# Puzzles of attitude ascriptions

Size: px
Start display at page:

Transcription

1 Puzzles of attitude ascriptions Jeff Speaks phil November 3, The puzzle of necessary consequence Structured intensions Frege s puzzle Kripke s puzzle Richard s puzzle The puzzle of necessary consequence Our theory of attitude ascriptions so far holds that the semantic value of a that-clause is the intension of the embedded sentence. Given that the intension of a sentence is the set of worlds in which it is true (or, equivalently, the characteristic function of this set), it follows from this theory that the following principle is true: The closure of belief under necessary equivalence If S and S* have the same intension (are true in exactly the same worlds), then A believes that S is true if and only if A believes that S* is. Can you think of any plausible counterexamples to this principle? What pairs of sentences have the same intension? This is just the beginning of the problems. First, the following principle appears very plausible: The distribution of belief over conjunction If A believes that S and S* is true, then so is A believes that S and A believes that S*. But now suppose that we have a pair of sentences, S and S*, and suppose that S entails S*. Then the following two sentences will have the same intension: 1

2 S S and S* Put all of this together, and what you get is: The closure of belief under necessary consequence If S entails S*, then if A believes that S is true, so is A believes that S*. Can you see how this follows from the closure of belief under necessary equivalence and the distribution of belief over conjunction? This closure of belief under necessary consequence is wildly implausible. The problem here (which, in this form, is due to Soames (1985, 1988)) can be brought out in two ways: (1) Necessary truths are necessary consequences of everything. So, anyone who has any beliefs at all believes all necessary truths. (So, for example, everyone believes every mathematical truth.) (2) Every proposition is a necessary consequence of a necessary falsehood. So, if anyone believed a necessary falsehood, they would believe every proposition. But no one believes every proposition. So no one believes any necessary falsehoods. (So, for example, no one has ever had any false mathematical beliefs.) Note that the problems here do not only arise for agents who fail to see what follows from their beliefs. The example of the paradox of the preface. It seems hard to deny that belief distributes over conjunction. So it seems that we must deny the closure of belief under necessary equivalence. But to do that within a compositional semantics, we have to deny that the semantic value of a that-clause is the set of worlds in which the embedded sentence is true. And to do that, we need to revise our lexical entry for that. 2 Structured intensions We have already discussed non-extensional contexts: nodes which are such that substitution of expressions with the same semantic value can change truth-value. What we have here, it seems, is a node which is such that substitution of sentences with the same intension can change truth-value. Such contexts are sometimes called hyper-intensional. Our former view of that was: [ CP that S] M,w,i,g ={w*:w* W and S M,w,i,g =1} 2

3 How might we do better? We already know how to understand the intension of a sentence. But we might also define the notion of a structured intension. Take a simple sentence like Pavarotti walks. The intension of this sentence is the set of worlds in which Pavarotti walks. But we also know the intensions of the words that make up this sentence: Pavarotti w = Pavarotti walks w = f:f(w) = {x : x walks in w} (Here for simplicity I ignore the role of time.) Then we might represent the structured intension of this sentence as the ordered pair <Pavarotti,f:f(w)= {x : x walks in w} > This is just a sketch of a theory; it will have to get more complicated to represent the structured intensions of sentences with more than two leaves. But even this simple sketch is enough to show how we might distinguish between the structured intensions of sentences which are true in just the same worlds, and hence share the same intension. And this promises to help with hyper-intensional contexts, if we revise our view that the meaning of that so that [ CP that S] M,w,i,g = the structured intension of S relative to M and g To state this more precisely, we d have to come up with some canonical way of deriving and representing structured intensions the informal sketch above will be enough for our purposes. To fix the problem, we also have to revise our lexical entry for believes. Our former view was that a belief ascription is true iff the embedded sentence is true in every world in the subject s belief set. But that view of believes leads immediately to the problems discussed above, whatever our view of that. Can you think of how we might state the lexical entry for believes to fit the view that belief is a relation between subjects and structured intensions? One might object that this view makes too many distinctions between beliefs, and hence fails to capture important generalizations which we might want to capture. Suppose, for example, that we want a theory which explains what it is rational for a given subject to believe or do, and suppose that we know that one subject believes the structured intension of S or S* and another believes the structured intension of It is not the case that not-s and not-s*. These will be different structured intensions. But it seems that the rational commitments of the two subjects will be the same. That is something that the intensions theory captures but which the structured intensions theory does not (at least not without further elaboration). 3

