approximately true) accounts of such structure. But how should we make sense of what a structure is if it is not characterized (or constituted) by underlying objects? Is it intelligible for relations to be primary than objects? Concerns of this kind have motivated an alternative realist view that incorporates both structural and object-oriented features. The resulting view is semirealism. (iii) Semirealism (Chakravartty 2007): According to the semirealist, scientific theories are true (or approximately true), but the terms of these theories refer to both objects (that is, relevant entities in the world) and properties (in particular, properties that can be detected). The cluster of these properties and the particular relations that hold among the objects under consideration yield the relevant structures. Scientific theories are empirically successful because they provide true (or approximately true) accounts of the detection properties in the world, and thus they provide proper accounts of the relevant objects and the appropriate structures in which they feature. In a certain respect, semirealism inhabits a common ground between an entity-based scientific realism and structural realism. On the one hand, the role of objects in scientific success is emphasized, given that objects need to be properly identified; on the other hand, the role of structural considerations is also stressed by noting the importance of detection properties and the relations among the objects in question. Are Pyrrhonists realists? There is one sense in which the answer is No. Scientific realism, structural realism and semirealism are all philosophical views about the nature of science. They are precisely the sorts of thing about which Pyrrhonists suspend judgment. There is, of course, disagreement about which of these views is correct. Structural realists argue that scientific realism is inadequate given its commitment to the metaphysics of objects. Scientific realists complain about the intelligibility of the structural realist conception of a structure without any objects. Semirealists point out the shortcomings in both views, finding a common ground that acknowledges some role for objects and structures (determined, in part, as noted, by detection properties). In turn, scientific realists will complain that the semirealist picture concedes too much to the structural realist by acknowledging the role of structures. And structural realists will complain that the semirealist picture concedes too much to the scientific realist by acknowledging the role of objects. Pyrrhonists, being unable to decide these issues without begging

11 Realism and Anti-Realism about Science 155 the question against some of these views, suspend judgment. In this sense, Pyrrhonists are not realists, and they could not be, given the dogmatic characterization of science these views provide (in the sense that they advance defenses of what scientific knowledge ultimately is). There is, however, a sense in which Pyrrhonists can be thought of as being realists. They are, after all, searching for the truth, which is, as should be clear by now, the central feature shared by all realist accounts of science. In fact, searching for the truth is perhaps the only feature among realist views about which there is some agreement. But in what sense are realists searching for the truth? There are at least two ways of answering this question.6 One is to understand it as a question about the proper interpretation of science (the question is, thus, raised at the metalevel): Scientific realists are trying to articulate the correct interpretation of scientific theories; they are seeking the truth about which epistemology of science is right. In this sense of truth seeking, there seems to be no difference with antirealism. But there is another way of understanding the question as addressing something about the world (the question is, thus, raised at the firstorder level): Realists are searching for truths about how the world is beyond the appearances, by interpreting scientific theories as they do. In this way of understanding the question, realism and anti-realism are significantly different. One could imagine Pyrrhonists seeking both sorts of truth. They could be trying to determine what is the proper interpretation of scientific theories, but they could just as well be searching for truths about the world that go beyond the appearances. It just happens that Pyrrhonists haven t found these truths yet. But that doesn t prevent them from persisting in trying to find them, and thus continuing the search. As Sextus tells us: Men of talent, troubled by the anomaly of things and puzzled as to which of them they should rather assent to, came to investigate what in things is true and what false, thinking that by deciding these issues they would become tranquil. ph I 12 Here we have a description of the way in which a person of talent eventually became a Pyrrhonist: it was by searching for such truths, and by systematically failing to be able to decide them, that this person eventually noted the rashness of deciding the issues under consideration. The difficulty to make a 6 Thanks, here, to Anjan Chakravartty.

12 156 Bueno decision emerged from the fact that to every account an equal account could be opposed (ph i 12), and Pyrrhonists were unable to decide between the conflicting accounts. In fact, it s precisely the ability to make such oppositions that Pyrrhonists explore in their inquiry, and the oppositions include, I suggest, different interpretations of scientific theories and conflicting claims about the way the world is beyond the appearances. In fact, it is this ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all (ph i 8; italics added) that Pyrrhonists explore. Among those items that are thought and opposed in any way at all, I suggest, we have the two different ways of interpreting the realist s search for truth. As a result of their investigation, however, being unable to decide between opposed and equally persuasive accounts, Pyrrhonists eventually come to hold no beliefs (ph i 12). Hence, since they are still searching for the truth in either of the two senses just identified they can be thought to be realists, without, however, being committed to realism as a philosophical doctrine. But how exactly should realism be understood in this case? Clearly, for Pyrrhonists to be realists, realism cannot be conceived of as a particular doctrine to be believed (as noted, Pyrrhonists will just suspend judgment about such a view). But realism can be thought of in a different way: it can be conceived of as a practice of investigation (with associated goals, norms, methods, and techniques); in other words, it can be conceived of in terms of what I will refer to as a stance. In the contemporary philosophical literature about science, Bas van Fraassen has been responsible, perhaps more than anyone else, for rehabilitating the concept of stance. On his view: A philosophical position can consist in something other than a belief in what the world is like. We can, for instance, take the empiricist s attitude toward science rather than his or her beliefs about it as the more crucial characteristic. A philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, approach, a cluster of such possibly including some propositional attitudes such as beliefs as well). Such a stance can of course be expressed, and may involve or presuppose some beliefs as well, but cannot be simply equated with having beliefs or making assertions about what there is. van Fraassen 2002: The central feature of a stance is the attitude one has toward a domain of inquiry (say, a certain portion of the world) rather than the particular beliefs one may have about it. To talk about a stance is to emphasize the relevant attitude.