4 3 Frege s puzzle But a problem remains, which was noticed by Frege (1892/1960). The problem is that very similar attitude ascriptions, like Bob believes that Hesperus is visible in the morning. Bob believes that Phosphorus is visible in the morning. or Lois believes that Superman can fly. Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly. seem as though they can differ in truth-value. This is often called Frege s puzzle (though other, related problems also go by that name). Is this a problem for our attempt to explain that-clauses in terms of structured intensions? It is if two names which refer to the same object have the same intension; and, in the semantic theory we ve been using, they will. Could we revise that theory so that such names differ in intension? What would this involve? Frege tried to solve this problem by distinguishing between sense and reference, and explained this distinction as follows: The reference of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by its means; the idea, which we have in that case, is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself. The following analogy will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the Moon through a telescope. I compare the Moon itself to the reference; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to the sense, the latter is like the idea or experience. The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneously. But each one would have his own retinal image. ( On sense and reference ) How might we incorporate this distinction into our semantics? One idea, which is close to what Frege thought, is that we can think of the semantic values of that-clauses as structured entitites (as the proponent of structured intensions thought) but ones whose constituents are, not intensions, but Fregean senses. 4

5 We would then have to revise our view of the lexicon. The lexicon will now assign to expressions, not intensions, but Fregean senses. Those Fregean senses will determine intensions so much of our semantics can continue to work as it has. It is reasonable to ask for more information about what Fregean senses are, and about when two expressions have the same sense. Frege answered the latter question using (roughly) the following principle: Frege s criterion If it is possible to understand two sentences S and S while (after reflection) taking different attitudes toward their truth-values, then S and S differ in sense. Then we can say that e and e differ in sense iff there are two sentences S and S, which differ only in the substitution of e and e, and differ in sense. How would you give the intension of believes and that, on a Fregean view? A problem: Frege s theory might explain substitution failures while failing to explain much more common cases of substitution success. 4 Kripke s puzzle However, even if we make use of Fregean senses, and these are otherwise unproblematic, a puzzle presented by Kripke (1979) remains. We can think of the puzzle as based on the following four initially plausible principles: 1. Weak disquotation: If a competent speaker on reflection sincerely assents to S, then that speaker believes that S. 2. Reverse disquotation: If a speaker believes that S then, on reflection, that speaker will (if given the chance) sincerely assent to S. 3. Translation: if a sentence expresses a truth in one language, then its translation into another language also expresses a truth (in that language). 4. Contradiction: if you have a pair of contradictory beliefs, it is always possible to discover this on the basis of reflection on those beliefs. Using the example of puzzling Pierre, Kripke argues that (1)-(3) are inconsistent. By (1), we can derive the truth of Pierre croit que Londres est jolie. Then by (3) we can derive the truth of the translation of this sentence, namely 5

6 Pierre believes that London is pretty. But by (2) we can derive the truth of Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. which is a contradiction. So one of (1)-(3) must be false. One might think that this is problem to do with translation, and hence that we can solve the problem by rejecting (3). There are two problems with this response to the puzzle: (3) is very plausible. Kripke s example of Peter and Paderewski shows that we can generate the puzzle without (3). A second version of the puzzle: the case of Pierre shows that (1) and (3) are inconsistent, not just with (2), but with (4). Kripke does not himself take a stand on how to resolve these puzzles. One plausible reply to the puzzles is to reject (2) and (4). But if we do this, that weakens the case for a Fregean approach to that-clauses for three reasons: (a) It seems that the examples which we used to argue against the structured intensions approach, and for the Fregean approach, relied implicitly on principles like (2) and (4). (b) It seems that Frege s criterion is going to lead to the implausible result that London is pretty and Londres est jolie differ in meaning. (c) The problem of substitution success returns with a vengeance. Imagine trying to report Peter s Paderewski beliefs. 5 Richard s puzzle Richard (1983) gives an example in which Bill is in a phone booth which, unbeknownst to him, is being approached by a steamroller. Sally is talking in the phone to Bill while looking at the phone booth but does not realize that Bill is the person in the phone booth at which she is looking. Sally accepts He is in danger but rejects You are in danger. Then, by Fregean lights, it looks like (i) is true and (ii) false out of Sally s mouth, despite he and you both having Bill as their semantic value: 6