13 Realism and Anti-Realism about Science 157 But this doesn t yet answer the question of what a stance is. In particular, what is involved in having a certain attitude toward a given domain? Although van Fraassen does not elaborate on this point, a number of authors have considered this very issue. In particular, a stance can be thought of as having three components (see Rowbottom and Bueno 2011): (a) A stance has a mode of engagement, that is, it involves a particular way of approaching the world. For example, in considering a certain situation, someone can be more or less active, more or less contemplative; the person can also be more investigative or more dogmatic in examining the domain. (b) A stance also has a style of reasoning, that is, it involves certain patterns of inference that are used to obtain the relevant results. Different patterns of inference employ different inferential devices: some are logical (different logical principles are at stake, depending on the particular logic that is used); other devices are of a non-logical sort (for instance, diagrams, templates, models, simulations; each can be used as inferential devices). Finally, (c) a stance involves certain propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, or hopes as well as commitment, detachment, pursuit, or suspension. These attitudes, however, typically are not identified with a stance, in the sense that normally they are not invoked to individuate it. As an illustration, the following example of a stance may be helpful. Consider constructivism in mathematics. Conceptualized as a stance, constructivism involves the three components just discussed: (a) The mode of engagement is the critical attitude toward the introduction of mathematical objects without a corresponding method of construction. The constructivist insists that, in the absence of a proper method, no such introduction is acceptable. (b) The style of reasoning involves arguing that proofs by reductio ad absurdum are not legitimate devices for positing mathematical objects. More generally, non-constructive methods of inference are systematically questioned (for example, cases in which the axiom of choice is used to establish the existence of certain mathematical objects are typically contested). Only constructive inferences are accepted. Finally, (c) among the propositional attitudes, due to the mode of engagement and the style of reasoning that are adopted, the disbelief in certain results from classical mathematics emerges. In just the same way, it is possible to consider realism about science also as a particular stance. The three relevant components are satisfied: (a) The mode of engagement, not surprisingly, is the search for true (or approximately true) scientific theories. This is a realist mode of approaching the investigation of the world. (b) The style of reasoning involves accepting inference to the best explanation as an inferential device within science. Although strictly speaking not necessary for realism in science, such inference is fairly common among

14 158 Bueno realists. Finally, (c) among the propositional attitudes we find, for instance, the belief in the existence of unobservable features of the world, which is another common trait among realists. However, as noted, such a belief need not be used to individuate a stance. In examining contemporary science, Pyrrhonists could be realists in the sense of invoking a realist stance. The mode of engagement they invoke is one in which the search for truth is crucial (in either of the two senses discussed above). It s just that, as noted, Pyrrhonists haven t found it yet. In good Pyrrhonian style, they keep searching. So this key aspect of realism is really not in conflict with Pyrrhonism. Moreover, their style of reasoning may involve the adoption of inference to the best explanation as a device of hypotheses generation. Once a hypothesis is identified as the best explanation of a certain phenomenon (given the available alternatives), it is considered as a candidate for the truth. Pyrrhonists will then critically examine, as good realists do, how strong is the evidence in support of that hypothesis, and whether some alternative hypotheses that haven t been considered yet could be better supported. What this means, however, is that the investigation will then continue, by uncovering alternative possibilities and assessing them. The commitment to establish the truth is not a requirement for a realist view. This would be an unreasonably high demand for a philosophical proposal at any rate. The central component is the systematic search for it and that s precisely what Pyrrhonists do. As part of this process of investigation, Pyrrhonists will entertain, as realists do, a number of propositional attitudes; in particular, the belief that there are unobservable features of the world. They can do that, and have done so, dialectically. They will consider these unobservable features and contrast rival accounts of them together with proposals that emphasize entirely different unobservable traits not to mention conceptions that deny the existence of these features altogether. Pyrrhonists will examine critically, as realists do, the weaknesses and strengths of the various possibilities, and they can do that non-dogmatically, that is without having to be committed to any particular proposal. In this way, even this component of realism the belief in the existence of an unobservable reality beyond the appearances is something available to Pyrrhonists, as long as it is understood as something they explore dialectically, as part of their investigation. The result is a non-dogmatic form of realism, in which at issue is the search for the truth, rather than its establishment; the search for hypotheses that better explain the phenomena, rather than the commitment to one unique explanation; and the search for unobservable traits of the world, rather than the advocacy of a single one proposal among many possibilities. In this way,

15 Realism and Anti-Realism about Science 159 understood as a stance, realism becomes a form of investigation rather than a particular philosophical doctrine. It is a kind of investigation in which the emphasis lies on the search for the goal rather than on its guaranteed establishment. As is well known, Pyrrhonists are those who keep searching. And as long as the mode of engagement involves a critical attitude and a lack of commitment, they can adopt a realist stance. Understood in this way, realism provides a form of investigation that is not in conflict with Pyrrhonism. To sum up: it seems that Pyrrhonists can be realists in the sense that they explore a mode of engagement and a style of reasoning that are crucial to a realist stance, precisely because this excludes the sorts of commitments that one may fear enter into the propositional attitudes that are part of realism and which would seem on their face to conflict with Pyrrhonism. However, once one sees how these propositional attitudes function in their dialectical process, even the Pyrrhonist can non-dogmatically embrace them. Typically most realists adopt the sorts of beliefs referred to in the third component of a realist stance. In fact, one might think that this is constitutive of realism. The suggestion here is that, on the stance conception, such commitments need not be constitutive of realism. One can envision other attitudes towards such propositions being compatible with realism, including the dialectical attitude characteristic of the Pyrrhonist. The result is that, as long as realism is conceived of as a stance, there need not be any conflict with Pyrrhonism. 4 Pyrrhonism and Anti-Realism As in the case of realism, there are many anti-realist views about science. I will consider two: (i) Instrumentalism (Nagel 1950): According to the instrumentalist, scientific theories are not truth-apt; they are simply tools of inference that are used to derive predictions about the observable world and, in this way, are helpful to organize experience. These theories can also be employed to connect empirical laws and observations. As a result, they help to establish the relevance that some such observations have to one another, while also guiding empirical research. For the instrumentalist, theories are unable to represent anything beyond experience.7 7 For a helpful survey of different kinds of instrumentalism, see Psillos (1999: 15 37).