7 (i) I believe that he is in danger. (ii) I believe that you are in danger. But suppose that Bill tells Sally that someone is looking at him gesturing wildly (unbeknownst to him, this is Sally). Then the following seems true out of Sally s mouth: (iii) The person waving at you believes that you are in danger. But (iii) entails (ii) which means that (ii) must, contra our earlier view, be true. Does the fact that (ii) is true pose a problem for the Fregean? References Gottlob Frege, 1892/1960. On Sense and Reference. In Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach and Max Black, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Saul Kripke, A Puzzle About Belief. In Meaning and Use, edited by Avishai Margalit, Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Mark Richard, Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic 12(4): Scott Soames, Lost Innocence. Linguistics and Philosophy 8:1: Scott Soames, Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content. In Propositions and Attitudes, edited by Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7

### Theories of propositions

Theories of propositions phil 93515 Jeff Speaks January 16, 2007 1 Commitment to propositions.......................... 1 2 A Fregean theory of reference.......................... 2 3 Three theories of

### Phil 435: Philosophy of Language. [Handout 7] W. V. Quine, Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes (1956)

Quine & Kripke 1 Phil 435: Philosophy of Language [Handout 7] Quine & Kripke Reporting Beliefs Professor JeeLoo Liu W. V. Quine, Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes (1956) * The problem: The logical

### Understanding Belief Reports. David Braun. In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection.

Appeared in Philosophical Review 105 (1998), pp. 555-595. Understanding Belief Reports David Braun In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory

### Millian responses to Frege s puzzle

Millian responses to Frege s puzzle phil 93914 Jeff Speaks February 28, 2008 1 Two kinds of Millian................................. 1 2 Conciliatory Millianism............................... 2 2.1 Hidden

### An argument against descriptive Millianism

An argument against descriptive Millianism phil 93914 Jeff Speaks March 10, 2008 The Unrepentant Millian explains apparent differences in informativeness, and apparent differences in the truth-values of

### Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions. David Braun. University of Rochester

Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions by David Braun University of Rochester Presented at the Pacific APA in San Francisco on March 31, 2001 1. Naive Russellianism

### Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. i-ix, 379. ISBN \$35.00.

Appeared in Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (2003), pp. 367-379. Scott Soames. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. i-ix, 379.

### Epistemic two-dimensionalism

Epistemic two-dimensionalism phil 93507 Jeff Speaks December 1, 2009 1 Four puzzles.......................................... 1 2 Epistemic two-dimensionalism................................ 3 2.1 Two-dimensional

### Coordination Problems

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXI No. 2, September 2010 Ó 2010 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC Coordination Problems scott soames

### Objections to the two-dimensionalism of The Conscious Mind

Objections to the two-dimensionalism of The Conscious Mind phil 93515 Jeff Speaks February 7, 2007 1 Problems with the rigidification of names..................... 2 1.1 Names as actually -rigidified descriptions..................

### Analyticity and reference determiners

Analyticity and reference determiners Jeff Speaks November 9, 2011 1. The language myth... 1 2. The definition of analyticity... 3 3. Defining containment... 4 4. Some remaining questions... 6 4.1. Reference

### ATINER's Conference Paper Series PHI Scope of Semantic Innocence

Athens Institute for Education and Research ATINER ATINER's Conference Paper Series PHI2013-0534 Scope of Semantic Innocence Jaya Ray Assistant Professor Lakshmibai College, University Of Delhi India 1

### sentences in which they occur, thus giving us singular propositions that contain the object

JUSTIFICATION AND RELATIVE APRIORITY Heimir Geirsson Abstract There is obviously tension between any view which claims that the object denoted is all that names and simple referring terms contribute to

### A set of puzzles about names in belief reports

A set of puzzles about names in belief reports Line Mikkelsen Spring 2003 1 Introduction In this paper I discuss a set of puzzles arising from belief reports containing proper names. In section 2 I present

### Discovering Identity

Discovering Identity Let a and b stand for different but codesignative proper names. It then seems clear that the propositions expressed by a=a and a=b differ in cognitive value. For example, if a stands

### 1 What is conceptual analysis and what is the problem?

1 What is conceptual analysis and what is the problem? 1.1 What is conceptual analysis? In this book, I am going to defend the viability of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method. It therefore seems

### A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports. Stephen Schiffer New York University

A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports Stephen Schiffer New York University The direct-reference theory of belief reports to which I allude is the one held by such theorists as Nathan

### Kripke s revenge. Appeared in Philosophical Studies 128 (2006),

Appeared in Philosophical Studies 128 (2006), 669-682. Kripke s revenge Millianism says that the semantic content of a name (or indexical) is simply its referent. This thesis arises within a general, powerful

### Contextual two-dimensionalism

Contextual two-dimensionalism phil 93507 Jeff Speaks November 30, 2009 1 Two two-dimensionalist system of The Conscious Mind.............. 1 1.1 Primary and secondary intensions...................... 2

### Propositions as Cognitive Acts Scott Soames. sentence, or the content of a representational mental state, involves knowing which

Propositions as Cognitive Acts Scott Soames My topic is the concept of information needed in the study of language and mind. It is widely acknowledged that knowing the meaning of an ordinary declarative

### PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE REPORTS

6.7 PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE REPORTS David Shier Propositional attitudes are cognitive states such as believing, desiring, doubting, and hoping. Propositional attitude reports (or ascriptions) i.e., sentences

### Russellianism and Explanation. David Braun. University of Rochester

Forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001) Russellianism and Explanation David Braun University of Rochester Russellianism is a semantic theory that entails that sentences (1) and (2) express

### Conference on the Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, PUCRS, Porto Alegre (Brazil), June

2 Reply to Comesaña* Réplica a Comesaña Carl Ginet** 1. In the Sentence-Relativity section of his comments, Comesaña discusses my attempt (in the Relativity to Sentences section of my paper) to convince

### Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori

Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori PHIL 83104 November 2, 2011 Both Boghossian and Harman address themselves to the question of whether our a priori knowledge can be explained in

### The Two Indexical Uses Theory of Proper Names and Frege's Puzzle

City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Graduate Student Publications and Research CUNY Academic Works 2015 The Two Indexical Uses Theory of Proper Names and Frege's Puzzle Daniel S. Shabasson

### (2480 words) 1. Introduction

DYNAMIC MODALITY IN A POSSIBLE WORLDS FRAMEWORK (2480 words) 1. Introduction Abilities no doubt have a modal nature, but how to spell out this modal nature is up to debate. In this essay, one approach

### Predict the Behavior. Leonardo Caffo. Propositional Attitudes and Philosophy of Action. University of Milan - Department of Philosophy

Predict the Behavior Propositional Attitudes and Philosophy of Action Leonardo Caffo University of Milan - Department of Philosophy Personal Adress: Via Conte Rosso, 19 Milan, Italy. Postal Code 20134.

### 15. Russell on definite descriptions

15. Russell on definite descriptions Martín Abreu Zavaleta July 30, 2015 Russell was another top logician and philosopher of his time. Like Frege, Russell got interested in denotational expressions as

### Propositions as Cognitive Acts Scott Soames Draft March 1, My theory of propositions starts from two premises: (i) agents represent things as

Propositions as Cognitive Acts Scott Soames Draft March 1, 2014 My theory of propositions starts from two premises: (i) agents represent things as being certain ways when they perceive, visualize, imagine,

### Comments on Carl Ginet s

3 Comments on Carl Ginet s Self-Evidence Juan Comesaña* There is much in Ginet s paper to admire. In particular, it is the clearest exposition that I know of a view of the a priori based on the idea that