16 160 Bueno Concerns have been raised regarding the viability of taking scientific theories in such instrumentalist terms. A significant form of revisionism regarding scientific practice is required to get such a view off the ground, since it demands that scientific theories not be taken literally. But there are anti-realist alternatives that manage to take scientific theories literally, such as the following one. (ii) Constructive empiricism (van Fraassen 1980, 1989, 1991, 2008): For constructive empiricists, scientific theories need not be true to be good, as long as they are empirically adequate (and informative); that is, roughly, as long as what they say about the observable world is correct. However, constructive empiricists recommend agnosticism regarding the unobservable, since according to them it is unclear how one can establish what is really going on beyond the observable level, given particular instances of underdetermination the same phenomena are compatible with conflicting unobservable descriptions. Consider, for instance, different interpretations of non-relativist quantum mechanics, such as the Copenhagen interpretation and the many-worlds view: although they agree with the empirical predictions generated by the theory, what each of them has to say about the unobservable world is significantly different. In the end, it is unclear how we can be in a position to know what is really going on beyond the appearances. Moreover, the constructive empiricist insists, it is possible to make sense of significant features of scientific practice without the commitment to the existence of unobservable entities, their properties, and relations. Are Pyrrhonists anti-realists? In one respect, clearly they are not. Anti-realist views about science are dogmatic proposals about the nature of the scientific enterprise. Despite the different commitments they recommend vis-à-vis their realist alternatives, they still advance definite views about the issues under consideration. Instrumentalism is committed to a particular conception of the nature of scientific activity, highlighting the central role that predictions play in this enterprise, and they deny that truth is the proper criterion for evaluation of a scientific theory. Constructive empiricists defend particular claims about the aim of science (the search for empirically adequate theories), the nature of the observable (which is restricted only to what can be seen with the naked eye), and the limitations of our epistemic access to unobservable features of the world (given particular underdetermination arguments). Pyrrhonists, not surprisingly, will suspend judgment about all of these claims, invoking if needed realist arguments to counterbalance the considerations provided by anti-realists. In another respect, however, Pyrrhonists can be thought of as being antirealists. Consider anti-realism as a philosophical stance. (a) As its mode of engagement, we have a critical attitude toward the idea that scientific theories

17 Realism and Anti-Realism about Science 161 need to be true to be good. Pyrrhonists will challenge, along instrumentalist or constructive empiricist lines, the adequacy of truth as a proper aim for science. They will note the difficulty of adopting, as an aim for science, something that one cannot know that has been reached even if it has indeed been reached (Laudan 1984). They will raise objections to the introduction of a concept (of truth) that, when taken as an aim of science and applied to scientific theories, commits one to all kinds of objects that are invoked in such theories: from whatever mathematical objects that are referred to, to all sorts of unobservable entities, processes and structures that may be in the world. In order to prevent such consequences, one needs to develop some nominalization strategy for mathematics (for a critical survey, see Bueno 2013) or some way of restricting the scope of the truth predicate when applied to scientific theories (for a defense, see Psillos 1999). A critical mode of engagement, which is common to a number of antirealist views, is central to anti-realism since this stance is typically adopted as a reaction to what is perceived as the excesses of realist alternatives. For the anti-realist, the various commitments that are embraced in realism are often questionable. (Realist conceptions can, of course, also adopt this critical mode of engagement, but it is not typical of what makes them realist.) Precisely this sort of critical engagement is similarly crucial to Pyrrhonism, which also emerges in response to the excesses of dogmatic philosophies in their attempt at establishing the truth (or approximate truth) about the relevant domains. From the perspective of a stance, anti-realism and Pyrrhonism share the same mode of engagement. Some anti-realist views, however, go beyond the critical mode of engagement, and attempt to establish the negative claim that nothing in a given domain (e.g., about unobservable objects) can be known. But to establish a claim of this sort can be just as difficult as to establish the corresponding positive claim (namely, to the effect that knowledge of unobservable objects is possible). Given the stance understanding of anti-realism, the critical mode of engagement will keep the anti-realist searching for whether it is indeed impossible to establish the relevant knowledge claim. By being critical about what it takes to establish such a negative claim, the anti-realist will pursue alternative arguments and will keep searching for better ways of trying to settle the matter. The critical mode of engagement is, thus, crucial to the process of making it clear that more is required to establish claims of this negative sort.8 Not 8 Perhaps Pyrrho himself was a metaphysical anti-realist, according to whom we must suspend judgment because no beliefs are true or false (for a thorough discussion of Pyrrho, see Bett 2000).

18 162 Bueno surprisingly, the compatibility of anti-realism and Pyrrhonism with regard to the mode of engagement emerges once again. (b) As its style of reasoning we have the questioning of inference to the best explanation as an acceptable inferential device within science or with which to interpret scientific activity (or both). Anti-realists will question the reliability of using this inferential mechanism given its inability to guarantee the truth of the relevant conclusion even if one starts from true premises. Moreover, one could be dealing with a bad lot of potential explanations, and thus one would infer the best explanation from the lot as the true one, despite the fact that the true explanation is not there (van Fraassen 1989). Once again, the critical considerations that are raised against inference to the best explanation should not be understood as conclusively deciding the issue. Additional arguments in support of the rival perspective can always be advanced, and the anti-realist will keep investigating the matter. Finally, (c) among its propositional attitudes we find agnosticism about the existence of unobservable entities. Given the critical mode of engagement and the difficulties that were raised to inference to the best explanation, it is expected that, as part of an anti-realist stance, a non-committal attitude be in place. But why should agnosticism be embraced rather than the (admittedly stronger) denial of the existence of unobservable entities? An anti-realist need not be committed to rejecting the unobservable. After all, to establish its nonexistence is just as difficult as to establish the opposite. For all we know, perhaps unobservable entities do exist. But, the anti-realist will argue, nothing requires such commitment one way or the other. An agnostic attitude then emerges. For dialectical purposes, however, when mounting a critique of standard commitments found in realism, the anti-realist can, and often does, engage with negative claims to the effect that unobservable entities do not exist. But this does not amount to any kind of commitment on their part, provided that the points are only made dialectically. In this way, understood as a stance, anti-realism becomes a form of investigation rather than a particular philosophical doctrine. As long as the mode of engagement involves a critical attitude and a lack of commitment, Pyrrhonists can adopt an anti-realist stance. Moreover, while engaging with anti-realist issues, Pyrrhonism would explore them dialectically, contrasting them, as needed, with realist views. To conclude: it seems that Pyrrhonists can be anti-realists in the sense that they explore a mode of engagement and a style of reasoning that are crucial to an anti-realist stance, precisely because this excludes the sorts of commitments that one may fear enter into the propositional attitudes that are part of

19 Realism and Anti-Realism about Science 163 anti-realism (such as the belief that unobservable entities don t exist) and which would seem on their face to conflict with Pyrrhonism. However, once one sees how these propositional attitudes function in their dialectical process, even the Pyrrhonist can non-dogmatically embrace them. Certain anti-realist beliefs (e.g., about the nonexistence of unobservable entities) may be thought of as constitutive of anti-realism. The suggestion here is that, on the stance conception, such beliefs need not be understood in these terms. One can envision other attitudes towards the relevant propositions being compatible with anti-realism, including the dialectical attitude and the agnostic way characteristic of the Pyrrhonist. The result is that, as long as anti-realism is conceived of as a stance, there need not be any conflict with Pyrrhonism. 5 Pyrrhonism, Scientific Practice, and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate By conceptualizing realism and anti-realism as stances to be taken rather than doctrines to be believed, the Pyrrhonist is able to avoid taking a stand on the debate between realists and anti-realists about science. Conceptualized in these terms, no dogmatic commitment to particular beliefs is involved (such as those concerning the existence of unobservable entities): just different attitudes toward scientific research are at issue. As we saw, realists typically take the scientific enterprise to involve the search for underlying features of the phenomena, whereas anti-realists tend to question whether the search for any such traits is in fact required, noting that if the phenomena are saved, in informative ways, this is enough to make sense of scientific research. These are, of course, different ways of implementing an investigation of the world. But to make them metaphysically substantive, additional commitments are needed, e.g., regarding the existence of unobservable objects, the search for true (or approximately true) scientific theories, the assignment of a central role to inference to the best explanation as a guide to truth (or approximate truth) of the relevant theories or, alternatively, the denial of each of these proposals. Commitments of this kind are typically invoked in order to argue that the underlying traits of the phenomena have been identified and possess the properties that have thereby been uncovered (following a version of realism), or that no such traits can ever be detected or that it s impossible for one to be in a position to settle such issues (following some forms of anti-realism). But these features involve particular interpretations of scientific activity and its achievements, and thus go beyond the simple specification of the relevant

Review of Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science

Review of Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science Review of Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science Constructive Empiricism (CE) quickly became famous for its immunity from the most devastating criticisms that brought down

More information

145 Philosophy of Science

145 Philosophy of Science Scientific realism Christian Wüthrich http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/wuthrich/ 145 Philosophy of Science A statement of scientific realism Characterization (Scientific realism) Science aims to give

More information

Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism

Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism Aaron Leung Philosophy 290-5 Week 11 Handout Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism 1. Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism What is scientific realism? According to van Fraassen,

More information

Qualified Realism: From Constructive Empiricism to Metaphysical Realism.

Qualified Realism: From Constructive Empiricism to Metaphysical Realism. This paper aims first to explicate van Fraassen s constructive empiricism, which presents itself as an attractive species of scientific anti-realism motivated by a commitment to empiricism. However, the

More information

Realism and the success of science argument. Leplin:

Realism and the success of science argument. Leplin: Realism and the success of science argument Leplin: 1) Realism is the default position. 2) The arguments for anti-realism are indecisive. In particular, antirealism offers no serious rival to realism in

More information

Is there a good epistemological argument against platonism? DAVID LIGGINS

Is there a good epistemological argument against platonism? DAVID LIGGINS [This is the penultimate draft of an article that appeared in Analysis 66.2 (April 2006), 135-41, available here by permission of Analysis, the Analysis Trust, and Blackwell Publishing. The definitive

More information

ALTERNATIVE SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI

ALTERNATIVE SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI ALTERNATIVE SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI Michael HUEMER ABSTRACT: I address Moti Mizrahi s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Mizrahi contends

More information

The Positive Argument for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best

The Positive Argument for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best The Positive Argument for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation Moti Mizrahi Florida Institute of Technology motimizra@gmail.com Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the positive

More information

The Illusion of Scientific Realism: An Argument for Scientific Soft Antirealism

The Illusion of Scientific Realism: An Argument for Scientific Soft Antirealism The Illusion of Scientific Realism: An Argument for Scientific Soft Antirealism Peter Carmack Introduction Throughout the history of science, arguments have emerged about science s ability or non-ability

More information

Understanding Truth Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002

Understanding Truth Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002 1 Symposium on Understanding Truth By Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002 2 Precis of Understanding Truth Scott Soames Understanding Truth aims to illuminate

More information

Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism?

Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism? Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism? Author: Terence Rajivan Edward, University of Manchester. Abstract. In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel attempts to identify a form of idealism.

More information

Van Fraassen: Arguments concerning scientific realism

Van Fraassen: Arguments concerning scientific realism Van Fraassen: Arguments concerning scientific realism 1. Scientific realism and constructive empiricism a) Minimal scientific realism 1) The aim of scientific theories is to provide literally true stories

More information

Against the No-Miracle Response to Indispensability Arguments

Against the No-Miracle Response to Indispensability Arguments Against the No-Miracle Response to Indispensability Arguments I. Overview One of the most influential of the contemporary arguments for the existence of abstract entities is the so-called Quine-Putnam

More information

Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument by Michael Huemer (2000)

Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument by Michael Huemer (2000) Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument by Michael Huemer (2000) One of the advantages traditionally claimed for direct realist theories of perception over indirect realist theories is that the

More information

In Defense of Radical Empiricism. Joseph Benjamin Riegel. Chapel Hill 2006

In Defense of Radical Empiricism. Joseph Benjamin Riegel. Chapel Hill 2006 In Defense of Radical Empiricism Joseph Benjamin Riegel A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

More information

The linguistic-cultural nature of scientific truth 1

The linguistic-cultural nature of scientific truth 1 The linguistic-cultural nature of scientific truth 1 Damián Islas Mondragón Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango México Abstract While we typically think of culture as defined by geography or ethnicity

More information

Varieties of Apriority

Varieties of Apriority S E V E N T H E X C U R S U S Varieties of Apriority T he notions of a priori knowledge and justification play a central role in this work. There are many ways in which one can understand the a priori,

More information

Philosophy of Science. Ross Arnold, Summer 2014 Lakeside institute of Theology

Philosophy of Science. Ross Arnold, Summer 2014 Lakeside institute of Theology Philosophy of Science Ross Arnold, Summer 2014 Lakeside institute of Theology Philosophical Theology 1 (TH5) Aug. 15 Intro to Philosophical Theology; Logic Aug. 22 Truth & Epistemology Aug. 29 Metaphysics