### Predict the Behavior. Propositional Attitudes and Philosophy of Action

Predict the Behavior. Propositional Attitudes and Philosophy of Action Leonardo Caffo Dialettica e filosofia - ISSN 1974-417X [online] Copyright www.dialetticaefilosofia.it 2011 Questa opera è pubblicata

### Understanding Truth Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002

1 Symposium on Understanding Truth By Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002 2 Precis of Understanding Truth Scott Soames Understanding Truth aims to illuminate

### Lecture 3. I argued in the previous lecture for a relationist solution to Frege's puzzle, one which

1 Lecture 3 I argued in the previous lecture for a relationist solution to Frege's puzzle, one which posits a semantic difference between the pairs of names 'Cicero', 'Cicero' and 'Cicero', 'Tully' even

### Frode Bjørdal ON BELIEFS. 1. Introduction

Frode Bjørdal ON BELIEFS 1. Introduction In order to include tacit beliefs in the analysis of belief contexts we need to think of beliefs in dispositional terms. I suggest that we think of a belief in

### Truth At a World for Modal Propositions

Truth At a World for Modal Propositions 1 Introduction Existentialism is a thesis that concerns the ontological status of individual essences and singular propositions. Let us define an individual essence

### Draft January 19, 2010 Draft January 19, True at. Scott Soames School of Philosophy USC. To Appear In a Symposium on

Draft January 19, 2010 Draft January 19, 2010 True at By Scott Soames School of Philosophy USC To Appear In a Symposium on Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne Relativism and Monadic Truth In Analysis Reviews

### Informative Identities in the Begriffsschrift and On Sense and Reference

Informative Identities in the Begriffsschrift and On Sense and Reference This paper is about the relationship between Frege s discussions of informative identity statements in the Begriffsschrift and On

### Scott Soames: Understanding Truth

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXV, No. 2, September 2002 Scott Soames: Understanding Truth MAlTHEW MCGRATH Texas A & M University Scott Soames has written a valuable book. It is unmatched

### The Objects of Belief and Credence

Forthcoming in Mind, perhaps with a reply from David Chalmers The Objects of Belief and Credence DAVID BRAUN University at Buffalo dbraun2@buffalo.edu Abstract: David Chalmers (2011) uses Bayesian theories

### Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account

Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account David J. Chalmers 1 Introduction When I say Hesperus is Phosphorus, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say Joan believes that Hesperus

### Reflexivity NATHAN SALMON*

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic Volume 27, Number 3, July 1986 401 Reflexivity NATHAN SALMON* In [38], Mark Richard formulated a new and interesting problem for theories of direct reference with regard

### Propositions as Cambridge properties

Propositions as Cambridge properties Jeff Speaks July 25, 2018 1 Propositions as Cambridge properties................... 1 2 How well do properties fit the theoretical role of propositions?..... 4 2.1

### Foundations of Logic, Language, and Mathematics

Chapter 1 Foundations of Logic, Language, and Mathematics l. Overview 2. The Language of Logic and Mathematics 3. Sense, Reference, Compositionality, and Hierarchy 4. Frege s Logic 5. Frege s Philosophy

### Direct and Indirect Belief

Trinity University Digital Commons @ Trinity Philosophy Faculty Research Philosophy Department 1992 Direct and Indirect Belief Curtis Brown Trinity University, cbrown@trinity.edu Follow this and additional

### Propositions as Cognitive Acts Scott Soames. declarative sentence, or the content of a representational mental state,

Propositions as Cognitive Acts Scott Soames My topic is the concept of information needed in the study of language and mind. It is widely acknowledged that knowing the meaning of an ordinary declarative

### The normativity of content and the Frege point

The normativity of content and the Frege point Jeff Speaks March 26, 2008 In Assertion, Peter Geach wrote: A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition

### Propositions as Cognitive Event Types

Propositions as Cognitive Event Types By Scott Soames USC School of Philosophy Chapter 6 New Thinking about Propositions By Jeff King, Scott Soames, Jeff Speaks Oxford University Press 1 Propositions as