More information

Chapter 5 The Epistemology of Modality and the Epistemology of Mathematics

Chapter 5 The Epistemology of Modality and the Epistemology of Mathematics Chapter 5 The Epistemology of Modality and the Epistemology of Mathematics Otávio Bueno 5.1 Introduction In this paper I explore some connections between the epistemology of modality and the epistemology

More information

How Do We Know Anything about Mathematics? - A Defence of Platonism

How Do We Know Anything about Mathematics? - A Defence of Platonism How Do We Know Anything about Mathematics? - A Defence of Platonism Majda Trobok University of Rijeka original scientific paper UDK: 141.131 1:51 510.21 ABSTRACT In this paper I will try to say something

More information

Philosophy 5340 Epistemology Topic 4: Skepticism. Part 1: The Scope of Skepticism and Two Main Types of Skeptical Argument

Philosophy 5340 Epistemology Topic 4: Skepticism. Part 1: The Scope of Skepticism and Two Main Types of Skeptical Argument 1. The Scope of Skepticism Philosophy 5340 Epistemology Topic 4: Skepticism Part 1: The Scope of Skepticism and Two Main Types of Skeptical Argument The scope of skeptical challenges can vary in a number

More information

PHI 1700: Global Ethics

PHI 1700: Global Ethics PHI 1700: Global Ethics Session 3 February 11th, 2016 Harman, Ethics and Observation 1 (finishing up our All About Arguments discussion) A common theme linking many of the fallacies we covered is that

More information

World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Natural- ism , by Michael C. Rea.

World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Natural- ism , by Michael C. Rea. Book reviews World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, by Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, viii + 245 pp., $24.95. This is a splendid book. Its ideas are bold and

More information

Saving the Substratum: Interpreting Kant s First Analogy

Saving the Substratum: Interpreting Kant s First Analogy Res Cogitans Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 20 6-4-2014 Saving the Substratum: Interpreting Kant s First Analogy Kevin Harriman Lewis & Clark College Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans

More information

Psillos s Defense of Scientific Realism

Psillos s Defense of Scientific Realism Luke Rinne 4/27/04 Psillos and Laudan Psillos s Defense of Scientific Realism In this paper, Psillos defends the IBE based no miracle argument (NMA) for scientific realism against two main objections,

More information

REVIEW THE DOOR TO SELLARS

REVIEW THE DOOR TO SELLARS Metascience (2007) 16:555 559 Ó Springer 2007 DOI 10.1007/s11016-007-9141-6 REVIEW THE DOOR TO SELLARS Willem A. de Vries, Wilfrid Sellars. Chesham: Acumen, 2005. Pp. xiv + 338. 16.99 PB. By Andreas Karitzis

More information

Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge

Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge Colorado State University BIBLID [0873-626X (2012) 33; pp. 459-467] Abstract According to rationalists about moral knowledge, some moral truths are knowable a

More information

Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Forthcoming in Thought please cite published version In

More information

Van Fraassen s Appreciated Anti-Realism. Lane DesAutels. I. Introduction

Van Fraassen s Appreciated Anti-Realism. Lane DesAutels. I. Introduction 1 Van Fraassen s Appreciated Anti-Realism Lane DesAutels I. Introduction In his seminal work, The Scientific Image (1980), Bas van Fraassen formulates a distinct view of what science is - one that has,

More information

5 A Modal Version of the

5 A Modal Version of the 5 A Modal Version of the Ontological Argument E. J. L O W E Moreland, J. P.; Sweis, Khaldoun A.; Meister, Chad V., Jul 01, 2013, Debating Christian Theism The original version of the ontological argument

More information

Received: 30 August 2007 / Accepted: 16 November 2007 / Published online: 28 December 2007 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V.

Received: 30 August 2007 / Accepted: 16 November 2007 / Published online: 28 December 2007 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. Acta anal. (2007) 22:267 279 DOI 10.1007/s12136-007-0012-y What Is Entitlement? Albert Casullo Received: 30 August 2007 / Accepted: 16 November 2007 / Published online: 28 December 2007 # Springer Science

More information

Theories of epistemic justification can be divided into two groups: internalist and

Theories of epistemic justification can be divided into two groups: internalist and 1 Internalism and externalism about justification Theories of epistemic justification can be divided into two groups: internalist and externalist. Internalist theories of justification say that whatever

More information

Realism and anti-realism. University of London Philosophy B.A. Intercollegiate Lectures Logic and Metaphysics José Zalabardo Autumn 2009

Realism and anti-realism. University of London Philosophy B.A. Intercollegiate Lectures Logic and Metaphysics José Zalabardo Autumn 2009 Realism and anti-realism University of London Philosophy B.A. Intercollegiate Lectures Logic and Metaphysics José Zalabardo Autumn 2009 What is the issue? Whether the way things are is independent of our

More information

Scientific Realism and Empiricism

Scientific Realism and Empiricism Philosophy 164/264 December 3, 2001 1 Scientific Realism and Empiricism Administrative: All papers due December 18th (at the latest). I will be available all this week and all next week... Scientific Realism

More information

Etchemendy, Tarski, and Logical Consequence 1 Jared Bates, University of Missouri Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1999):

Etchemendy, Tarski, and Logical Consequence 1 Jared Bates, University of Missouri Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1999): Etchemendy, Tarski, and Logical Consequence 1 Jared Bates, University of Missouri Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1999): 47 54. Abstract: John Etchemendy (1990) has argued that Tarski's definition of logical

More information

Class #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism

Class #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism Philosophy 405: Knowledge, Truth and Mathematics Fall 2010 Hamilton College Russell Marcus Class #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism I. The Continuum Hypothesis and Its Independence The continuum problem

More information

Empiricism. Otávio Bueno Department of Philosophy University of Miami Coral Gables, FL

Empiricism. Otávio Bueno Department of Philosophy University of Miami Coral Gables, FL Empiricism Otávio Bueno Department of Philosophy University of Miami Coral Gables, FL 33124 e-mail: otaviobueno@mac.com Abstract Two major problems have challenged empiricist views in the philosophy of

More information

What the History of Science Cannot Teach Us Ioannis Votsis University of Bristol

What the History of Science Cannot Teach Us Ioannis Votsis University of Bristol Draft 1 What the History of Science Cannot Teach Us Ioannis Votsis University of Bristol The 1960s marked a turning point for the scientific realism debate. Thomas Kuhn and others undermined the orthodox

More information

THE SEMANTIC REALISM OF STROUD S RESPONSE TO AUSTIN S ARGUMENT AGAINST SCEPTICISM

THE SEMANTIC REALISM OF STROUD S RESPONSE TO AUSTIN S ARGUMENT AGAINST SCEPTICISM SKÉPSIS, ISSN 1981-4194, ANO VII, Nº 14, 2016, p. 33-39. THE SEMANTIC REALISM OF STROUD S RESPONSE TO AUSTIN S ARGUMENT AGAINST SCEPTICISM ALEXANDRE N. MACHADO Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) Email:

More information

Aspects of Western Philosophy Dr. Sreekumar Nellickappilly Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

Aspects of Western Philosophy Dr. Sreekumar Nellickappilly Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Aspects of Western Philosophy Dr. Sreekumar Nellickappilly Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Module - 21 Lecture - 21 Kant Forms of sensibility Categories

More information

Reconstructed Empiricism

Reconstructed Empiricism Reconstructed Empiricism Finnur Dellsén Penultimate draft; please cite the article in Acta Analytica Abstract According to Bas van Fraassen, scientific realists and anti-realists disagree about whether

More information

Rule-Following and the Ontology of the Mind Abstract The problem of rule-following

Rule-Following and the Ontology of the Mind Abstract The problem of rule-following Rule-Following and the Ontology of the Mind Michael Esfeld (published in Uwe Meixner and Peter Simons (eds.): Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age. Papers of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium.

More information

Chapter Six. Putnam's Anti-Realism

Chapter Six. Putnam's Anti-Realism 119 Chapter Six Putnam's Anti-Realism So far, our discussion has been guided by the assumption that there is a world and that sentences are true or false by virtue of the way it is. But this assumption

More information

Does the Skeptic Win? A Defense of Moore. I. Moorean Methodology. In A Proof of the External World, Moore argues as follows:

Does the Skeptic Win? A Defense of Moore. I. Moorean Methodology. In A Proof of the External World, Moore argues as follows: Does the Skeptic Win? A Defense of Moore I argue that Moore s famous response to the skeptic should be accepted even by the skeptic. My paper has three main stages. First, I will briefly outline G. E.

More information

Chapter One. Constructive Empiricism and the Case. Against Scientific Realism

Chapter One. Constructive Empiricism and the Case. Against Scientific Realism Chapter One Constructive Empiricism and the Case Against Scientific Realism The picture of science presented by van Fraassen addresses several standard questions about science. What are scientific theories?

More information

The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism

The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism What is a great mistake? Nietzsche once said that a great error is worth more than a multitude of trivial truths. A truly great mistake

More information

Skepticism and Internalism

Skepticism and Internalism Skepticism and Internalism John Greco Abstract: This paper explores a familiar skeptical problematic and considers some strategies for responding to it. Section 1 reconstructs and disambiguates the skeptical

More information

Author's personal copy

Author's personal copy Synthese (2017) 194:1663 1680 DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-1012-x ORIGINAL RESEARCH A neo-pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument Diego E. Machuca 1 Received: 10 October 2015 / Accepted:

More information

ELEONORE STUMP PENELHUM ON SKEPTICS AND FIDEISTS

ELEONORE STUMP PENELHUM ON SKEPTICS AND FIDEISTS ELEONORE STUMP PENELHUM ON SKEPTICS AND FIDEISTS ABSTRACT. Professor Penelhum has argued that there is a common error about the history of skepticism and that the exposure of this error would significantly

More information

Semantic Foundations for Deductive Methods

Semantic Foundations for Deductive Methods Semantic Foundations for Deductive Methods delineating the scope of deductive reason Roger Bishop Jones Abstract. The scope of deductive reason is considered. First a connection is discussed between the

More information

OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 3

OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 3 University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 3 May 15th, 9:00 AM - May 17th, 5:00 PM Commentary on Schwed Lawrence Powers Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive

More information

Mohammad Reza Vaez Shahrestani. University of Bonn

Mohammad Reza Vaez Shahrestani. University of Bonn Philosophy Study, November 2017, Vol. 7, No. 11, 595-600 doi: 10.17265/2159-5313/2017.11.002 D DAVID PUBLISHING Defending Davidson s Anti-skepticism Argument: A Reply to Otavio Bueno Mohammad Reza Vaez

More information

FINAL EXAM REVIEW SHEET. objectivity intersubjectivity ways the peer review system is supposed to improve objectivity

FINAL EXAM REVIEW SHEET. objectivity intersubjectivity ways the peer review system is supposed to improve objectivity Philosophy of Science Professor Stemwedel Spring 2014 Important concepts and terminology metaphysics epistemology descriptive vs. normative norms of science Strong Program sociology of science naturalism

More information

Nominalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics First published Mon Sep 16, 2013

Nominalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics First published Mon Sep 16, 2013 Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia Free Nominalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics First published Mon Sep 16,

More information

A Defense of the Significance of the A Priori A Posteriori Distinction. Albert Casullo. University of Nebraska-Lincoln

A Defense of the Significance of the A Priori A Posteriori Distinction. Albert Casullo. University of Nebraska-Lincoln A Defense of the Significance of the A Priori A Posteriori Distinction Albert Casullo University of Nebraska-Lincoln The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has come under fire by a

More information

BELIEF POLICIES, by Paul Helm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Pp. xiii and 226. $54.95 (Cloth).

BELIEF POLICIES, by Paul Helm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Pp. xiii and 226. $54.95 (Cloth). BELIEF POLICIES, by Paul Helm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xiii and 226. $54.95 (Cloth). TRENTON MERRICKS, Virginia Commonwealth University Faith and Philosophy 13 (1996): 449-454

More information

All philosophical debates not due to ignorance of base truths or our imperfect rationality are indeterminate.