### Two-dimensional semantics and the nesting problem

Two-dimensional semantics and the nesting problem David J. Chalmers and Brian Rabern July 2, 2013 1 Introduction Graeme Forbes (2011) raises some problems for two-dimensional semantic theories. The problems

### PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS & THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS & THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE Now, it is a defect of [natural] languages that expressions are possible within them, which, in their grammatical form, seemingly determined to designate

### Foreknowledge, evil, and compatibility arguments

Foreknowledge, evil, and compatibility arguments Jeff Speaks January 25, 2011 1 Warfield s argument for compatibilism................................ 1 2 Why the argument fails to show that free will and

### Keeping track of individuals

Keeping track of individuals Brandom s analysis of Kripke s puzzle and the content of belief* Carlo Penco University of Genoa, Italy This paper gives attention to a special point in Brandom s Making it

### Empty Names and Two-Valued Positive Free Logic

Empty Names and Two-Valued Positive Free Logic 1 Introduction Zahra Ahmadianhosseini In order to tackle the problem of handling empty names in logic, Andrew Bacon (2013) takes on an approach based on positive

### Leibniz, Principles, and Truth 1

Leibniz, Principles, and Truth 1 Leibniz was a man of principles. 2 Throughout his writings, one finds repeated assertions that his view is developed according to certain fundamental principles. Attempting

### The Metaphysics of Propositions. In preparing to give a theory of what meanings are, David Lewis [1970] famously wrote:

The Metaphysics of Propositions In preparing to give a theory of what meanings are, David Lewis [1970] famously wrote: In order to say what a meaning is, we must first ask what a meaning does, and then

### Relative Thoughts. Dr. Sanna Hirvonen Junior visiting fellow, Universita Degli Studi di Milano

Relative Thoughts Dr. Sanna Hirvonen Junior visiting fellow, Universita Degli Studi di Milano hirvonen.philosophy@gmail.com 1 Course schedule Lecture 1, Mon 16 th Oct, 10-12am: Propositions as contents

### On possibly nonexistent propositions

On possibly nonexistent propositions Jeff Speaks January 25, 2011 abstract. Alvin Plantinga gave a reductio of the conjunction of the following three theses: Existentialism (the view that, e.g., the proposition

### Singular Propositions and Singular Thoughts

114 Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic Volume 39, Number 1, Winter 1998 Singular Propositions and Singular Thoughts ARTHUR SULLIVAN Abstract The core of the debate between Fregeans and Russellians in the

### SALMON TRAPPING. Takashi Yagisawa. [Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57.2 (1997), ] I. Introduction

SALMON TRAPPING Takashi Yagisawa [Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57.2 (1997), 351-370] I. Introduction Let us call a sentential context semantically transparent if and only if all synonymous

### Presupposition and Rules for Anaphora

Presupposition and Rules for Anaphora Yong-Kwon Jung Contents 1. Introduction 2. Kinds of Presuppositions 3. Presupposition and Anaphora 4. Rules for Presuppositional Anaphora 5. Conclusion 1. Introduction

### Varieties of Apriority

S E V E N T H E X C U R S U S Varieties of Apriority T he notions of a priori knowledge and justification play a central role in this work. There are many ways in which one can understand the a priori,

### On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXV No. 3, November 2012 Ó 2012 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions

### COMPOSITIONALITY AND BELIEVING THAT

Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations Vol. 15, 2016, pp. 60 76, ISSN 1841-2394 COMPOSITIONALITY AND BELIEVING THAT TONY CHENG h.cheng.12@ucl.ac.uk University College London ABSTRACT. This paper is

### Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible *

Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible * Received: 10.01.2013 Final version: 17.02.2013 BIBLID [0495-4548 (2013) 28: 78; pp. 407-420] DOI: 10.1387/theoria.7102 ABSTRACT: I review but don t endorse

### Response. Paul Johnson University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Response Paul Johnson University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Miller has offered us a solution to what we may agree, on the authority of Kripke himself, is a deep and genuine conceptual conundrum arising

### Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement Imogen Dickie and Gurpreet Rattan, University of Toronto

Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement Imogen Dickie and Gurpreet Rattan, University of Toronto This paper is about the relation between a singular term s cognitive significance and the requirements

### Horwich and the Liar

Horwich and the Liar Sergi Oms Sardans Logos, University of Barcelona 1 Horwich defends an epistemic account of vagueness according to which vague predicates have sharp boundaries which we are not capable

### Why the Traditional Conceptions of Propositions can t be Correct

Why the Traditional Conceptions of Propositions can t be Correct By Scott Soames USC School of Philosophy Chapter 3 New Thinking about Propositions By Jeff King, Scott Soames, Jeff Speaks Oxford University

### Can We Think Nonsense? by Christian Michel

Can We Think Nonsense? by Christian Michel 1.Introduction Consider the following sentence The theory of relativity listens to a breakfast. Is this sentence just nonsense or is it meaningful, though maybe

Believing Epistemic Contradictions Bob Beddor & Simon Goldstein Bridges 2 2015 Outline 1 The Puzzle 2 Defending Our Principles 3 Troubles for the Classical Semantics 4 Troubles for Non-Classical Semantics

### Subjective Logic: Logic as Rational Belief Dynamics. Richard Johns Department of Philosophy, UBC

Subjective Logic: Logic as Rational Belief Dynamics Richard Johns Department of Philosophy, UBC johns@interchange.ubc.ca May 8, 2004 What I m calling Subjective Logic is a new approach to logic. Fundamentally

### Language, Meaning, and Information: A Case Study on the Path from Philosophy to Science Scott Soames

Language, Meaning, and Information: A Case Study on the Path from Philosophy to Science Scott Soames Near the beginning of the final lecture of The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, in 1918, Bertrand Russell

### Russell on Denoting. G. J. Mattey. Fall, 2005 / Philosophy 156. The concept any finite number is not odd, nor is it even.

Russell on Denoting G. J. Mattey Fall, 2005 / Philosophy 156 Denoting in The Principles of Mathematics This notion [denoting] lies at the bottom (I think) of all theories of substance, of the subject-predicate

### Class 33 - November 13 Philosophy Friday #6: Quine and Ontological Commitment Fisher 59-69; Quine, On What There Is

Philosophy 240: Symbolic Logic Fall 2009 Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays: 9am - 9:50am Hamilton College Russell Marcus rmarcus1@hamilton.edu I. The riddle of non-being Two basic philosophical questions are:

### Phil 413: Problem set #1

Phil 413: Problem set #1 For problems (1) (4b), if the sentence is as it stands false or senseless, change it to a true sentence by supplying quotes and/or corner quotes, or explain why no such alteration

### Conceivability and Possibility Studies in Frege and Kripke. M.A. Thesis Proposal. Department of Philosophy, CSULB. 25 May 2006

1 Conceivability and Possibility Studies in Frege and Kripke M.A. Thesis Proposal Department of Philosophy, CSULB 25 May 2006 Thesis Committee: Max Rosenkrantz (chair) Bill Johnson Wayne Wright 2 In my

### Narrow Content and Utterance Meaning

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY Narrow Content and Utterance Meaning Undergraduate Honors Thesis Spring 2018 By: Irina Bigoulaeva Faculty Advisor: Dr. John Biro Table of Contents I. Introduction

### What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames

What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames The Frege-Russell analysis of quantification was a fundamental advance in semantics and philosophical logic. Abstracting away from details

### Lecture 4. Before beginning the present lecture, I should give the solution to the homework problem

1 Lecture 4 Before beginning the present lecture, I should give the solution to the homework problem posed in the last lecture: how, within the framework of coordinated content, might we define the notion

### A Liar Paradox. Richard G. Heck, Jr. Brown University

A Liar Paradox Richard G. Heck, Jr. Brown University It is widely supposed nowadays that, whatever the right theory of truth may be, it needs to satisfy a principle sometimes known as transparency : Any

### Russell: On Denoting

Russell: On Denoting DENOTING PHRASES Russell includes all kinds of quantified subject phrases ( a man, every man, some man etc.) but his main interest is in definite descriptions: the present King of

### Epistemic Modals Seth Yalcin

Epistemic Modals Seth Yalcin Epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore s paradox. I set out the puzzling phenomena, explain why a standard relational semantics

### russell s theory of propositions

russell s theory of propositions Propositions are mind- and languageindependent complexes made up of entities and universals. They play the following roles: (a)they are the things that are either true

### INTERPRETATION AND FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: DAVIDSON ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE. David Beisecker University of Nevada, Las Vegas

INTERPRETATION AND FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: DAVIDSON ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE David Beisecker University of Nevada, Las Vegas It is a curious feature of our linguistic and epistemic practices that assertions about

### The free will defense

The free will defense Last time we began discussing the central argument against the existence of God, which I presented as the following reductio ad absurdum of the proposition that God exists: 1. God

### Glossary of Terms Jim Pryor Princeton University 2/11/03

Glossary of Terms Jim Pryor Princeton University 2/11/03 Beliefs, Thoughts When I talk about a belief or a thought, I am talking about a mental event, or sometimes about a type of mental event. There are

### THE FREGE-GEACH PROBLEM AND KALDERON S MORAL FICTIONALISM. Matti Eklund Cornell University

THE FREGE-GEACH PROBLEM AND KALDERON S MORAL FICTIONALISM Matti Eklund Cornell University [me72@cornell.edu] Penultimate draft. Final version forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly I. INTRODUCTION In his

### Interpretation: Keeping in Touch with Reality. Gilead Bar-Elli. 1. In a narrow sense a theory of meaning (for a language) is basically a Tarski-like

Interpretation: Keeping in Touch with Reality Gilead Bar-Elli Davidson upheld the following central theses: 1. In a narrow sense a theory of meaning (for a language) is basically a Tarski-like theory of

### Class #7 - Russell s Description Theory

Philosophy 308: The Language Revolution Fall 2014 Hamilton College Russell Marcus Class #7 - Russell s Description Theory I. Russell and Frege Bertrand Russell s Descriptions is a chapter from his Introduction

### THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND ITS SEMANTIC PREMISE

Diametros nr 29 (wrzesień 2011): 80-92 THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND ITS SEMANTIC PREMISE Karol Polcyn 1. PRELIMINARIES Chalmers articulates his argument in terms of two-dimensional

### Now consider a verb - like is pretty. Does this also stand for something?

Kripkenstein The rule-following paradox is a paradox about how it is possible for us to mean anything by the words of our language. More precisely, it is an argument which seems to show that it is impossible

### 17. Tying it up: thoughts and intentionality

17. Tying it up: thoughts and intentionality Martín Abreu Zavaleta June 23, 2014 1 Frege on thoughts Frege is concerned with separating logic from psychology. In addressing such separations, he coins a

### Facts and Free Logic. R. M. Sainsbury

R. M. Sainsbury 119 Facts are structures which are the case, and they are what true sentences affirm. It is a fact that Fido barks. It is easy to list some of its components, Fido and the property of barking.

### Facts and Free Logic R. M. Sainsbury

Facts and Free Logic R. M. Sainsbury Facts are structures which are the case, and they are what true sentences affirm. It is a fact that Fido barks. It is easy to list some of its components, Fido and

### Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction

Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction Kent State University BIBLID [0873-626X (2014) 39; pp. 139-145] Abstract The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account

### On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View

On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View University of Sydney BIBLID [0873-626X (2016) 43; pp. 269-293] Abstract This paper is about the meaning and function of identity statements involving

### The problem of evil & the free will defense

The problem of evil & the free will defense Our topic today is the argument from evil against the existence of God, and some replies to that argument. But before starting on that discussion, I d like to

Chadwick Prize Winner: Christian Michel THE LIAR PARADOX OUTSIDE-IN To classify sentences like This proposition is false as having no truth value or as nonpropositions is generally considered as being

### Against Sainsbury and Tye s Originalism

Against Sainsbury and Tye s Originalism A Critical Investigation of an Originalist Theory of Concepts and Thoughts Sara Kasin Vikesdal Thesis presented for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY Supervised