All philosophical debates not due to ignorance of base truths or our imperfect rationality are indeterminate. PHIL 5983: Naturalness and Fundamentality Seminar Prof. Funkhouser Spring 2017 Week 11: Chalmers, Constructing the World Notes (Chapters 6-7, Twelfth Excursus) Chapter 6 6.1 * This chapter is about the

More information

Philosophy Epistemology. Topic 3 - Skepticism

Philosophy Epistemology. Topic 3 - Skepticism Michael Huemer on Skepticism Philosophy 3340 - Epistemology Topic 3 - Skepticism Chapter II. The Lure of Radical Skepticism 1. Mike Huemer defines radical skepticism as follows: Philosophical skeptics

More information

Philosophy 125 Day 1: Overview

Philosophy 125 Day 1: Overview Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Philosophy 125 Day 1: Overview Welcome! Are you in the right place? PHIL 125 (Metaphysics) Overview of Today s Class 1. Us: Branden (Professor), Vanessa & Josh

More information

Philosophy of Mathematics Nominalism

Philosophy of Mathematics Nominalism Philosophy of Mathematics Nominalism Owen Griffiths oeg21@cam.ac.uk Churchill and Newnham, Cambridge 8/11/18 Last week Ante rem structuralism accepts mathematical structures as Platonic universals. We

More information

A Defense for Scientific Realism:

A Defense for Scientific Realism: A Defense for Scientific Realism: Skepticisms, Unobservables, & Inference to the Best Explanation Vincenzo Domanico A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

More information

Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge Gracia's proposal

Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge Gracia's proposal University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor Critical Reflections Essays of Significance & Critical Reflections 2016 Mar 12th, 1:30 PM - 2:00 PM Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge

More information

On the epistemological status of mathematical objects in Plato s philosophical system

On the epistemological status of mathematical objects in Plato s philosophical system On the epistemological status of mathematical objects in Plato s philosophical system Floris T. van Vugt University College Utrecht University, The Netherlands October 22, 2003 Abstract The main question

More information

How Successful Is Naturalism?

How Successful Is Naturalism? How Successful Is Naturalism? University of Notre Dame T he question raised by this volume is How successful is naturalism? The question presupposes that we already know what naturalism is and what counts

More information

Informalizing Formal Logic

Informalizing Formal Logic Informalizing Formal Logic Antonis Kakas Department of Computer Science, University of Cyprus, Cyprus antonis@ucy.ac.cy Abstract. This paper discusses how the basic notions of formal logic can be expressed

More information

In Search of the Ontological Argument. Richard Oxenberg

In Search of the Ontological Argument. Richard Oxenberg 1 In Search of the Ontological Argument Richard Oxenberg Abstract We can attend to the logic of Anselm's ontological argument, and amuse ourselves for a few hours unraveling its convoluted word-play, or

More information

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The Physical World Author(s): Barry Stroud Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 87 (1986-1987), pp. 263-277 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian

More information

CONSCIOUSNESS, INTENTIONALITY AND CONCEPTS: REPLY TO NELKIN

CONSCIOUSNESS, INTENTIONALITY AND CONCEPTS: REPLY TO NELKIN ----------------------------------------------------------------- PSYCHE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF RESEARCH ON CONSCIOUSNESS ----------------------------------------------------------------- CONSCIOUSNESS,

More information

THE MEANING OF OUGHT. Ralph Wedgwood. What does the word ought mean? Strictly speaking, this is an empirical question, about the

THE MEANING OF OUGHT. Ralph Wedgwood. What does the word ought mean? Strictly speaking, this is an empirical question, about the THE MEANING OF OUGHT Ralph Wedgwood What does the word ought mean? Strictly speaking, this is an empirical question, about the meaning of a word in English. Such empirical semantic questions should ideally

More information

Are Scientific Theories True?

Are Scientific Theories True? Are Scientific Theories True? Dr. Michela Massimi In this session we will explore a central and ongoing debate in contemporary philosophy of science: whether or not scientific theories are true. Or better,

More information

Kazuhisa Todayama (Graduate School of Information Science, Nagoya University, Japan)

Kazuhisa Todayama (Graduate School of Information Science, Nagoya University, Japan) todayama@info.human.nagoya-u.ac.jp Kazuhisa Todayama (Graduate School of Information Science, Nagoya University, Japan) Philosophical naturalism is made up of two basic claims as follows. () Ontological

More information

BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN 1. AGAINST ANALYTIC METAPHYSICS

BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN 1. AGAINST ANALYTIC METAPHYSICS BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN PRE CIS OF THE EMPIRICAL STANCE What is empiricism, and what could it be? I see as central to this tradition first of all a pattern of recurrent rebellion against metaphysics, and in

More information

Fr. Copleston vs. Bertrand Russell: The Famous 1948 BBC Radio Debate on the Existence of God

Fr. Copleston vs. Bertrand Russell: The Famous 1948 BBC Radio Debate on the Existence of God Fr. Copleston vs. Bertrand Russell: The Famous 1948 BBC Radio Debate on the Existence of God Father Frederick C. Copleston (Jesuit Catholic priest) versus Bertrand Russell (agnostic philosopher) Copleston:

More information

Jeu-Jenq Yuann Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University,

Jeu-Jenq Yuann Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University, The Negative Role of Empirical Stimulus in Theory Change: W. V. Quine and P. Feyerabend Jeu-Jenq Yuann Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University, 1 To all Participants

More information

Deflationary Nominalism s Commitment to Meinongianism

Deflationary Nominalism s Commitment to Meinongianism Res Cogitans Volume 7 Issue 1 Article 8 6-24-2016 Deflationary Nominalism s Commitment to Meinongianism Anthony Nguyen Reed College Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans

More information

1/12. The A Paralogisms

1/12. The A Paralogisms 1/12 The A Paralogisms The character of the Paralogisms is described early in the chapter. Kant describes them as being syllogisms which contain no empirical premises and states that in them we conclude

More information

Predicate logic. Miguel Palomino Dpto. Sistemas Informáticos y Computación (UCM) Madrid Spain

Predicate logic. Miguel Palomino Dpto. Sistemas Informáticos y Computación (UCM) Madrid Spain Predicate logic Miguel Palomino Dpto. Sistemas Informáticos y Computación (UCM) 28040 Madrid Spain Synonyms. First-order logic. Question 1. Describe this discipline/sub-discipline, and some of its more

More information

Experience and Foundationalism in Audi s The Architecture of Reason

Experience and Foundationalism in Audi s The Architecture of Reason Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXVII, No. 1, July 2003 Experience and Foundationalism in Audi s The Architecture of Reason WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG Dartmouth College Robert Audi s The Architecture

More information

Lecture 9. A summary of scientific methods Realism and Anti-realism

Lecture 9. A summary of scientific methods Realism and Anti-realism Lecture 9 A summary of scientific methods Realism and Anti-realism A summary of scientific methods and attitudes What is a scientific approach? This question can be answered in a lot of different ways.

More information

Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality

Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality Thomas Hofweber University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill hofweber@unc.edu Final Version Forthcoming in Mind Abstract Although idealism was widely defended

More information

WHY RELATIVISM IS NOT SELF-REFUTING IN ANY INTERESTING WAY

WHY RELATIVISM IS NOT SELF-REFUTING IN ANY INTERESTING WAY Preliminary draft, WHY RELATIVISM IS NOT SELF-REFUTING IN ANY INTERESTING WAY Is relativism really self-refuting? This paper takes a look at some frequently used arguments and its preliminary answer to

More information

Luck, Rationality, and Explanation: A Reply to Elga s Lucky to Be Rational. Joshua Schechter. Brown University

Luck, Rationality, and Explanation: A Reply to Elga s Lucky to Be Rational. Joshua Schechter. Brown University Luck, Rationality, and Explanation: A Reply to Elga s Lucky to Be Rational Joshua Schechter Brown University I Introduction What is the epistemic significance of discovering that one of your beliefs depends

More information

A Priori Bootstrapping

A Priori Bootstrapping A Priori Bootstrapping Ralph Wedgwood In this essay, I shall explore the problems that are raised by a certain traditional sceptical paradox. My conclusion, at the end of this essay, will be that the most

More information

Plato's Epistemology PHIL October Introduction

Plato's Epistemology PHIL October Introduction 1 Plato's Epistemology PHIL 305 28 October 2014 1. Introduction This paper argues that Plato's theory of forms, specifically as it is presented in the middle dialogues, ought to be considered a viable

More information

A Logical Approach to Metametaphysics

A Logical Approach to Metametaphysics A Logical Approach to Metametaphysics Daniel Durante Departamento de Filosofia UFRN durante10@gmail.com 3º Filomena - 2017 What we take as true commits us. Quine took advantage of this fact to introduce

More information

Horwich and the Liar

Horwich and the Liar Horwich and the Liar Sergi Oms Sardans Logos, University of Barcelona 1 Horwich defends an epistemic account of vagueness according to which vague predicates have sharp boundaries which we are not capable

More information

Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View

Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319532363 Carlo Cellucci Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View 1 Preface From its very beginning, philosophy has been viewed as aimed at knowledge and methods to

More information

PHILOSOPHY 5340 EPISTEMOLOGY

PHILOSOPHY 5340 EPISTEMOLOGY PHILOSOPHY 5340 EPISTEMOLOGY Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception Chapter V. A Version of Foundationalism 1. A Principle of Foundational Justification 1. Mike's view is that there is a

More information

Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities

Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities This is the author version of the following article: Baltimore, Joseph A. (2014). Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities. Metaphysica, 15 (1), 209 217. The final publication

More information

DO WE NEED A THEORY OF METAPHYSICAL COMPOSITION?

DO WE NEED A THEORY OF METAPHYSICAL COMPOSITION? 1 DO WE NEED A THEORY OF METAPHYSICAL COMPOSITION? ROBERT C. OSBORNE DRAFT (02/27/13) PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION I. Introduction Much of the recent work in contemporary metaphysics has been

More information

What God Could Have Made

What God Could Have Made 1 What God Could Have Made By Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky I. Introduction Atheists have argued that if there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, then God would have made

More information

Ayer and Quine on the a priori

Ayer and Quine on the a priori Ayer and Quine on the a priori November 23, 2004 1 The problem of a priori knowledge Ayer s book is a defense of a thoroughgoing empiricism, not only about what is required for a belief to be justified

More information

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE GENERAL MAXIM OF CAUSALITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORMITY IN HUME S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE GENERAL MAXIM OF CAUSALITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORMITY IN HUME S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CDD: 121 THE RELATION BETWEEN THE GENERAL MAXIM OF CAUSALITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORMITY IN HUME S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE Departamento de Filosofia Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas IFCH Universidade

More information

Qualitative and quantitative inference to the best theory. reply to iikka Niiniluoto Kuipers, Theodorus

Qualitative and quantitative inference to the best theory. reply to iikka Niiniluoto Kuipers, Theodorus University of Groningen Qualitative and quantitative inference to the best theory. reply to iikka Niiniluoto Kuipers, Theodorus Published in: EPRINTS-BOOK-TITLE IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult

More information

Putnam s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived*

Putnam s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived* 1 Putnam s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived* Otávio Bueno Received: 10/11/2017 Final versión: 12/04/2018 BIBLID 0495-4548(2018)33:2p.201-218 DOI: 10.1387/theoria.18473 ABSTRACT:

More information

The Rightness Error: An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism

The Rightness Error: An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism Mathais Sarrazin J.L. Mackie s Error Theory postulates that all normative claims are false. It does this based upon his denial of moral

More information

IDHEF Chapter 2 Why Should Anyone Believe Anything At All?

IDHEF Chapter 2 Why Should Anyone Believe Anything At All? IDHEF Chapter 2 Why Should Anyone Believe Anything At All? -You might have heard someone say, It doesn t really matter what you believe, as long as you believe something. While many people think this is

More information

Naturalized Epistemology. 1. What is naturalized Epistemology? Quine PY4613

Naturalized Epistemology. 1. What is naturalized Epistemology? Quine PY4613 Naturalized Epistemology Quine PY4613 1. What is naturalized Epistemology? a. How is it motivated? b. What are its doctrines? c. Naturalized Epistemology in the context of Quine s philosophy 2. Naturalized

More information

Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly *

Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly * Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly * Ralph Wedgwood 1 Two views of practical reason Suppose that you are faced with several different options (that is, several ways in which you might act in a

More information

Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction

Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction Kent State University BIBLID [0873-626X (2014) 39; pp. 139-145] Abstract The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account

More information